DEFENSE DEPARTMENT REGULAR BRIEFING
BRIEFER: ADM. CRAIG QUIGLEY, SPOKESMAN
PENTAGON BRIEFING ROOM,
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 1:30 P.M. EDT
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 14, 2000
Q: On Iraq. How seriously are you taking their recent comments about
Kuwait that they will take some sort of unspecified action? And are
you guys gearing up in any way?
Quigley: We always pay attention to what Iraq says and, more
particularly, what it does. The comments, the very bellicose comments
made several weeks ago by Iraqi leadership were one indicator.
Historically, if you go back over the course of the past decade, there
have been several instances of this being a time of year when Saddam
has done aggressive acts against either his own people or moved forces
in an aggressive way that would lead us to believe that he was about
to do something else. So this is -- we always pay attention, but this
is a time of year that we pay particular attention to what is going on
inside Iraq.
Now, this is also the time of year that is their traditional training
cycle, so it is not unusual to see Iraqi forces doing what you would
consider normal routine training activities. That's fine, and that is
expected. What we would be looking for would be something that is not
normal, that is larger, longer lasting, if you will, or some other
sort of activity that might prove to be an indicator of potential
hostile action against either a neighboring nation or against his own
people in the North or the South.
So this is something we always pay attention to. This time of year we
pay particular attention to that, and we will continue that for as
long as it takes.
Q: But are there any indications that there is something larger in the
works?
Quigley: So far, we have not seen an indication that is out of
character of the sort of activity that you would see this time of year
in conjunction with their normal training cycle.
We'll continue to watch very carefully.
Q: What kind of restrictions are there on actual Iraqi troop movements
in the Kuwaiti theater?
Quigley: Say that again?
Q: What kind of restrictions -- I understand that there's also the --
I think they call it the no-drive zone. You know, there's the no-fly
zone, but is not the Iraqi military under U.N. sanction to prevent
massing troops along the border?
Quigley: I'm going to have to check. The one that we pay attention to
most of the time that we see, certainly, is either activity against
coalition aircraft, patrolling the northern or southern no-fly zones
and certainly movement of forces elsewhere in the country. But let me
check on that. [U.N. Security Council Resolution 949 (October 1994)
restricts Iraqi troop enhancements south of the 32nd parallel. It
demands Iraq not use military or other forces in a hostile or
provocative manner to threaten neighbors or U.N. operations in Iraq.
It demands Iraq not enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq,
defined as below the 32nd parallel.]
Q: Has the coalition bombed any targets in Iraq today?
Quigley: This morning at 9:00 Eastern Time there was a strike in
Southern Watch against a radar site, an element of the air defense
network. The coalition aircraft all returned safely to their home
stations and the battle damage assessment is still being done.
Q: What precipitated that strike?
Quigley: A series of provocations over the past -- yesterday -- the
past couple of days, of either AAA [anti-aircraft artillery] or SAM
[surface-to-air missile] firings. And as we've said on several
occasions, we will respond in a manner and a time and a location of
our choosing.
Q: There are some reports, and apparently confirmation out of New York
that the Iraqis flew over Saudi Arabia last week with at least one
flight. Can you give us anything on that?
Quigley: Well, we've seen more than 150 violations of the no-fly zone
-- zones, I should say, both northern and southern no-fly zones, since
Desert Fox of December of 1998. The preponderance of those are in the
south. But I'm not going to get into any violations of any other
nation's sovereign airspace. Those questions should be referred to the
nation that you're concerned with to let them respond on their own
behalf.
Q: Well was there a plane that flew over the no-fly zone, headed into
Saudi Arabia?
Quigley: There were a couple of violations on Monday, the 4th -- I
think it was the 4th of September, Labor Day, yes, of the Southern
no-fly zone.
Q: And did they go into Saudi Arabia?
Quigley: Go back to my previous answer.
Q: Well, were they deep into the no-fly zone or were they just --
Quigley: I'm not going to start splitting hairs, Jamie, I'm sorry.
Q: Well, I think --
Quigley: I will say that they were unequivocally south of 33 North.
Q: All right. Well then why was the -- if these violations were not
simply a quick skirting of the no-fly zone, an in-and-out, if they
were an actual substantial penetration into the southern no-fly zone,
why weren't the -- why wasn't the Iraqi plane challenged or shot down?
Quigley: Typically, the Iraqis do not fly when we are flying, or it's
when we are egressing from the area and not in a position to engage.
They are not looking for a fight with coalition aircraft. They are
looking to try to only reassert sovereignty over Iraqi airspace and
to, I guess, show us that they still can. But they have not put
themselves in a position, that I can recall, where coalition aircraft
can engage.
Q: Without citing any specific instances, can you tell us whether
Iraqi aircraft in the past -- well, during the time that we've been
enforcing the no-fly zones, have they violated the airspace of any
neighboring countries?
Quigley: Again, I will stick with my previous statement -- that we've
seen more than 150 violations of the no-fly zones. But I'm not going
to address violations of another nation's sovereign airspace.
Q: Can you explain why you can't talk about that?
Quigley: Because I feel that would be more appropriate -- for the
nation concerned to address their own airspace and not me, from here.
Tony?
Q: Is it non-Iraqi, your question?
Q: (Off mike.)
Quigley: Any other -- Barbara?
Q: These two incidents that you referred to on September 4th -- you
seemed to be suggesting that it was a different sort of air tactic by
the Iraqis. So were coalition aircraft surprised? Why weren't they
there?
Quigley: Well, the Iraqi air defense system clearly sees when we are
flying, when the coalition is flying, in either northern or -- either
the northern no-fly zone or the southern no-fly zone. And as I
indicated, they don't seek to come into the same airspace as coalition
aircraft at the same time. And we were not flying on Monday the 4th.
It was a no-fly day. And clearly they saw that that was a no-fly day.
And I can -- I'm assuming here, Barbara -- I don't like doing that,
but I can only assume that they felt that this was an excellent
opportunity to violate the southern no-fly zone when they saw no
coalition aircraft up that day.
Q: So the coalition aircraft don't patrol the no-fly zones every
single day --
Quigley: Correct.
Q: On average, how often do we patrol the no-fly zone?
Quigley: Oh, gosh. I'd have to go back and check, Jamie. I'm not sure.
It's most of the time, but we do have no-fly days, for a variety of
reasons. That particular day was a no-fly day.
Q: I just want to really make sure I understand this, then.
So, can you say then were we surprised by what the Iraqis did on the
4th?
Quigley: I'm not going to characterize our state of alert or what we
knew or didn't know, either, Barbara.
Q: How long did the incidents last?
Quigley: They were not long, although I don't have the exact duration
of time that the violation was actually occurring.
Q: (Off mike.)
Quigley: No, more than minutes. It was deeper than that.
Q: Admiral, I don't want to read too much into what you're saying, but
are you then characterizing this as something that was not designed to
provoke any kind of action from the United States?
Quigley: I don't know if I can give it a very good characterization
because I'm not clear as to the motivation of the Iraqi leadership as
to why this was done.
Dale?
Q: You said it was a no-fly day, but obviously their movement was
detected. Was -- were any coalition aircraft scrambled and put in the
air and the Iraqis were gone by the time they got there, or was this
just judged not a threat?
Quigley: Well, again, I'm not going to get into our reactions, I'm
sorry, to what we do note when we see Iraqi air activity. And the
reason I'm not going to do that is because that would give the Iraqis
some assistance in determining what would trigger a response from us.
And I'm not going to help him in that regard.
Ben?
Q: Could you explain the philosophy behind the no-fly zones in that --
I mean, it's sort of like a sometimes-fly zone. If we're not
monitoring 24 hours a day and challenging every single time they come
up, how do we explain it to our readers that it is a no-fly zone but
there are significant gaps?
Quigley: The no-fly zone means that Iraqi aircraft are not to fly in
the two zones.
Q: Right. But if they do fly and there's no repercussions for them
immediately --
Quigley: Because we have said that we will respond to violations or
provocations, and that would include triple-A fire, that would include
surface to air missile firings, and it could include airplane
incursions as well. But we will respond in a manner, in a time, in a
place of our choosing. And it's not necessarily a tit for tat or an
immediate response to a provocation.
Q: So why fly any -- why fly anything at all? Why not just wait until
they do something and then respond? What --
Quigley: Don't feel that that's an effective way of enforcing the
no-fly zones. Most of the time, we fly. But it isn't an everyday, 24
hours around the clock sort of an event. But we are airborne often,
and we think that that is a better way to more effectively enforce the
no-fly restrictions in both zones.
Q: Are U.S. forces currently on heightened alert in that region
because of --
Quigley: We are paying particularly close attention to the activities
of the Iraqis in that part, and have been for some time. But I'm not
going to characterize our alert posture, Toby, in that part of the
world. But I will certainly say that we are paying close attention to
both statements and activities.
Q: Was the bombing this morning the first U.S. strike since that
incident? And was it in any way a reaction to that incident?
Quigley: I think it was the first, but let me double check. Since the
4th, you mean?
Q: Since the 4th.
Quigley: I think so, but let me double check.
Q: Was this in any way a response to that?
Quigley: Again, we try not to keep a particular box score, that if
they have violations we're going to respond four times. We don't do it
that way. We will respond at a place and a time and a manner of our
choosing, and it's not necessarily reciprocal; nor to the provocateur,
it may not be that we would strike a AAA site necessarily if coalition
aircraft were shot at by AAA; it could be another method. And again,
we reserve that choice.
Q: Earlier you said that you hadn't seen any indication -- in your
words -- of "hostile intent" by Iraqi troops on the ground. Can you
give us any idea how many Iraqi troops are currently deployed or on
maneuvers in the northern part of the country, and whether they
include any Republican Guard units?
Quigley: No, I don't have those figures, Jamie, I'm sorry.
Q: Is that a question you can take, by any chance?
Quigley: I'll have to check the classification on that. If I can get
that to you in an unclassified way, I will. [There are 23 divisions in
Iraq today, compared with 54 divisions ten years ago. Thirteen
divisions are deployed roughly along the "line of trace" with the
Kurds in northern and eastern Iraq. These units include some
Republican Guard Forces. There are three armored divisions around
Baghdad. There are seven divisions in southern Iraq. We have seen no
unusual Iraqi troop movements. Iraqi forces are deployed similar to
the way they have been deployed for the last five years.]
Q: And just to clarify, you said this was the time of year when they
conduct routine maneuvers.
Quigley: Yes, in the fall.
Q: But are there any indications, or have there been any public
statements from Iraq that would lend any sort of question to whether
or not these troops are in fact just on routine maneuvers?
Quigley: Not that I'm aware of, no.
Sir?
Q: Admiral, can you tell us how many Iraqi planes were involved in
those incursions on the 4th, and if that was --
Quigley: I think just a couple. I think just a couple.
Q: And is that the typical amount that -- when they --
Quigley: Yeah, sometimes one. And they do vary. They penetrate to
different depths for differing lengths of time.
Q: I'm sorry, to clarify that. Two at once or two flew two times
during the day, or one flew and then another one flew?
Quigley: Let me double check. [There were five violations involving
six aircraft on Sept. 4.]
Q: Do you know the type of aircraft involved?
Quigley: No, I don't.
...
Q: I wanted to go back to Iraq for a moment. Four years ago, Saddam
Hussein was able -- moved troops into the North, moved against some of
the Kurdish factions there, one of the factions.
Quigley: Right.
Q: And the United States wasn't able to do anything to prevent that.
In fact, that resulted in airstrikes after the fact, and I believe
that's when the no-fly zone was moved from the 32nd to the 33rd
Parallel.
Is the United States in any better position today to stop Saddam
Hussein if he decided to again, as he did in 1996, move against the
Kurds in the North?
Quigley: I'd have to do a more thorough analysis than I have at my
immediate disposal, to compare 1996 to now. I think I'll just stick
with now. I think that we have a variety of means at our disposal to
take action, if we so choose to do so, against any aggressive acts
that Saddam would impose, either on a neighbor or on his people. And
that's a combination of -- as Toby asked early on in the brief -- a
combination of trying to stay on top of things and be as proactive and
get as much advance warning as we possibly can of whatever intentions
we might see, as well as the actual forces that are physically present
in the region.
Q: Other than public statements from U.S. officials, has the United
States issued any sort of a warning to Saddam not to -- during this
time when you were paying particular attention, as you said, to what's
going on -- any warning to Baghdad not to move against neighbors or
its own people?
Quigley: Not that I'm aware of, no.
...
Q: To go back to Iraq for just one second, you mentioned that the
strike in the south today was in retaliation to several provocations
over the past several days, I guess since the 4th. In the past, the
pattern has seemed to be coalition aircraft are lit up or fired upon,
they fire back on the spot. Why was there a delay this time? Was there
any sort of reluctance?
Quigley: Sometimes that's true. But again it goes back to us making
the determination when and how and if we will respond to a
provocation. At times that is immediate, but at other times, it is
not.
Q: Was there a reluctance, perhaps, to take any action while the
summit was going on at the United Nations?
Quigley: That was not our motivation.
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