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06 August 2002

Ambassador Wolf Says Iraqi Efforts to Rearm Cannot Be Ignored

(Interview with Dublin Radio) (2580)
The U.N. sanctions on Iraq have played an important role in denying
Saddam Hussein access to Iraq's vast oil revenues to strengthen his
military and in facilitating the flow of consumer goods to Iraqi
civilians, Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation John Wolf
said in an interview with Dublin Radio August 2.
"[T]he sanctions that were in place in 1991 until now have made it
more difficult for Iraq to acquire the kind of technologies and
equipment that it needs to reconstitute arms programs that are
prohibited by the United Nations. It hasn't stopped them, but it has
certainly made them more difficult. The sanctions programs have
controlled 12 to 13 billion dollars worth of oil revenue last year, a
little bit less this year, but had that money been in Saddam Hussein's
hands, it would have gone for weapons before it went for food,
medicine and anything else that the Iraqi people actually need," Wolf
said.
"Our goal is to see the disarming of Iraq and the ending of the threat
that Iraq poses," he added.
Wolf said during the four years since U.N. weapons inspectors were
expelled from Iraq, the regime has been working to obtain chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them.
"[I]t is very clear to anybody who cares to look that in the four
years since, Iraq has been working very hard, without the benefit of
inspectors being there, to reconstitute its chemical, biological and
nuclear weapons and the missiles that would deliver them," Wolf said.
Asked if he is concerned about "leaky" sales of prohibited nuclear
materials in the international markets, Wolf said the United States is
very concerned and working bilaterally with countries to tighten
export controls.
"It's not enough for exporters simply to say 'I don't know' or 'I
didn't know that this particular broker or middle man was then going
to sell it on to a country that is trying to develop weapons of mass
destruction.' That's a cop-out and it's not sufficient in the wake of
September 11th. There can be no question that we all need to heighten
our scrutiny," he told Dublin Radio.
"Iraq with these weapons poses a threat in its region, and it poses a
threat beyond the region, and that's something that none of us should
be willing to tolerate," he said, noting the importance international
consensus plays in diminishing the threat.
Following is the full transcript of Assistant Secretary for
Nonproliferation John Wolf's August 2 interview with Dublin Radio.
(begin transcript)
QUESTION: This morning Iraq announced that it would begin what it
calls technical talks about the resumption of UN weapons inspections
to the country. In the past weeks there has been growing speculation
that this issue would be used by America as a pretext for the invasion
of Iraq, and many see the Iraqi move today as an attempt to stave this
off. If this is the case, it calls into question a sanctions policy
followed by the US and the UN, and I put this to John Stern Wolf, the
US Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation.
AMB. WOLF: Well, sanctions have worked in the past, and we think that
they do work. Sanctions certainly worked in the case of South Africa,
. but what's important is maintaining an international consensus. If
we focus on Iraq, the sanctions that were in place in 1991 until now
have made it more difficult for Iraq to acquire the kind of
technologies and equipment that it needs to reconstitute arms programs
that are prohibited by the United Nations. It hasn't stopped them, but
it has certainly made them more difficult. The sanctions programs have
controlled 12 to 13 billion dollars worth of oil revenue last year, a
little bit less this year, but had that money been in Saddam Hussein's
hands, it would have gone for weapons before it went for food,
medicine and anything else that the Iraqi people actually need.
QUESTION: Can I bring you back to the analogy with South Africa
because it is an intriguing one? Many argue that the reason sanctions
worked in South Africa was that there was a white middle class that
ran the place, that benefited from the regime and that ultimately
suffered both in their pocket and psychologically from sanctions. In
the case of let's say Mr. Milosevic in Belgrade or Mr. Hussein, there
isn't the same structure of support for the leader and, as a
consequence, sanctions tend to criminalize the economy and prolong the
dictatorship.
AMB. WOLF: The problem we are trying to deal with, for instance, in
Iraq is controlling the vast amount of resources that Iraq gets from
oil revenue, and the 'Oil for Food Program' does that. It's been
specifically recast to make very clear that the program is designed to
enable Iraq to purchase those things that it needs for its civilian
economy, while creating a watch list, a goods review list of sensitive
technologies that could be used by Iraq to reconstitute its military
prowess. It's important to focus on the differences. These sanctions
are letting things get to the civilian economy, things that people
need to survive and things that the Iraqi government has shown a
cavalier disinterest in, in the past. But under the United Nations, we
will be able to assure that those things get to the civilian economy.
On the other hand, the things that Iraq needs to build chemical and
biological weapons, nuclear weapons and missiles we will hope to stop.
QUESTION: Can I ask you about the politics of sanctions? In Europe in
particular, to a very small degree in the United States, but in Europe
in particular, the political propaganda that Mr. Hussein has got from
sanctions, in galvanizing an image of Iraqi children suffering
dramatically from a lack of health spending for example, has in some
way enflamed European opinion. It certainly enflamed Arab opinion and,
as a consequence, would seem to be rather retrograde for the United
States' view, which is to try and isolate the man.
AMB. WOLF: Well, yes. If you accept your proposition, then one should
simply lift sanctions and let Saddam Hussein buy whatever he wants. I
think the fact that Saddam Hussein has.had been doing better on the
p.r. side reflects our inability to make a proper case, but it doesn't
change the soundness of the policy that we are pursuing. The policy is
designed to deny him access to those technologies that he is trying to
acquire to rebuild his chemical weapons, his biological weapons, his
nuclear weapons and his ability to deliver them, to deliver those
things by missiles. No one should be under any illusion that that is
not happening. It is happening, and he is doing it. The sanctions are
designed to limit his access.
QUESTION: Now in recent weeks, we've had two specific UN weapons
inspectors, former weapons inspectors from Iraq, suggesting that the
capability of Mr. Hussein has been over inflated and ultimately the UN
inspectors have done their job very well, and this is something that
Saddam does not necessarily have, this potential.
AMB. WOLF: Well, there's a kind of cottage industry among former UN
special commission experts. They make a living going around talking
about it. I guess they need to have something to talk about. Whatever
the facts that they ascribe, whatever they say about the facts
pre-1998, when UNSCOM was kicked out by the Iraqi government, the fact
is that the UN public record, the Amorim report, and other public
statements by UN officials make clear that there was work that was
still to be done when the inspections were ended in 1998, and it is
very clear to anybody who cares to look that in the four years since,
Iraq has been working very hard, without the benefit of inspectors
being there, to reconstitute its chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons and the missiles that would deliver them. That work goes on.
They are rebuilding buildings that were used in the weapons program.
They are trying to buy dual use technology and then to divert it from
the legitimate purpose for which it was purchased and to put it into
these facilities. They are reconstituting their biological weapon
production capability, their chemical weapons production capability.
They're working on missiles, and they are doing procurement in the
international market place that suggests that they may also be trying
to reconstitute their nuclear program.
QUESTION: Can I ask you about the international market place, which
seems to be very leaky with respect to non-proliferation? Does it
worry you greatly that countries like Ukraine are seeing it as
absolutely necessary and imperative to sell some nuclear technology on
the open market, or so we've been led to believe?
AMB. WOLF: Well I don't know about nuclear technology. We've had
conversations with the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian
government has worked on tightening its export controls. We are very
concerned by leakages; we believe that it is important that
manufacturers and the governments that license exports look very
carefully at the destinations for exports. It's not enough for
exporters simply to say 'I don't know' or 'I didn't know that this
particular broker or middle man was then going to sell it on to a
country that is trying to develop weapons of mass destruction.' That's
a cop-out and it's not sufficient in the wake of September 11th. There
can be no question that we all need to heighten our scrutiny.
Technologies that have benign purposes, technologies that can be used
for good, making vaccines for instance, can also be used to make
biological weapons material. So one needs to look if one's going to
sell. One ought to think what one is being asked to sell, and
licensing officials in the EU, in western countries and in the
developing world need to look because proliferators will go wherever
they find a weak export control regime.
QUESTION: Now Assistant Secretary John Wolf, earlier on you mentioned
the, at the very beginning of this interview you mentioned the need to
solidify the coalition around Iraq. This coalition seems to be
fragmenting, not least because the flash point that is the Middle East
seems to be dividing Europe, United States and particularly some of
America's more formally client allies in the Middle East.
AMB. WOLF:  And the question is?
QUESTION:  The question is how are you going to keep it together?
AMB. WOLF: I think people need to recognize the threat that Iraq
poses. This is a country which is making an assertive effort to
acquire weapons of mass destruction in complete contravention of a set
of mandatory UN resolutions passed, albeit passed 11 years ago, but
just as valid today. Iraq with these weapons poses a threat in its
region, and it poses a threat beyond the region, and that's something
that none of us should be willing to tolerate.
QUESTION: Can I ask you finally, many people are looking for a pretext
for an American attack on Iraq. Many people are saying that America
will have to have some reason to go ahead with this much touted war on
Iraq that has been mentioned over the last couple of months. Could
using a failure to meet UN regulations on inspections be reconciled
with stepping outside of the UN framework and as a consequence used as
an excuse to launch an attack on Iraq?
AMB. WOLF: Eleven years ago the world passed a series of resolutions,
including resolution 687. They called for the disarmament of Iraq.
When we did it then, the world community did it with a good purpose,
which was to stop the threat that Iraq posed in its region and beyond.
That resolution is still being observed in the breach. Iraq has not
disarmed; indeed it is developing weapons of mass destruction. Those
weapons pose a threat. Our goal, the United States' goal is, on the
one hand, to see the full disarmament of Iraq in compliance with that
resolution. We also think that the current government in Iraq is the
kind of government, which also poses a threat to the Iraqi people.
If.you talked earlier about the privations that are suffered by the
Iraqi people, that's not because of sanctions, that was because the
Iraqi government diverted money and it diverted goods from the people
and their legitimate needs to the military and their illegitimate
needs. That's the problem that Iraq poses, and it's the problem that
we need to deal with. It won't get any better simply by burying our
heads in the sand.
QUESTION:   Was that a yes or no answer?
AMB. WOLF: That was a "the problem won't get better if we bury our
heads in the sand."
QUESTION: The question was whether it could be used to.as a pretext to
launch an attack on Iraq.
AMB. WOLF: Our goal is to see the disarming of Iraq and the ending of
the threat that Iraq poses in its region and the threat that the Iraqi
government poses to its own people.
QUESTION: Assistant Secretary John Stern Wolf, thank you very much
indeed for talking to me this morning.
AMB. WOLF: It was my pleasure, thank you very much. Have a good day.
(end transcript)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)