Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

DATE=08/3/2002

TYPE=ON THE LINE

NUMBER=1-01168

TITLE= A COMING WAR WITH IRAQ?

INTERNET=Yes

EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY 619-0037

CONTENT=

THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE

{Please note: This is a rerun of On the Line number 1-01164, originally broadcast 7/27/02.}

Host: A coming war with Iraq? Next, On the Line.

Host: Iraq is an ever-growing danger to the U-S and its allies, including Turkey. Saddam Hussein is supporting suicide bombers in the Middle East. He is continuing his quest for nuclear weapons. Saddam demonstrated his willingness to use weapons of mass destruction when he attacked Iran with poison gas in the 1980s. He has gassed thousands of Iraqi Kurds. On a recent visit to Turkey, U-S Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz discussed the dangers of leaving Saddam Hussein in power:

Wolfowitz: "The current regime in Iraq is a serious danger to the United States and to other countries because it's hostile to us, because it supports terrorism, because it has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking to develop more. But the President has not made the hard decisions about what we need to do to deal with that danger."

Host: President George W. Bush has made it clear that the U-S intends to remove the Iraqi dictator from power. How will the U-S pursue regime change in Iraq? I'll ask my guests, Charles Duelfer, a former weapons inspector in Iraq and now a visiting resident scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Gary Schmitt, executive director of the Project for the New American Century; and Stephen Hayes, staff writer for The Weekly Standard magazine. Welcome gentleman. Thanks for joining us today.

Host: Stephen Hayes, let me start by asking you. You wrote an article recently for The Weekly Standard about the debate within the administration about what to do about Iraq and when to do it. What's the state of play in the administration?

Hayes: Well, within the administration, I think, a consensus has formed. It is clear that President Bush has been saying since, really, late November, that regime change in Iraq was his policy, was his government's policy. Since then, there have been many discussions about how to do this. You know, ground troops versus air power versus working with Iraqi opposition groups or a combination of all of those. And I'd say those discussions are ongoing, they're fluid. There haven't been any firm decisions made about them.

Host: Gary Schmitt, let me ask you. Is the decision made yet, and what would that decision be?

Schmitt: I think the decision has been made. Frankly, I think that the idea that the president hasn't already put in place plans for operating against Iraq is somewhat misleading. He hasn't signed on the bottom line [and said]: "This is what we're doing tomorrow." But I think the decision has been made and I actually think they're fairly far along in planning.

Host: What do you think that decision is?

Schmitt: It's absolutely to remove Saddam, and I think, as we say, it's the big option, which [means] probably two-hundred-thousand troops.

Host: Charles Duelfer, do you think that decision has been made?

Duelfer: I think there's a decision in a commitment that [the] regime has to go. I think there's been direction to the agencies to provide options, including military options. But where the problem is right now that the administration is wrestling with is how do you connect military action with political objectives? And remember the changing of regimes is very different than just expelling Iraqi troops from Kuwait, as they did in 1991. That was a purely military activity. Changing a regime is fundamentally a political activity. And right now they've got to face the issue of what are the organizing principles on the policies? How do we sell this to the international community? And most importantly, how do we connect military plans with political objectives? For example, should the objective be to destroy the Iraqi army? Maybe not if that's one of the elements of glue that holds Iraq together as an entity. But these are the issues they're dealing with now.

Host: Now would that have to take in some decision made that the Iraqi army is somehow not ultimately loyal to Saddam Hussein? Is that a determination that is being looked at?

Duelfer: These are things that they're evaluating now. One is looking now hard at the day-after kinds of issues. Yes, we can defeat -- militarily -- Iraq. There's no question about that. But we want to make sure that on the back end of this we come up with something that is better: an Iraq which is part of the international community; an Iraq which can be an engine of development in the Middle East; an Iraq with whom we can have relations. These are all the core things we want. But we want to figure out how to do that with the least amount of damage in a military operation.

Host: Stephen Hayes, who is looking at this political question? Sort of what to do after Saddam is out of power.

Hayes: It's a number of different bodies, and some people who aren't officially looking at it, want to be looking at it. Congress for instance, next week will begin holding a series of hearings, starting next Wednesday [July 31] and Thursday [August 1]. Senator [Joseph R.] Biden's foreign relations committee is going to look at a lot of the questions that Charles was talking about. You know, what happens on the day after? I think that is of particular interest to Senator Biden. So I think that they're looking at those kinds of plans. And at the highest levels of the administration, they are talking about these day-after plans in addition to the actual war planning. And I think the fact that we're having these kinds of discussions, these advanced discussions, really makes the point that our plans for going to Iraq are a lot farther along than media reports have suggested.

Host: Gary Schmitt, what would this plan for what Iraq might look like post-Saddam, what are those plans shaping up as?

Schmitt: Well, to be brutally honest, I think Charles is right. One of the difficulties here is not only just winning the war, but also winning the peace. And I think the administration has been somewhat slow in taking up that issue. I think, if anything, the decision not to go to war right away will be predicated on the fact that they don't in fact have these day-after plans set up. Now I think people are working very hard at this point on that, but whether they're ready to go is a different matter.

Duelfer: Eric, on this point, we've also got to look for some important consultations which are going to have to take place between Washington and other key capitals, including capitals in the region. You saw in your lead-in that Paul Wolfowitz was in Turkey, and this is a key beginning of a dialogue. What we have to [do] as a country [is] put together a very cogent rationale for this. I think we can. I think we can make an excellent case about why this is good for the international community and why the international community is justified in intruding over the questions of sovereignty in this particular case. But we've got to do that, and we're going to have to do that over the next couple of months.

Host: Well, Charles Duelfer, you bring up this issue of consultations with allies. And we had a clip there from Paul Wolfowitz in Turkey. Let's go back and look at another clip from that same speech and hear a little bit more about what Paul Wolfowitz had to say while he was in Turkey.

Wolfowitz: "There are certain things that we can say very clearly. We would like to see an Iraq that's democratic, an Iraq that maintains the territorial integrity of the country, to include an Iraq that does not lead to the creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. We want to see an Iraq that's at peace with its neighbors, and an Iraq that treats its minorities fairly, including the Turkmens."

Host: Gary Schmitt, in that speech in Turkey, Paul Wolfowitz was going through a bunch of issues that are of particular interest to Turkey. What does that tell us about how the U-S is dealing with its allies in trying to build support for a confrontation with Saddam?

Schmitt: Well again, I think this is an indication of how soon we are about ready to go to war. Precisely because Wolfowitz was there talking about these post-war issues: the Kurds, the integrity of Iraq, and those things and debt relief, frankly, for Turkey. So, these discussions are pretty far along. And I would say these discussions have actually been happening with a lot of states in the region, below the radar screen as well.

Host: Stephen Hayes, the integrity of Iraq, why is that of particular interest to Turkey?

Hayes: I think Turkey wants to make sure that Iraq's borders stay as Iraq's borders. There are concerns within the Turkish government that the Kurds don't have a separate state, which they worry could lead Turkish Kurds to leave Turkey and could upset the economic balance, and all sorts of unrest might result. But just to follow-up on something that Gary said. Another important thing about the Wolfowitz speech, with respect to Turkey in particular, is that he went to these meetings leaning forward. Which is to say he went in to say, essentially: "We're going to do this. We really need you. We'd like to have you, but this is something we are planning to do." And, you know, U-S media hasn't been reporting that, but the Turkish prime minister who came out of the meeting with Wolfowitz had no illusions. He said, "It's clear from my discussions, that the U-S is going to intervene militarily in Iraq."

Host: Charles Duelfer, the prime minister of Turkey also said then to Turkish television recently that the U-S is mistaken if it thinks it can defeat Saddam quickly, and rather that it is likely to take a very long time. How convinced is Turkey of the U-S plan and its willingness to go along?

Duelfer: This is a key point in the American strategy, and not only with respect to Turkey but also with respect to all key audiences. Most importantly, the audience of Iraqis in Iraq. The point is, audiences, these people need to be starting to think about their relationship with the next government in Baghdad. Where do they want to be with respect to the next government in Baghdad? So the United States has to convince everyone: "This time, we're dead serious. This regime is on its last legs, it's going to be gone." And that is vital, both politically and militarily, because to succeed in both of those forms -- politically and militarily -- we want to convince as many Iraqis and others as possible that life gets much better when they get new management in Baghdad. Life will get much better and, therefore, why should they oppose this international intervention? So all this fits together in a political strategy, which has to be propagated.

Host: Gary Schmitt, has the U-S convinced Europe, allies in the Middle East, people in Iraq, that there is no ambiguity about what's going to happen here?

Schmitt: I think they have. And I think the other key part here is that the reason why when this military action takes place it will be a large-scale one is precisely because the administration wants to do this decisively. Now decisively really matters because you want to convince your friends in the region and your friends in Europe that this is not going to wind up being a long drawn-out thing. We want to send the signal that the U-S is getting rid of them and it's going to be quick, and there are going to be new people in charge in a rapid way. And that's the way you in fact keep your allies with you.

Host: Stephen Hayes, let's talk a little bit about what Gary brings up in terms of what kind of operation may be taken against Saddam Hussein. After the success in Afghanistan, a lot of people were saying this might be a new model that would be pursued: look for the opposition within a country, support them with air power, let them do the ground work. Is that what it's going to be in Iraq? Or are planners in the U-S leaning more toward heavy U-S involvement of troops on the ground?

Hayes: I think that's a key question and I think it's the latter of the two options that you laid out. The way that it was described to me when I was doing reporting for this piece in the current issue of the Weekly Standard, was that essentially the general laid out a big plan. It's two-hundred [-thousand] to three-hundred-thousand troops and they did so to err on the side of caution. But that all of the discussions that have taken place within the administration since then have used that as sort of the benchmark. And while other options have been discussed or entertained or deliberated, that is the one that most administration officials seem to be keen on.

Host: Charles Duelfer, what kind of response is Saddam Hussein preparing? You were a weapons inspector in Iraq, what weapons does he have at his disposal and is he willing to use them?

Duelfer: He's got a lot of weapons at his disposal. Not all of them are military. He's already in a serious diplomatic strategy. Recall back in the winter, in February, the common wisdom was that America might take military action as early as this past April. At that point in time, Saddam began dialogue with the U-N about perhaps re-admitting inspectors. They've had discussions recently on that in Vienna between the foreign minister and [U-N Secretary General] Kofi Annan. Those are now on ice. I would expect Saddam to restart those discussions when it appears that the American military action is becoming more proximate. But in addition to that diplomatic strategy, he does have military things. I mean, Saddam is a proactive guy. He's just not going to sit there and wait. He will do something and we may not be able to predict it. He can do military things. He can do terrorism things. He's going inflame the Israeli-Palestinian problem. There are all kinds of things and we need to be braced for that.

Host: Gary Schmitt, on the question of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, already Saddam Hussein has been engaged in giving money to the families of suicide bombers. How much is he going to bank on trying to keep things destabilized in Palestine as a way to keep the U-S off-balance?

Schmitt: I think he'll try everything he can in that regard. But I actually think the Bush administration, by now talking about the key to the peace process being the democratization of the Palestinian Authority, in some ways has moved the discussion off of an agenda that Saddam can in fact change or influence dramatically. The Bush administration has changed the terms of reference and I don't think Saddam can play in that game. Now he will try and we should be, as Charles says, aware of all the possibilities. But on the other hand, I don't think he has that card really to play anymore.

Host: Stephen Hayes, just on the military options that Saddam Hussein might have, clearly he has chemical weapons. Are plans in the U-S taking into account the possibility that Saddam Hussein would try to use chemical weapons or some other weapon of mass destruction?

Hayes: Absolutely. General [Tommy R.] Franks has briefed the President at least three times now, most recently a week ago from Wednesday [July 17]. And of the two -- he mentions, specifically, two major concerns -- one of them is obvious: chemical, biological weapons attacks when we have troops on the ground. The second is urban warfare. I was told that Franks has been fairly reassuring on the second of those points, but the first point remains an open question. I think we have to prepare for all of these possible options, I think, when his back is against the wall. I would be surprised if he wouldn't try those kinds of things.

Duelfer: Eric, let me jump in here. The question is always asked, well, what does he have now? One thing you can say with certainty is whatever he has now is less than he had in 1991. Less in terms of biological agent, less in terms of chemical agent - but he does have it in quantity. The question will be quality, and in 1991 he was deterred from using this. And I had this conversation with various senior Iraqis, ministers, and they argued that, yes, Saddam was deterred because of the threats that the United States made if he used these things. The question is this time will he be? And the answer is likely no. But can we deal with this militarily? I think we probably can. It's a containable threat. The missiles are limited in number and they don't have good warheads for these types of agents. The real question in my mind is -- does he use these things in some kind of terrorist way? And that is a very big question.

Hayes: Do you mean in advance in a terrorist way?

Duelfer: Either in advance or as a way of disrupting an attack. I mean it's just something which is not predictable. The military approach, I mean, he can use C-W [chemical weapons] and B-W [biological weapons] in artillery pieces. Aircraft in principle could be used for aerosol dispersal, but we're going to control the airspace. And the SCUD missiles only had impact fuses on the warheads, which means that there's either a very limited local dispersal or if it's a biological agent it gets incinerated on impact.

Host: How did he disperse chemical weapons when he used gas against Iran in the eighties?

Duelfer: In Iran he used a large mixture of artillery rounds -- a hundred-twenty-and-two millimeter rockets, a hundred-and-fifty-five millimeter artillery shells -- loaded with either mustard -- which is a blister agent -- or a Sarin [nerve gas]. And he also used, in the air force he used an aerial gravity bombs, two-hundred-and-fifty gauge munitions, dropped on troop concentrations. But again, we will control the airspace and the artillery rockets and hundred-and-fifty-five millimeter is limited in range and we can affect that by dispersing our troops in and out and fitting them with protective gear if necessary.

Host: Gary Schmitt, how is the debate currently going in Europe and with other allies? Britain has talked about being satisfied if Iraq were to open up to inspections. Does Saddam have a way of derailing plans if he does move forward with allowing inspectors back in?

Schmitt: Well the kinds of inspections that the United States and even Britain would want, there is no way that Saddam will accept. So I think that is sort of a false lead that the British put out. They're firmly behind us in the fact that there are lots of stories about their training already with the U-S for leading up to the military operation. As for the other European capitals, I don't see a single European capital, from what I have been told, that will actively oppose what we are doing. And in fact, some will join us in the operations as well.

Host: Stephen Hayes, what's your sense of the consensus among U-S allies with regard to Iraq?

Hayes: I think Gary is exactly right. It is important that we be seen as leaning forward, as I said before, with Paul Wolfowitz having been dispatched to Turkey and similar missions being taken. The way to make the argument is [say] "Here's what we know. Here's what we've got on Saddam. Here are possible Saddam-al-Qaida links and here is what we are going to do about it." Lay that out and say: "Please come along. We need your help."

Host: What are these Saddam-al-Qaida links? Is there a smoking gun at this point?

Hayes: The reports that I've gotten, there are some public reports. There was a very good article in the New Yorker by reporter Geoffrey Goldberg that detailed some of the alleged connections between a relatively new al-Qaida cell called Antar al-Islam that has been working with Saddam's intelligence service fairly extensively. It is hard to tell if that's a pocket -- which is what I suspect -- or if there is a kind of broader cooperation. We've seen reports of coordination or at least, again, pockets of cooperation dating back since 1992. So, if they can make that link, it is a compelling link to use in the argument with our allies. The administration seems right now -- they've got a team at the Pentagon who is investigating these links right now, reviewing past intelligence [and] looking for additional links that might have been missed. They have some solid links, but nothing linking Saddam directly to September 11th.

Host: Charles Duelfer, does the U-S need to have some kind of direct link between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden to convince its allies?

Duelfer: No. To narrowly define the Iraq problem under this regime as being one of just a specific terrorist incident or just specifically weapons of mass destruction is a mistake because it too narrowly defines the problem. But what we've got to anticipate and look forward to is, you know, as this becomes an approaching war, there is going to be increasing attention and activity to try to defuse it. Try to find a peaceful solution. One can expect [U-N] Secretary General Kofi Annan to become more directly involved. One can expect other leaders, as happened in 1991, to be invited to Baghdad to try to find a peaceful solution. And in that context we can expect to see Saddam give a concession of some form by accepting inspectors. So we have to be thinking ahead in terms of what political game lies ahead.

Host: I'm afraid we only have a few seconds left. I want to get one more quick question in to Gary. We talked about European opinion, world opinion -- what's the U-S sense of opinion on going to war with Iraq?

Schmitt: The public is behind the President's decision and if the war goes successfully, it will be a huge political success as well.

Host: Well, I'm afraid we don't have any more time, even though there is a lot more to talk about. I'd like to thank my guests for joining me today, Charles Duelfer from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Gary Schmitt from the Project for a New American Century, and Stephen Hayes of The Weekly Standard. For On the Line, I'm Eric Felten.