Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

1. The Special Commission started its activities in the chemical field in June 1991. Since then Iraq was keen to offer all kinds of cooperation in presenting all past chemical programme - related data. These data include all precursors, primary and produced chemical materials and all the relevant imported equipment as well as the filled and empty ammunition. Also, Iraq declared the sites of the past chemical programme. Iraq did so to implement its obligations under para ( C ) of the SC Resolution 687 (1991).

2. The Special Commission started its missions in September 1991 with the destruction of the empty chemical ammunition in Al-Muthana Establishment. 12500 items were destroyed (different air - bombs and artillery shells ).

3. In February 1992, the Special Commission destroyed (122mm Rocket ) Sarine - filled ammunitions in Al-Khamissyah. The destruction took place in this area in an agreement between the experts of the SC and the Iraqi side . No technical capability was available to destroy them in al-Muthana Establishment. The Iraqi side destroyed them under the supervision of the SC. (400) missiles were destroyed within (40) days. The Iraqi side showed full cooperation with the Special Commission. A reference was made to such cooperation in its reports.

4. The pieces destroyed by the Special Commission in al-Muthana Establishment within the period June 1992 - June 1994 involve:

A- Finally produced agents 690 tons.

B- Empty and filled ammunition 38537 pieces.

C- liquid precursors 180000 liters.

D- Solid precursors 1000000 Kgs.

E- Production equipment 150 ones.

F- Production sites 4 ones.

G- Stores 2 ones.

In addition to what destroyed during the military operations. The Iraqi side presented all the capabilities necessary to carry out the missions of destruction as soon as possible. Also, Iraq made available a large number of personnel and specialists in the operations of destruction. They took place in al-Muthana Establishment under the supervision of the Special Commission. The Special Commission praised the Iraqi cooperation with it.

The Iraqi efforts lead to prevent the environment pollution and keep the expenses and time of destruction to the minimum. These efforts aim at closing the chemical file. The Special Commission was about to do so. This file was actually closed in June 1995.

5. In August 1995 Iraq handed over all previous chemical programme - related documents. This action was taken by Iraq to show its good will. On the contrary, the Special Commission used these documents to raise doubts about the credibility of the Iraqi declarations and reopened all the files. This happened despite the fact that there was no difference between what was stated in these documents and what was in the Iraqi declarations. The Special Commission intentionally looked over this fact for political purposes unrelated to its technical missions. However Iraq was keen to fully deal with the Special Commission in all relevant aspects. A number of clarifications was presented in relation to suspended issues the Special Commission considered dubious.

The Special Commission asked for the presence of all personnel participating in the past chemical programmes for the purpose of interview and verification. Long discussions were conducted about the suspended issues. However, the Special Commission was still dubious about the Iraqi arguments. It persisted on such policy. It asked for the destruction of the dual use production equipment. Though it previously gave the green light to use such equipment. The Special Commission destroyed (385) production equipment, (90) different analytical equipment and (275) tons of general chemical materials.

6. The number of the chemical teams visited Iraq mounted to (60) ones. They conducted inspections, discussions and interviews with the personnel working in the past chemical programme. The inspections carried out by the Special Commission since 1991 came to a conclusion that there was no proscribed material. A number of surprised and planned inspections was done to sites unrelated to the chemical programme. Such sites included universities, institutes, oil refineries, industrial establishments, offices of the Ministry of Agriculture etc. The inspection teams found nothing that violates the implementation of the Resolution 687.

7. At the beginning of 1997, the Special Commission mentioned in its report that there were (7) suspended issues in the chemical field. Iraq exercised serious efforts to present clarifications related to such issues in the form of exchanged letters. They came as a complementary part to the Iraqi declaration. Two issues (out of seven) were still suspended. They are Vx agent and the special warheads. The Iraqi side asked for a discussion session with the experts of the Special Commission attended by neutral ones to explain the subject. The request was actualized in February 1998.

However, the Special Commission was not satisfied with the arguments and evidence of the Iraqi side. This is because the Special Commission built its satisfaction on unreal information with a view to prolonging and keeping the file open.

8. The suspended issues in the chemical field claimed by the Special Commission had no relationship with the phase of disarmament. They were mentioned only for the purpose of prolonging. Every time Iraq closed a subject, the Special Commission opened another subject already discussed and sorted out. The latest allegation presented by the Special Commission was the appearance of degradation of the Vx agent in samples of the remnant of the warheads which were destroyed by the Iraqi side in summer 1991. These samples were also subjected to analysis in the American Amy's labs. Iraq refused the results concluded. This is due to the fact that Iraq basically does not produce the Vx agent in such a stable way that it can use it in any ammunition.

9. Iraq offered all forms of facilities that made it possible for the Special Commission to monitor all its chemical establishments. This occurred since the monitoring system put in effect in November 1994. The number of such establishments mounted to (80) sites. (35) cameras and (22) air samples sensors were installed in (13) sites. (367) dual-use equipment were labeled with stickers in different sites. They belong to the Military Industrialization Corps, Ministry of Higher Education and the private sectors all over the country. These sites are always subjected to continuos and sudden inspections.

Mid-annual and periodical announcements of all the materials and equipment covered by the monitoring system were presented. The Special Commission acknowledged that the system worked effectively. This acknowledgement was a reflection of the cooperation of the Iraqi side with it.

The Iraqi side was serious and cooperative with the Special Commission with a view to speeding up closing the files. This should eventually lead to the application of para (22) of the SC Resolution (687) to end the sufferings of the Iraqi people. The cooperation and keeness shown by the Iraqi side were meant not to give the Special Commission the chance to present fabricated pretexts in order not to apply the resolution. This came in conformity with the hostile Anglo-American policies against Iraq and the Arab Nation.

- More than 1000 tons of chemical precursors.

- 45000 pieces of empty and filled ammunitions (the majoriis 1mm mortar shells).

- 6000 pieces of empty and filled ammunitions (air bombs, 122 mm rockets and artillery shells ).

- 100 pieces of different production equipment.

- 85 stores and buildings.

- (29500) pieces of empty ammunitions ( rockets warhead 122 mm, air bombs) .