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28 August 2002

Armitage Fields Questions on North Korea, Iraq

(Deputy Secretary of State Aug. 28 press conference, Tokyo) (5020)
Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage fielded questions at a
press conference at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo August 28 from reporters
who overwhelmingly had two things on their minds: North Korea, and
Iraq.
Armitage said the State Department's recent sanctioning of North
Korean entities for the alleged sale of missile technology to Yemen
was "a very symbolic gesture" because the United States does not have
a relationship with North Korea.
Although the imposition of sanctions "is not necessarily divorcing
them from business in the United States," he said, "I think it was a
useful reminder that problems of proliferation emanating from North
Korea are real in our minds, and we believe real in the minds of our
Japanese friends, among others."
Armitage said his visit to Japan gave U.S. and Japanese officials "a
chance to exchange views about the way we both see the danger of any
developments of weapons of mass destruction or missile delivery
technology, etc." In particular, he said that the U.S. delegation had
been briefed by Japanese government officials on recent discussions in
Pyongyang held by Japanese Director General for Asian Affairs Hitoshi
Tanaka.
"We welcome the discussions between Mr. Tanaka and North Korean
counterparts," Armitage said. He declined to respond to reports that
Pyongyang expressed the desire for Tokyo to facilitate dialogue
between Washington and Pyongyang.
In response to reporters' questions, Armitage said the Bush
administration has "received a variety of messages from North Korea
over the past months, and it seems to me the general thrust is that
they would welcome a visit by Assistant Secretary Kelly."
"Our view now is that at an appropriate time a trip by Mr. Kelly is
probably warranted," he continued. With regard to Iraq, Armitage
stressed that the purpose of his visit to Japan was not "to ask Japan
to do something specifically on Iraq," but "to share views."
"And in that regard I think (my trip) was most successful," he added.
When asked by a reporter about the likelihood that President Bush will
take action against Iraq, Armitage replied: "I'll just make it clear
that: (1) we have many tools at our disposal and he has many options,
and (2) on the specific question of whether or not we need another UN
Security Council Resolution, I think it's generally our view that the
relevant and existing resolutions give us sufficient latitude to move
forward, if that's the President's decision.
Following is a transcript of the press conference:
(begin transcript)
U.S. EMBASSY TOKYO
Press Office
Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage
Press Conference
August 28, 2002
U.S. Embassy Auditorium
Tokyo, Japan
3:10 p.m. local time
MODERATOR: Ambassador Baker will introduce the Deputy Secretary.
AMBASSADOR BAKER: Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the U.S. Embassy.
We are happy you're here. It gives me great pleasure to welcome my
good friend, the Deputy Secretary of State, Rich Armitage, to the
American Embassy in Tokyo. He has covered a lot of territory on this
trip. I know he's anxious to answer your questions, and I yield the
platform to the Deputy Secretary.
D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you very much, Ambassador, and good afternoon
ladies and gentlemen. It's great fun for me to be back with most of
you who are very well known to me, and I'm thrilled to have the
opportunity to return to Tokyo and to this embassy. It's been a little
over a year since I was last here, and as far as I'm concerned, that's
much too long a time.
I've engaged in extensive discussions with Japanese colleagues, a
strategic dialogue with Vice Minister Yukio Takeuchi and his
colleagues, for two days now. I was honored to be able to call on the
Prime Minister, had a good discussion and lunch with Chief Cabinet
Secretary Fukuda, I was able to see the Minister of State for Defense,
Minister Nakatani, and to call on the three secretary generals of the
coalition. Our discussions followed my trip to South Asia to Sri
Lanka, India and Pakistan, as well as a stop in Beijing for
consultations prior to the Crawford Summit between President Bush and
President Jiang Zemin.
I'm sure you'll have a lot of questions on just what sort of subjects
were covered here in Tokyo, so I'll just stop right there and try to
answer your questions in as explicit a manner as possible.
MODERATOR: Ladies and gentlemen, I'd ask that you identify yourself
and your organization when you start your question. I will go with Mr.
Suzuki, TV Asahi. Yes, please.
QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I am Sato Suzuki with TV Asahi. Good to see
you again. Regarding your discussion with Japanese officials on Iraq,
what did you say to them, or what would you say to those Japanese
skeptics who tend to wonder why we have to deal with Saddam Hussein so
urgently, now? Do you have any convincing evidence that the Iraqi
regime has been connected with some Al Qaeda or any other terrorist
groups, or do you have any convincing evidence that Iraq's use of
weapons of mass destruction is imminent, and are you going to ask the
Japanese government to show the flag again as you did last fall in
coping with, this time, Iraq. And secondly ... (laughter) If I may ask
you, the second question is about the sanctions the State Department
imposed against North Korea for alleged sale of missile technology to
Yemen. Is there any concern whatsoever on the part of the U.S. State
Department that the North Korean missile technology could be
transferred to Al Qaeda in the Middle East? Thank you.
D/S ARMITAGE: Wow, I'll try to answer all seven of your questions, Mr.
Suzuki. In the first instance, I came among other things to discuss
our views of Iraq. I think Secretary (Vice President) Cheney laid very
well the other day the fact that an Iraq left unattended is a threat
to, our belief that, an Iraq left unattended is a threat to its
neighbors, and ultimately a threat to ourselves. Given the fact that
the regime in Baghdad has had a consistent program striving for
weapons of mass destruction, and has indeed used chemical weapons on
its own population as well as the well-known invasion and attempted
subjugation of Kuwait. We believe as we move forward that we'll be
able to make a very compelling case for regime change. But having said
that, the President of the United States has made it very clear that
he has made no decisions, number one. Number two, that he's intent on
full consultations. He said that again yesterday as he entertained a
visitor, the Ambassador from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in Crawford,
Texas. When he does make a decision he'll be moving forward in full
consultation with friends and allies such as those in Japan.
Today and yesterday we simply exchanged views about the region and our
views of Saddam Hussein. I think at a point in time when the President
decides, we will move forward and try to make a compelling public
case.
We do know that there are some Al Qaeda in Iraq. They may very well
be, however, in some of the areas not controlled, necessarily, by the
government of Iraq, in some of the areas that are disputed, under one
of the two Kurdish parties' control. We believe that we will
ultimately be able to make a compelling case about the weapons of mass
destruction, and at an appropriate time we'll be moving forward.
Now your question on North Korea had to do with the recent
announcement of sanctioning, by the Department of State, of North
Korean entities. We are concerned whenever we have proliferation
ongoing. We made the sanctions public against North Korea. In a way
it's a very symbolic gesture, because we don't have a relationship
with North Korea. We don't do business with them ourselves, and it is
not necessarily divorcing them from business in the United States. But
I think it was a useful reminder that problems of proliferation
emanating from North Korea are real in our minds, and we believe real
in the minds of our Japanese friends, among others.
MODERATOR: I'd ask that you limit yourself to one question at a time,
please. From the Mainichi, Mr. Takehata.
QUESTION: Welcome back to Tokyo, Mr. Secretary Armitage.
D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you.
QUESTION: Everybody is talking about Iraq, and I think we need to cool
down and think about the situation very calmly, and what should be the
best way to go. And for this regard, I may quote your remarks from
March of last year at the confirmation hearing in the Senate, when you
were the designated Deputy Secretary of State. I quote: "I believe
that many of the theoretical debates of the merits of unilateralism
and multilateralism become truly relevant only when we have lost the
ability to attract supporters to a course of action desired by the
United States. The coalition built a decade ago to free Kuwait did not
materialize out of thin air. It was built by those who are able to
draw upon relationships of trust, which had been planted deeply and
tended carefully. If we view foreign policy as an episodic endeavor to
be engaged in only during times of crisis or convenience, we shall
find unilateralism to be a fait accompli instead of an option. Close
and constant consultation with allies is not optional, it is a
precondition for sustaining American leadership." End of quote.
This is your remark, and I think this is truly the time that your
model should be realized in reality and, therefore, my question is:
How successful your consultations with allies, including Japan, (have
been) so far. And secondly, do you agree or not with the idea put
forth by those people like former Secretary Baker or Richard Holbrooke
that new action needs a new resolution by the United Nations? Do you
agree or not? Thank you.
D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you, and thank you for reminding me of the
eloquence of my comments during the hearing. (laughter) I had long
forgotten. But the point is exactly relevant. I believe I should refer
you, in a way, to our Japanese friends, to Vice Minister Takeuchi and
his colleagues, and they can tell you how efficacious they thought the
consultations were.
Remember, in the first instance, this is a consultation across a full
range of activities, not simply limited to Iraq. It included South
Asia, it included all of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, it was
bilateral relations, the U.S.-Japan security relation, China, among
others. So I consider the fact that we were able to sit for two days
and talk completely openly as far as the U.S. side was concerned --
and I felt I had a reciprocal engagement from the Japanese -- as proof
of the effectiveness and the successfulness of the consultations.
What is most disappointing perhaps to you all is I didn't come to ask
Japan to do something specifically on Iraq or anything else. I came to
share views on this question. And in that regard I think it was most
successful, but I refer you to them.
The second part of the question had to do with, do I agree with Mr.
Baker? Well, I'll note that recently in Washington there's been no end
of people who have a lot of ideas, and they want to share them with
the President and with the Administration, and we take a look at each
of these ideas. Jim Baker's was one, Henry Kissinger has had recent
articles, Brent Scowcroft ... Many have had articles. And we take them
all into consideration as we move forward, and the only nationally
elected leader in the United States, the President, makes a decision
on his course of action, and I'll just make it clear that: (1) we have
many tools at our disposal and he has many options, and (2) on the
specific question of whether or not we need another UN Security
Council Resolution, I think it's generally our view that the relevant
and existing resolutions give us sufficient latitude to move forward,
if that's the President's decision.
MODERATOR: We had a question in the middle of the floor, sir, yes. And
I'd ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to stick to one question. And
questions, please.
QUESTION: Tomohiko Taniguchi with Nikkei Business magazine. Can I ask
what you exactly said to Jiang Zemin about U.S. policies toward
Taiwan?
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I'll tell you what I said publicly about U.S.
policy to Taiwan, sir. I said that we follow strictly our one-China
policy, which is based on the three communiqués and the Taiwan
Relations Act, and we depend on the continuation of the policy of the
People's Republic of China for peaceful resolution of the question.
MODERATOR: Mr. Tomiyama, Jiji.
QUESTION: Hi, Mr. Secretary.
D/S ARMITAGE: Great to see you.
QUESTION: Just to follow up the previous question on Taiwan. The basis
of the American one-China policy was that both sides of the Taiwan
Strait say that there is only one China, but now the situation has
changed, because Taiwan says they are an independent, separate
country. So what's the new basis of your one-China policy if you
continue to keep it? Thank you.
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I think first of all the question or the statement
to which you refer was probably the one contained in President Chen
Shui-bian's August 3 speech, and it occurs to me that the exact
definition of what was said is open to some interpretation in the
Chinese language, but the point remains that our response to that
speech is we do not support Taiwan independence, and that is the U.S.
position. And the basis for the position, our one-China policy, as you
articulated, that people on both sides of the strait agree that there
is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China.
MODERATOR: Ms. McKinnon from CNN.
QUESTION: Rebecca McKinnon from CNN. I was wondering, earlier this
week when Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials went to North Korea,
there were reports that Pyongyang expressed the desire for Tokyo to
facilitate dialogue between Washington and Pyongyang. And I'm
wondering if you could tell us a bit about what was discussed
regarding North Korea in your talks here, and whether the Japanese
side passed on any messages from the North Korean side that might
facilitate resumption of dialogue or possibly a trip soon to North
Korea by Assistant Secretary Kelly?
D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you very much. We were briefed on the recent
discussions in Pyongyang held by Director General for Asian Affairs
Hitoshi Tanaka, and we were briefed on the discussions, particularly
concerning the bilateral issues, the very serious bilateral issues
that exist between Tokyo and Pyongyang -- the abductions, the trawler
incident, things of that nature. We also had a chance to exchange
views about the way we both see the danger of any developments of
weapons of mass destruction or missile delivery technology, etc.
We have received a variety of messages from North Korea over the past
months, and it seems to me the general thrust is that they would
welcome a visit by Assistant Secretary Kelly. We were prepared to send
Mr. Kelly until the Yellow Sea incident occurred, and our view now is
that at an appropriate time a trip by Mr. Kelly is probably warranted.
MODERATOR: In the back, Mr. Ota, from Kyodo.
QUESTION: Masakatsu Ota, Kyodo News. Thank you for yesterday, for
making a brief stop at the Prime Minister's Office and taking some
questions.
D/S ARMITAGE: I had no choice; you ambushed me. (laughter)
QUESTION: OK, my question about Iraq. What's your most persuasive
point, persuasive element to persuade the Japanese government and the
Japanese people to support your country's policy in the future? That's
my question.
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, the most persuasive point, I think your question
was, that I might use to persuade the Japanese public in the future
about the necessity of regime change. I don't know what will be most
persuasive to the Japanese public. Our view is the truth is always a
good thing to engage in, and we'll move forward and make a public case
when the President determines that the time is right.
I think there is a good bit to be learned from the history of the
regime in Baghdad, and I earlier spelled out some of the past history,
and nothing that has happened in the intervening years has shown that
the regime in Baghdad has become any more benign toward their own
population, or certainly, if you judge them by their rhetoric, to
their friends and neighbors. And I would note with great
dissatisfaction the offer of the regime in Baghdad to pay up to
$25,000 to the families of suicide bombers in Israel.
So I think when we move forward we'll simply engage in the truth. And
the Japanese public and the officials of the Japanese government can
make their own decision up. I didn't come here to lay out a decision
for the Japanese government. I simply came here to have a discussion
and exchange of views on Iraq.
MODERATOR: The gentleman in the front.
QUESTION: Anatoli Karasnov of Itar-Tass News Agency. Again a question
about North Korea: What do you think about the late visit of Kim Jong
Il to Russia? Thank you.
D/S ARMITAGE: What did I think of Kim Jong Il's visit to Russia? Well,
I saw it was his second visit, and I saw that he met with President
Putin in Vladivostok, I believe. I've not been briefed on the
discussion. The United States government was briefed on a prior visit
by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to Pyongyang, and when Foreign
Minister Ivanov visited with Secretary Powell in Brunei they had a
good discussion about that. I think I should refer you to President
Putin for his reaction to the bear hug from Kim Jong Il.
MODERATOR: Mr. Koyama (Nihon Kogyo Shimbun).
QUESTION: You mentioned that Al Qaeda was in the northern part of
Iraq.
D/S ARMITAGE: Yes.
QUESTION: How would you interpret that? Does this mean that Hussein
doesn't like Al Qaeda, or that Al Qaeda is under the protection of the
Kurds?
D/S ARMITAGE: I have no idea whether Saddam Hussein likes Al Qaeda or
not, and I'm certainly not suggesting that Al Qaeda is under the
protection of the Kurds. I'm simply noting that there is Al Qaeda
presence in an area that is disputed, that is primarily Kurdish
controlled. I don't think the Kurds have any more affection for Al
Qaeda than anyone else. This is not the first time U.S. officials have
pointed this phenomenon of some presence in Iraq. I think Secretary
Rumsfeld has also spoken about this recently.
MODERATOR: Mr. Kato, from the Asahi Shimbun.
QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Secretary. About North Korea: It seems to me
North Korea has been showing some flexibility to Japan. I don't know
what kind of outcome it's going to really bring about, but I was
wondering what do you think is the right approach to North Korea this
time around? Is the Sunshine Policy the right approach, or a hard-line
approach that the Bush Administration seems to be putting out is the
right approach? Thank you.
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I don't know that I'd characterize hard-line or
soft-line approach; these are decisions to be made by Japanese
officials at the present time, and as Mr. Tanaka and his colleagues at
the Gaimusho move forward, I'm sure they'll determine the proper
stance to take. From our point of view, we're informed, we welcome the
discussions between Mr. Tanaka and North Korean counterparts. Foreign
Minister Kawaguchi had informed us at Brunei that these discussions
were going forward, and we followed them with some interest.
MODERATOR: Mr. Greimel, from AP.
QUESTION: Hello. Hans Greimel, Associated Press. To what degree is the
United States right now trying to build a coalition that agrees with
the United States position toward Iraq, and how many countries would
you say are out there that actually subscribe to the U. S. point of
view?
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I think I've indicated that when the U.S. lays out
the public case against Iraq we do expect to have a fair amount of
international support. I don't think I'd care to give a laundry list
because I don't think we've choosed up sides yet on the question of
who would do what. We haven't asked anything of anyone, as yet. But I
have no doubt that when the President makes a decision and that we lay
out our public case and that we consult with friends and allies, that
at the end of the day there are a good many people who will share the
view of President Bush.
MODERATOR: Mr. Sugita, Kyodo News.
QUESTION: Hello, Mr. Secretary. My question is about reintroduction of
the UN inspectors back to Iraq.
D/S ARMITAGE: Yes.
QUESTION: At this moment, what kind of achievement can you expect by
those inspections again back to Iraq?
D/S ARMITAGE: Iraq, you mean.
QUESTION: Iraq, yes.
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I'd have two comments on that. Inspections
themselves are not the end, they're simply a means. I'll note that the
relevant UN Security Council resolutions, in particular Resolution
687, calls not just for inspections but disarmament, that is the
destruction of weapons of mass destruction, and that is the end, and
that's what I would keep my eye on. And I would just note with
interest, I believe it was Hans Blix in the Sunday TV shows in
Washington, who stated that the Iraqi regime started to show a little
nervousness and a little more, quote, "flexibility" once the United
States started getting very serious about the question of -- again --
of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.
MODERATOR: The gentleman in the middle.
QUESTION: Takashi Yokota of The Los Angeles Times. If President Bush
decides to attack Iraq, what would you expect of Japan in terms of
support, considering its legal restrictions?
D/S ARMITAGE: If I understand the question correctly, it was: If
President Bush decides to attack Iraq, what would we expect the
government of Japan to do? Well, I think I'd refer you to the
government of Japan. I shouldn't make a prediction on what any
sovereign government would do or not do.
QUESTION: (inaudible)
D/S ARMITAGE: No, I would think I'd give you an expectation after I'd
engaged in intensive consultations on the subject and after we've laid
a probable case, but I think I don't want to engage and try and judge
a government's reaction prior to having heard all the facts.
MODERATOR: The gentleman on the aisle.
QUESTION: Mark Simkin, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. Could
I ask about the trilateral talks with Australia and Japan today. What
was discussed, and were any decisions made?
D/S ARMITAGE: (laughs) Nice try. (laughter) We took advantage of the
fact that Vice Foreign Minister Takeuchi was here, and I was able to
be here at the same time as Ashton Calvert, the Under Secretary in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra, former Ambassador
to Tokyo I might add, was also here. We talked the full range of
issues, mostly regional. We spoke about Iraq a little bit. No
decisions were made because no decisions were asked for.
MODERATOR: Yes?
D/S ARMITAGE: One more.
MODERATOR: OK.  Last question.
QUESTION: My name is Yokota with Nikkei Financial Paper. During the
Gulf War, Iraq attacked Israel with SCUD missiles so many times, and
at that time the United States asked them not to retaliate. And now
the Israeli government deploys, you know, the latest missile defense
systems, and they expect the Iraqi attack again in case of a U.S.
attack against Iraq. In this case, are you going to ask Israel not to
retaliate again? Are you going to allow them to strike back? Thank
you.
D/S ARMITAGE: Well, I think that I'd have to know the circumstances
surrounding the event, which you describe. I think it's very difficult
to keep a country from defending themselves. I think the circumstances
surrounding would very much depend on what the United States and the
coalition might be doing at the time, and it would be determined also
by what was the extent of the attack. But I think no one could gainsay
the intent and the readiness and the willingness of Israel to fully
defend itself at any moment.
MODERATOR: Thank you Mr. Secretary.
D/S ARMITAGE: Thank you all very much.
MODERATOR: Thank you, ladies and gentlemen.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)