Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=09/19/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01194

TITLE=BUSH, THE U.N. AND IRAQ

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

Host: Will the United Nations stop Saddam Hussein? Next, On the Line.

Host: President George W. Bush addressed the U-N General Assembly on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. He made the case that the Iraqi regime is both a risk to international security and a threat to the authority of the U-N.

Bush [speech, September 12, 2002]: Iraq has answered a decade of U-N demands with a decade of defiance. All the world now faces a test and the United Nations a difficult and defining moment. Are Security Council resolutions to be honored and enforced or cast aside without consequence? Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding or will it be irrelevant?

Host: Mr. Bush called on the U-N to pass a new resolution authorizing a military response if Saddam Hussein continues to ignore demands to disarm and stop repressing the Iraqi people. How will the U-N respond to President Bush's challenge? I'll ask my guests: Peter Galbraith, former ambassador to Croatia and now a professor of national security strategy at the National War College; Martha Brant, White House correspondent for Newsweek magazine; and Gary Schmitt, executive director of the Project for the New American Century. Welcome, thanks for joining us today. Peter Galbraith, was the Bush speech a surprise?

Galbraith: I think it was surprising in the way that he so effectively made the case against Saddam Hussein and, frankly, it didn't match his previous comments which had not gone much beyond saying Saddam is an evil man -- which he is. But this time, he made a case that I think was persuasive to his audience. That is to say, he presented in detail Saddam Hussein's violations of international law, of U-N Security Council resolutions, and it came to a fundamental point, that war was fought against Iraq, Iraq agreed to certain conditions as part of the peace -- as the price of ending that war. It's failed to honor basically any of those conditions. What do you do about it? Doesn't the international community have not just the right but the obligation to insist that Iraq honor its agreement, and if it refuses to, use force? I think the President made that case effectively.

Host: Martha Brant?

Brant: I thought it was really interesting how he turned the multilateral-unilateral argument on its head. Up to this point he'd been accused by many in the international community of being too unilateralist. And instead, he went up there and said, actually Saddam Hussein's the unilateralist for ignoring U-N resolutions, and you guys want to be multilateral, great, here's your chance. Let's see that you can actually enforce these U-N resolutions. The other interesting thing about the preparation for the speech is, up to the last minute -- which is really quite amazing for this White House [administration], which is so disciplined and planned in advance -- he wasn't sure he was going to mention we will abide and call for a new U-N resolution. And when he actually went up to the podium, he added an S to the word [resolution]. I don't know if this is Bush misspeaking, or him giving a nod to Jacques Chirac [president of France] who had proposed two resolutions as part of a strategy. But I thought that was an interesting moment.

Host: Gary Schmitt, did President Bush turn the question of multilateralism on its head?

Schmitt: Oh, absolutely. As one of my colleagues put it sort of pithily, he said "Bush used Powell's means for Cheney's ends." And I think that's correct.

Host: Now, you're talking about Colin Powell, the Secretary of State who is in favor of diplomacy perhaps more than intervention, as opposed to Dick Cheney, Vice President, who is more in favor of intervention.

Schmitt: Right. But more seriously, I mean, institutions lose their legitimacy when people stop listening to them. And the main reason why they stop listening to them is when they aren't able to effectively reach their goals and accomplish what they've set out to do. And I think the president put that issue in a very straightforward way to the U-N on Iraq.

Host: Let's look at how the president put that to the U-N and ask the question whether Bush challenged the U-N to prove that it really has a reason to exist.

Bush [speech, September 12, 2002]: The United Nations was born in the hope that survived a world war -- the hope of a world moving toward justice, escaping old patterns of conflict and fear. The founding members resolved that the peace of the world must never again be destroyed by the will and wickedness of any man. We created a United Nations Security Council, so that, unlike the League of Nations, our deliberations would be more than talk, our resolutions would be more than wishes.

Host: Peter Galbraith, what was the most effective part of this speech, making it about the viability of the U-N, or making it about the specific danger posed by Saddam Hussein?

Galbraith: I don't think this was in any way about the viability of the United Nations. And incidentally, President Bush's history of the League of Nations is very incomplete. There was a Security Council equivalent in the league, and the reason the league didn't work was that the United States was not a member of it. And the consequences were tragic, the Second World War, which might otherwise have been avoidable. So this, the United Nations is nothing more than the countries that are members of it and particularly the United States, which is by far its most important member. So, I thought the most effective part of the speech was the way in which he laid out a case, as a prosecutor might, about Iraq's violations of international law, violations of its obligations. And the way also, he moved it beyond just weapons of mass destruction, just the threat to the United States, to other issues that are also extremely important. Resolution 688, which requires Iraq to stop repressing its people. The Kurds have been victims of genocide -- the Kurds in the north. The Shiite Arabs who are a majority in the country continue to be subject to the most brutal repression imaginable. It was very good to bring that in as well as other obligations, like to account for the thousands of missing people that were taken out of Kuwait in 1990 and 1991.

Host: Martha Brant?

Brant: I was just going to say, I think those are very important points and will become important in the next few weeks as they broaden this resolution and find ways that even if Saddam Hussein says, "Sure, bring in the inspectors," they're still going be [able to] find ways to get him. But I thought the most important thing was that he went, period. It didn't matter what he said. He was up there on the podium, speaking to a body he actually can't stand. And there's still no love lost. He didn't go there and have an epiphany that wow, you know, I actually need these guys and like these guys. His comment right afterwards, we went over to the U-S mission and his comment to his aides was, "It's like speaking to a wax museum." Because this is a man who feeds off the energy of when he gives speeches around the country and around the world. And there isn't a lot of energy in the world body. It's very stony-faced and diplomatic, and he doesn't have a good feel for these people, nor they for him. The White House has been very smart marketing the president to the world and here domestically, and they just wanted to show him looking like a diplomat and seeming to go through the multilateral motions. I think that was more important even than what he ended up saying.

Host: Gary Schmitt?

Schmitt: I was just going to say, they do have a case which is, the U-N operates by consensus of the Security Council and the General Assembly. I mean, we play a large role but ultimately the U-N is going to war if there's a consensus. What President Bush was saying was, look, if you can not bring yourself to have a consensus on this guy, then you have a real question about whether the U-N has a role to play in security matters over the long term. Because this guy has a record which is unquestionably in violation of every international norm both inside his country and outside his country. And if you can't bring yourselves to deal with that in a consensus form, then the U-N really is, in fact, irrelevant.

Host: Peter Galbraith, what was the reaction to the speech? What was the effect particularly on the European allies of the United States?

Galbraith: Well, I'd like to comment on what Gary said, which is, of course it's not that the U-N is ineffective. It's to say that France, Russia, China, and the United Kingdom are ineffective, because the United Nations is again nothing more than the sum of its parts.

Host: And those countries [along with the U-S] are the permanent members of the Security Council.

Galbraith: They're the permanent members and that's where you need the consensus. If you have those five, you will always get a majority in the Security Council. And so, it's not a test of the United Nations. It's a test of American leadership. It's a test of the Bush administration, which went completely off on the wrong track at the beginning, alienated our allies over totally gratuitous small issues. I mean, for example, the International Criminal Court, where there is exactly zero likelihood that an American will ever end up before the court. [Bush had] a totally overwrought response. But he got it right this time. He presented an effective case and the Europeans, the Russians, and even the Chinese responded. They listened to the case. They understood it was about the whole concept of collective security. It was very clear that Bush was talking about international law, about things that they value. He made the case effectively and he got the kind of support, I think, that he needed from the Russians, from the French. [He] even [got] favorable comments from Saudi Arabia, which absolutely supports U-S military action but until Bush made that speech was afraid to say so.

Host: Martha Brant, let's talk about the reaction in the broader Arab world, not only Saudi Arabia but other countries.

Brant: Sure. I think Saudi Arabia is a really important point, because up until just very, very recently they were being adamant. Sometimes with the Saudis, they'll say one thing but mean another. And the public and private disconnect, and many people have written about this. But they were adamant when we talked to the Saudis -- who've been fantastic sources for us in the White House press corps, I might add. Keep it up, guys. They were saying we really are not going to go along. And now that he [President Bush] has gone through these motions -- and maybe they're not just motions. It could be a completely sincere attempt. And ultimately they will not be for regime change, but strictly for disarmament. And that is a tonal change we've been hearing the last few weeks. They're no longer stressing regime change, which is what the President had been saying for weeks and weeks, but really talking about disarmament as the end result. I don't know yet whether or not they [the Bush administration] would accept, ultimately, just disarmament even if Saddam Hussein is in power. But to your question, it isn't just about hopefully establishing a democratic foothold in Iraq, which is one of their pipe dreams [hopes]. [That] is, if we can get rid of Saddam Hussein, eventually we'll be able to establish a base. They see regime change throughout the region. And they see the road to Jerusalem lying through Baghdad, that you will not solve the Middle East crisis until you start bringing about regime change all the way down the line. And that is a very tall order that we're just getting glimpses of at this point.

Host: Gary Schmitt, one of the things that President Bush said in this speech, however, in pursuing this consensus is he also made it clear that if the U-N did not act, that the U-S would still be willing to act by itself. What impact did the willingness to express an ultimate willingness to go it alone have on bringing allies on board?

Schmitt: Well I think it was everything. I think the threat to go it alone in fact makes the possibility of actually accomplishing what you want to do at the U-N. The said threat is in fact that hard line that they've drawn in the sand that in fact pushes the others into trying to do something about Iraq. I mean, the last thing they want to do is look like they're powerless in the face of that.

Host: Now, we've talked a bit about the various resolutions that the president cited. Let's take a look at a bit of the video from the speech where President Bush mentions some of those resolutions.

Bush [speech, September 12, 2002]: In 1991, Security Council resolution six-eighty-eight [688] demanded that the Iraqi regime cease at once the repression of its own people. . In 1991, the U-N Security Council, through resolutions six-eighty-six [686] and six-eighty-seven [687] demanded that Iraq return all prisoners from Kuwait and other lands. . In 1991, the U-N Security Council through resolution six-eight-seven [687] demanded that Iraq renounce all involvement with terrorism. . In 1991, the Iraqi regime agreed to destroy and stop developing all weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles.

Host: That was a series of clips taken from the speech. To what extent does that express the American position that this is not just about U-N weapons inspections, about weapons of mass destruction, Peter Galbraith?

Galbraith: Well, again, this is not [only] the American position, it is the world's position in resolutions that were adopted by the United Nations that had very broad support and incidentally don't necessarily have to be restated in a new resolution. They are still legally valid demands.

Host: Now when you say legally valid demands, what powers of enforcement are behind those legally valid demands?

Galbraith: Now that's actually an interesting question. I'm not persuaded that the administration needs to get a new resolution authorizing force. I think it would be wise and I think it can be obtained, but I'm not sure it is necessary. And in 1999, the Clinton administration undertook the military campaign in Kosovo, with NATO, on the basis of a resolution that required [Slobodan] Milosevic to stop repressing the Kosovar people. And that was sufficient basis. And that authority really is already there. I think it would be helpful to restate it. I think it would be helpful to get specific authorization. I don't think it's actually legally required.

Brant: But isn't it politically necessary? Because it seems like they left Colin Powell there in place to negotiate a new resolution, again, so they could show themselves in action, but so that they could design a resolution that's fairly narrow. You know, again, if Saddam Hussein says, "Sure, we'll abide by all this stuff," then the administration's painted into a box they may not be able to get out of. But if they can design a new resolution that gets them out -- Bush was suggesting in his speech, human rights abuses for example -- other ways in which Saddam is still a "bad guy," in the parlance of George Bush, that will still give them the justification for ultimately going in.

Galbraith: Yes, but -- and this is a very big but -- I absolutely think these other resolutions have to be enforced, but I think it will be very hard to get a consensus for military action either in this country or internationally with regard to those other resolutions. And I want to come back to one point you made which is very important. First, I don't think we're going to get Iraqi compliance without regime change. So, I think that's essential. But the issue is whether this is the first step to something else. There's also the question about what's going on in Iraq. Iraq as a country is finished. Already in the north for the last eleven years there's a de facto, independent Kurdistan that is one of the most democratic places in the Middle East. Those people will agree to live within the borders of Iraq. They won't declare independence because they know that's not geopolitically possible. But they will not agree to be under the authority of Baghdad and they have the military might to make sure that doesn't happen. I don't think this administration yet has thought through the implications of all of this, but we're going to see some very significant changes in the coming months that will change the map of the Middle East.

Host: Gary Schmitt, we've talked about these various resolutions and Iraq has responded at first by saying it would not open up to any new inspections without there being any number of conditions. And then they turned around and announced that they'll have new weapons inspectors in without conditions. What's going on there?

Schmitt: Well, they're willing to accept inspections under the terms of the new U-N inspection regime, sometimes referred to as "UNSCOM lite". [As in lite beer, i.e. watered-down] Because it's not nearly as -- as many problems as UNSCOM had in carrying out inspections, the new inspection regime that the U-N has set up is even less vigorous and even more under the thumb of the politics and diplomacy of the Security Council. So, they're more than willing to allow those kinds of inspections, I think, ultimately because they don't actually fear them. I don't think, in fact, the United States will accept those kinds of inspections as satisfactory however.

Host: Martha Brant, actually, let me read to you from an article that was in the New York Times written by Gary Milhollin and Kelly Motts. Gary Milhollin argues that new inspections would not work. He writes: "New inspections will occur under the threat of imminent American military action. Such a risk might encourage U-N inspectors to monitor what is already known, rather than aggressively try to find what is hidden." Is there an incentive for the U-N inspectors not to be as aggressive as they might be if these inspections were resumed?

Brant: Right, it's an interesting point. I read that piece the other day as well. I think the Bush administration would argue that, to Gary's point, they don't buy any of this. "Stalling tactics" is how they will dismiss any rapprochement that Saddam Hussein will offer us. And Bush's "religion," if you will, hasn't changed on this topic. First, they went looking for a smoking gun, a way to connect Saddam Hussein to nine-eleven. Couldn't find that. Then they went looking for a loaded gun. They may keep looking and keep looking, but chances are they won't find that either. It's not about that. It's about making a moral case, in Bush's parlance, against Saddam Hussein. And we will see in the next couple of weeks arguments that he's a bad Muslim; they're going to appeal to Europeans and show all the environmental damage he's done. They will be making their case much more along the lines of what they see as a morally persuasive argument against Saddam Hussein as an unpredictable and irresponsible leader who's a threat to the United States and other U-N countries rather than about inspections or about some connection to nine-eleven [the September 11th terrorist attacks].

Host: Peter Galbraith, President Bush's spokesman Ari Fleischer described the Iraqi offer to have inspectors back in as a "rope a dope," which is the term for [boxer] Mohammed Ali's tactic of sort of covering himself up and bouncing off the ropes to tire out an opponent when he was boxing. Is that an apt description?

Galbraith: I teach national security strategy and one of the issues we deal with is how you use weapons of mass destruction. You have two uses for them, one of them is to deter an attack and the other is to defeat an adversary. Saddam has to realize they're not going to work as deterrence and he has to know that whatever weapons he has, the United States is going to be able to defeat him. So these weapons, in fact, have no value to him and logically he should give them up, agree to inspections and I think that would probably defuse the pressure on him -- although I don't think it should defuse the pressure on him, I think it will. But his past behavior doesn't indicate that he really understands this. So my guess is that it is "rope a dope," and that in fact we will be back to the games that we saw from 1991 to 1998 and that ultimately the international community will run out of patience and it will authorize the use of force.

Host: We only have a couple of seconds left. Gary Schmitt, was the U-S ready for this feint from Iraq?

Schmitt: I think so, I think they expected it.

Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have for today. Obviously something that's going to keep developing. I'd like to thank my guests for joining me today: Peter Galbraith of the National War College, Martha Brant of Newsweek magazine, and Gary Schmitt of the Project for the New American Century. I'm Eric Felten for On the Line.