12 December 2002
U.S. Experts Decry Iraqi Declaration as Nothing New
(Panel discussion at Brookings Institution December 12) (710) By David Anthony Denny Washington File Staff Writer Washington -- U.S. experts on Iraq and weapons of mass destruction expressed skepticism December 12 over Iraq's December 7 declaration to the United Nations on its weapons programs. Briefing at the Brookings Institution in Washington, former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay said that on the basis of the nine-page table of contents of the Iraqi declaration that has been circulated, plus "a few side conversations" with people who are examining the declaration, "[i]t looks very much like it is the same old stuff that we've had before." Kay, Kenneth Pollack and Michael O'Hanlon briefed on Iraq's declaration and the Iraq inspections process at a Brookings panel discussion. Kay is a senior fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies as well as a former chief of the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM), which conducted weapons of mass destruction (WMD) inspections in Iraq from 1991 through 1998. Pollack is director of research at Brookings' Saban Institute for Middle East Policy, a former CIA analyst, and a former National Security Council official. O'Hanlon is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Brookings. Kay said the nuclear section of the new Iraqi declaration in particular "looks identical" to what Iraq declared in 1998. Kay said that in UNSCOM's final report at the end of 1998, "about a dozen" outstanding issues were identified, and the report laid out how the Iraqis could provide the information to satisfy them. "They've done none of that," he said. Pollack reinforced Kay's remarks by saying that "the Iraqis haven't even bothered to address the gaps identified by UNSCOM when they left in 1998." Apparently the Iraqis have no intention of doing so, he added. O'Hanlon said he is "discouraged" that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein has apparently chosen to disclose nothing of his WMD programs in the declaration. O'Hanlon said that throughout the summer he advocated publicly that an aggressive inspection regime could rid Iraq of its WMD without a war, but that a prerequisite would involve extensive disclosure of its programs by Iraq. Now, he said, he is much less confident that war can be avoided. He described the Iraqi declaration as clever, but not smart. Kay, however, noted that Iraq has included some new material on dual-use technologies -- those that have both civilian and military uses. Kay hypothesized that Iraq did so because the regime in Baghdad wants the inspections process to last for "a very long time," in order to "buy time" for U.N. Security Council unity to break down, so that an anti-war movement can build, and so that the cost to the United States of maintaining 150,000 or more troops near Iraq and poised for invasion will mount. All three said the United States could do much more than it has to publicize what it and the United Nations already know about Iraq's WMD programs. "A lot of detail has been forgotten," O'Hanlon said. "I know I have forgotten some of it. U.S. credibility on this issue is still not that high," he said. He added that an abundance of circumstantial evidence is available -- where it is known, for instance, that Iraq purchased a documented quantity of certain products but has only accounted for part of that amount. "I quite agree," Kay said. He noted that German intelligence put out a considerable amount of information on Iraq's nuclear program at the beginning of 2002, but it has been largely ignored. He added that sanitized versions of the stories of dozens of Iraqi defectors who were involved with WMD programs would be very informative. "Would that convince the skeptics? No, but it would still be useful," Kay said. "We're never going to get to a standard that some people would want," Pollack said. Evidence which would stand up in a U.S. court of law is "almost nonexistent," he said, because of the nature of intelligence information. "But there is information which the U.S. could put out which would be really helpful," he said. The Iraqis have said they have not imported anything for any prohibited programs since 1991, Kay said. "There is an abundance of evidence" which contradicts that assertion, and "the administration needs to ...put that information out," Kay said. (The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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