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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

10 October 2002

Transcript: Wolfowitz Says Iraqi Nuclear Debate Distracts from Toxin Issue

(Says U.S. military capabilities have increased since Gulf conflict)
(2370)
Deputy U.S. Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz says that the current
focus on Iraq's nuclear weapons capability tends to distract attention
from the fact that Iraq has stockpiled large quantities of anthrax,
botulin toxin and aflatoxin.
During an October 4 interview with the weekly newsmagazine U.S. News
and World Report he was asked why the Bush administration is pressing
for a regime change in Iraq now, and he said: "We don't know when it
will be too late to have dealt with Saddam, and he's dangerous
already. ... The risks of inaction are severe."
Wolfowitz said the United States intends "to go the U.N. route" if
possible on the Iraq situation and noted that President Bush "has not
made a decision to use force." But if it comes to using military
force, he said, "this is going to be a liberation of the Iraqi people,
not a war" against them. "I think there's an opportunity here,
actually, to help liberate what most people say is perhaps the most
talented population in the Arab world, including 4 million very
successful exiles" many of whom would return to Iraq, he said.
Because Saddam Hussein "has shown himself over many years to be a
survivor," Wolfowitz said the Iraqi leader could face the choices
before him and possibly "have an extraordinary change of heart"
regarding his ambitions to have weapons of mass destruction "and we'll
be able to do this without a war."
If there is a war, he emphasized that U.S. military capabilities have
improved vastly since the Persian Gulf war more than a decade ago.
"Our capabilities to detect are better. Our capabilities to attack
targets on the ground quickly are better, and our capability to
intercept missiles, and the Israeli capability to intercept missile
are vastly better," he said.
Following is the transcript of the Wolfowitz interview:
(begin transcript)
U.S. Department of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
October 4, 2002
(Interview with Mark Mazzetti, U.S. News and World Report)
Question: Thank you for taking the time to speak with us. Our piece
we're working on is on the Saddam threat. I was wondering, though, if
I could start with a question that -- from something that came out of
the briefing this morning. [Pentagon spokesman] Torie Clarke mentioned
that you guys have seen some movement of -- in Iraq of trying to
conceal weapons of mass destruction. And I was wondering if you could
maybe provide any detail about that, about what they've been trying to
do, and whether they've been trying to move them into presidential
sites.
Wolfowitz: I'm not sure which details she was talking about. We've
been seeing a lot over the last years and the last months, so, and I
-- the stuff I know is too classified to talk about.
Q: Okay. I mean, I think the indication was that it was since Iraq had
agreed to let inspectors back in. Are you still seeing that type of
concealment?
Wolfowitz: I'm -- I don't know what you're specifically referring to.
I'll try to see if we can get you an answer.
Q: Okay. Thank you. The first question I wanted to ask was on the idea
of the Saddam threat, and this is something that you've obviously
thought about a great deal. And I would like to ask what is it that
makes regime change now so important? Is the most pressing threat the
idea that Saddam could have a nuclear weapon in a small period of
time? Or is it the idea that terrorists could get weapons of mass
destruction and strike at the United States? What, in your mind, is
the greatest threat?
Wolfowitz: Well, let me say first in general terms, the problem here
is that time is not on our side. When people say, "Why now," they
imply that somehow it'll be better later. As I think Senator Lieberman
said, "Every additional day that" -- this is a direct quote -- "Every
additional day that Saddam Hussein is in power in Iraq is an
additional day of danger." And that's absolutely correct. The focus on
nuclear weapons is actually a bit distracting from the fact that he
has large quantities of anthrax and botulin toxin and aflatoxin. When
he declared to the inspectors some time ago that he had, for example,
2,000 plus gallons of concentrated anthrax, UNSCOM inspectors
estimated he had three to four times the amount that were declared,
and no evidence that he destroyed what he claimed to destroy. So
that's a perfect weapon to hand over to a terrorist, and you don't
know when a threat like this will be imminent.
I mean, think about it this way. The pilots who did the World Trade
Center attack and the Pentagon attack were here in the United States
in early 2000, and the entire crew was here by spring of last year. So
if we had gone to war with Afghanistan in June or July of last year,
it would have already been too late to prevent September 11th. We
don't know when it will be too late to have dealt with Saddam, and
he's dangerous already.
Q: Do you think that if we don't act, then he will inevitably not only
get a nuclear weapon, but his weapons will inevitably get in the hands
of terrorists, and who will strike at the United States? I mean, do
you think all of this is inevitable?
Wolfowitz: Does it have to be inevitable to do something about it? I
think it is highly probable and extremely dangerous. And the question
comes, why would we continue to tolerate it, when we've had eleven
years of flouting the United Nations, sixteen different resolutions
that he has defied. And frankly, part of the point here is that we
have an opportunity to deal with this threat like no other because, in
fact, there has been a very clear declaration by the international
community of the requirement that he disarm. All this talk about the,
you know, that we're inventing some new doctrine is total speculation.
With respect to Iraq, there's no new doctrine whatsoever. This is
eleven years of old, and unfortunately, failed policy.
Q: You and [Defense] Secretary Rumsfeld talked a great deal about
weighing the risks of war, and the risk of action versus the risk of
non-action -- or inaction, sorry. And you talk a lot about what the
risks of inaction are, and I was wondering if I could just get you to
talk a little bit about what, in your mind, are some of the risks of
action? What keeps you up at night in terms of things that could go
wrong, or risks that could be borne out if, in fact, regime change by
military force does go into place?
Wolfowitz: Well, first of all, just to frame this clearly, the risks
of inaction are the continuing and growing danger that tens of
thousands, or even hundreds of thousands, of Americans will die in
some catastrophic attack with a biological weapon, or if we wait long
enough, a nuclear weapon. So the risks of inaction are severe. Anytime
you send American troops into combat, you're running a serious risk of
people dying for their country. And I don't believe you should send
American troops to die, except in defense of the country, but that's
one of the major risks. And the other major risk is that we know he
has these weapons, and there is a danger at any point that he may use
them in some terrible way. But our ability to prevent that now, if
there's a military confrontation, is greater than it will be a year
from now, or two years from now, or three years from now. So --
Q:  Sorry.  And that is because?
Wolfowitz: Because our capabilities are great now, and his are more
limited. So it's -- if you're going to act, and I believe we have to
act, the sooner you act, the lower the risks, but one shouldn't
minimize the risk that he will do something terrible with what he's
got. One place where I believe that people seriously exaggerate the
risks, either out of ignorance, or just repeating some of the same
errors that we heard eleven years ago about how the Middle East would
go up in flames if there was a war with Iraq, I believe, frankly, that
the risks of dealing with a post-Saddam Iraq are not only exaggerated,
but are largely misstated.
I think there's an opportunity here, actually, to help liberate what
most people say is perhaps the most talented population in the Arab
world, including 4 million very successful exiles, who, many of whom
would want to go back to Iraq from what is one of the worst tyrannies
in the modern world. And that is a huge strategic advantage on our
side. This, like every other regime that supports terrorism, rules its
people by terror. We saw with the Taliban what a huge weakness that
created for the regime. I think it's an even bigger weakness for the
Iraqi regime. I think there are very few people in Iraq who want to be
the last person to die for Saddam.
Q: And even getting before the post-Saddam -- idea of a post-Saddam
Iraq, I mean, there seems to be concern in the Middle East and
elsewhere that the actual attack itself would create instability, and
the idea that he could use these weapons of mass destruction certainly
against Israel. I mean, is this something that -- as someone who went
to Israel during the Gulf War to urge restraint, how concerned are you
about Israel being brought into this?
Wolfowitz: I'm very concerned that, at any point, that clique in
Baghdad, and it is a very small clique, will do what they can to make
the situation worse. That is one of the real concerns. But I really
believe on this issue about broader instability in the Middle East, I
think when people see huge crowds in Basrah and Kirkuk and Mosul and
Baghdad eventually cheering the arrival of American troops, and
saying, "Why didn't you come sooner," I think the air will go out of a
lot of whatever excitement there may be temporarily.
Q: So the notion of mass unrest in the Arab street you think, once
again, is something that is being overstated right now?
Wolfowitz: It was definitely overstated eleven years ago. As Yogi
Berra says, "It's dangerous to make predictions, especially about the
future."
Q:  Right.
Wolfowitz: But I think to the extent we have insight into what the
conditions are like in that country, there's every reason to believe
that this is going to be a liberation of the Iraqi people, not a war
against the Iraqi people.
Q: Could the -- do you think the Pentagon can do a better job than was
done during the Gulf War of trying to either take out Scuds being
launched, or prohibit Saddam from actually using these WMD -- or the
WMDs that he has? You said this is a concern of yours, but do you
think the capabilities are better?
Wolfowitz: No question the capabilities are better. Our capabilities
to detect are better. Our capabilities to attack targets on the ground
quickly are better, and our capability to intercept missiles, and the
Israeli capability to intercept missiles, are vastly better, but that
may not be good enough to prevent something. I should emphasize -- by
the way, I hope you'll put this primarily in whatever we say -- that
the President has not made a decision to use force --
Q:  Right.
Wolfowitz: -- and in fact, though it may be improbable, Saddam Hussein
has shown himself over many years to be a survivor. And it may be
improbable that he will finally give up his ambitions to have weapons
of mass destruction, but he may be finally confronted with the fact
that this is the only way he can survive. And if he faces that choice
clearly, it's just possible he will have an extraordinary change of
heart, and we'll be able to do this without a war.
Q: And based on your studying of Saddam and your studying of the Iraqi
regime, how would you gauge the probability of that?
Wolfowitz: Based on the fair amount of trying to figure them out, I
wouldn't attempt to predict how they'll behave. That's what makes them
so dangerous.
Q:  Okay.
Staff:  We're about out of time, Mark.
Q:  Okay.  Could I ask one more quick question?
Wolfowitz:  Sure.
Q: And just going back to this threat issue, obviously, there's been a
lot of concern raised among U.S. allies about a possible attack. And
I'm wondering why you think that allies, our allies, seem to gauge the
threat differently than certainly the U.S. and Britain seem to be, who
are obviously most prominent in talking about the Saddam threat. Is it
just a question that they gauge it differently, or that they just
don't have certainly the September 11th experience? What is your
thinking on that?
Wolfowitz: Well, if you go and look at the magazines that were
published in Baghdad on the anniversary of September 11th, including
one that shows the World Trade Center burning and in Arabic says,
"God's Judgment," maybe they don't feel quite as targeted as we do. I
think in the case of some countries, they have been in the business of
courting Baghdad for economic benefits for a long time, and it's a
hard habit to break. And there are some countries that are just
terribly afraid, for good reason, of antagonizing this man. It's --
you don't ask the small shopkeeper to take on the Mafia. You expect
the law enforcement people to do it, and that's -- in this case, it's
the United States.
I do think that you are seeing increasingly, thanks to the President's
speech to the United Nations, a clear demonstration that we intend to
go the U.N. route if it all possible, that even countries like Saudi
Arabia are -- have shifted their position quite significantly in just
the last few weeks.
Q:  Sir, thanks very much for your time.
Wolfowitz:  You're very welcome.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)



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