Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

1. Section-C of Security Council resolution 687 states as follows, regarding the missile area:

2. In view of the requirements of paragraph 9-A above, Iraq declared, in April 1991, 48 missiles, 5 launchers and other supporting equipment which were destroyed under the supervision of the Special Commission in July 1991. Iraq partially retained 85 missiles, 9 launchers and other supporting equipment. Following the clarification of the relationship with the Special Commission and the disappearance of the danger of the resumption of military aggression which was expected then, Iraq unilaterally destroyed all the remaining items in the Summer of 1991 in compliance with paragraph 8-b of resolution 687.

3. In March 1992, Iraq disclosed to the Special Commission what it had unilaterally destroyed in the Summer of 1991. Over the period from March to May 1992, the Special Commission had dispatched 4 inspection teams to verify the destruction of those weapons and supporting equipment. The Iraqi side had cooperated with the Special Commission in the clarifying in detail the picture of this issue, and made strenuous efforts to excavate the remnants of the missiles and launchers from the destruction sites in order to enable the Special Commission to carry out the verification. The Special Commission had considered that the Iraqi declaration of the unilateral destruction of the missiles and launchers was consistent with the material evidence of the buried remnants.

4. In March 1992, the draft FFCD was submitted to the Special Commission which made its comments thereon and requested to re-write and submit the FFCD according to those comments. In June 1992, the Iraqi side submitted the FFCD in the missiles area, which contained full and complete information about Iraq's possessions of missiles with a range greater than 150 km and the related major relevant components. In that FFCD, Iraq mentioned detailed information about the projects involved in the development and production of those missiles, in terms of their sites and equipment.

5. In August and October 1992 and following the consideration, by the Special Commission, of the FFCD, large, intrusive and vigorous inspection teams were dispatched. Those inspection teams had carried out scores of surprise inspections of various sites throughout Iraq and held discussions and interviews with senior personnel in charge of the research, production and operational aspects of the missile programme. The Special Commission had also seen the consumption diaries of the missiles from their very beginning in Iraq to the end of 1990 in order to make sure of the credibility of Iraq's declarations and to verify the material balance of the missiles. UNSCOM-45 had reached a comprehensive and complete picture of the missiles file, and stated in its report to the Security Council its following conclusion:

" UNSCOM-45 discovered no weapons or item prohibited by SCR-687 (1991) . UNSCOM-45 has closed many gaps in the Special Commissions understanding of Iraqi ballistic missile program's. Further analysis of the vast amount of information obtained by UNSCOM-45 is necessary, and may result if the information provided by Iraq is not refuted by reliable evidence from other sources, in the closing of remaining gaps as well . If this occurs, it would appear that the Special Commission will have practically complete picture of Iraq's past ballistic missile programmes. "

6. After having the required clear picture of the past missile programme, the Special Commission focused its activity, in early 1993, on monitoring although Iraq at that time has not yet accepted resolution 715. For this end, the Commission dispatched three inspection teams, which were called as the Provisional Monitoring Teams. The teams through continued field work for five months, from January 1993 to May 1993 had established a data base on monitoring the activities related to missiles that are permitted to be manufactured under resolution 687 (1991). During that period, the teams made daily field visits to sites designated by them, and held detailed discussions with the senior technical personnel at those sites, with full cooperation of the Iraqi side. The Commission stated that the purpose of dispatching the Provisional Monitoring Teams was to monitor the activity of missiles with admissible range under resolution 687 (with range of 50-150 km) with a view to establishing a data base that would qualify the Commission to implement the Monitoring Plan in order to achieve all the requirements of section-C of resolution 687.

7. In 1993, the Special Commission was provided with false allegations by sources hostile to Iraq, claiming that Iraq was still in possession of proscribed missiles, launchers and missile capabilities. In order to refute those tendentious allegations, the Iraqi side proposed to the Special Commission to request every state to provide it with the information available to their respective intelligence services about Iraq's possession of such items, and after receiving that information, the Special Commission could dispatch an inspection team with any number of inspectors that it deemed appropriate, to inspect any site in Iraq. The team could stay in Iraq as long as the Special Commission wished in order to close this file completely. On the basis of that proposal, the Commission dispatched in October 1993 UNSCOM-63 comprising 100 inspectors, bringing with them sophisticated equipment, probing devices and specialized helicopters in addition to the helicopters stationed in Iraq, in order to detect any proscribed missiles, launchers or related parts under resolution 687, which the tendentious sources alleged that they were concealed and undeclared by Iraq. The team stayed in Iraq for 35 days and carried out round the clock intrusive and surprise inspections that covered sites and vast areas throughout Iraq. The team had used ground penetration radar and other sensors fixed on the helicopters brought by them. The Iraqi side had cooperated in providing all the logistic and technical requirements necessary for the work of the team. Following the completion of the team's mission, the Special Commission declared, in its report to the Security Council (S/26910-item 23), the following:

Paragraph 1 of the report underlined the team's mission as follows:

8. In February 1994, the Special Commission requested the Iraqi side to hand over the consumption diaries of the proscribed missiles which were fired before 1991 in order to make sure of the credibility of Iraq's declarations through additional forensic verification and to complete the additional verification of missiles material balance. Although the SpeCommission saw those docin October 1992, the Iraqi side had cooperated with the Commission and handed the documents over. The Special Commission had carried out forensic investigation in international labs, the results of which proved the authenticity of those documents which were returned to the Iraqi side in late April 1994.

9. Following the completion, by the Special Commission, of verifying the part concerning disarmament under resolution 687 and Iraq's official acceptance of resolution 715 in October 1993, the Commission began to use methods and procedures which were deliberately aimed at procrastination with a view to prolonging the non-implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687. The Special Commission began to put the establishment and active operation of the Monitoring System for six months as a prerequisite to implement paragraph 22 of resolution 687.

In order not to give the ill-intentioned members of the Special Commission any chance to cast doubts on Iraq's intentions, the Iraqi side had cooperated and seriously participated with the Commission in the establishment of the Monitoring System. This work which was carried out the whole 1994, simultaneously with the continued intrusive inspections and interviews with the Iraqi personnel. In June 1995, the Special Commission was compelled to openly report to the Security Council that Iraq had fulfilled its obligations under paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of resolution 687 (S/1995/494 paragraph -29).

10. The Special Commission had used the defection of Hussein Kamil in August 1995 to cast doubts again on disarmament. In October 1995, it requested the Iraqi side to re-write the FFCD of the missile programme according to formats prepared by the Commission. The Iraqi side presented a draft FFCD in October 1995, which was corroborated with thousands of supporting documents. However, the Special Commission requested additional unessential details, a matter which consequently led the Iraqi side to present a second revised version of the draft FFCD in February 1996 and another draft in May 1996. During that period, the Special Commission dispatched (4) specialized inspection teams to discuss those reports. The teams had conducted discussions and prolonged interviews, for tens of hours, with the technical personnel involved in the past missile programme. The Special Commission had made some comments which the Iraqi side took into consideration and subsequently presented the FFCD on 30 June 1996, which contained detailed information, including the material balance of missiles, launchers, warheads, propellants, supporting equipment and full information and details about the projects related to the development and production of the missiles. The Special Commission officially accepted that report and considered it as a complete report covering the whole past programme.

11. At the end of 1996, the Special Commission raised again the verification of the unilateral destruction of 85 missiles, in order to deliberately prolong the non-closure of the missiles file and it requested clarification of the following questions:

Despite this and to deprive the Special Commission of exploiting this subject, the Iraqi side carried out additional strenuous efforts for six months to re-excavate the unilateral destruction sites of missiles and the burial sites of missile engines, where many engineering equipment were used for this purpose. Technical delegations were sent to Russia to verify, from the original factory, the serial numbers of those engines excavated from the destruction sites. The results arrived at proved that all the suspicions were absolutely incorrect. Since that outcome had embarrassed the Special Commission, it resorted to a new trick that was to remove the engines to international labs in order to examine them and to make sure that all the destroyed engines were not fired. The Iraqi side agreed to that, in spite of its conviction that the results of the examination would be in favor of Iraq. After additional six months of deliberate prolongation, the engines were tested in American, French and Russian labs which proved the falsehood of the Commission's allegations and suspicions. The results also proved the correctness and credibility of Iraq's declarations. This had forced the Special Commission once again to admit that the verification of the accounting for missiles and launchers were completed as contained in document (S/1997/774 - para 123).

12. After Ambassador Richard Butler took over as Executive Chairman of the Special Commission, the Commission continued with pursuing its previous method of raising minor issues irrelevant to disarmament, or subjects which were previously discussed in detail during the past years. The purpose of the Commission was to move the goal post whenever we were near to it so as not implement to paragraph 22 of resolution 687.

Following July 1997, the Special Commission particularly focused on the special warheads which the Commission considered as a common denominator of chemical, biological and missile files, on the basis that the settlement of this issue would help close the three aforementioned files. The Iraqi side had cooperated with and presented to the Special Commission further written clarifications corroborated with scores of supporting documents, and largely excavated, counted and classified the unilaterally destroyed parts, in order not to give the Special Commission a pretext to abuse its position and for the exceptional importance of the special warheads in closing the three files of weapons. The Iraqi side also requested the Special Commission to support its efforts with ground penetration radar to detect the destroyed warhead remnants.

At that time, the issue of the conventional warheads was not raised (since it does not relate to disarmament as they are of simple accessible technology, and it is difficult to verify the destruction of the conventional warhead because the warhead is fragmented to small pieces unlike the special warhead which does not contain a large quantity of high explosives that causes such fragmentation.) Subsequent, when the Special Commission felt that the material baof the special warheads was close to a final settlement, it began to raise the issue of the conventional warheads.

Later on, the Special Commission began to raise the issue of the indigenous production of missiles. A subject which was previously raised by the Commission and discussed with the Iraqi side and had long been verified.

From July 1997 to July 1998, the Special Commission dispatched (15) inspection teams to discuss the above issues. The inspection teams had conducted field visits and prolonged interviews with the previous staff. The issues were also discussed at a high-level. The two sides held seminars among their experts. All those activities had proved the correctness of Iraq's declarations. However, during those meetings, the Special Commission began raising the subject of Iraq's retention of propellants, which was not included in the Joint Programme of Work agreed upon between the two sides in June 1998, as it was not related to disarmament: For what would be the value of propellants if all missiles, engines, launchers and the special warheads were accounted for? Further, this subject was previously verified in October 1992. The UNSCOM-45 pointed out the following:

13. As a result of the Iraqi side's efforts and its cooperation with the Special Commission, the Commission was left with no choice but to openly admit that it had counted and verified the special warheads. Unfortunately, this recognition came only after losing a full year the price for which was paid through the sufferings of the people of Iraq. The Commission had recognized, in its report to the Security Council in October 1998 (S/1998/920) that it was able to account for the unilaterally destroyed special warheads.

14. In the field of the indigenous production of missiles, the chief inspector of UNSCOM-242 recognized, in late July 1998, that the destroyed quantities of the parts and systems declared by Iraq were identical to the quantities excavated from the destroyed debris after conducting a weight comparison in the field. This is contrary to the claims made by the Commission on many occasions that it was able to verify only 13 tons out of 200 tons of the items which were indigenously produced and unilaterally destroyed in the Summer of 1991. The team had also confirmed the correctness of Iraq's declarations, when they mentioned to the Iraqi side that their conviction was that the parts and systems produced were experimental samples which did not amount to the level of production for operational purposes.

As regards the liquid propellants, UNSCOM-8 saw in August 1991 the remaining quantities after the cease-fire and requested the Iraqi side to destroy them. The Iraqi side had destroyed all the aforementioned quantities. The Special Commission dispatched UNSCOM-13 and UNSCOM-18 to verify the destruction. After seven years, the Commission is demanding from the Iraqi side to provide it with a document which the Iraqi side is unable to find, a document which is considered, in the Commission's view, as the only obstacle. Had this document (diary of destruction in 1991) existed, the Iraqi side would not have hesitated to hand it over, because this is in its interest.

The liquid propellants was not a part of disarmament whether in the resolutions of the Security Council or the international conventions on missiles, such as the convention on elimination of the medium and short range missiles concluded between the former Soviet Union and the United States of America. The storage age of the liquid propellants cannot last for more than 5 years in the best storage conditions pursuant to the supplier's recommendations (the former Soviet Union). Bearing in mind that the last consignment of fuel and oxidizer were dispatched to Iraq in 1988 which by now would be well beyond its expire period.

15. In the light of the requirements outlined in the above paragraphs of SCR 687, Iraq has implemented completely all its obligations with regard to disarmament in the missile area since the end of 1991 through the following :

- The Special Commission has accounted for and verified the consumption of all missiles (819 imported missiles), the launchers (14 combat launchers) and the special warheads (75 special warhead) through material evidences and documents. The authenticity of documents was established through forensic investigation carried out at international laboratories in April 1994. Accordingly, the Special Commission recognized in June 1995 that Iraq has implemented paragraphs (8-B,9-A and 10) of SCR 687 (Doc. S/1995/494).

- Destruction of missiles, launchers, major parts, supporting equipment for the missile system with a range greater than (150) km and production capabilities which were possessed by.

16. The Special Commission re-opened the missile file after the defection of Hussein Kamil in August 1995 under the pretext that there was new information which had not been submitted by Iraq during the previous period . The Special Commission has spent more than three years, to conduct additional verification (excavating the remnants of missiles, launchers and special warheads which had been previously destroyed either unilaterally or under UNSCOM supervision). The conclusion of this additional verification proved that Iraq was disarmed since the end of 1991 . It was proved that the Iraqi declarations, supported by original documents were correct, accurate and credible. This was recognized by the Special Commission in October 1997 (Doc. S/1997/774, para. 123, page 27 on missiles and launchers) and in October 1998 regarding the special warheads (Doc. S/1998/920 para. 250 page 9).

17. The Special Commission supervised the destruction of all equipment, dies and fixtures used in the past missile programm for producing missile parts indigenously. The Special Commission request for destruction was too arbitrary, even civil items were included. The Iraqi side proved by supporting documents and material evidence that the level of indigenous production did not reach the level of producing a single operational missile. The Special Commission verified and accounted for the material balance of the produced parts, though this issue is not related to disarmament

18. The Special Commission has monitored Iraq's full compliance according to the monitoring plan . No indication has been registered that Iraq has ever intended to resume any prohibited activities in the missile area, which is the main objective of SCR 715, taking into account that the monitoring system was in place and operating effectively since August 1994.