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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

The International Conventions and Their Applications in The Field of Chemical Weapons. A Comparison with Iraq.

1. The rights of the inspection teams and the inspected state (under the convention OPCW) .

1-1 The inspection team shall have a free access to the concerned site and to the items to be inspected .

1-2 The inspectors shall have the right to meet with any personnel working on the concerned site in the presence of the representative of the inspected state. The inspectors shall ask only for the data and information necessary to conduct inspection process. The representatives of the inspected state shall have the right to express protest to any question considered irrelevant to the inspection.

1-3 The inspectors shall have the right to inspect the documents and records they consider relevant to implement their missions.

1-4 The inspectors shall have the right to ask the representatives of the inspected state for permission to take photos of the site being inspected.

1-5 The representatives of the inspected state shall have the right to monitor all the verification activities conducted by the inspection team.

1-6 The technical secretariat shall have the right to install instruments and systems of ongoing monitoring and seals in conformity with the provisions of the convention.

1-7 The inspected state shall have the right to inspect any instrument used or installed by the inspection team. The team shall also have the right to test it in the presence of the representatives of the inspected state.

1-8 The inspection team shall have the right to make sure that the monitoring system functions properly and that the seals are undamaged. Also, it shall have the right to go on visit to maintain or replace the monitoring systems when necessary.

1-9 The representatives of the inspected state shall have the right to take samples at the request of the inspection team and in the presence of the inspectors.

1-10 The inspected state shall have the right to retain parts of the samples taken. Also, it shall have the right to be present when the sample is analyzed on the site.

1-11 The analysis of the sample shall take place on site where possible using the instruments brought by the inspection team.

1-12 The inspection team shall have the right, when necessary , to transfer the samples for analysis in off-site laboratories specified by the organization.

1-13 The inspectors shall request only for data and information necessary to conduct their mission. They shall not record any information gathered incidentally unrelated to the verification.

1-14 In order to avoid any disclosure of the secrets, the inspectors and the personnel shall be notified and reminded to consider the security of the inspected state and penalties that may result in case of unnecessary disclosure.

 

 

2. The Styles of the Special Commission Adopted in Inspection and Monitoring.

2-1 The work of the successive chemical groups lacks the idea of follow-up. This means that they can not establish a data-base fed and updated throughout their inspections. What actually happens is that a file of certain items or equipment is closed by a certain chemical group. The same file is reopened and the same information, already gathered, is again asked for. Also many visits were conducted to cover the same subject by another group without referring to the documents and information of the former group.

2-2 The chemical groups involved a number of members who lack the experience or the necessary specialities in the field of inspection and verification. Quite often a member specialized in language (interpreter) or a doctor assistant may raise a question related to the ongoing monitoring. Also, young people (who don't exceed 21 years old) recently graduated were sent to Iraq to conduct the mission of inspection and verification. In order for them to acquire experience or to understand the function of a certain system, those young people stayed in Iraq for months.

2-3 During its visit to a number of sites, the chemical group followed a new manner unprecedented in the procedure and the requirements of the ongoing monitoring. It took the measurement of each site and the dimensions of each building. It also drew a diagram of some of the specialized rooms (such as labs) on which the locations of the equipment were marked. This behavior which does not comply with the powers of the UN Special Commission clearly reflects the evil intentions. Such axiom became true after the crisis of Oct. 1998.

2-4 The chemical group also adopted a new manner which again does not meet with the powers of the Special Commission. Previously prepared forms were handed over. Such forms must be filled in with details of the personnel working on different sites especially those with university degrees. Such details involved purely personal information, date and place of graduation and even the standards they obtained.

2-5 The chemical group listed a large number of sites of civil-oriented purposes claiming that they had equipment and materials of dual-use. This led to include a long list of sites on such baseless allegation.

2-6 The chemical group conducted, sometimes by its own or with the participation of the other groups, an inspection to a complex of buildings. Such complexes have buildings of a different nature : of commercial or social purposes unrelated to the plan of monitoring . The inspection to such buildings was highly exaggerated in relation to the number of inspectors , cars escorted by helicopters. They conducted such activities depending on inaccurate information with the purpose of provocation .

2-7 The chemical group went on intensive activities of inspections on Fridays and public holidays (particularly in the second half of 1998). It strongly persisted on opening the locked doors and on fetching the personnel from homes. It did not pay any consideration to the particular nature of such holidays.

2-8 The chemical group showed unjustifiable exaggeration and persistence on taking photos, with more than one camera , of materials and equipment. They are unrelated to the previous programmes and to the plan of the ongoing monitoring . If the Iraqi side refused to grant a permission to the chemical group to do so , a crisis might rise.

2-9 The monitoring chemical group reiterated questions concerning the location of the fuel stock (The emergency fuel) and the authority that issues such orders. (That happened after each evacuation process)

2-10 It requested purely intelligence information concerning the structure of the Chemical Corps Directorate - Ministry of Defence .

2.11- The chemical group made sudden periodical visits to the Iraqi universities and institutes. This happened despite the fact that they do not have materials or equipment covered by the monitoring and verification. It caused provocation , confusion and infringement to the privacy of campuses.



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