A Factual Report about Iraq's Implementation of its obligations under para (22) of the Security Council Resolution 687(1991) in the field of Biological Weapons
Introduction
Iraq presented the complete, comprehensive and final report of its biological programme in June 1996. This occurred following a series of meetings with the Special Commission's biological team during the period July 1995- June 1996. During the stated period Iraq submitted the drafts of the report taking into consideration all the remarks and comments made by the Special Commission. This was meant to make the report acceptable by the commission. The Special Commission conducted a number of measures of verification through inspection and interviews. The head of the inspection team (UNSCOM-157) pointed out with full confidence that such measures might last 6-9 months unless an early political decision was taken to close the biological file. ( This was an obvious indication that the task of the Special Commission was not purely technical - it was actually subjected to American policy - dictated pressures).
However, the Special Commission made it clear in April 1997 that the report of the biological weapons was not sufficient.
The former executive president of the Special Commission (Ekius) suggested that Iraq should give another thought in restructuring its report. Iraq showed protest due to the fact that all the essential elements of the biological file included in the report and in particular production, armament and destruction could never be changed. They were based on actual calculations supported by documents. However, Iraq positively responded to Ekius' request and restructured its report which was presented again in Sept. 1997.
The Special Commission's decision of June 1996 was that the report was without credibility. Iraq fully recognized the fact that such decision was coercive and unfair and that the report could never be changed and no extra details could be added. Late in Sept. 1997 the Special Commission asked a team of international experts to revise the 700-page report. The team came to the conclusion that the report was incomplete and unreal. However, a number of comments made by the experts were worth considering such as :
* In 1990 the programme did not yet take its shape and was still in the process of expansion and development.
* The experts recommended the Special Commission to ask Iraq for further information on :
- What were the fields of the Biological weapon's programme which were not covered in the comprehensive, complete and final report.
- What were the aspects of inaccuracies the report included.
Technical assessment meetings were held in Viena during the period 20-27 March attended by (18) experts (4-5 ones were new ) representing (14) states. In New York and Viena the members of the Special Commission gave the experts briefing about what had so far been achieved. The experts had also an access to a large number of documents and materials (they were part of the drafts of the Iraqi declarations ) and to two copies of the report. They were not given enough time to fully study them and draw their own conclusions. This was why a number of experts adopted the ready-made opinions, comments and questions previously set by the members of the Special Commission . These questions were directed to the members of the Iraqi side who spent long time answering them. Some of these questions were irrelevant, unnecessary or previously sorted out and verified through visits, tests, inspections, analyses, discussions and interviews conducted by the Special Commission in (30) months. The report of the technical assessment's teams was full of generalizations and did not have any definite remarks that came in contrast with what the Iraqi side declared. It also failed to reflect Iraq's point of view in any way. Moreover, It did not include Iraq's response which was handed over to the technical assessment team in their final session. The former executive president of the Special Commission suggested, in June 1998, that a number of international experts should meet together in Iraq to thoroughly study the Iraqi report of Sept. 1997 " from the top of the pyramid to its base " starting with the armament ending with the calculations of the raw materials involved in the production. The meetings which were held in Baghdad during the period 17-23 July 1998 came to the following technical assessment as stated by the head of the team Professor Slistrom :
- Basically, the comprehensive evaluation of the declaration of the Iraqi chemical weapons programme could not be verified .
- Secondly, in relation to the matters considered by the experts, the calculations of the material balance as stated in the report and the stock of the agents and culture media could not be verified either. Anyhow, the Iraqi side put forward a proposal in relation to the issues whose calculations were considered unverified. The proposal was that the reports should consider the state in which the biological agents were stored ( they were stored in a liquid state), the duration of keeping them alive and active and also the effectiveness of the weapons produced in 1990. These points should be considered from a scientific and technical point of view. The experts refused to discuss or accept the proposal. This refusal based on the allegation that they had been instructed by the Special Commission only to see whether the Iraqi calculations were verifiable and inverifiable . The only example that gained the satisfaction of the experts when verifying Al-Hakam Factory dual used equipment . Iraq declared that it used the equipment in producing biological agents. The equipment destroyed by the SC in 1996.
The Iraqi side pointed out that the agents and ammunition were destroyed by Iraq in 1991 prior to the arrival of the Special Commission. Consequently what left was only the remnants and traces of the destroyed agents and ammunition. This material evidence was not as indicative as the evidence of the equipment. The Special Commission should take this fact into account when carrying out the measures of verification. It should also adopt more reasonable and scientific ones with regard to the practical application. It is worth mentioning that such measures were taken by efficient inspectors in some previous cases and were confirmed by Iraqi declarations. Unfortunately, they were disregarded, in the Headquarters of the Special Commission, when reports were prepared and handed over to the Security Council. However, it was important to make it clear that the international experts did not state, this time, that Iraq's report was incomplete nor untrue. Their comments centered upon the verifiability. It was an abnormal indication that many important disarmament related aspects were disregarded when carrying out the total assessments of the biological weapons programme.
Iraq mentioned in many occasions that it never had biological weapons on its territories since July 1991. The Special Commission did not come to what contradicted with the Iraqi declarations. Also the mission of the disarmament was fully completed in the areas of both ammunition and agents in July 1991.
As related to the sites and equipment, they were wholly destroyed in 1996. The activities of the ongoing monitoring system in the field of the biological weapons (implemented in 1994) did not record any material breach to the Resolution 687.
In this concern, a reference should be made to an important fact. That was to say, the Special Commission did find, since August 1995 up till now, any proscribed thing that contradicted with the Iraqi declarations. Thousands of visits and inspections to different sites, declared by Iraq and inspected by the SC, came to confirm this fact.
A Historical Background of the Biological Programme
1. There were unsuccessful early attempts in the field of the biological programme during the period 1974-1978. Al-Hassan bin Al-Haitham establishment was established in 1974 for this purpose. It was liquidated in 1978 due to its failure.
2. A small unit of research and development , anneto al-Muthana state Establishment, waestablished in 1985. A success was achieved in the process of research and development of two biological agents during the period 1985-1986. They were
- Botulinum toxin (Agent A )
- Bacillus antracis (Agent B)
3. The biological unit was transferred from al-Muthana Establishment to al-Sulman site in 1987. A new phase started. A new agent was added to the two previous agents. It was (Agent G) gas gangaren spores. The researches were greatly supported and a pilot production building was established on the site.
4. Production attempts were conducted at al-Taji site after being annexed to the programme during the period 1988-1989.
5. New sites were built for the purpose of biological production in 1988(Al-Hakam site).
6. New production sites were added in Sept 1990.
7. The production was fully terminated in 1990.
8. Ammunition filling during the period Dec. 1990- Jan. 1991.
The Production of the Biological Agents
- The production of the agent (A).
The total produced amount of the botulinum toxin was (25 c.m) as followed.
19 c.m of active toxin
6 c.m of discarded quantity.
- The production of the agent (B) (Bacillus anthracis spores )
The total produced amount of the Bacillus anthracis spores was (9,5 c.m) as followed.
8.5 c.m of active spores.
1 c.m of discarded quantity.
- The production of the agent (G) ( gas gangaren spores )
The total produced amount of the gas gangaren spores was (360 liter) as followed.
340 c.m of active spores.
20 liters of discarded quantity.
- The production of the agent (C) ( Aflatoxin)
The total produced amount of the Aflatoxin was 2390 liters.
The nature of the produced biological agents.
The amounts of the produced biological agents (A,B,G,C) was in a liquid , suspended form.
The Special Commission made sure of this fact through the supportive documents, inspections and discussions.
The Armament
Bombs (R-400)
- 200 bombs (R-400) were produced.
- 157 bombs(R-400) were filled and then destroyed.
- The number of the bombs remained unfilled was (37 ones). They were destroyed by the Special Commission in 1991.
- The number of the empty and rejected bombs was (6 ones). They were destroyed and verified by the Special Commission in 1996.
Al-Hussain Military Waheads
- 25 special warheads were produced.
- The total number of the warheads filled, destroyed and verified was (25 ones).
Drop Tank
- Four tanks were modified. One of them was tested in 1990-1991.
- No tank was filled with the biological agent at all.
- Four tanks were destroyed in 1991.
The Deterioration of the Biological Weapons
- The produced and filled biological agents were in a liquid state.
- The method adopted in the production led to the existence of residues in the final biological agent.
- The existence of residues caused a severe impotency to the agents in the course of time and as indicated.
* The Agent (A) (botulium toxin ) being protein material is transferred into a non-toxic one within three years under ideal storing conditions.
* The agent (B) (Bacillus anthracis spores) produced in a slurry state is completely transferred into vegetative cell within two years under ideal storing conditions.
The conditions of the process of filling and storing of the filled ammunition were not ideal, Consequently the deterioration of the biological was expected to be faster.
The Conclusion
The total stock of the produced biological agents in 1990 and before this year was inactive or non-toxic even it was under ideal storing condition.
The Destruction under the Supervision of the SC
* 926 equipment including the equipment unused or unrelated to the biological programme destroyed.
* (50) buildings (with an area of 152 00 sq.m) were destroyed.
* (43) empty ammunitions were destroyed .
* A large amount of culture media, chemicals, scientific books, lab furniture , tools and spare parts of equipment and glassware was destroyed.
* The raw materials involved in manufacturing the biological pesticides, single cell protein and bacteria isolates used in producing of the biological pesticides, bacterial fertilizer and the single cell protein.
The supporting Documents for the purpose of verifying the past Biological - Programme - Related Iraqi Announcements:
1. The research and development - connected supportive documents :
* The number of the documents 13 ones.
* The number of the pages 223 ones.
2. The production verification - connected supportive documents:
* The number of the documents 15 ones.
* The number of the pages 36 ones.
3. The biological sites verification - connected supportive documents:
* The number of the documents 16 ones.
* The number of the pages 24 ones
4. The verification of the armament and destruction - connected supporting documents :
* The number of the documents 59 ones.
* The number of the pages 130 ones
5. The verification of possession - connected supportive documents:
* The number of the documents 82 ones.
* The number of the pages 228 ones
6. The supportive documents of the verification of the date of the commencement of the biological programme
* The number of the documents 21 ones.
* The number of the pages 32 ones
The Activities of the Ongoing Monitoring
The monitoring system was operative and active in the biological field through applying the following measures:
* Mid-annual declarations were presented on 15th of January & 15th of July each year.
* Monthly declarations concerning the biological key sites covered by the system.
* Declarations of the statistics of the vaccination against human and animal diseases presented.
* Notifications were presented when an instrument or equipment was transferred within the same site or from one site to another.
* Notifications were presented in case a new site was established or any biological activity or research conducted on the sites covered by the monitoring system. This included any activities or researches which had not yet taken roots or in their primary designs.
* Notifications should be presented according to forms (B1,B2, B3) when intending to purchase any dual-use material, or equipment or instrument covered by the monitoring plan of the SC Resolution 1051(1996).
* Monitoring cameras and different sensing instruments were installed by the Special Commission on biological sites.
* Surprised visits to sites covered by the monitoring plan and to others uncovered by the plan.
* The surprised night visits conducted randomly.
* Stickers were put on all the lab instruments and equipment related to the biological programme and covered by the monitoring plan.
* Reports, replies and sketches of sites were presented at the request of the inspectors of the SC whenever required.
* Requests of the SC to interview the personnel who worked in the past biological programme were met. The interviews were intended to know the nature of the recent job of these personnel.
The Inspections
Nothing indicated that Iraq committed an infringement under para ( C ) of the SC Resolution 687(1991) during the period the SC was implementing its missions.
The Biological Teams
|
Year |
No. of teams |
No. of visits |
|
1991-1993 |
3 |
26 |
|
1994 |
13 |
231 |
|
1995 |
12 |
92 |
|
1996 |
15 |
45 |
|
1997 |
15 |
78 |
|
1998 |
16 |
194 |
|
The total |
74 |
666 |
The Groups of the Biological Monitoring
|
Year |
No. of teams |
No. of visits |
|
1994-1998 |
17 |
1802 |
|
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