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12 December 2002

For Sake of Iraq Peace, Prepare Military Option, Feith Says

(Undersecretary of Defense Douglas Feith in Rome) (2940)
At a media roundtable in Rome following a conference of Southeast
European Defense Ministers, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy
Douglas Feith said the United States will review "very meticulously"
Iraq's declaration concerning its weapons of mass destruction and that
the review "will probably take weeks."
"We intend to consult with other countries that have intelligence and
insights into the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction programs, and
consult with the countries on the United Nations Security Council and
other countries and develop as broad a base as possible, and as solid
a base as possible, for whatever conclusions we are going to come to
about the truthfulness of that Iraqi declaration," Feith said December
11.
He told a media roundtable that his discussions with Italian Defense
Minister Antonio Martino and other government focused on Iraq and that
"we talked about the building of a coalition for possible military
action in Iraq."
The U.S. view "is that the only chance that exists to avoid war is if
the Iraqi government understands that there is a solid coalition that
is ready to disarm Iraq by force, if the Iraqi government does not
disarm itself cooperatively with the UN," Feith said. "It is our hope
that we can avoid war.. The building of a coalition in advance, and
preparing a military option, is the best way, we believe, of
minimizing the chances that any kind of military action would be
required."
Feith said he also discussed Afghanistan with Italian officials,
expressing "once again, the gratification of the United States that we
are working so well with the Italian Government, that the Italian
Government has been providing important support to Operation Enduring
Freedom, with the promise of the deployment of the Alpini battalion in
March, with the contributions that Italy has made to the International
Security Assistance Force."
During the defense ministers' conference, Feith gave a briefing on the
war on terrorism, coalition operations in Afghanistan, and Iraq. The
main issue at the conference, however, was getting the formation of a
peacekeeping brigade "moving forward, in the hope that it can deploy
and do some missions probably in connection with NATO and probably in
the Balkans sometime next year," he said.
Feith also responded to questions regarding Turkey, coalition
building, Yemen, and the new UN inspection regime in Iraq being
implemented by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
Following is the Defense Department transcript of the roundtable:
(begin transcript)
U.S. Department of Defense
News Briefing
UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DOUGLAS J. FEITH
Wednesday, Dec. 11, 2002
(Media Roundtable at the U.S. Embassy Rome)
FEITH: Good afternoon. It's nice to have a chance to meet with you. I
saw and chatted with some of you a few weeks ago.
I've just completed participation in the conference of the Southeast
European Defense Ministers and we met pretty much all day today. The
event began last evening. We had discussions of the issues relating
specifically to this Southeast Europe Defense Ministerials
organization, in particular, the issue of getting the brigade that is
going to be doing peacekeeping work moving forward, in the hope that
it can deploy and do some missions probably in connection with NATO
and probably in the Balkans sometime next year.
At the conference, we were given the opportunity to provide a briefing
on the war on terrorism, and in it we discussed the operations that
the coalition forces have been engaged in Afghanistan. We discussed
the danger in particular of the overlap of the countries that are
supporting terrorism, and those countries that have dangerous and
irresponsible regimes that are pursuing weapons of mass destruction
and the overlap of those two lists represents a significant strategic
danger. The danger comes together in an especially acute form in the
regime in Iraq, and we discussed that issue, and I explained that the
U.S. position regarding the recent declaration about weapons of mass
destruction that Iraq has given to United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) at the United Nations
is going to be studied very carefully.
The United States expects to spend a significant period of time
reviewing, very meticulously, this Iraqi declaration. We do not think
that we are going to have any kind of definitive conclusions about it
in a matter of days, it will probably take weeks. We intend to review
the declaration carefully, using all of the sources of intelligence
that we have. We intend to consult with other countries that have
intelligence and insights into the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction
programs, and consult with the countries on the United Nations
Security Council and other countries and develop as broad a base as
possible, and as solid a base as possible, for whatever conclusions we
are going to come to about the truthfulness of that Iraqi declaration.
I also had the opportunity to consult bilaterally with a number of the
defense ministers at the conference, and I am sure that of particular
interest to this group is the fact that I was able to have very useful
meetings with the Italian Defense Minister Martino and with officials
in the Prime Minister's office and in the Foreign Ministry. In those
meetings, we talked about this issue of Iraq and the recent Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction declaration.
We talked about the building of a coalition for possible military
action in Iraq. Our view is that the only chance that exists to avoid
war is if the Iraqi government understands that there is a solid
coalition that is ready to disarm Iraq by force, if the Iraqi
government does not disarm itself cooperatively with the UN. It is our
hope that we can avoid war. It is our hope that the Iraqi government
will come to the conclusion that it has no option, no realistic
option, other than cooperating with disarmament. The building of a
coalition in advance, and preparing a military option, is the best
way, we believe, of minimizing the chances that any kind of military
action would be required.
It is also the case that, if military action is required, the stronger
the coalition that can be put together, the faster any military action
could be done, and one would expect the lower the cost for everybody
involved, and so it is highly desirable to have a broad base of
support for our diplomacy and for military action, if it's required.
We also discussed Afghanistan and I expressed, once again, the
gratification of the United States that we are working so well with
the Italian Government, that the Italian Government has been providing
important support to Operation Enduring Freedom, with the promise of
the deployment of the Alpini battalion in March, with the
contributions that Italy has made to the International Security
Assistance Force, and we are pleased with that cooperation. We think
it is important for the reconstruction of Afghanistan, and ensuring
that Afghanistan does not, in the future, revert to serving as a base
of operations for terrorism.
With that, I will be happy to take your questions.
QUESTION: You said you had some bilaterals, Mr. Undersecretary. Did
you meet with any of the Turkish officials, and if so, has any
progress been made in trying to get assurances from Turkey that their
bases could be used, which would be essential for any action against
Iraq?
FEITH: I did have a chance to talk to the Turkish Defense Minister. I
think it was yesterday if the time change hasn't thrown me off. I
think it was yesterday that President Bush met with Mr. Erdogan in
Washington. And there have been important talks there on the issue of
Turkish cooperation on bringing the kind of coalition together that
could induce Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the disarmament.
Q: But nothing specific out of your talks with the Turkish Defense
Minister yesterday, no progress in getting any firmer assurances that
they will allow use of their bases? ...
FEITH: I would describe any meeting that produces better mutual
understanding as progress. And I think we had a good meeting and ideas
were exchanged, thoughts were exchanged and that's inherently
progressive.
Q: Mr. Secretary, could you elaborate on the potential members of this
coalition?
FEITH: There are a number of countries cooperating with the US on the
war on terrorism. And as US officials have explained since the Sept.
11 attack, we have a policy in discussing the coalition, and that
policy is we let each country that is contributing decide for itself
how it wants to characterize its contributions to the coalition
effort. There are countries that are contributing militarily, there
are others that are contributing intelligence, there are others that
are participating through their law enforcement efforts, there are
others that are participating by clamping down on the financial flows
to terrorist organizations, and we let each country decide how it
wants to explain its own role in the war on terrorism. So I'm not
going to get into more detail than that.
Q: What kind of help could Italy provide in a war against Iraq? Did
Martino tell you something about this?
FEITH: As I said in line with the answer to the previous question
that's a question that should be addressed to the government of Italy.
Q: Do you have any reason to believe that the ship that was
intercepted by the Spanish was not headed for Iraq?
FEITH: I have been on the road the last two days or so, and I don't
have the latest information of what we know about where that ship was
headed. It's possible that you're more current than I am at this
minute. I haven't a chance to connect back to the Pentagon since I
finished my meetings today.
Q: But if you had to think of three countries in that region where
Scud missiles would be headed ...
FEITH: I would not say that I have any information to rule it out, but
I don't have any information at all, so it's not very useful, sorry.
Q: You mentioned the importance of a broad base of support. Often
government coalitions aren't backed by popular support. Does this
concern you and your department, especially given the rise of
anti-Americanism?
FEITH: We understand the importance of explaining our views, making
our case to publics. Our closest allies and friends around the world
are democracies and democratic governments are good to deal with and
difficult to deal with because they're democratic and they have to
answer to their people. And it complicates life in all kinds of ways
when you have to deal with the public, but it makes policy better, and
it makes your friendships truer, and recognizing that we think is
helpful when we're working with our democratic friends to present the
kind of explanations and evidence that allow them to persuade their
publics that if they're cooperating with us, it is in the common
interests of the two countries. And so I think your question is very
well taken, it's an extremely important point, and I think we have it
at the fore of our mind.
Q: You said before that the US has come to the meetings for the last
few days with the notion that the best way to prevent a war, prevent
an armed aggression on Iraq is to build a coalition and to be
prepared. If I'm not misunderstanding, if Saddam Hussein believes that
if he doesn't cooperate then there will be an armed intervention, this
will lead him to cooperate?
FEITh:  That's pretty much the logic.
Q: Have you found that the other defense ministers with whom you've
been meeting from the other coalition countries share that point of
view?
FEITH: I'm loath to talk for the other defense ministers. I think if
you want to ask what their views are it's best to ask them directly.
What I would say is that I had a very respectful hearing when I
presented that as our view, and I was pleased with the opportunity, I
was pleased that the communiqué that was agreed by all of the defense
ministers at the SEDM meeting today gave a strong endorsement of the
demand that Iraq comply with its obligations to disarm under the new
UN Security Council resolution 1441 and the previous resolutions that
it built on.
I think there is a common understanding of the very serious danger
represented by the Iraqi regime, given its history of using weapons of
mass destruction against its neighbors, against the Iranians, against
its own Kurdish citizens, its history of aggression not only against
Iran, but against Kuwait and against Saudi Arabia and against Israel.
I think that there is an understanding that the time has come for the
Iraqi regime to cooperatively comply with its international
obligations, or to be compelled to do so.
Q: You said it might take weeks before the report is sorted through,
translated, analyzed, backed up by other intelligence, etc. You're
trying to gain momentum now, but this could stretch out to weeks,
maybe go back to diplomacy and getting perhaps another resolution. It
could be perhaps months. Do you think this momentum for this
understanding, that this is the only way to go against an aggressor
nation like Iraq, can stand the test of time, can it last for a couple
of months, until Spring?
FEITH: If I understood your question, it assumed that there was going
to be an analysis followed by diplomacy. What I was suggesting is that
diplomacy is going to be part of the analytical process. We are going
to be doing our own analysis, and we're going to be doing it together
with other countries that have information about Iraq, other countries
that can help us understand the declaration as best as possible. So
the diplomatic effort, the professional exchanges with diplomats and
with intelligence people, is part of our analytic process that's going
to be occurring over the next several weeks. And we think that the
world expects a careful analysis, rather than any hasty judgment, and
that's what we intend to provide.
Q: Russia today stressed that although different copies of the
documents have been distributed to Security Council members, finally
it's only the inspectors that should decide or point out violations
from the Iraqi side. Do you agree?
FEITH: That's not consistent with the UN Security Council resolution
1441. 1441 makes it clear that it's the Security Council that decides
whether Iraq is complying not the inspectors.
Q: Yes, but who should point out eventual violations or whatever,
should refer to the Security Council, should be only the inspectors or
eventually also...
FEITH: The UNMOVIC people can be one source of information, and one of
the few really promising possibilities from UNMOVIC's work would be if
UNMOVIC would, for example, find Iraqi engineers and scientists who
are involved in Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program, and get
them out of the country under circumstances where they're not subject
to intimidation by the Saddam Hussein regime, and question them about
what they know about the Iraqi WMD programs and the nature of their
stockpiles, of their facilities, the locations and the like. And that
would be a particularly useful function that UNMOVIC could perform.
It's worth pointing out that there is a very common misconception
about inspections. UMOVIC does not have the capability to uncover WMD
in Iraq that the Iraqi government is trying to conceal. That is not,
in our view, what UNMOVIC can be expected to achieve. What UNMOVIC
could be expected to achieve is to monitor Iraqi disarmament done
cooperatively by the Iraqi government, if the Iraqi government
concludes that it must cooperate in its own disarmament. Then UNMOVIC
could be there, it could watch the disarmament, it could monitor it,
and it could certify to the world that it's happening.
But if the Iraqi government is going to continue its denial and
deception policy, and is going to continue to work to conceal what it
possesses in the way of WMD, then it is unrealistic to suppose that
inspectors are going to be able to uncover what is hidden. Iraq is too
big a country, it is too easy for a tyrannical government of that of
Saddam Hussein, which controls the country and maintains secrets and
has all kinds of facilities that it has built underground and that can
be concealed. It is too easy for the Iraqi government to hide what it
has, and it is unrealistic to expect that UNMOVIC in the absence of
extraordinary good luck could find what the Iraqi government intends
to conceal.
And so it's very important to be clear on what UNMOVIC can accomplish
and what it can't accomplish. Now one thing, as I said, it can
accomplish would be to talk to people who know about the Iraqi
program, and can reveal the secrets, and Iraq is under an obligation
to make those people available for interviews outside the country.
That's what UN Resolution 1441 says. And in the past when UNSCOM, the
previous inspection regime, was inspecting Iraq, much, most of the
good information that UNSCOM obtained about Iraq's WMD programs it got
not from inspections, but from defectors. And it's clear that the key
to finding out what Iraq has is having the people with the knowledge
in Iraq, the Iraqis who are involved in these programs, come forward
and say what they know, and that is a much more effective way to find
out what is going on in the country in this field, than playing
hide-and-seek, cat and mouse games, with an Iraqi regime that's intent
on defeating the purpose of the inspections.
Thank you.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)