Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

- On August 1^st 1991, the former Executive Chairman of the Special Commission Ekeus notified the Iraqi side in a formal letter that the Special Commission has decided to implement aerial surveillance over the Iraqi territories. This was to be conducted temporarily, by aircraft that can fly in high altitudes to ensure and supervise the Iraqi compliance with SCR 687(1991). In this letter he has clarified the notification procedures concerning these flights. He also made it clear that if Iraq refuses these flights, the Special Commission would insist on conducting them and provide the necessary measures to protect the aircraft.

- Rolf Ekeus made it clear to the permanent representative of Iraq in New York that the aircraft used for this purpose would be American and take off from the Saudi territories. If Iraq refuses the idea, the aircraft would be escorted by combat planes for protection.

- In response to the letter of Ekeus , Iraq expressed on August 6^th 1991 its protest to the idea in a formal letter. This is due to the fact the choice of American aircraft and pilot would raise doubts. The doubts are centered on the idea that the UNSCOM would only be a cover to achieve purposes other than those intended by the U.N, Iraq insisted that only the Secretary General or the President of the Security Council should have the authority to issue the flying orders. At the end of the letter, Iraq insisted that there was no intention to hinder the surveillance flights. This was meant to refute the claims of the ill-intentioned parties. Instead, Iraq made it obvious that protest was expressed only to safeguard the national security against spying.

This is a naturally expected consequence after the revelations made by a number of UNSCOM members among them was Scott-Ritter. This was related, in particular, to the flight of the American aircraft (U2), which was used for spying purposes under a UN cover.

- On August 12^th 1991 the American aircraft (U2) violated, for the first time, the Iraqi air space. In a letter to the Secretary General Iraq expressed its protest. On August 19^th 1991, Iraq asked the Secretary General to present confirmation that all the data and photos gathered by the aircraft should be in the possession of the UN and be used only for the purposes of the UNSCOM stated in SCR687. Unfortunately Iraq received no positive response in relation to its demands not to its confirmation about the manner in which the data or photos would be dealt with.

- It is worth mentioning that no reference has been made in SCR687 to the aerial surveillance. In spite of this fact the UNSCOM stated in its letter that the use of the aircraft complied with its authority granted by the said resolution. Three days, after the incident of the violation, the SCR707 was issued. This with no doubt gives the conclusion that the U.S pressed hard on SC and the U.N to issue such resolution to cover its spying activities. Such activities came in full contrast with the objectives and principles of the charter of the U.N and with the legitimate rights of Iraq.

- The (U2) violated the Iraqi air space many times since then up to December 1998. Iraq keeps a record of many incidents that show, without any doubt, that the aircraft was to implement a number of spying missions. What sort of conclusion one can end up with the flight of this aircraft over Baghdad for many times, over the transportation and communication networks and over particular areas during crises. It is only to gather information about the movements of the Iraqi army and the systems of air defense. This aircraft is also involved in aerial surveillance missions before and after any Potential American aggression with a view to gathering information in relation to the targeted sites or analyzing the results of the air strikes after being carried out against Iraq.

* The First Plan: In August 1993 Iraq conducted discussions with a delegation of the Special Commission. The discussion was centered on the use of the Russian-made aircraft (AN-30) for the purposes of the aerial surveillance. The two parties also discussed the idea of using Mirage-F1 to meet the requirements of the Commissions activities. Field visits were organized to Iraqi printing and processing labs where aerial photos, taken by Western and Eastern aircraft, were processed. Also samples of aerial photos were handed over to the representatives of the Special Commission. These photos were taken and processed by Iraqi means. The UNSCOM showed no positive stand at all to the Iraqi initiative. The UNSCOM promised that it would have no objection in relation to what Iraq proposed on condition that the whole process should be under its direct and full control. The UNSCOM however, did not fulfil its promise.

* The Second Plan: During discussions conducted in New York in November 1993 the Iraqi side put forward practical proposals. They were in relation with the idea of using Iraqi defense means instead of foreign ones to carry out the activities of the UNSCOM. The Special Commission welcomed the proposals and expressed its willingness to consider the use of the helicopters and fixed - wing aircraft. Also it promised to expand, in the due time, the scope of the discussion to include the use of the Iraqi means for the purposes of the special commission. Regrettably the special commission turned its back to the whole subject. This happened despite the fact that the Iraqi side sent many confirming letters, in many occasions, to follow up the subject.

* The Third Plan: In June 1998, the Special Commission started to use the French aircraft (Mirage-F4) for the purposes of the aerial surveillance. The Iraqi side showed no objection. The Iraqi side exercised serious effort to make arrangements for the aircraft to fly from an Iraqi air base. Iraq promised to offer all technical facilities for the aircraft. But the Special Commission put pressure on France not to carry out the missions from Iraqi territories but in particular from Saudi bases. The Special Commission also put a severe condition. It was the American aviation experts who decided the flight route over Iraq and the sites to be photographed. The pilot had no say at all only in emergency cases. This was only to reflect the bad intentions of the Special Commission. It planned to spoil the friendly atmosphere of the relations between Iraq and France through creating crises between the officials of the two parties.

- Three evil attempts were attempted in this respect. They were discovered by the Iraqi side and fully understood by the French side. The Special Commission pressed hard on the French aircraft to violate the Iraqi air space during implementing its missions. The French side decided to stop the (Mirage-F4) from carrying out the aerial surveillance for the purposes of the Special Commission. This measurement came to support. The soundness of Iraq's views. (France terminated its participation on October 25^th 1998 after implementing 25 missions).

* The Forth Plan: It seems that Russia practiced a lot of pressure on the Special Commission. Russia pressed hard to drive the Commission to use the Russian specialized technical air means for the purposes of the aerial surveillance on equal terms with the American ones. Iraq did not express any protest in this concern. Thus Iraq put the Special Commission in a tight corner. As a result the commission showed its willingness to go back to the first plan. Technical dibetween the Iraqi side a delegation of the Special Commission was under way in response to the latter's request. A delegation of Russian officers, specialized in aerial surveillance, arrived in Iraq in June 1998. The Iraqi side promised, during the discussions, to offer its utmost technical support for the (AN-30) to implement its missions. The Iraqi side presented a proposal that the air-base (Al-Habaniyah) was to be the departing point for the aircraft to achieve its missions.

* The state subject to inspection shall have full right to supply the aircraft and crews in accordance with the technical conditions of inspection.

* In case the respective state fails to supply the aircraft that satisfies the required technical conditions the inspecting party supplies or hires an aircraft on conditions that it gains the approval of the said state.

* The state subject to inspection shall have the right to specify the type of the aircraft used for inspection purposes.

* The representatives of the state subject to inspection shall get acquainted with the equipment and sensors used aboard the aircraft for the purposes of aerial surveillance. The respective state shall have the right to examine them before, during and after the flight.

* The state subject to inspection shall have the right to nominate a number of its representatives to be aboard the aircraft of observation or aerial surveillance.

* The flights shall be carried out according to pre-arranged flight plan in the knowledge of the two parties. They shall also be in harmony with the criteria of the International Aviation Organization, the rules of the air control and the measurements of the safety of flight applied by the respective state.

* It shall be totally prohibited to have the equipment of processing or recording or re-emitting electronic signals aboard the aircraft.

* All photos, rollfilms, cassettes and analyses shall be put in a container and sealed in the presence of the representatives of the two parties as soon as they are taken out of any device. The two parties shall have the right to see how the findings of the surveillance are processed to get the final product. The party subject to inspection shall receive the second photocopied version of the product if there is only one original copy.

* The state subject to inspection shall have the right to impose restrictions with reasonable justifications or ban the flights over sensitive sites which are not involved in the process of surveillance. These restrictions can be extended to cover the flight plans (flight a latitude, number of looping, duration of hovering, types of measurements, number of inspectors, etc.)

* The state subject to inspections shall have the right to provide a lab to analyze the photos and other products. Failing to do so, the inspecting party shall bring and supply its own lab.