
Daily Press Briefing
Philip T. Reeker, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
December 30, 2002
INDEX:
IRAQ | |
16 | US Providing Additional Intelligence to Inspectors |
18 | List of Scientists Provided by Iraqis |
18-19 | UN Security Council Passage of Res. 1454 Revising Goods Review List |
TRANSCRIPT:
(...)
QUESTION: Yes, I want to go on a tangent, if I may. Does the North Korea case have any ramifications for the current US policy on Iraq?
MR. REEKER: I don't think so. They are two different cases. The Secretary was asked this a couple of times yesterday. They are very different situations, and the diplomacy and the methods of dealing with different situations are, by that very nature, different. So I don't -- I fail to see any implication there other than --
QUESTION: And in terms of resorting to the Security Council as an avenue for dealing with the North Korea case, members of the Security Council who are against using force against Iraq will argue, and have argued, indeed, like the Russians and the French, that that is the way to deal with both cases -- at the Security Council.
MR. REEKER: Well, again, I don't -- I guess I don't understand what your question is. We are dealing with this diplomatically with both cases, diplomatically through the use of international organizations, through the structures that we have in place, these multilateral structures. That's what we're doing. The IAEA, perhaps the United Nations, which will have interest in this. Clearly, the UN will be interested in this. As I said to your colleague, the IAEA is a UN agency.
So both situations are one where we've gone to the international community as a whole, worked with friends and allies to focus on how to deal with problems that are presented by, in these cases, two different nations. But each case has a different context. Each case involves different histories, different players, and you can't just take a cookie-cutter approach to the diplomacy or the how to deal with them. And the Secretary went through that in several of the interviews he did yesterday.
(...)
QUESTION: Concerning Iraq again --
MR. REEKER: Does this have to do with North Korea?
QUESTION: Some of it.
MR. REEKER: Mezzo-mezzo. (Laughter.) All right, Aliyev*. I will give you the benefit of the doubt.
QUESTION: You have a softer stance with North Korea and we think you have a tough one with Iraq. Then the United States announced several times that it had evidence that Iraq has weapons of mass destructions, and the inspectors' chief asked several times the US to reveal this evidence. Why do not the administration reveal this?
MR. REEKER: We are giving intelligence to the inspection team. The Secretary talked about that yesterday. In fact, we talked some time ago following the Iraqi declaration that we found certainly insufficient, that we would begin providing additional intelligence to the inspectors and that is taking place. That is happening, and the Secretary said that yesterday. I'm not going to go into details about that intelligence. I think UNMOVIC, Dr. Blix's organization, has put into place ways to protect intelligence sources and methods and that's enabled us to obviously work with them and other countries, as well, in sharing that intelligence.
We have also provided a significant amount of information publicly over a long period of time, as have the British and others, and we are always considering when we're in a position to provide more information. But we are providing intelligence to the inspectors and supporting them, as we promised to do, in every way we can.
(...)
QUESTION: Can I go to Iraq real quickly?
MR. REEKER: Okay.
QUESTION: I've been gone, so I don't know if you talked about this before.
MR. REEKER: That's a dangerous intro.
QUESTION: But I think relatively recently -- have you talked about the Iraqi list of scientists that they've handed over?
MR. REEKER: A little bit last week, that was provided to the United Nations.
QUESTION: All right, then I won't ask about that.
MR. REEKER: Yeah. We didn't say anything, because it's -- (laughter).
QUESTION: Another list?
MR. REEKER: Another list.
QUESTION: I presume that you guys, your people up at the UN, have already talked about the Goods Review List being adopted, but I'm wondering if you have anything additional to say.
MR. REEKER: Making a list and checking it twice. You know that that resolution was just passed. 1454 is the number of that resolution which revises the Goods Review List. The Oil-for-Food program under which that list operates was extended earlier this month, I think around the 1st of December, for six months.
The changes adopted to this latest resolution reflect the Security Council's desire or ideas on how best to ensure the steady flow of purely civilian goods to the people of Iraq under that massive Oil-for-Food program while maintaining the critical controls on items that could be exploited by Saddam Hussein.
And as you know, we had our Under Secretary John Bolton, as well as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense in New York a couple of weeks ago making presentations on that subject to help the Security Council come to this decision. So they worked through those things and the Security Council passed that resolution 13 to 0.
QUESTION: Can you comment on the Russian criticism of the new restrictions on Iraqi imports saying that they would exacerbate the humanitarian situation in Iraq?
MR. REEKER: I don't know if I've seen specific Russian comments. I would note that Russia abstained on this vote from the resolution. So I couldn't try to explain another country's action.
But the changes that this new Goods Review List will bring will require the Sanctions Committee of the United Nations to review medications that might have a military use when the requests are for quantities that are grossly in excess of any civilian requirement. We only oppose allowing the Iraqi military to stockpile quantities of certain medicines that could be used to protect its troops if -- in the event that Iraq launched a chemical and biological warfare.
So neither the Goods Review List itself or these changes that were adopted today in the resolution deny any item to the Iraqi people. The revised list requires the UNMOVIC, as well as IAEA, to refer items that have a military application to the Security Council for review and they do not change the -- I guess as they call it the objective of the UN Security Council Resolution 1409, which actually created the current Goods Review List, to streamline UN oversight of the export to Iraq of purely civilian goods while maintaining the critical control on goods that may have a military use.
QUESTION: Some of the items on the list, like heavy trucks, for example, used to ship food and medicine to civilians, the new restrictions actually include those --
MR. REEKER: I think the determination was that those items could have a very significant military dual use, if you were, and that there are alternative means to ship goods to civilians. Again, this -- the changes do not deny any item to the Iraqi people and, in fact, they keep in the goal of the original Goods Review List resolution that Secretary Powell was very much a part of, and that is to streamline the process, streamline the UN's oversight of the process to make sure there was enhanced international confidence that Saddam Hussein's regime could not use the Oil-for-Food program to get items that would be of use to his war machine, but rather, we could still get important goods, including medicines and other consumer goods, to the Iraqi people.
(...)
QUESTION: And also, the Turkish Government officials including the Prime Minister Gul, they announced that they wait second UN Security Council resolution about Iraq. Then after they will decided on the US requested. Do you planning to apply for the second -- another UN Security Council resolution about Iraq?
MR. REEKER: I think you're just ahead of yourself. We've talked about what we're pursuing with Iraq, watching the inspectors and the inspections process go forward, supporting that effort while we try to look for compliance by Iraq with the UN Security Council Resolution 1441, that is, disarmament as they are required to do, as they have been required to do under some large number of other Security Council resolutions over more than a decade. And so any other, I think, discussions on this point are just hypothetical and I just don't have anything to add to what we've said on this subject before.
(...)
[End]
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