The Ongoing Monitoring System
Iraq implemented its obligations under the monitoring plan accompanied with the resolution 715/1991.
1. Factual report about the ongoing monitoring plan and the cooperation of Iraq.
2. Data in relation to the activity of the monitoring groups that conducted their missions right from the beginning up till 15/12/1998.
3. The involvement of a great number of sites in the monitoring system without any satisfying technical reasons.
- In the missile's field.
- In the chemical field,
- In the biological field,
- In the nuclear field,
- Imports and exports.
4. Data about the support monitoring groups and tags inspections within the period Oct. 1994 - 12/12/1998.
A Factual Report about the Ongoing Monitoring Plan
And the Cooperation of Iraq
1.In Oct. 1993
Iraq officially announced its acceptance of the resolution (715/1991) and the monitoring plan annexed to it following the Special Commission's commitments to observe Iraq's sovereignty, dignity and security. It also bound itself to make the inspection procedures less interfering and less rigid similar to those followed in the international treaties and agreements .
- Iraq showed, right from the beginning, cooperation to establish the monitoring system. Iraq also provided the Special Commission with the required logistic needs such as restorating al-Caual Hotel in order to be taken up as Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center's Headquarters and as Special Commission's Headquarter in Iraq. Also a communication system was installed including a communication tower of 100m height. It was described by the former executive chairman of the Special Commission Rolf Ekius as a symbol of the Iraqi cooperation with the commission. It was installed by Iraqi technicians within less than two weeks whereas it was planned by the Special Commission to be installed within six months.
Iraq also cooperated with the Special Commission in the area of suggesting the technical inspection means and ways due to limited experience the Special Commission's members had.
The Iraqi intensive and active efforts to establish the monitoring system came following the Special Commission's package to present a recommendation to the security council that Iraq implemented its obligations under para(22). The recommendation should come after six months following establishing and putting the system intest .
The monitoring system was put in active and intensive operation since August 1994. It was designed not only to detect any proscribed activity but also to prevent it. This was why the Special Commission took exaggerated measures to carry out its monitoring plan.
- Iraq also showed cooperation in presenting the required data in relation to the sites involved in the basic monitoring and inspection activities .
We would like to make a reference that the Special Commission and IAEA put into account the assumption that the armament programmes of Iraq were likely wider than what declared when installing the monitoring system.
The Special Commission received inaccurate data in relation to allegedly undeclared programmes from other sources. To clarify Iraq's stand additional data were disclosed by the Iraqi side in 1995. Such data did not result in substantial changes since no new sites, equipment or items were to be subjected in the monitoring system .
The National Measures
The National Monitoring Directorate (NMD) was established to express Iraq's credibility and wish to implement the monitoring plans and to show its cooperation with the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency. This directorate was established even prior to the establishment of Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Center. It took the measures to implement Iraq's commitments under the monitoring plan attached to the UN Resolutions 715(1991) and 1051(1996). It offered assistance to the monitoring groups of the Special Commission and IAEA operation at BMV center.
The NMD consists of specialized departments to handle the tasks involved in the monitoring plan : They are :
1. The Missile Department.
2. The Chemical Department.
3. The Biological Department.
4. The Nuclear Department.
5. The Import-Export Department.
6. The Operation's Department.
7. The Documentation and Translation Department.
8. The Follow-Up Department.
9. The Studies and Researches Department.
An annual budget was allocated to allow the NMD to run its activities. A liasion officer was appointed in each of the sites involved in the monitoring plan. His main and only task was to receive instructions from the NMD and to convey the information required to implement the monitoring plans attached to the UN Resolutions 715(1991) and 1051(1996).
In the field of the aerial surveillance Iraq offered the support that ensured ground services to the UNSCOM's aircraft , pilots and technicians to facilitate the operation of the helicopters used daily by the aerial surveillance team. Iraq also made available helicopters to escort the UNSCOM's aircraft and provided the ground services at al-Habaniyh airfield.
It is worth mentioning that the Special Commission promised through the letter (dated 23rd June 1992 ) of its former president Rulf Ekius that the aerial surveillance operation by helicopter would be cut down or cancelled following locating the sites involved in the ongoing monitoring system . The promise also covered the number of the technical personnel who escorted the inspection teams and monitoring groups in their surprise and planned visits. Iraq was incharge of the safety of the inspectors. It is worth mentioning that no member of the UNSCOM and IAEA was under threat or physical danger during the period of their work that extended for more than seven years.
The Iraqi air defencs ensured the safety of the Special Commission's fixed wing aircraft and helicopters in their movement and when implementing the missions of surveillance since 1991.
On May 27th 1996 the Special Commission together with IAEA started to implement the mechanism of monitoring of the import and export set up under resolution 1051(1996). Iraq fully cooperated to implement that mechanism . The mechanism covered many sites including naval and land entry points and customs offices. Each group of import and export monitoring spent days inspecting each entry point . The United Nation's offices in Baghdad such FAO , Unicef and foreign companies were involved in inspecting and verifying the mechanism of import and export. The activities of import and export monitoring group also covered offices of private commerce , small plants, companies of private sector , food companies and centres of agricultural services.
The Monitoring System
The monitoring system relied on presenting periodical , mid-annual , quarterly and monthly declarations and notifications and data according to forms previously prepared by the UNSCOM and IAEA. They should be presented by the sites involved in the monitoring plan determined by the activities of each site :
- The periodical mid-annual declarations presented (15th January and 15th July ) each year. They were handed over in many different forms and charts. They were presented by the sites involved in the chemical , biological , missile and nuclear monitoring . The volume of the data provided amounted to many thousands of pages.
- Notifications should be presented when intending to move or transfer an equipment or materials involved in the monitoring plan within the same site or from one to another ( In most cases replies to Iraqi demands came too late. This caused economic losses under the embargo conditions ).
- Notifications should be presented in forms B1, B2 and B3 when planing to import any material or equipment within the technical supplement of import and export (dual-use materials) including all activities .
- A form of data should be presented concerning any research and development project of all missiles which Iraq permitted to possess (missiles of a range not exceeding 50-150 km. ) .
- Presenting data format in relation to the concept of basic design of missiles of
(50-150 km.) range .
- Presenting monthly declarations concerproducing components of missiles of (50-150 km.) range. This involved all sites that produced such components.
- Presenting many forms of different content when putting the missiles of (50-150 km.) range on flight test. The test should be attended by inspectors.
- Presenting a format of data when intending to establish any chemical project in which dual use material or equipment might be used.
- Presenting monthly declarations about the major biological sites involved in the monitoring plan .
- Presenting a format of data when establishing new sites or activities or projects or researches on biological sites. This covered those which were still in the phase of initial design or under considerations .
- Presenting a form of quarterly data in relation to the state of production carried out by the machines and equipment monitored by the UNSCOM and IAEA- installed cameras.
- Presenting mid-annual data of the explosives (HMX , RDX and PETN ) involved in the nuclear monitoring plan.
- Presenting reports, replies and charts of the sites at the request of the UNSCOM and the IAEA when visiting them.
- Interviewing the personnel who took part in the previous programmes at the request of the UNSCOM and IAEA. These interviews meant to know the nature of their present work. The number of the personnel interviewed amounted to (1378) persons. Their interviews took (2350) hours.
Means used by the Special Commission (UNSCOM )to Implement Monitoring Plan
- The UNSCOM and IAEA selected the most complicated equipment and sensors in the field of monitoring. In 1994 they modernized some of the monitoring equipment to enhance the effectiveness of the monitoring system (without any real need for that !) . They also installed monitoring instruments and sensors whose types and distribution are detailed below :
- (130)Monitoring cameras = (130) ones
- (29) camera- monitored sites = (29) ones
- (23) Sensor-monitored sites = (23) ones
- (30) Varied sensors = (30) ones
A. (4)Movement sensors = (4) ones
B. One Electrical sensors = (1) one
C. (21) Air-sampling instruments for chemical activity = (21) ones
D. (4) Air-sampling instruments for nuclear activity = (4) ones .
The distribution of cameras and sensors on the sites was determined by the following activities :
1. The missile activity : (65) cameras were installed in (15) sites
(3) movement sensors were installed in (2) sites.
2. The biological activity : (13) cameras were installed in (3) sites
(1) movement sensor was installed in (1) site.
3. The chemical activity : (27) cameras were installed in (3) sites
(21) air-sampling instrument for chemical materials and
(1) electrical sensor.
4. The nuclear activity : (25) cameras were installed in (5) sites
(21) air-sampling instruments for radioactive materials were installed in (4) sites
When the monitoring system was in the process of being established the Special Commission promised to conduct less frequent inspections to camera and
sensor-monitored sites in order to avoid confusing the people working there. Yet , the UNSCOM never kept its promise and went on intensive inspections without any discrimination between the sites covered by the monitoring equipment and those which were not .
- Fixing stickers on instruments, equipment , machines and missiles of more than (50 km) range . The number of the stickers and seals fixed by the UNSCOM and IAEA amounted to (11105) ones .
- Random and surprise inspections were conducted to sites covered by the monitoring plan. They were conducted by the SC and IAEA's monitoring groups that resided at BMVC. These groups were specialized in the missile , chemical , biological , nuclear , export , import and air surveillance fields .
- Inspection groups specialized in the area of missile research and development. They visited Iraq two or three times a year to discuss the area of research and development and check the stickers fixed on the missiles which were covered by the monitoring plan to make sure that they were not developed or converted .
- The UNSCOM and IAEA used German helicopters (CH-53) and then Chillian ones (UH-IH). They carried out almost daily missions. The number of the flights amounted to (3952) ones during the period June 21st 1992 - December 15th 1998. And (2967) ones were for logistical purposes and to transport the inspectors. In addition (77) ones were for the purposes of Gama and radar-assisted survey. These flights took about (7496) flight hours out of which (2785 ) hours were for the purposes of the air surveillance and photography .
- The American spying aircraft (U-2) violated the Iraqi air spaces (2- 4 ) times a month. It carried out (434) missions which took (1799) flight hours.
- A French surveillance aircraft performed (25) missions. They took (31) flight hours.
- An annual radiological survey was carried out by the IAEA. It covered a large area of Iraq to make sure that there were no undeclared nuclear activities .
- Special teams to monitor the nuclear materials. They were commissioned by the IAEA to do so once a year to check the material balance and test the materials.
* Teams specialized in taking water and air samples. They were commissioned by the IAEA and the UNSCOM to do so once a year to make sure that there were no undeclared biological or chemical or nuclear activities.
* A resident team specialized in monitoring the communication system and the cameras installed on the sites covered by the monitoring plan .
The sites involved in the Monitoring plan
The number of the sites covered by the monitoring plan amounted to about (595) ones. They belong to the Government and to the private sectors . The table below shows the sites involved according to their activities :
Serial No: The Activety No. of Sites
1- The Missiles 43
2- The Chemical 170
3- The Biological 163
4- The Nuclear 219
Total: 595
It is worth mentioning that the Special Commission and IAEA made a lot of changes in their technical plans annexed to the Resolution 715 (1991) in order to harm Iraqi people. These changes particularly involved the areas of specification and the amounts of the equipment and instrument covered by the monitoring system . The number of the sites concerned with the monitoring plan were (110) ones in 1994 , they went up to (595) ones at the end of 1998. Most of these sites are production and public utilities ones and should not be involved in the plan.
* In addition to that number of sites , there were also more than (74) sites covered by mechanism of import and export monitoring plan of the UNSC`s Resolution 1051 (1996) and more than (140) secondary sites as well . Most of these sites belong to the (595) major sites .The total number almost reached (809) sites .
The Inspections of the Monitoring Groups.
The number of the surprise inspections conducted by the monitoring groups between August 1994- December 15th 1998 were as follow:
Monitoring Group NO. of Inspections
The Missile Group 1967
The chemical Group 1932
The Biological Group 1802
The Nuclear Group 2154
The Import & Export Group 645
The Camera Remote Controlled 1655
MoGroup
The Air Surveillance Group 908
The Group of Verification of Sites 101
With (claimed) capabilities and concealment
Total : 11164
Since May 27 th 1996 Iraq implemented its obligations under the Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996) (the mechanism of Import & Export Monitoring). It covered all the concerned sites.
Since the establishment of the monitoring system on August 1994 until December 15th 1998 the number of the resident monitoring groups in (BMVC)were as follow:
The Activity No of Inspection No of Inspectors
The Missile 19 221
The Clenical 16 247
The Biological 19 139
The Nuclear 78 484
The Import & Export 12 60
The Camera Remote Controlled 15 78
The Air Surveillance 31 94
The Verification of Sites with 2 9
(Claimed) Capabilities and
Concealment
Total 192 1332
Observations about the Conduct of the Monitoring Groups
The Iraqi side noticed an evident and deliberate increase in the number of the incidents that undoubtedly showed the violation to the United Nation charter and the provocative behavior of the monitoring groups. The Iraqi side also noticed that they did respect the manners of work established between the two sides in the previous years . The accumulated field experiences supported the Iraqi side`s observations. Below some of the violations:
* Conducting spying activities in the interest of states with hostile stands to Iraq such as the U.S and (Israel) .The information they gathered during their inspections was disclosed to those states as admitted by the executive chairman of the UNSCOM Richard Butler and the inspector Scott Ritter. They admitted the fact that they passed sensitive military information about Iraq to (Israel) . They also passed information to the aggressive American forces prior to their air strikes on military and industrial sites in 1998.
* Conducting air surveillance operations over certain sites . These operations were without any justification either because they were not necessary at all or the sites involved were for industrial and educational purposes. The operations aimed at creating provocation and confrontation with Iraq. Flying over campuses and taking photos of military and industrial sites (not covered by monitoring plan) were only some examples of such provocative activities and spying .
* The universities inspection was conducted in a provocative manner .Professors briefcases, benches, boots of professors and students cars and personal documents were targeted.
* They asked for Iraqi convoys to accompany them on surprise visits. The requests came only a very short time (not exceeding 20-30 minutes) before they went on their mission .They did not allow a sufficient time for the convey to drive from the NMD to BMVC even if he was fully ready for an immediate move .
They conducted intensive inspections at weekends, in official holidays and national days and religious occasions.
* Requests were handed over by the air surveillance team. Such requests confused the air defenses because they restricted them for relatively long periods and over wide areas (30.000-120.000 square km.).
* Their helicopters landed on sites which were improper to do so such as campuses or oil refineries .
* They broke padlocks and smashed doors on some sites to inspect them during official holidays.
* They delivered provocative questions unrelated to the powers of the Special Commission.
* They persisted on gaining fully detailed information about the production of the conventional ammunition and weapons..
* They requested taking photos of the conventional ammunition .
* They used their own personal cameras to take photos of the conventional ammunition .
* They used their own personal cameras to take photos of sites and equipment without any justification.
The Conclusion
* The special commission promised to carry out less interfering inspections following the establishment of the monitoring system . The system went into actual operation in 1994, but the UNSCOM did not keep its promise to apply inspection procedures similar to those adopted in the international treaties and conventions taking into account observing Iraq`s sovereignty, dignity and security (para 4,annex 2,document s/26451/on September 16th 1993). Contrary to its false promise , the Special Commission went on activities that ran against its powers granted by the Security Council Resolutions 687 and 715 (1991) when it passed sensitive information to hostile states such as the U.S and (Israel).
* The monitoring system, which was in full operation in 1994 was strict and comprehensive. Iraq showed full cooperation with the UNSCOM to implement the monitoring technical plans annexed to the Security Council Resolution 715 (1991). Iraq was also cooperative in carrying cut the mechanism of import and export under the Security Council Resolution 1051 (1996). Iraq placed hopes on such cooperation to see the SC end its activities in Iraq and that UNSC implement its commitments under para (22) of the resolution 687.
* The Special Commission did not find any proscribed activity or even an indication of such activity that ran contrary to the UN resolution 687(1991) in missile ,chemical and biological areas . This conclusion confirmed Iraq`s full implementation of its commitments under the Security Council resolutions concerned .
* The Special Commission put in use spying equipment installed at BMV center to overhear Iraqi communications . Also the Special Commission vehicles had such equipment .
* The Special Commission carried out air surveillance on civil and military sites which were not involved in the previous programs of mass destruction weapons . These sites included air bases , barracks , military depots , oil establishment such as oil wells and refineries , scientific institutions such as universities and colleges and schools ...etc.
* The American spying aircraft (U-2) gathered information about the targets the U.S. planned to hit as happened on Dec. 17th 1993 , June 26th 1993 , September 3rd 1996 and Jan . 14th 1998.
The Special Commission provided a good coverage under which the American aircraft performed its missions.
* The Special Commission delivered questions aimed at gathering intelligence information about normal military sites during the inspections . such questions covered the higher command to which the military unit belongs, its organizational structure ,the name of its commanding officer , its nature, type and number of the vehicles available , the name of its security officer, number of working hours , types of the communication means ...etc.
* A number of the Special Commission personnel behaved in such a way that did not show any respect to the Iraqi national existing regulations and laws. They violated them through irresponsible patterns of behavior . We mention only some examples of these patterns:
* A number of the Chilean helicopter crews attempted ,on June 5th 1997, to smuggle (25) cases . They contained carpets, paintings, watches, electronic instrument, manual and electrical equipment, cigarettes and other materials which were not allowed to be taken out because of the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq .
* A number of the Special Commission members drove their vehicles while they were drunk. They also committed many traffic offences which caused a huge amount of damage to Iraqi`s and their properties. The normal procedure followed in such incidents is to reto the authorities concerned . What happened was they drove away from the scenes of the incidents as happened on May 8th ,1997, April 18th 1998 and on October 22nd 1998.
* The monitoring groups of the Special Commission kept on asking for information irrelevant to their missions especially when they inspected universities and academic institutes.
Below are examples of such requests that ran contrary to the normal inspection manners.
-They asked for the names of the academic staff and the postgraduate students.
-They asked for copies of postgraduate theses.
-They asked to interview postgraduate students.
-They asked for the number of the academic staff who left Iraq for an opportunity to work abroad.
-They asked for CVs of university academic staff.
-Types of tests.
Thus, it has become quite obvious that the Special Commission and IAEA exercised unlimited authorities in carrying out their illegitimate activities . Also their members , who were partial and subjective, committed many offences.
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