Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=11/21/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01230

TITLE=A COALITION AGAINST IRAQ?

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: Is the world united against weapons of mass destruction in Iraq? Next, On the Line.

[music]

Host: U-N weapons inspectors have arrived in Baghdad to prepare their search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Saddam Hussein's regime continues to insist that it has no such weapons. Hans Blix, chief U-N weapons inspector, had this to say upon his arrival in Iraq:

[Video package]

Hans Blix

"We have come here for one single reason, and that is because the world wants to have assurances that there are no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. The situation is tense at the moment, but there is a new opportunity. And we are here to provide inspection which is credible. Inspection that is credible is the only thing that is in the interests of Iraq and in the interests of the world, and we are trying to do so."

Host: The U-N Security Council unanimously passed resolution one-four-four-one, demanding inspections after President George W. Bush urged the world body to enforce a raft of previous security council resolutions. Has the U-S managed to build a coalition willing to use military force if Saddam Hussein violates the U-N resolutions? I'll ask my guests: Danielle Pletka, vice president of foreign and defense policy at the American Enterprise Institute; John Barry, national security correspondent at Newsweek Magazine; and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Washington bureau chief of Die Zeit, a weekly newspaper. Welcome and thanks for joining us today. Danielle Pletka, the Security Council arrived at a unanimous resolution. Does that mean that there's a consensus on how to deal with Saddam Hussein?

Pletka: Well, I think the consensus in the Security Council was, Eric, that if they didn't have a resolution the United States was going to go in and remove Saddam from power and so they'd better have a resolution to stop us. I think that's about as far as the consensus has gone. We're going to see that agreement break down very, very soon when we are confronted by Saddam not allowing inspectors in, not fully disclosing what he needs to disclose in terms of his weapons of mass destruction and component parts. I think we're going to see some trouble very, very soon.

Host: John Barry, is this a consensus on how to deal with the United States more than it is a consensus on how to deal with Iraq?

Barry: Yes, I think so, probably. I think it's clear that if the U-S had not said essentially either you come with us or we'll go alone, I think it's clear the U-N Security Council would not have voted unanimously. Having said that, it seems to me that I'm slightly more optimistic that a fragile consensus can be maintained in the Security Council. I think it does depend how -- let's assume that Saddam is going to stiff the U-N, it's a reasonable assumption. I think it depends how flagrantly he's going to do it and how good the U-S evidence is going to be that he's lying. I think if the evidence is marginal, I don't think the U-S will carry a majority of the Security Council with it. But if the evidence is clear cut -- somebody said referring to the Cuban Missile crisis, what we need is an Adlai Stevenson moment. You remember in the Cuban Missile crisis back in 1962, Stevenson produced what were then the crown jewels of U-S intelligence, which were aerial reconnaissance photographs to demonstrate there were indeed missiles in Cuba which the Soviets were denying. If the U-S can produce something as dramatic as that to the Security Council to prove Saddam is lying, then I think they would probably get a consensus to take military action. But absent that definite proof, I suspect Danielle is right that the consensus will break down.

Host: Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, a definite proof, will that keep a consensus together?

Kleine-Brockhoff: That's the thing. I very much agree with John, because at this point the strategy, as both of my colleagues have said, has been basically a double containment. One is directed at Saddam and the other is directed at the United States -- not to go it alone. And the minute there is an excuse to go to war, there will be no coalition. And the minute there is proof there will be a pretty large coalition.

Pletka: Just hang on a second there. I mean, no proof is going to be good enough. This is the program we're going to confront. You know we see this right now with North Korea. We went to North Korea. Our diplomats had a meeting with the North Korean diplomats. They told them we have a nuclear program and we have a nuclear weapon. We came out, we said they told us and people said you must have misunderstood. Then the North Koreans themselves said we have a nuclear program and we have a nuclear weapon and everybody said hmmm. And then the North Koreans said oh, we didn't say that. You misunderstood. This is the problem, you know. If you don't want to go to war with Iraq, no proof is going to be good enough other than Saddam Hussein standing in front of a camera with a nuclear weapon or a missile or a chemical or biological weapon. We're not going to get those kinds of pictures. There's always disagreement about intelligence. There's always disagreement about the quality of the photographs or the sources. The problem will be, at that point, it will be a matter of judgment. And our judgment and the judgment of the British will differ from those of the rest of the members of the Security Council.

Host: Do you agree that it will be a judgement call?

Barry: I don't know because I don't know what the evidence is going to be. I know that the U-S intelligence community is worried that doesn't have conclusive proof. I mean, both the American government and the British government produced assessments based upon the best intelligence they had. And the assessments were full of "mights" and "maybes" and the "some evidence of" and so on. It wasn't conclusive. And one of the things that worries people in the intelligence community is that while we do have a list of sites which we would like to visit, some of these sites are existing sites which were weapons of mass destruction research or production facilities before the Gulf War, where there are new buildings going up. So we'd like to look at those buildings. But the truth is it's extremely unlikely that Saddam has been so stupid as to actually restart programs in exactly the same places. So, those buildings are probably empty. But then we have a list of sites given to us by supposed Iraqi defectors and everyone is really very worried that if we go and look at those sites, the defectors will prove, as defectors very often do, to be lying their heads off, and we'll look like idiots if we go and look in those places. If at the end of, let's say, two months, Hans Blix comes back and says I've looked in all the places you've told me and there's absolutely nothing there, then we're going to have a big problem.

Host: Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, Kofi Annan said: "The U-S does seem to have a lower threshold than others may have for justifying military action. . I think the discussion in the council made it clear we should be looking for something serious and meaningful and not for excuses to do something." How universal is that opinion at the U-N?

Kleine-Brockhoff: I would think he's represented what most members are thinking, that there are some hawks in this town that like to go to war anyway. But I can think, I'd be more optimistic than you are, because I believe Saddam will give more than enough reasons to do that. It can be very easy. It doesn't need to be an inspection site. It can be his denial to go to one. It can be his denial to meet the timelines. All of those things are a breach of the resolution and that will trigger the whole thing.

Host: Let's talk about that a little bit. Saddam Hussein, under resolution one-four-four-one, is obliged to come up with a statement that lays out whatever program he has in weapons of mass destruction. And to date, Iraq continues to claim that there are no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever. If Saddam Hussein comes forward with a document saying "We have no weapons of mass destruction whatsoever," is that going to be a test of the U-N will to look at that which most people will agree is on its face is a false document and act on that?

Kleine-Brockhoff: Well, Hans Blix will have to go and see. And I will sure hope that he will go to those places first that the English and American evidence points to so that he himself has a chance to meet the timeline that there is. And then we'll go and see.

Host: Danielle Pletka, what do you think happens when Saddam Hussein brings forward his statement of what Iraq does and does not have.

Pletka: Well, it's a little bit more complex than him just revealing his weapons of mass destruction. This is part of the problem. What he needs to reveal on December 8th, and I think December 8th is a very important date, that will be his first big test. What he needs to reveal is not only his prohibited weapons of mass destruction, chemical, nuclear, biological and missiles. He also needs to reveal all of his component parts and technology for such weapons, even if they are not actually destined for those programs. In other words, things like chlorine gas, that Saddam has been procuring for years on end through the United Nations, I would add, which is an integral component in making chemical weapons, are also an integral component in water purification. We're going to need him to disclose where all of that went -- something we have absolutely no idea about. So, he has a disclosure to make -- that's clear. The problem is the formulation that we're all discussing. This is his last chance to disclose everything. This isn't about Hans Blix going and knocking on doors and saying, "Excuse me, do you have a chemical weapon here?" It's about a full and complete disclosure and the onus is entirely on Saddam. So anything at all is a violation. Any lack of full disclosure is a complete and total violation. It is material breach and material breach is the term of art, the legal language that authorizes an attack on Iraq. And that's important to us.

Kleine-Brockhoff: But then you're going to have to come back and show some evidence that he's lying and as soon as you can do that, that will be -- I mean, all of this is about credibility. All of this is about the building of legitimacy of the use of force in the world community. That is what this whole operation is all about. As long as you can show that, there will be a coalition. But there is a murky area.

Pletka: I don't agree. I don't agree with you.

Barry: I think.

Host: John Barry?

Barry: The administration, this administration, the White House, very much hopes that it doesn't come down to arguments about this bit of the declaration or that bit of the declaration. I mean, what the White House wants Blix to do, or wants [Mohamed] El Baradei to do, of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who's looking at the nuclear weapons part, they want them to mount such intrusive inspections from the word "go" that he's really going into some of the most sensitive places Saddam Hussein has, first of all his palaces, but secondly, the offices and headquarters of his innermost bodyguards and so on, because they want to test -- as officials put it to one -- whether or not Saddam has had a genuine change of heart. Their expectation, by the way, is that Saddam will slam the doors and say "no," and that it's that obstruction which they will then take to the Security Council and that will be the trigger for war rather than the technical arcana of this declaration or that declaration.

Host: Let me ask you about Mohamed El Baradei who is the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, who will be leading the look for nuclear weapons this year. When he arrived in Baghdad, he said, "We hope to be able to carry out our work as soon as possible. This is essential to beginning the process of improving relations between Iraq and the United Nations in order to lift the sanctions and thus reach positive results which will have positive repercussions for peace in the Middle East." Now, does that suggest to you that he's looking to be as aggressive as possible in knocking down doors?

Barry: I truly don't think you can read anything into that other than that he's decided not to actually spit in Saddam's face when he lands at Baghdad airport. That just seems to me to be diplomatic sashaying. [Other unintelligible comment.] But, I don't really expect him to get off the plane and gnash his teeth and say, "We're here to get this one." Of course not. So I don't read anything into that.

Pletka: As long as he in fact intends to go in there and get this one. And that's the troubling thing. If he follows in the great tradition of Hans Blix and the I-A-E-A, he won't be getting anybody.

Barry: I think that's actually very unfair on Hans Blix. I mean, the truth of the matter is that it is quite accurate that in the 1980s the I-A-E-A, of which Hans Blix was the director general, did not find the hidden programs in Iraq. The reason is very simple, which is that in those days the mandate of the I-A-E-A was only to look at declared facilities. After 1991, the I-A-E-A got the mandate to look at all facilities in Iraq and indeed all facilities around the world undeclared or otherwise as a result of the Iraq experience. And then in the '90s the I-A-E-A did very well. I actually don't think you can call Hans Blix a wimp on the basis of what happened in the 1980s, to be candid.

Pletka: Well.

Host: Let's talk a little bit about what happens after another month or two and whether the U-S will be able to lead a coalition against Iraq, should the U-S believe that there's been a violation of the U-N resolution. President George W. Bush, interviewed in the Washington Post, recently said "We're never going to get people all in agreement about force and the use of force, but action, confident action that will yield positive results provides a kind of slip stream into which reluctant nations and leaders can get behind." Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, do you think that if the U-S makes it clear that it has the resolve to move against Iraq that there will be a large number of reluctant nations that will fall behind into that slip stream?

Kleine-Brockhoff: It all depends under what condition. Now the condition is the Security Council resolution which was passed fifteen and zero. So, once this can be, the evidence is quite clear, there will be a coalition that is quite right, but this quote that you just read was made, I believe earlier than that, back in August. So that suggests American unilateral action, if that shows to be successful, then other nations will fall in line. I'd be skeptical about that, because that's what all the eight weeks of the Security Council were all about, about the legitimacy to use force.

Host: Danielle Pletka, what do you think?

Pletka: I think this kind of tea leaf reading is very difficult. What did he mean in August versus what did he mean in November is immaterial. The point is that no matter what happens, the United States is going to end up doing what the United States feels is in its national security [interest]. Will other countries follow along? As we learned at the Security Council, I think, and as Bush has learned in both international and domestic policy, when you push forward on a point and you are unyielding on that point, people will eventually fall in behind you. Do you need to make compromises along the way? Yes, possibly. But if you are resolute towards your end, in fact, you will find that people fall in more easily than if you are willing at the outset to make compromises. This is, you know, this is how we went down this road with the Security Council and I think ultimately, if we need to go to war with Iraq, that is how we will go. We will make a decision and then we will seek to persuade others once that decision is made. It will not be made in concert with others because otherwise we won't do anything. That's eleven years of history.

Host: John Barry?

Barry: I agree with Danielle, at least in a large part.

Pletka: Yay. [laughs]

Barry: But it seems to me clear that the U-S is not actually going to take a case to the Security Council in public unless it has previously taken that case in private to some of the other key members of the Security Council and have got their agreement that this is worth discussing. This is going to be behind closed doors with what comes out in the open. And at this point, what matters is one of the things we don't know, which is: before the resolution was passed in the Security Council, there were private conversations between President Bush and President Jacques Chirac and President Vladimir Putin and, obviously, Prime Minister Tony Blair. And one is told that reassurances were exchanged between the various leaders as to the seriousness of their purpose and pledges were given in exchange. Now we don't know what those pledges were and we don't know how those pledges would stand up under the stress of actually having to make a decision to go to war. But I think there is more consensus among the permanent five, well, four of the perm five. I exempt China from that, because they're absorbed with their own leadership elections and selection and so on. But among four of the perm five, it seems to me there is more private understanding between the leaders than we know about in public. At least that's my understanding.

Host: Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, do you agree that there's more agreement there?

Kleine-Brockhoff: Well, we've had eight weeks of negotiations. They've had more than enough time to discuss the ifs and whens and I'm sure they've done that, because once they've come to the conclusion to go down this road, it's going to be this path to either have inspections or have war. But there's one thing that troubles me a little, Danielle. The U-S can't have it both ways. It can have it unilaterally. It's as you said, if the U-S decides to go it alone, it will be and it may be. But it can't go down the U-N route and then be impatient about the results as some in town are suggesting at this time.

Host: Would it be however, if it became clear in some way that there were those at the U-N that were hoping to just bog down the U-S. At what point does the U-S say, well, this is bogging us down?

Kleine-Brockhoff: I don't think there would be bogging down because the fact of the matter is Hans Blix is there. It's Saddam's case now. It's in his hands and I believe we will see several occasions on where we will shake our hands on how this Iraqi government acts. And there will be lots of occasions. The question, rather, is along the lines that John has mentioned of how much of an agreement and how will that stand up in the occasion we're seeing that might be murky. And here's the real case. Here's the real case and how do you judge on this or that that we'll see on the ground?

Host: Danielle Pletka?

Pletka: I must say, this is rather beautiful optimism and utterly unrealistic and un-backed-up by empirical proof over almost twelve years. Now we saw Iraq importing aluminum tubing that was either going to be used in nuclear weapons production or in missile development, but not in anything else, illegally, outside the U-N program, and it didn't cause anybody to do anything. I don't know what makes people think that the members of the Security Council have suddenly changed their stripes. If we set up a standard that requires court of law type proof in order for us to go into Iraq, we will never go in, never. Because we haven't up to now, and the proof isn't going to get better than what we've had over the last eleven years. And I'd like to leave you with just one interesting question: If having weapons of mass destruction isn't enough, is slamming the door in the face of a U-N inspector really going to have the moral gravity in order to get us into Iraq? It's a very difficult question to answer.

Host: John Barry, will slamming the door in a weapons inspector's face have enough to energize the U-N if that were to happen?

Barry: Once, no. Three times, yes, I should say.

Host: Quick question for those countries who are not on the Security Council. How is Germany responding to this and what's the current temperature in Germany, if you will, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff?

Kleine-Brockhoff: There's been a lot of talk amongst Washington conservatives that the U-S is in the U-N trap. Well, I don't believe so. I believe there's one country that is in the U-N trap, that is where Gerhard Schroeder has taken us. [laughter] Because there is a fifteen zero vote in the Security Council, Syria agreeing to it. The one country that would not have been agreeing to it is my country. Now, tell me why? Gerhard Schroeder will tell you. He had to win an election. Now he's in a terrible situation. He has no room for diplomacy, zero at all. Basically, Germany is in a box here. So how do they get out of it? They haven't shown a sign of getting out of that box. The one thing they won't do, of course, is send troops to a coalition. They will acquiesce to whatever will happen there, but the one thing they won't do is join a fighting coalition. However, what they have done is, they've now taken up the lead roll in Afghanistan and there will be other commitments, also military commitments in the Balkans to sort of beef up the security situation.

Host: I'm afraid that's going to have to be the last word for today. I'd like to thank my guests, Danielle Pletka of the American Enterprise Institute, John Barry of Newsweek Magazine, and Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff of Die Zeit newspaper. Before we go, I'd like to invite our audience to send us your questions or comments. You can e-mail them to ontheline [one word] at I-b-b-dot-g-o-v. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.