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30 October 2002

Wolfowitz: Peaceful Disarmament of Iraq Requires Credible Threat of Force

(Deputy Defense Secretary's Oct. 28 speech) (3140)
Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says the debate in the United
States over Iraq's weapons of mass destruction "is not between those
who desire peace and those who desire war. The issue is how best to
achieve a peaceful outcome."
"Our only hope . of achieving the peaceful disarmament of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction is by having a credible threat of force
behind our diplomacy. To be effective, the two must be part of a
single policy," Wolfowitz said in remarks prepared for delivery at a
meeting of the defense industry-related Association of Old Crows (AOC)
October 28.
Wolfowitz said that Saddam Hussein's "stubborn defiance" of U.N.
Security Council resolutions over the past 11 years provides a clear
indication that simply passing another resolution will not be
sufficient. Hussein's compliance would come about "only . if he
believes that doing so is necessary for his personal survival and for
the survival of his regime," he said.
In his speech, Wolfowitz deals with current arguments being made
against taking any action against the Iraqi regime. To those who
assert that moving against Iraq would distract the United States in
its global war against terrorism, he quotes Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld that "Iraq is part of the global war on terror -- stopping
terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is a key
objective of that war." He further quotes Rumsfeld that "we can fight
all elements of this war simultaneously," and adds that "we must do so
. with every available resource . of national power."
As for the argument that dealing with Iraq should wait until the
threat is imminent, Wolfowitz replies that it "assumes that we will
know when it is imminent. That was not even true in 1962, with the
very obvious threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba."
To those who say that Hussein is most likely to use his weapons of
mass destruction if his survival is threatened, Wolfowitz acknowledges
the risk but notes the "dubious assumptions" underlying the idea of
containing Hussein indefinitely without confronting him. First, "we do
not understand the way his mind works and he is a risk-taker who has
frequently taken actions that put his regime in grave danger," he
said.
"The most dangerous assumption of all," Wolfowitz said, "is that
Saddam [Hussein] would not use terrorists as an instrument of
revenge." What we know of Hussein "suggests . an enormous thirst for
revenge," he said, citing the attempt to assassinate former President
Bush "at the very moment when there was a brand-new administration
here in Washington and a president who openly signaled his desire to
come to peaceful terms with the Iraqi regime."
As to whether Iraq with Saddam Hussein removed would cause more
instability for the region, Wolfowitz said that he doubts whether rule
by Hussein's sons would be preferable.
"In fact . sooner or later the Middle East and the world will have to
cope with the reality of the demise of this Iraqi regime. And it would
be far better for that admittedly enormous change to take place when
the eyes of the world are upon Iraq, and when the United States and a
strong coalition are committed to seeing it through to a successful
conclusion," he said.
Following are excerpts of Wolfowitz's remarks, as prepared for
delivery:
(begin excerpt)
Iraq discussion
. I'd like to look at one issue in our national debate, and share some
thoughts. I'd like to read you a couple of quotes which I think are
important in framing the notion that we face a grim new reality.
One describes the security reality we face. Secretary of State Colin
Powell has said, "Since September 11th, 2001, . the world is a more
dangerous place. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks on that
day, a new reality was born. The world had to recognize," Powell said,
"that the potential connection between terrorists and weapons of mass
destruction moved terrorism to a new level of threat -- a threat that
could not be deterred ... because of this connection between states
developing weapons of mass destruction and terrorist organizations
willing to use them without any compunction and in undeterrable
fashion."
The other quote is from somebody who's been in the news quite a bit
lately, Scott Ritter, who describes part of the horrific reality of
what's inside Iraq. And he does so even though he admits reluctantly
-- in fact, he said he's not going to describe quite how horrible it
is, because, in his words, he's waging peace now. He describes the
prison in Baghdad, whose stench, he said, was "unreal," an amalgam "of
urine, feces, vomit and sweat;" a hellhole where prisoners were
"howling and dying of thirst." In this prison the oldest inmates were
12, the youngest mere toddlers. Their crime was being children of the
regime's political enemies.
It's hard to imagine a more grim symbol of a regime that rules by
terror and that embraces terror as a policy against those who oppose
it, both at home and abroad, than a children's prison. And I think
there are few, if any -- in this country, at least -- who would deny
that the present Iraqi regime is an evil one and a dangerous one. And
it would be difficult to find Americans who would not agree that the
world would be safer and the Iraqi people would be much better off if
that regime no longer ruled.
The real issue we face, though, is how we weigh the risks of using
force, should we have to do so. And that's what I'd like to talk about
briefly now.
The risks are very real. As President Bush has demonstrated over and
over again, he takes those risks extremely seriously, as does everyone
in his administration.
That's why the president has made it clear that he will do everything
possible to achieve a peaceful disarmament of Iraq that resolves this
issue, that resolves this danger to our country and the world, if
possible without the use of force.
So the debate in this country is not between those who desire peace
and those who desire war. The issue is how best to achieve a peaceful
outcome. There is a seeming paradox at work here that takes some
effort to grasp. Our only hope -- our only hope in my view -- of
achieving the peaceful disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction is by having a credible threat of force behind our
diplomacy. To be effective, the two must be part of a single policy.
We know, from 11 years of stubborn defiance of some 16 U.N. Security
Council resolutions, that Saddam Hussein will not easily give up those
horrible weapons that he has worked so hard and paid such a high price
to develop and to retain. No one should be under any illusions that
Saddam Hussein will give up the weapons that he is not supposed to
have simply because the United Nations passes another resolution. He
will only do so if he believes that doing so is necessary for his
personal survival and for the survival of his regime.
Over the last 12 months, President Bush and his advisers have been
weighing very carefully the risks of the various courses of action.
While everything possible is being done to reduce those risks, no one
is discounting them. The fundamental question is how to weigh the
risks of action against the risks of inaction, and to weigh the risks
of acting now against the risks of acting later.
I'd like to address what I think have been some of the most important
questions that have been raised in this debate so far. The debate has
to continue. It's a healthy feature of our democracy. And it's in that
spirit that I want to address these questions. But let me also
emphasize -- it can't be said often enough -- what I said earlier. Our
goal is to avoid the use of force. And the president has not made any
decision to use force, but I think we need to think about what it
would mean if we did.
One of the questions that's been asked frequently, and maybe even more
frequently since the horrendous attacks in Bali, is whether an attack
on Iraq would disrupt or distract the United States from the global
war on terror. The answer to that, I believe, as Secretary Rumsfeld
has said, is that "Iraq is part of the global war on terror --
stopping terrorist regimes from acquiring weapons of mass destruction
is a key objective of that war." And as Secretary Rumsfeld has [also]
said, "we can fight all elements of this war simultaneously." And I
would add, we must do so, and we must do so not only with our military
power but, as the president has said, with every available resource
and with every element of national power.
Indeed, in many fronts of this war on terrorism, the military is a
relatively minor element, and other parts of our government, other
parts of our country, are in the lead.
So this fight is a broad fight. It's a global fight. But Iraq is part
of that fight. If it becomes necessary to use force against Iraq, we
have a military that is strong enough to take on that task.
But the war on terrorism is a global war, and one that must be pursued
everywhere. Indeed, as we look at the problems we face today, be it in
Indonesia, most tragically recently; in the wilds of Pakistan, where
significant numbers and probably significant figures from al-Qaeda are
still hiding; or Yemen, where we see or have evidence of people
plotting dangerous operations; though our tactics differ, in each one
of those cases, our goal is to deny the terrorists sanctuary. It is
impossible to see how a policy of denying terrorists sanctuaries in
those countries could be assisted by a policy that leaves them a
sanctuary in Iraq with one of the most murderous dictators we know. We
cannot continue to allow one of the world's worst dictators to
continue developing the world's worst weapons.
When we got to safe houses in Afghanistan, we discovered documents and
captured terrorists who helped us to break up plots in Southeast Asia
and North Africa and around the globe. When we drove al-Qaeda out of
Afghanistan, out of their sanctuaries, we were able to capture
terrorists like Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi Binalshibh, and not only get
them off the street but get important intelligence from them.
Similar effects can be expected if there is a decent government in
Baghdad that can help us to uncover evidence, to capture terrorists
and to deny them sanctuary.
Some ask, "Why act now? Why not wait until the threat is imminent?" In
some ways, it seems to me, the answer is very simple, and it was
expressed very clearly by [Connecticut Democratic] Senator [Joseph]
Lieberman in the Rose Garden the day the original draft use-of-force
resolution was introduced.
Senator Lieberman said, "I have felt for more than a decade now that
every additional day that Saddam Hussein is in power in Iraq is an
additional day of danger for the Iraqi people, for his neighbors in
the region, particularly for the people and the military of the United
States and, indeed, for the people of the world." And I share that
view strongly.
The notion that we can wait until the threat is imminent assumes that
we will know when it is imminent. That was not even true in 1962, with
the very obvious threat of Soviet missiles in Cuba. As President
Kennedy said at the time, the United States cannot tolerate deliberate
deception and offensive threats on the part of any nation, large or
small. We no longer live in a world," the late president said, "where
only the actual firing of weapons represents a sufficient challenge to
the nation's security to constitute maximum peril."
Some people ask, why run the risk of provoking Saddam Hussein? Doesn't
the only danger that he will use those weapons of mass destruction
come if we threaten his survival? There is no doubt a serious concern
here, and we must certainly plan on the assumption that a moment of
great danger will come if Saddam Hussein believes that his survival is
in peril and that he has little to lose by using his most terrible
weapons. But it's important to recognize how many assumptions -- in my
view, dubious assumptions -- underlie the contention that this is a
danger we can avoid forever if we simply seek to contain the Iraqi
regime indefinitely.
First, it assumes that we understand the way Saddam Hussein's mind
works and that he will always avoid actions that would risk his
survival, and it makes that assumption despite an enormous body of
evidence to the contrary: In fact, we do not understand the way his
mind works and he is a risk-taker who has frequently taken actions
that put his regime in grave danger.
What evidence we do have suggests an enormous appetite, an enormous
thirst for revenge -- a thirst that was signaled in some of the Iraqi
regime's earliest rhetoric, at the end of the Persian Gulf War.
Indeed, the true significance of the attempted assassination of former
President Bush in 1993 is what it tells us about Saddam Hussein's
thirst for revenge. All rational considerations, at least as we would
understand that word, would have argued against taking such a
provocative step at the very moment when there was a brand-new
administration here in Washington and a president who had openly
signaled his desire to come to peaceful terms with the Iraqi regime.
We will probably never know why Saddam Hussein went ahead with that
plot, but we must confront the fact that he did.
But the most dangerous assumption of all is the assumption that Saddam
would not use terrorists as an instrument of revenge. That is the very
danger that Secretary Powell warned about so eloquently in the quote
that I read to you at the beginning: the use of terrorists as an
undeterrable weapon for delivering the most terrible weapons of all.
Finally, and this is the last question I'd like to raise today, many
ask whether Iraq will be even more unstable and dangerous after Saddam
Hussein is gone. Of all the risks involved should it come to the use
of force-and we are looking at many -- the one risk that seems to be
frequently exaggerated is the risk that the removal of the Saddam
Hussein regime would be a cause of instability in the region.
Indeed, the northern part of Iraq has been beyond the reach of Baghdad
for a decade, thanks to the marvelous efforts of our Army and Marines
and Air Force and Operation Provide Comfort -- a rather important
operation to think about, it took place a month after the Gulf War
ended, and its results were quite amazing. As a result, the Iraqis in
the North, predominantly Kurds, but with significant numbers of Arabs
and Turcomans has well, have been beyond the reach of Baghdad for more
than 10 years. And they've been able, in difficult circumstances, to
demonstrate an impressive ability to manage long-standing differences,
and even to develop relatively free and prospering societies. And they
do this, ironically, even though they labor under the very same U.N.
economic sanctions that apply to the rest of Iraq.
Do the pessimists really believe that the only way to preserve what
they call stability in this, one of the most important countries in
the Middle East -- a stability that the once tyrannized Poles used to
call the "stability of the graveyard" -- the only way to preserve that
stability is by preserving indefinitely the rule of a despotic
tyranny? If so -- and I sincerely doubt that many believe that -- then
they would have to explain how this so-called stability is going to be
preserved after the demise of Saddam Hussein. Do they believe that his
sons -- Qusay and Uday -- will successfully carry on his despotism
after him, like the sons of Hafez al-Assad and Kim Il Sung? Hardly
something one would wish for.
In fact, for better or for worse -- and I am convinced it will be for
far, far better -- sooner or later the Middle East and the world will
have to cope with the reality of the demise of this Iraqi regime. And
it would be far better for that admittedly enormous change to take
place when the eyes of the world are upon Iraq, and when the United
States and a strong coalition are committed to seeing it through to a
successful conclusion.
Indeed, I must say that I'm surprised that so many people who know the
Middle East well, people who admire, as I do, the talents of the Arab
people, believe that the demise of this despotic regime would be
harmful to the Arab cause. To the contrary, I believe there is
actually a great opportunity here to liberate one of the most talented
populations in the Arab world and, indeed, to bring back some
significant fraction of those talented Iraqis in exile with positive
effects throughout the Middle East, and indeed, throughout the world's
billion [thousand million] Muslims.
That also constitutes a huge strategic advantage for us should force
ever become necessary. Saddam Hussein rules by fear and only by fear,
and when his people no longer fear him, he will have to fear them.
So let me just conclude by saying that with this regime, this regime
has turned that country, one of the potentially richest countries in
the Middle East, into the most savage kind of prison. But as we've
seen in Afghanistan, when the yoke of terrorism is removed, people use
their new-found freedom to sing, to work, to learn, to build a better
future for themselves and their children. And there's no question that
if it comes to it, that if we can do all of that, with the world's
help, we will have removed yet another haven for terrorists and will
have made a significant step forward in helping the Muslim world to
build a better future.
To those here who help build peace, who help us build, as the
president has said, "a better world beyond the war on terror," a great
mission lies ahead. But we will not be deterred from the truth. And
this truth we know: that the single greatest threat to peace and
freedom in our time is terrorism.
So this truth we must also affirm: that the future does not belong to
the terrorists. The future belongs to all those who dream the oldest
and noblest dream of all -- the dream of peace and freedom.
(end excerpt)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)