Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
State Department Noon Briefing, October 31, 2000
Q: Richard, a new Russian -- another Russian plane landed in Baghdad
today with 250-odd people on board. Do you know whether --
MR. BOUCHER: I'm not going to comment on what kind of people they
were.
(Laughter.)
Q: Do you know whether this one had approval by the Sanctions
Committee, and do you have anything new to say about flights to
Baghdad by -- (inaudible)? If you're going to repeat what you said
yesterday, don't bother.
MR. BOUCHER: Oh, please, allow me. (Laughter.) Let's see. The flights
presently before the UN Sanctions Committee include flights from
Russia that were pending for November 3rd and November 10. Recent
flights from blah, blah, blah, blah, blah were all approved.
I see Russia on that list. So specifically one that went in today? I
have to assume that because -- here we go. Flights approved by the
Committee in the last two weeks: 10/29 to 11/3, Russia; 10/30 to 11/6,
Russia. So those are two flights that were approved.
Q: Oh, okay. So it was approved.
MR. BOUCHER: Yes.
Q: So it's not a big deal then.
MR. BOUCHER: And then there is a number pending, including three or
four from Russia that have been applied for.
Q: Are they giving you a sort of daily schedule of flights to Baghdad?
(Laughter.)
Q: (Inaudible) -- regularly scheduled operation.
MR. BOUCHER: Let's -- I mean --
Q: It didn't used to be this way.
MR. BOUCHER: Look, let's not lose sight. I mean, in this, and as well
as with the question of internal flights, let's not lose sight of what
we're dealing with here. The issue of sanctions and no-fly zones are
put in place so that Iraq can't threaten its neighbors, can't threaten
its own people, can't threaten its neighbors. Activities that don't do
that -- domestic flights -- are not subject to the no-fly zones. Those
are imposed for military flights because of the way military aircraft
are used.
Activities of a few flights with a couple hundred people on board, you
know, who want to go in and be humanitarian, those don't alter the
essential character of the embargoes on Iraq, which are designed to
prevent Iraq from developing weapons of mass destruction, from
threatening the US forces, from threatening its own people, from
threatening their neighbors, as they have done in the past and as they
show every indication of wanting to do again.
So we're not here -- we're not trying to squeeze Iraq. We're trying to
prevent Iraq from developing certain capabilities and from carrying
out certain intentions. So the fact that there are these flights
doesn't detract from the fact that we have an effective set of
sanctions, a set of sanctions that serve the purpose of keeping Iraq
from becoming a threat again.
Q: But, Richard, you said "a few." I mean, it's much more than a few.
In fact, it's getting to the point where they might as well be
offering shuttle service between capitals -- some capitals and
Baghdad. Do you not see that -- I mean, why wasn't this going on
three, four, or five months ago, the number of --
MR. BOUCHER: Well, I think you'd have to ask the people who are
flying, and sort of for what purpose. There are people that are indeed
carrying in food, clothing and medicine. Food, clothing and medicine
have never been under embargo. I'm sure there's probably much more
efficient ways of delivering food, clothing and medicine to the Iraqi
people than taking it on airplanes, but some people seem to want to do
that. So we've had -- there's a lot of flights, and if I look back
over the last three weeks, the Sanctions Committee has approved three,
six, nine, 12, 14 flights over three weeks -- you know, one every day
or two. That's not the way to sustain the Iraqi people. The way to
sustain the Iraqi people is what goes on in greater volume every day
with the Oil for Food program that we're also trying to make succeed.
Q: Well, Richard, how is the United States going to prevent one of
these flights carrying the components for a nuclear reactor or --
MR. BOUCHER: There is a very strict, a very formal, regime of
inspections, of flights before they leave and when they come back.
There are debriefings, and there are obviously other ways of finding
out what people might have carried.
Q: This particular Russian flight that left today, or yesterday, was
supposed to be for some kind of Iraqi business or trade fair. Is this
violating, if not the actual law, but the spirit of the sanctions, and
are you worried that this kind of more business-to-business contact
might actually enhance Iraq's capability to threaten its neighbors?
MR. BOUCHER: What violates the sanctions -- again, look at the purpose
of the sanctions. The purpose of the sanctions is not to prevent
people from talking to each other; it's not to prevent Iraqis from
eating, or eating together with other people. The purpose is to keep
them from acquiring military goods, dual-use goods, things that
contribute to their capabilities to threaten their neighbors and their
own people. So when the Sanctions Committee gets involved, when people
need to get approval for sales, it's because they're selling something
that's not food, that's not medicine, that's not benign, that has
potential military uses, and that's where we get involved.
Q: On the question of the internal flights, how do you -- or maybe you
can't answer this type of thing, but how do you tell the difference
between a commercial flight and a military flight for the purposes of
the no-fly zone? Is there a process?
MR. BOUCHER: You look at the airplane. I think people who do these
things can tell the difference between military and commercial
flights. Certainly we would monitor carefully any Iraqi aviation
activity. We would try to determine whether it posed a threat to our
forces, toward Iraq's neighbors or the Iraqi people.
For reasons of flight safety, the Iraqis have to notify the UN of any
civilian flights, schedules and routes no less than 48 hours in
advance of each flight. But we do know that Iraqi air defenses will
fire indiscriminately at aircraft in the northern and southern no-fly
zone, so notification of civilian flights should allow sufficient time
to inform operations, Northern and Southern watch -- that's our forces
-- and the time to notify -- for the Iraqis to notify their own
forces. But even with such notification, we have no way of preventing
Iraqi forces from firing on flights that might be operating in the
no-fly zones.
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