19 September 2002
Bush Asks Congress for Use of Force Resolution on Iraq
(President says Iraq continues to violate U.N. resolutions) (5050) President Bush asked the U.S. Congress for authority to use all means necessary, including the use of the U.S. armed forces, to depose the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and to disarm the country of any weapons of mass destruction. Bush told news reporters September 19 after sending the proposed resolution to the Congress that "If you want to keep the peace, you've got to have the authorization to use force." The resolution was sent to Congress after meetings September 18 with the Congressional leadership at the White House. Bush is seeking action on the resolution before a Congressional recess for the general elections November 5. The resolution reads, in part: "The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region." Two senior administration officials, during a background briefing, said that the president will consult closely with Congress at it moves forward on the resolution's language. "It is important that this nation be united in confronting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime," they said. And the resolution specifically calls for a regime change in Iraq, consistent with U.S. policy since 1998, they said. In addition to sending the resolution to the Congress, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld concluded two days of testimony September 19 before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, and Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the House International Relations Committee. Both cabinet officers were testifying about the reasons why Bush is seeking support for the resolution. Bush said in the resolution that Saddam Hussein has repeatedly violated UN resolutions and international law by obtaining chemical and biological weapons, and seeking nuclear weapons. It also cites his support for terrorism and for oppressing the Iraqi people. Following is the text of the Bush resolution and a transcript of the White House background briefing: (begin text) White House Discussion Draft September 19, 2002 Joint Resolution To authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against Iraq. Whereas Congress in 1998 concluded that Iraq was then in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations and thereby threatened the vital interests of the United States and international peace and security, stated the reasons for that conclusion, and urged the President to take appropriate action to bring Iraq into compliance with its international obligations (Public Law 105-235); Whereas Iraq remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international obligations by, among other things, continuing to possess and develop a significant chemical and biological weapons capability, actively seeking a nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and harboring terrorist organizations, thereby continuing to threaten the national security interests of the United States and international peace and security; Whereas Iraq persists in violating resolutions of the United Nations Security Council by continuing to engage in brutal repression of its civilian population, including the Kurdish peoples, thereby threatening international peace and security in the region, by refusing to release, repatriate, or account for non-Iraqi citizens wrongfully detained by Iraq, and by failing to return property wrongfully seized by Iraq from Kuwait; Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people; Whereas the current Iraqi regime has demonstrated its continuing hostility toward, and willingness to attack, the United States, including by attempting in 1993 to assassinate former President Bush and by firing on many thousands of occasions on United States and Coalition Armed Forces engaged in enforcing the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council; Whereas members of al-Qaeda, an organization bearing responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens, and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq; Whereas Iraq continues to aid and harbor other international terrorist organizations, including organizations that threaten the lives and safety of American citizens; Whereas the attacks on the United States of September 11, 2001 underscored the gravity of the threat that Iraq will transfer weapons of mass destruction to international terrorist organizations; Whereas the United States has the inherent right, as acknowledged in the United Nations Charter, to use force in order to defend itself; Whereas Iraq's demonstrated capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction, the high risk that the current Iraqi regime will either employ those weapons to launch a surprise attack against the United States or its Armed Forces or provide them to international terrorists who would do so, and the extreme magnitude of harm that would result to the United States and its citizens from such an attack, combine to justify the use of force by the United States in order to defend itself; Whereas Iraq is in material breach of its disarmament and other obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, to cease repression of its civilian population that threatens international peace and security under United Nations Security Council Resolution 688, and to cease threatening its neighbors of United Nations operations in Iraq under United Nations Security Council Resolution 949, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 authorizes use of all necessary means to compel Iraq to comply with these "subsequent relevant resolutions"; Whereas Congress in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) has authorized the President to use the Armed Forces of the United States to achieve full implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678; Whereas Congress in section 1095 of Public Law 102-190 has stated that it "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Security Council Resolution 687 as being consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq (Public Law 102-1)," that Iraq's repression of its civilian population violates United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 and "constitutes a continuing threat to the peace, security, and stability of the Persian Gulf region," and that Congress "supports the use of all necessary means to achieve the goals of Resolution 688"; Whereas Congress in the Iraq Liberation Act (Public Law 105-338) has expressed its sense that it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove from power the current Iraqi regime and promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime; Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to take action in order to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United States, as Congress recognized in the joint resolution on Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107-40); and Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national security interests of the United States; Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This joint resolution may be cited as the "Further Resolution on Iraq". SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES. The President is authorized to use all means that he determines to be appropriate, including force, in order to enforce the United Nations Security Council resolutions referenced above, defend the national security interests of the United States against the threat posed by Iraq, and restore international peace and security in the region. (end text) (begin transcript) THE WHITE HOUSE Office of the Press Secretary September 19, 2002 BACKGROUND PRESS BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION James S. Brady Press Briefing Room 3:01 P.M. EDT MR. MCCORMACK: We have two senior administration officials here to talk about the proposed language for a joint resolution which the President sent up to the Hill today. So without further ado, I'll turn it over to our senior administration officials. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good afternoon. Let me have a brief opening statement, and then we will be prepared to take questions. This morning, the President sent to Congress proposed language for a joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein. The President is asking Congress to support him in using all means he determines to be appropriate, including force, to enforce United Nations Security Council resolutions, to defend the national security of our country against the threat posed by the Iraqi regime. The President is reviewing all of his options to ensure that the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime is addressed in an effective manner. For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has defied U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding that, among other things, he give up his stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons, stop his aggressive efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, stop his violent oppression of the Iraqi people, and end his support for terrorism. Iraq also agreed to do all of these things after its defeat in the Gulf War as part of a cessation of hostilities. The President has urged the United Nations Security Council to act now to enforce its own resolutions, and he expects that the UN will live up to its responsibilities. But the world should not doubt the resolve of the United States to do what is necessary to defend its national security interests. Secretary Powell is working closely with UN Security Council members and other parties to draft language for a new, effective resolution that makes clear what is required of Saddam Hussein's regime, as well as the potential consequences if the regime fails to act. Long experience has shown us the character of Saddam Hussein's regime. We know what he is capable of. For more than a decade, he has been in violation of UN resolutions. The burden of proof does not rest with the Security Council to prove that Saddam continues to defy the United Nations. The burden is on Saddam Hussein to prove that he is complying with Security Council resolutions, and complying with the agreements he made at the end of the Gulf War. The burden is on him to prove that he has destroyed all chemical and biological weapons, and ended his nuclear weapons program. The President and members of his administration will consult closely with Congress as it moves toward a vote on a joint resolution. It is important that this nation be united in confronting the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's regime. The President is confident that the Congress will act in the best traditions of our democracy in debating and voting on a resolution. Thank you. Do you have any comments you want to add? All right, we'll take questions. Ron. QUESTION: A couple of questions on the technical merits of this. Does -- there's no explicit mention of regime change in Section 2. Because of the reference to the earlier "whereas"-es, are you saying that there is -- that he is asking -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's there -- Q: -- clearly for a regime change, and to use military force to do so? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It's there in the "whereas"-es. And I'd just remind everybody that the policy of the United States since 1998 has been regime change. So, yes, it concerns regime change. Q: And secondly, the language, it says "the threat posed by Iraq" and "restore international peace and security in the region." Could that be interpreted to include threats outside of Iraq, either now or in the future? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's very clear that the President is asking for support on Iraq at this point. Q: Could it be interpreted, though, to react to threats, either now or in the future, outside of Iraq? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the President has -- I'll let my colleague speak to this, but the President constitutionally has authority to react to any threat to the United States and the people. But this resolution is specific to Iraq. Do you want to add anything? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, my colleague is right. The President would have the constitutional authority to take any actions to restore peace and security to the region. But the focus here is on Iraq and the threat that is posed by Iraq to the United States and to the region. Q: Can I follow up on that issue? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Sure, follow up. Q: The question is, could this language, as written, be used somewhere down the road to make the argument that Congress has, in fact, authorized military force in the region elsewhere besides Iraq? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Could the language be -- first of all, let me make one point perfectly clear. This is an initial draft by the White House. We're going to be meeting with Congress to debate these kinds of points with the Congress. The objective here is to provide to the President the maximum flexibility to deal with the threat posed by Iraq, and to provide, as the resolution says, peace and security to the region. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Note that this -- it really refers to peace and security in the region in the context of Iraq. Q: There are some members on the Hill who would have some kind of language in here that would refer to what's going on at the United Nations -- maybe a direct link, maybe not a direct link, but in some way acknowledge what's happening in the international community. Is that something the White House would oppose, any kind of reference or connection to -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the important thing here is to provide maximum flexibility to the President to react to this threat. But again, let me just underscore what my colleague said. This is a draft. We are going to talk with members of the Congress about what needs to go into this resolution. What would not make sense, of course, is for the United States to -- as the President as Commander-in-Chief, to be wholly obligated to only act on behalf of the United States if the U.N. did something. I mean, that would not give the President maximum flexibility. But we'll talk about how the language might be, and it's obvious that we're working in the UN. Q: Can I ask about the legal doctrine in here and the precedence? It talks about because 9-11 showed the gravity of terrorist attacks, and there's a threat that Iraq could transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, and the United States has the right of self-defense, therefore the President should be authorized to use force. What's the precedent for that kind of anticipatory defense doctrine in international law? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, there is the inherent right of self-defense for all member-nations under the UN charter. Q: Against a threat? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: And the question is, what do you mean by responding in self-defense to a threat? The theory of anticipatory threat, or anticipatory self-defense, is one that is long recognized. It is something that has been utilized by the United States in the past. If you look at the Cuban missile crisis, the embargo, for example, one could characterize that as anticipatory self-defense, the use of force -- a blockade is a use of force. So there is some history for this. Q: If I could ask you to respond to the Iraqi Foreign Minister's contention, among many, that the U.S. is not consistent in enforcing UN resolutions about weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, and that Israel's weapons of mass destruction, if, in fact -- Israel's weapons of mass destruction are off the table, as far as the U.S. is concerned. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: As far as the United States is concerned, Saddam Hussein, who fought a war of aggression, a war that he began in 1991, during that war and the war previously -- I'm sorry, war that he began in 1990 -- but, and a war that he previously launched against another neighbor, has used chemical weapons against those people and against his own people; a bloody tyrant that represses his people at the level that he does, including minorities, to the point that the U.N. human rights reports continue to cite him as one of the worst offenders, is -- and given the way that he has defied the United Nations time and time and time again is in a class by himself. And it probably should not be the Iraqi Foreign Minister's job to start trying to hold the United States to consistency. I mean, this is a ludicrous argument. Q: So there are regimes that are okay to have those weapons in that region, and regimes which aren't? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Look, we -- obviously, weapons of mass destruction have to be put into context. And the context here is a bloody dictator who has used a weapon of mass destruction against his own people and against his neighbors, who has tremendous animus against the United States, has tried to assassinate an American President, has paid suicide bombers. I think the equation of Iraq with almost anybody else in this context really doesn't make any sense. Q: Would you point to any significant differences, or any important differences, between the language you're now asking for and the language from 1998? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me have my colleague do that, because he did most of the drafting of this. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 1998 language, of course, the resolution in 1998 had a series of "whereas"-es that basically makes the case for the breaches that occurred. So that's one difference. The other difference is the specific grant; it urges the President, I believe, to take "appropriate" or maybe "necessary" means to bring Iraq into compliance with U.N. resolutions. So that was the language of the '98. Q: And this one is saying that -- while we're pursuing a different resolution at the UN, this one says that should he not do that, then the U.S. would act on its own? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Absolutely not. It's not tied to any actions by the U.N. What we're asking -- again, what the President is asking for is maximum flexibility to deal with the threat posed by Iraq to the interests of the United States. It's not in any way tied or conditioned on what happens at the UN. Q: Which you believe the '98 language was? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The '98 language was not tied to any future action, or further action by the UN. And what I'm saying is the language used in the grant of authorization used the word "urges" the President to exercise his powers under the Constitution and under applicable laws to bring Iraq into compliance. And that -- we've used different language. Here, the grant of authority is a lot more explicit. Q: Senator Daschle said today that he would want to approve this with an understanding that before a trigger was pulled, there would be additional consultations with Congress. This -- the wording here reads like this is the last stop for Congress. Is that the correct way to read it? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, consultations go on with Congress all the time. But, obviously, this is a grant of support and of authority. And that would stand. But consultations would, of course, continue with Congress as we go forward, and as we think about what options the President needs to pursue. But it must be understood that when there's a resolution, there's been a grant of authority. Q: In the part that talks about the right of self-defense in the UN Charter, under Chapter 7, that speaks specifically to a response to a direct attack. I wonder if you're now saying that the President's doctrine of preemption is the administration's interpretation of Article 51 of Chapter 7. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I'm going to go back to my colleague again, but let's remember that -- first of all, it is not a new idea that you do not have to wait to be physically attacked before you try to take out the means that might attack you. That is not a new idea. As the other official said, we blockaded Cuba in expectation that missiles that were being put there -- missiles that nobody was even clear on how operational they might be -- might be used against the United States. And so, in a sense, that's anticipatory self-defense. It is also the case that the United States maintained throughout the Cold War a policy that refused to say that there would be no first use of nuclear weapons, because there was an expectation that you might have to use weapons to prevent a worse attack against the United States. So this is not a new idea. Nobody has ever said that you have to wait to physically be attacked in order to take out the means that might attack you. Q: I'm not asking if it's been U.S. policy before, but is it the specific administration interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter that it explicitly authorizes a preemptive attack that is not in response to an attack? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There is no precise definition of imminence in international law. And I think it is a word, a definition, that evolves over time. As you find weapons that can be delivered with more speed, with more destruction, I think it's appropriate to redefine or look at imminence, and consider a wide variety of factors -- such as the probability that a threat will materialize; the degree of harm that will result if that threat materialized; the probability that the risk of that threat materializing increasing over time; and perhaps the amount of time that one can anticipate before that threat will materialize. So I think that there are a variety of things that one ought to look at in defining whether or not a threat is imminent. Q: I'm sorry, I don't mean to belabor the point, but you speak specifically of the United Nations Charter, which as I understand it, doesn't use the word imminent at all, let alone try to interpret it. So I'm asking if your interpretation of the Charter is that it specifically authorizes a preeminent -- preemptive -- sorry -- attack. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think if you look at the history of actions by member states, I don't think there's any kind of requirement that you have to wait until you're physically being attacked or about to be attacked. And I think also, again, that the doctrine of self-defense and the incorporation of the term of imminence, I think that is something that has evolved, and will continue to evolve as the threat changes. Q: Sir, if there's a possibility that the President might go to war against Iraq, why under the Constitution is he not obligated to get a declaration of war from Congress? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He is coming to the Congress to get whatever authority he believes is appropriate in this case. I think as a matter of constitutional theory, the President has the authority, under the Constitution, as the Commander-in-Chief, to use force to defend this country. It is true that the Constitution grants Congress only the power to declare war. That does not mean that the President is precluded from defending this country as Commander-in-Chief. Q: There's talk at the UN that it could take months to get weapons inspectors up and running. How long are you willing to wait for the UN to act? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think that we don't believe that the time line needs to be months. But one of the things that we have to assess with others on the Security Council is what the time line really should look like here. Let me just say that weapons inspectors may well be a part of the story of how you get Saddam Hussein disarmed. But the United States is withholding at this point, pending discussions and pending consultations on what means you use to disarm him. The question -- weapons inspectors are simply a means, not an end in and of themselves. So the key here is to get an effective resolution that deals with the threat, not just to get one that might deal with weapons inspections. So we'll see how long some of this would take. But I've heard varying estimates of how long such a thing could take. I think we have to just talk with people and see. Q: What's the state of play -- Q: Doesn't this -- SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's got a follow-up, just a second. Q: What's the state of play with discussions with the Russia and France? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, Secretary Powell has had a couple of conversations with various foreign ministers of the Perm Five. It was important for people to go back to capitals and to talk, obviously, to the heads of state and to get instructions. You might note that the Russian Foreign Minister is here today, so they'll have another opportunity to talk. Although, let me be clear, the visits of the Russian Foreign and Defense Ministers have long been planned in accordance with the Moscow Treaty, which has a consultative group with the four ministers. So this is not Iraq specific. But, obviously, while the Foreign Minister is here, he will, and he'll continue phone conversations with him. I think that we're impressing upon people that strong Security Council action through a new resolution is required, that we -- to the degree that Iraq was concerned about such -- it made this ploy the other night, but it does mean that you've got Iraq's attention -- this isn't the time to let up if you want a road to, this time, a successful outcome. Q: Doesn't this new doctrine, the preemptive strike idea, introduce a certain element of arbitrariness in your decisions? That is, what is to prevent you, or what is to prevent a government from deciding they didn't -- somebody they don't like, that they will use this a pretext for attacking them and eliminating a bad -- what they consider to be a bad guy, in spite of the fact there might not be a threat? Really, it's an arbitrary decision on your part, or on the part of government, to decide, okay, this is a guy who represents a threat in the future, therefore, we should eliminate him. SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd be the first to say there have never been any hard and fast rules about when to use force. Never. And it is, in fact, not a new matter to think that you don't have to wait to be attacked until you attack. That's simply not a new concept. Now, we believe that the particular notion of anticipatory self-defense or preemption is a pretty limited concept. This isn't something that you go around the world preempting and changing regimes around the world. Nobody is making that claim. There are circumstances in which you have no other option to protect yourself but to try and deal with a growing threat before it becomes a devastating attack on you. There are many other cases in which diplomacy might work, in which other counter-means might work. All of those have actually been tried with Iraq. You might note the President made a long list of all of the things that have been tried with Iraq. But nobody would say that this is something that you go out and do every day. And as to whether others might do this, I think we have to be a little careful in assuming that others will be deterred from doing aggressive acts, that we would consider aggressive acts, just because the United States doesn't say that it's going to protect itself against an emerging threat. And I think that norm -- people are going to do what they need to do. In the cases that have been most often cited, like India-Pakistan, we continually talk to the Indians and the Pakistanis about the available means that they have to deal with the conflict between them. And indeed, we have been very intimately involved -- we, and particularly the British -- in trying to find a means for them to resolve that conflict. And we're very clear with them that the use of military force is not going to resolve that conflict and it's going to make the situation worse. So when thereare other means, you by all means ought to try them. You ought to try to deal with threats in any way that you can. But there will come times when, in order to prevent an attack against you, you have to preempt that threat. Last question. Q: Did you all speed up work on this resolution in a way to kind of influence skeptical U.S. allies in the UN to act with a new resolution? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. Kelly, if you remember, all the way back on -- when the President first came back from Crawford, he made clear that he thought that this resolution needed to be before the members went out for the recess. We do believe that the effect of a united front by the United States will be to show the seriousness of purpose of the United States and to underscore that the United Nations Security Council should act because the United States is prepared to act in the absence of action by the Security Council. Q: Isn't it likely the Security Council will act before Congress gets around to its resolution? SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't -- I don't know, Jim. That would also be great. But I think just the fact that the United States is debating this, that there's a seriousness of purpose within the United States is having an effect. It is also the case that other parliaments are debating this, as well. The British Parliament will come in on Tuesday to debate it. Thank you. END 3:24 P.M. EDT (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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