Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The SC's members carried out spying activities in the military field. Among which were the followings :

The Special Commission's inspection teams and monitoring groups visited hundred of sites. They belong to the ministries, other establishments and the private and amalgamated sectors companies. These sites should not be covered by the SC's activities. However, the SC misinterpreted the Security Council's Resolutions in order to gain intelligence information for spying purposes in relation to the scientific, economic and technical capabilities of these sites. We have a great umber of examples to support this statement among them are:

The Arab Washer Company's stores, Food Processing Companies, Irrigation Companies, Baghdad Furniture Factory, Baghdad Wire and Reinforcement Company, School Requirements Factory, Bicycle Manufacturing Company, private stores, different clothes and sewing factories, soft drinks companies, refreshments factories, car repair workshops, ice-making plants, rubber and plastic factories, printing houses, carpentry factories, poultry farms, tiles factories, cloth making factories, tea-mixing factories, constructional materials stores farms..etc).

The Special Commission's joint inspection teams and monitoring groups and the International Atomic Energy Agency conducted hundreds of visits to sites. They belong to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Ministry of Education, research centers and to the private sector. They misused the Security Council's Resolutions to achieve intelligence and spying activities relating to the technical and scientific capabilities of such sectors (such as Iraqi universities, institutes, preparatory schools, research centers, industrial factories, vocational and technical centers).

It goes without saying that the Special Commission's activities were governed by the interests of the U.S.A whose ultimate aim is to prolong the embargo on Iraq and to impair its sovereignty. This became apparent if we had a close look at the way it performed its activities, its organization and the huge support it enjoyed from the U.S.A. Its well-fortified headquarter in Baghdad Hotel / Al-Kanat, and the highly restricted access to the data even to some of its members were all manifest indications that raised doubt the ill-intended SC's activities.

The Special Commission's headquarter is fortified with iron fences and wires that control the approaches leading to inner and outer exits. It is also encircled with a system of cameras and monitoring senses. The building seems as if it were an intelligence center.

In addition, the immunities that the Special Commission's officials enjoyed, enabled them to enter equipment and instruments of surveillance and wireless overhearing. They were dispatched in very well-packed cases. The Iraqi authorities could not inspect the contents of these cases because of the immunities which were widely abused since 1991. The Iraqi side has many examples to support its stand.

The Special Commission started its activities in 1991. Since then it used many aerial means for the purposes of the aerial surveillance (helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft such as the American spying U2). The number of the sites involved mounted to (1906) ones - (31) aerial surveillance teams aboard helicopters conducted the missions through (2785) flight hours. On the other hand, the American spying U2 performed (434) sorties through (1799) flight hours inside the Iraqi air space.

These figures manifestly indicate the fact that too many targets are involved in the aerial surveillance. This is a total misinterpretation of the Security Council's resolutions which, they are unfairly and covertly used to gather data about such targets that extend all over the country - inspection teams had members of different nationalities.

What is striking is that the American and British officials of the teams often had the lion's share among the other nationalities and took up the leading positions.