02 August 2002
Senate Panel Hears Discussion of U.S. Strategies toward Iraq
((Foreign Relations Committee considers diplomatic, military options)) (1130) By Benjamin Gross Washington File Staff Writer Washington -- Members of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations consulted with a panel of experts July 31 on how to deal with Iraq's persistent flouting of U.N. Security Council resolutions. The meeting was part of a two-day series of hearings intended to assess the threat posed by Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, the range of actions available to the United States, and the effect of such actions on other nations of the region. "We must confront clear dangers with a new sense of urgency and resolve," Committee Chairman Joseph Biden said in his opening remarks. "Saddam Hussein's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction is one of those clear dangers, even if the right response is not so clear." To examine the full range of possible responses to the Iraqi threat, the panel comprised a wide range of diplomatic and military experience. It included Robert Gallucci, Dean of the Georgetown School of Foreign Service; Charles Deulfer, former deputy executive chairman of the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM); Gen. Joseph Hoar, former commander-in- chief of U.S. Central Command; Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, former assistant vice chief of staff of the U.S. Air Force; and Dr. Morton Halperin, a senior fellow on the Council for Foreign Relations. The witnesses presented two general strategies to deal with the Iraqi regime's plans to develop nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction. The first option builds upon the containment strategy already in place, expanding the U.N. embargo and reinstating U.N. weapons inspection programs. The second embraces a military campaign intended to forcibly remove Saddam Hussein from power and destroy Iraq's ability to pursue WMD. Gallucci, the first speaker, argued in favor of the containment option, suggesting that a military strike would only provoke the Iraqi government to continue work on its WMD program. Instead, he suggested the international community learn from earlier U.N. inspections and design a more politically plausible inspection regime with more effective deterrents. "This inspection regime would be designed to prevent Iraq from manipulating the inspection process," Gallucci explained. "It would aim to strike the right balance, linking the inspection regime to an invasion if Iraq fails to cooperate, without being so robust as to appear to inevitably presage a move to overthrow the Iraqi government." Halperin presented an alternative containment strategy which he termed "containment plus." This option would coordinate a regional tightening of the embargo with economic compensation for resultant trade losses to the neighboring states. "Rather than pressing states that border Iraq to provide base rights for unilateral military action against Iraq, we would be pressing them to end the smuggling and trade in violation of the U.N. embargo, assist them in monitoring their borders and the flow of material into and out of Iraq," he said. Halperin also emphasized that although a military campaign could be relatively short, the potential economic and human costs would likely outweigh the benefits. "There can be no question the military cost of this option will be enormous," he said, adding that it is clear that members of the international alliance will not pay that cost as they did at the time of the Gulf War. "I think we are entitled to know what these budget costs are and whether we will pay for them with larger deficits, new taxes, or drastic cuts in domestic spending," he said. Furthermore, Halperin warned, "a very compelling case can be made that even the successful implementation of this option with relatively small direct costs would increase the risk of terrorist attacks directed at the United States." Although they supported a more aggressive approach toward regime change, both Hoar and McInerney agreed that the success of any military or diplomatic strategy would rely on cooperation with key states within the region. Considered along these lines, Hoar argued, the United States might wish to wait until further progress has been made in the Arab-Israeli peace process. "If we were to make progress on the peace process, many things would be possible for us," Hoar said. "For example, disarmament in the region after a peace process would be a much easier hurdle to vault than to try and do it now." Deulfer compared the present situation in Iraq to that of Germany following World War I, noting that the current regime has undermined an international mandate banning the possession of certain types of weapons. And, as in that case, he noted, an inspection strategy proved an ineffective long-term strategy. Instead, the international community should rally together to ensure a new government is put into power, he said. "Limited actions by the international community will have limited effects," Deulfer warned. The threat will continue to grow, he said, and "this is clearly an issue where the United States must lead, one way or the other." Ultimately, Duelfer concluded, this is a political issue and the most important people to consult with in the coming months would be representatives of the Iraqi opposition. Based on his experiences in the country, he said, he had no doubt that the Iraqi people would be amenable to a more humane regime." Given a choice, Iraqis would not opt to live under the government of the Saddam regime," Deulfer said. "They will never achieve their vast potential under the current regime and, implicitly, senior Iraqis recognize this. They will only begin to reach their potential if they rejoin the world as part of a country with leadership that follows internationally accepted norms." (The Washington File is a product of the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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