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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

14 November 2002

ElBaradei Lays Out Prerequisites for Success of Iraq Weapons Inspections

(Says Blix and he will travel to Baghdad Nov 18 to launch process)
(4100)
In a speech to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in
Washington November 14, the director of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), Mohamed ElBaradei, laid out five prerequisites
for the success of the next round of weapons inspections in Iraq that
are scheduled to get underway November 18:
-- immediate and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq,
and full use of all the authority granted to inspectors by the
Security Council -- including the additional authority provided in the
new resolution;
-- ready access to all sources of information -- including timely
intelligence information;
-- unified and unequivocal support from the Security Council, with the
affirmed resolve to act promptly in case of non-compliance, as the
best support that inspectors could have and the best deterrence
against non-compliance;
-- active co-operation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of
its stated willingness to be transparent and to enable inspectors to
fulfill their mission without any conditions attached;
-- the preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the
inspection process, free from outside interference, to ensure that
conclusions are accepted as objective and credible by all parties.
On the last point, ElBaradei stated that efforts by national
governments to infiltrate the inspection process are ultimately
counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of the very
fabric of the process, let alone its credibility.
The IAEA director and Hans Blix, the chief of the U.N. Weapons
Inspectors, will lead an advance team of inspectors to Baghdad
November 18 to begin the next round of inspections.
"I would hope and trust that, empowered with the appropriate authority
and provided with the necessary information, inspectors should be able
to verify effectively the disarmament of Iraq," ElBaradei said.
He said inspections were the key in the long term to "ensuring that
clandestine efforts to develop nuclear weapons -- in Iraq or elsewhere
-- are detected and thwarted,"
With regard to North Korea's nuclear weapons program, ElBaradei said
the IAEA has urged North Korea to confirm reports that it is pursuing
a program to produce high enriched uranium and enter into discussions
about coming into compliance with its non-proliferation obligations.
"We have yet to receive a response," he said.
ElBaradei said progress in non-proliferation slowed in the 1990's
after the end of the Cold War. He attributed the slowdown to the
"continuing reliance on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the
lack of an overall disarmament strategy."
ElBaradei said that in order for the collective security system as
prescribed in the United Nations Charter in 1945 to function, the
concepts of threats to international peace and security have to be
redefined.
Such threats "relate to the lack of good governance and the usurpation
of people's sovereignty, to the desperate need for economic and social
development, and to the denial of human rights," ElBaradei said.
Following is a transcript of ElBaradei's speech:
(begin text)
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:
REVISITING THE BASICS
Carnegie International Non-Proliferation Conference 2002
Washington, DC
14 November 2002
Mohamed ElBaradei
International Atomic Energy Agency
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION:
REVISITING THE BASICS
In little more than half a century, the age of nuclear weapons has
witnessed the manufacture of more than 125 000 nuclear warheads --
most packing a greater explosive force than the "Little Man" device
used at Hiroshima. Nuclear weapons testing has resulted in over 2000
nuclear detonations -- in the atmosphere, in space, underwater and
underground. Despite the ending of the Cold War, non-proliferation and
disarmament challenges abound in all categories of "weapons of mass
destruction" nuclear, biological and chemical -- and one enduring
legacy of the Cold War is a glut of weapon-usable fissile material, in
the form of high enriched uranium and plutonium. And while we have not
reached the predictions of the 1960s -- of an eventual 15 to 20
nuclear-weapon States - the unfortunate reality 40 years later is that
at least eight countries are believed to possess nuclear weapons, and
the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world remains elusive.
The 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT),
with 188 States party, represents the cornerstone of the global
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament effort -- and despite recent
challenges, it has never been more relevant than it is today. But if
we are to move forward, I believe it is essential that we revisit a
number of the basic assumptions and features of the existing regime,
and consider a number of new approaches.
ADDRESSING THE ASYMMETRY OF "HAVE'S AND HAVE-NOT'S"
A key assumption at the core of the NPT was that the asymmetry between
nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would gradually
disappear. Different interrelated commitments were undertaken by two
distinct groups of States: for the five nuclear-weapon States -- that
is, States that had manufactured and detonated a nuclear weapon before
1 January 1967 -- a commitment to divest themselves of those weapons
through "good faith" negotiations; and for all other States, a
commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to accept IAEA
verification of all their peaceful nuclear activities, in return for
access to peaceful nuclear technology.
But the record on upholding those commitments is mixed. Global access
to the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology -- related to energy
generation, human health, water management, food production, and
environmental restoration -- has indeed made significant progress,
through the technology transfer efforts of the IAEA and others. And
the nuclear nonproliferation regime has overall been successful -- but
with some shortcomings which I will address later. Progress has also
been made on the nuclear disarmament front, but much more remains to
be done.
Nuclear disarmament strategies have for the most part focused on the
negotiation of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements between the
holders of the two largest nuclear arsenals, and a few multilateral
agreements designed to curb the quantitative and qualitative
development of nuclear weapons. With the end of the Cold War as an
impetus, some progress was made in the early- and mid-1990s, but the
process unfortunately slowed in the latter part of the decade. While
the START I Treaty, which entered into force in 1994, made significant
cuts in the level of deployed strategic weapons, START II, signed in
1993, has been abandoned. Efforts to end nuclear weapons development
achieved an important milestone with the conclusion of the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, but
the pace of progress has been sluggish among the 44 countries whose
ratification is required for the treaty to enter into force -- and the
rejection of the CTBT by the US Senate in 1999 was a distinct setback.
Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) continues to
languish in Geneva, more than seven years after agreement was reached
on a mandate.
These problems can be traced in general to the continuing reliance on
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the lack of an overall
disarmament strategy. In some cases -- for example, the CTBT and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention -- progress has faltered in
part because of perceived doubts about the credibility of the
respective verification regimes. These regressions have led to
stagnation in the disarmament process and have put a damper on hopes
for further progress.
The 2000 NPT Review Conference, building on the package of decisions
and resolutions that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT in
1995, resulted in a number of encouraging commitments, not least the
"unequivocal undertaking" by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. But a scant two years
later, we have moved sharply away from those commitments, with a
number of the '13 steps' toward nuclear disarmament -- such as
'irreversibility,' 'START II, START III and the ABM Treaty,' further
'unilateral' reductions in nuclear arsenals, 'increased transparency,'
'further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons,' and 'regular
reports' on the implementation of Article VI of the NPT -- left
without concrete follow-up actions and in some cases discarded.
This is not to say that there have been no encouraging signs. This
summer, the Russian and US Presidents signed a treaty to further
reduce their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700 and 2200,
respectively, by the end of 2012, and agreed to remove additional
unspecified amounts of fissile material from military use. And at
their June Summit, the G8 Heads of State established a Global
Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction, and made a commitment to raise up to $20 billion over the
next ten years to fund, inter alia, the disposition of excess
weapons-origin fissile materials.
But in every fundamental aspect, the asymmetry remains between what US
President Kennedy referred to as the "have's and have-not's."
Moreover, some nuclear-weapon States have reversed direction, by
stressing the continuing value of nuclear weapons in defense of
national security interests, including discussions of the feasibility
of developing new types of nuclear weapons, and scenarios for the use
of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.
In my view, the longer this asymmetry is perpetuated, the more it will
become a threat to the very foundation of the non-proliferation
regime. As the Canberra Commission stated a few years ago, the present
situation "cannot be sustained, [because] the possession of nuclear
weapons by any State is a constant stimulus to other States to acquire
them." While it may be unrealistic to expect complete nuclear
disarmament in the very near future, it is essential that incremental
steps be taken by all parties, which would signal a willingness to
reduce the volume of and dependence on nuclear weapons, in fulfillment
of existing commitments.
A crucial step in moving towards nuclear disarmament will be to
reexamine the longstanding doctrine of 'nuclear deterrence.' This
doctrine remains deeply entrenched in the national security strategies
of all the nuclear-weapon States, and continues to be relied on by
many non-nuclear-weapon States, through the so-called 'nuclear
umbrella' arrangements, as an important feature of their security
portfolio.
Indeed, irrespective of whatever deterrent effect nuclear weapons
achieved during the Cold War, they are progressively losing their
value as a currency of power -- particularly in preventing local
conflicts and in dealing with threats posed by sub-national terrorist
groups. Given that the only perceived legitimate use of nuclear
weapons is for the ultimate survival of a State, nuclear-weapon States
should at the very least be able to move faster towards bringing their
weapons inventory to a bare minimum.
STRENGTHENING THE VERIFICATION REGIME
The discoveries of a clandestine nuclear weapon programme in Iraq
after the 1991 Gulf War made it painfully clear that the IAEA
verification system, with its focus on declared nuclear activities and
its limited rights of access to information and sites, was not
adequate for the IAEA to provide the comprehensive peaceful use
assurances required under the NPT. This stark realization prompted the
international community to significantly expand the IAEA's
verification rights. These new rights were incorporated into a 1997
protocol additional to safeguards agreements, with a request for all
States to subscribe to it.
For non-nuclear-weapon States with both a safeguards agreement and an
additional protocol in force, the IAEA is now able to provide credible
assurance not only about the diversion of declared nuclear material
but, equally important, about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities. Regrettably, however, many States have not
taken the necessary steps to conclude the required safeguards
agreements with the Agency, let alone the additional protocol: 48
non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT are still without
safeguards agreements, and since 1997, when the Model Additional
Protocol was adopted, only 28 such additional protocols have entered
into force. Clearly, more work needs to be done to ensure that States
take their non-proliferation obligations more seriously; however, I
should note that some non-nuclear-weapon States are hedging on their
willingness to conclude required additional protocols to their
safeguards agreements, by pointing to the lack of progress on nuclear
disarmament. Naturally, without safeguards agreements, the Agency
cannot perform any verification activities or provide any assurance of
nonproliferation. And for States without additional protocols, IAEA
rights of access remain essentially the same as in pre-Iraq days. For
the IAEA to provide the required assurances, it must have the required
authority.
It is clear that the success of the IAEA verification regime will
depend heavily on achieving universal adherence to the required
safeguards agreements and additional protocols by all
non-nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT. The Agency must also have
adequate financial resources; despite our growing responsibilities,
the safeguards budget, as well as the rest of the Agency's budget, for
that matter, has been frozen for over a decade-and-a-half as the
result of a blanket zero real growth policy imposed on all United
Nations system organizations, irrespective of their responsibilities,
priorities or modes of operation. This situation, if continued, will
inevitably undermine the Agency's ability to conduct credible
verification. Fortunately, recently, a number of Member States --
including the USA -- have recognized the importance of increasing IAEA
resources, and are now advocating such an increase.
The IAEA verification regime would also benefit from closer
cooperation with Member States in the area of information sharing.
Irrespective of what information States might hold relevant to
possible non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations, it is only
through the IAEA that such information can be corroborated through
inspection and conclusions drawn. The value of receiving timely
information from States about alleged cases of non-compliance cannot
therefore be overemphasized. I can report that good progress is being
made in developing a modus operandi for the Agency to receive relevant
information in a timely manner; while protecting the confidentiality
of information, on the one hand, and respecting the independence of
the Agency, on the other.
CONSISTENCY IN ADDRESSING NON-COMPLIANCE
The aspect of non-proliferation that receives the most attention
relates to compliance questions -- currently, the situations in Iraq
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
Iraq
In a recent editorial to the Washington Post, I clarified what I see
as the purpose and value of weapons inspections in Iraq. The
inspection activities that came to an abrupt halt in December 1998 had
successfully thwarted Iraq's efforts to develop a nuclear weapons
programme. We had neutralized Iraq's nuclear programme. We had
destroyed, removed, or rendered harmless all its facilities and
equipment relevant to nuclear weapons production -- mostly by the end
of 1992. We had confiscated Iraq's weapon-usable material --
essentially research reactor fuel -- and by February 1994 had
completed its removal from the country. And while we did not claim
that we had absolute certainty, we were confident that we had not
missed any significant component of Iraq's nuclear programme.
In December 1998, the IAEA and UNSCOM inspection activities in Iraq
were brought to a halt, with a military strike imminent. While
satellite monitoring and other analytical work has continued since
that time, no remote analysis can replace inspections, nor can it
enable us to reach conclusions about what has occurred related to
nuclear weapon development in Iraq in the intervening four years. The
only way to establish the facts is through inspection.
With the adoption last Friday of Security Council resolution 1441, we
are now preparing to resume our inspection activities in Iraq as early
as next Monday, when Hans Blix and I are expected to lead an advance
team of inspectors to Baghdad. The success of inspections in Iraq will
in my view depend on five interrelated prerequisites: (1) immediate
and unfettered access to any location or site in Iraq, and full use of
all the authority granted to us by the Security Council -- including
the additional authority provided for in the new resolution; (2) ready
access to all sources of information -- including timely intelligence
information; (3) unified and unequivocal support from the Security
Council, with the affirmed resolve to act promptly in case of
non-compliance -- this, in my view, is the best support that
inspectors could have and the best deterrence against non-compliance;
(4) active co-operation from Iraq, with a sustained demonstration of
its stated willingness to be transparent and to enable inspectors to
fulfil their mission without any conditions attached; and (5) the
preservation of the integrity and impartiality of the inspection
process, free from outside interference, to ensure that conclusions
are accepted as objective and credible by all parties. Efforts by
national governments to infiltrate the inspection process are
ultimately counterproductive, because they lead to the destruction of
the very fabric of the process, let alone its credibility.
I would hope and trust that, empowered with the appropriate authority
and provided with the necessary information, inspectors should be able
to verify effectively the disarmament of Iraq. In my view, the use of
force should clearly be the last resort, and not the first option. But
regardless of how events unfold in the foreseeable future, inspections
will be the key, in the long haul, to ensuring that clandestine
efforts to develop nuclear weapons -- in Iraq or elsewhere -- are
detected and thwarted. There is no certainty, for example, that a new
regime in Iraq, democratic or otherwise, would automatically renounce
unconventional weapons, if such renunciation were perceived to be
inconsistent with its threat perception. It is essential, therefore,
that we make every effort to see to it that inspection -- which is
central to the entire nuclear arms control effort -- succeeds both in
Iraq and everywhere else. This requires that we continue to learn from
our past experience, that we refine the system, and above all that we
continue to work together towards that goal.
DPRK
The DPRK acceded to the NPT in December 1985, but its safeguards
agreement did not enter into force until April 1992, six years after
its NPT accession. Shortly afterward, in 1993, the DPRK was declared
by both the IAEA and the Security Council to be in non-compliance with
its safeguards agreement. This is because the Agency has not been
provided with the necessary access to information and locations to be
able to verify that the DPRK has made a complete and correct
declaration of its nuclear material that is subject to Agency
safeguards.
Our estimation is that the work required to verify the correctness and
completeness of the DPRK's initial declaration could take up to three
to four years, assuming full cooperation by the DPRK. In addition to
being a basic obligation under the DPRK's safeguards agreement, this
verification work is a prerequisite for the delivery of key nuclear
components under the Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK --
delivery that could begin as soon as mid-2005. I have therefore
continued to urge the DPRK to agree to the initiation of this
verification process.
Recent information has suggested that, during the past few years, the
DPRK has been working, in addition, on a programme to produce high
enriched uranium. We have asked the DPRK to confirm these reports, and
offered to discuss at a senior level these and all other issues
relevant to their coming into compliance with their non-proliferation
obligations, which require that all nuclear material in the country be
declared and be subject to IAEA safeguards. We have yet to receive a
response.
As you are aware, comparisons continue to be made between the
different approaches adopted with respect to Iraq and the DPRK -- two
countries in violation of their non-proliferation obligations. Various
explanations have been advanced for these differences in approach.
Obviously, the two situations differ and are highly complex, and it is
understandable that incentives and disincentives -- "the carrot and
the stick" -- have to be used with differing emphases. However, I
believe that while differing circumstances may necessitate asymmetric
responses, in the case of non-compliance with non-proliferation
obligations, for the credibility of the regime, the approach in all
cases should be one and the same: zero tolerance.
CONSOLIDATION OF THE REGIME
In parallel with the above, we should continue to explore pragmatic
ways to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. A case in point is
the approach to the three remaining countries outside the
non-proliferation regime. In my view, we should not continue to treat
these States only as 'outsiders', but rather induce them to act as
partners in the global effort to consolidate the non-proliferation
regime and to make progress in nuclear disarmament.
A good example lies in the area of export controls. Both India and
Pakistan continue to operate some nuclear reactors and related
facilities that are subject to IAEA safeguards, yet -- due to export
controls -- neither country is able to secure much-needed nuclear
safety equipment and technology. Rather than focusing exclusively on a
policy of denial, we must search for opportunities for engagement,
through, inter al" the application not only of sanctions but also of
incentives. For example, in exchange for receiving nuclear safety
assistance -- an exception foreseen under the guidelines of the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) -- such States might commit themselves
to follow the NSG guidelines and to actively support the CTBT and
FMCT.
WORKING ON NEW APPROACHES TO SECURITY
My final theme relates to the fundamental issue of security. To
understand how to move forward, I believe we must examine not only the
symptoms but also the underlying causes -- the 'drivers' and
motivations that give rise to nuclear proliferation. Why, for example,
is the Middle East an area of recurring proliferation activity, as
opposed to, say, Scandinavia? Clearly, it is the situation of enduring
conflict and tension that creates this potential. The same might be
said of South Asia, another 'hot-bed' of proliferation concern.
In some regions, basic security concerns have been largely resolved --
through the 'nuclear umbrella' arrangements to which I referred
earlier and through regional arrangements and accommodations. And
thus, in regions where security concerns have been addressed, there is
little or no 'demand' for weapons of mass destruction. But it should
come as no surprise that regions facing a security deficit and
unresolved conflict are also the regions with a continuing 'demand'.
In each of these problematic regions, the conflicts and proliferation
concerns have been around for some time -- in some cases sheltered or
ignored. In such a regional context, the possession by one country of
weapons of mass destruction provides a clear stimulus for their
acquisition by others. Thus, for each of these regions, discussions of
regional security cannot be de-linked from the settlement of regional
disputes and must be addressed in parallel, in a comprehensive manner
that takes into account the security concerns of all. A perfect
security for one party may be a perfect insecurity for another.
One strategy currently emerging involves greater reliance on regional
systems of security, like the one that has been developed in Europe.
How effective these systems will be remains to be seen. However, in my
view, the feasibility of moving forward -- not only on proliferation
concerns but also towards meaningful cuts in current nuclear arsenals
-- depends critically on our ability to develop credible alternative
security strategies, strategies that do not include nuclear deterrence
as a feature, strategies that are functional and upon which all States
can rely with confidence.
To this end, there is an urgent need to re-energize the collective
security system of 1945, as prescribed in the United Nations Charter,
through a broader definition of the concept of threats to
international peace and security, to encompass not only military
threats but also threats that relate to the lack of good governance
and the usurpation of people's sovereignty, to the desperate need for
economic and social development, and to the denial of human rights.
Equally important, there is an urgent need for Security Council reform
to better reflect the changing realities of recent decades, and to
enable the Council, through clearly defined 'rules of engagement,' not
only to respond but also to prevent threats to international peace and
security. Areas of reform could include: a functioning mechanism for
the settlement of disputes -- including as appropriate the resort to
international adjudication and arbitration; a smart system of
sanctions for dealing with non-compliance, adaptable to different
regimes and different situations; readily available and better
equipped UN forces to contain and manage incipient disputes; and
agreed limitations on the use of the veto power.
CONCLUSION
Notwithstanding the challenges I have outlined today, I continue to
believe strongly in the contributions that the multilateral treaty
regimes make in preventing further proliferation and use of weapons of
mass destruction. It is worth recalling the words of General Omar
Bradley, spoken virtually half a century ago: "We've unlocked the
mysteries of the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the
Mount. We know more about war than we know about peace." I trust that
we will all continue to work together to prove that we have learned
some lessons since General Bradley spoke those words.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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