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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

U.S. Department of State


Daily Press Briefing
Richard Boucher, Spokesman
Washington, DC
December 20, 2002

INDEX:


IRAQ

8-10 Analysis of Iraqi Declarations of Weapons of Mass Destruction / Reactions from Secretary Powell, Dr. Blix, and Dr. El Baradei
10 Interview Process with Iraqi Scientists


TRANSCRIPT:

(...)

QUESTION:  On Iraq.  I'm sure you saw Mr. Blix's remarks saying that he really did need more information from the United States and Britain on the evidence they have on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, where they might be hidden.  What is your answer to his remarks?

MR. BOUCHER:  I'm sure you saw the Secretary's remarks yesterday where he said that we will provide the inspectors with every possible assistance and all the support they need to succeed in their crucial mission.  And we are doing that.

QUESTION:  Well, I mean, why don't you give it all at once, instead of in dribs and drabs as it appears they've been getting it so far?

MR. BOUCHER:  We are doing what the Secretary promised we would be doing.

QUESTION:  So why is Mr. Blix complaining, then?

MR. BOUCHER:  Why?  That was yesterday.

QUESTION:  So you've given everything today?

MR. BOUCHER:  We are doing what the Secretary said we were going to do.  He said, he had another statement in here, he said we're prepared to start doing that, sharing more information, and he'll be in contact with them.  And he said we were prepared and now we're doing it.

QUESTION:  Can I speak a little bit more about what the Secretary was saying about interviewing scientists and the need to get them out of the country?  And what about not only their immediate family, but extended family, because the United States has said Iraq has a long history of going after extended families of people that might betray him?

MR. BOUCHER:  There's not much more I could say to help make this process successful.  It's an important authority in the resolution.  It's important to the inspection process.  I think you saw from the comments of Dr. Blix and Dr. El Baradei yesterday that they also understand the importance of interviews with people in circumstances where they feel comfortable in speaking freely.  And so it's something we have been discussing with them and continue to work with them on. 

And that, I'm afraid, is about as far as I can go because to try to define it more would make it, I think, more difficult to accomplish this, rather than less.

QUESTION:  Mr. Boucher, The Mirror had a front page saying a lunatic with weapons of mass destruction, stop him, and a picture of George W. Bush, not Saddam Hussein.  Apparently, around the world people seem to think that this administration has made up its mind what it's going to do, no matter what they find.  Do you need to do a better job of selling -- what -- how do you -- ?

MR. BOUCHER:  I'm happy not to have received my copy today.  I think I wouldn't take one newspaper around the world to be indicative of world opinion.  There are a variety of opinions overseas, some of which are very supportive of the need to disarm Saddam Hussein, some of which recognize quite clearly the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein:  the fact that he produced a report that does not answer the questions the inspectors have; the fact that he produced a report that the inspectors say is deficient, omits much of the information, fails to address programs that were already reported not by US intelligence, but programs reported by the inspectors themselves; and the fact that the inspectors themselves said that there is information, that they have information that contradicts some of the Iraqi assertions. 

So I think those bits of news, the general tenor of what the inspectors said yesterday, may be perhaps as convincing as anything to show that Iraq has not yet 'fessed up and come clean. 

QUESTION:  They seem to --

MR. BOUCHER:  I'll get there, I'll get there. 

The administration is certainly doing a lot so that people understand our policy, reporting out information and facts.  You saw the fact sheet we put out yesterday, so it wasn't just our assertions, but we pointed to many of the specific things that Iraq had failed to address, questions of anthrax and mustard gas shells and missile fuels and things like that. 

And I think as the facts sink in -- and we will do more to publicize the facts -- as Iraq's failure to cooperate is seen more clearly, as the inspections proceed more vigorously, that people will understand whether or not Iraq is cooperating. 

And let's face it.  Iraq's non-cooperation is a fact that has been known from the beginning of this process, even when we went to the United Nations.  And the commitment of the President to work with the United Nations, the commitment of the United States to try to make this UN process work, has been strong and sustained.  And I think that fact will sink in, as well. 

QUESTION:  Are you worried about the world being skeptical -- or portions of the world?

MR. BOUCHER:  I think if you -- I don't have any polls to gage the skepticism, but I would venture a guess that skepticism about Saddam Hussein is probably a lot higher than any skepticism about George Bush.  We are happy to stand by our deeds.  And the fact is, the President brought this to the United Nations, even when Iraq was already in material breach, and has persisted to work with the United Nations to try to make this process work.  If we had wanted a war, there was no reason to do that. 

And the President and the Secretary, as the Secretary said again yesterday, we're doing everything possible to avoid war.  Stepping up the inspections, stepping up the interviews, stepping up the information exchange, stepping up the attention of the Council, stepping up the preparations for whatever might have to happen, stepping up the pressure on Saddam Hussein, is the best way to make the UN process work and to try to avoid war.  And I think it will be obvious that that is what we're doing. 

QUESTION:  Richard, I want to go back to those scientists.  You've obviously been talking about the modalities in quite some detail with the United Nations, so you should have answers to some of these questions.  Do you, for example, envision that these interviews would be only voluntary, or are you proposing some kind of coercive system of interviews?

MR. BOUCHER:  Jonathan, as I pointed out to your colleague, we do have answers and discussions in some detail with the UN weapons inspectors and the other governments involved in crafting the UN resolution.  That doesn't mean I'm in a position to provide them all to you here, and I'm afraid I won't be able to.

(...)

 
[End]


Released on December 20, 2002



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