DoD News Briefing
Tuesday, August 01, 2000 - 2:30 p.m. EDT
Presenter: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA
Q: Ken, it's been about 10 years since the end of the Gulf War. I wonder if you have any interesting statistical analysis of how successful you have been in the intervening years; how many thousands of missions you have flown since the end of that war and sort of what you've accomplished?
Bacon: Well, in terms of looking at accomplishments, I guess the first answer has to be that Kuwait is free, it's rebuilt, it has a thriving economy, its citizens travel all over the world. Iraq is contained, it has a broken economy, it is an isolated state. And I think that's the fundamental difference between Iraq and Kuwait, and probably the fundamental accomplishment over the last 10 years.
We, obviously, through the U.N. and with our allies have worked very hard to get inspection teams into Iraq and monitor its program of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunately, Iraq has denied that. In the meantime, we do monitor the no-fly zones, which basically deny Iraq access to 60 percent of its airspace, and we've been doing that fairly constantly since 1992. And I think that that has led to containing Iraq from attacking neighboring countries, as well as from attacking its own people on a regular basis, either in the north or in the south.
So I think that the primary outcome is that Iraq remains isolated and contained and Kuwait is free.
Q: Do you have any dollar figure on what it has cost since the end of the Gulf War to maintain the no-fly zones? Is it about $2 billion a year?
Bacon: The -- I believe the cost is slightly less than that, but it is certainly over a billion dollars a year of maintaining the no-fly zones.
In addition, we have the biggest change in deployments since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. We have now started to deploy on a regular basis a fairly major force in the Gulf. We have today probably about 24,000 troops in the Gulf. These would include Army troops exercising in Kuwait.
They would include Air Force members stationed around the Gulf and Navy troops at the 5th Fleet in Bahrain, headquartered in Bahrain, at NavCent.
We have in Southern Watch flown more than 200,000 sorties since August of 1992, when we started enforcing the no-fly zones. And in Southern Watch, we have flown -- Southern Watch began in 1997 -- I'm sorry; Northern Watch began in 1997, and we've flown more than 16,000 sorties in Northern Watch -- so more than 200,000 in Southern Watch and more than 16,000 in Northern Watch.
Ivan?
Q: Change of subject?
Q: Actually, I have --
Bacon: Yeah?
Q: Just on that, is there any anticipation that the Iraqis tomorrow will try to have some sort of show of force, some -- you know, commemorating their glorious invasion?
Bacon: Would the -- do I anticipate the Iraqis will have a show of force to remind the world of their defeat? Is that what you're asking me?
Q: Well, it wouldn't be something that I would necessarily rule out --
Bacon: I know Saddam Hussein is hard to figure, but this seems like a no-brainer.
I can't answer that question. We have to be ready for everything, and I think that the record of our troops in the Gulf has shown that they are extremely well trained and very ready, very well equipped. They've carried out a demanding mission, during which they're under fire at least several times a week and sometimes every day of every week, typically from anti-aircraft guns, but occasionally from missiles as well.
We think that the Operation Southern Watch and Northern Watch have been able to debilitate Saddam Hussein's air defense quite a lot. For one thing, we think that he's largely afraid to use his top-of-the-line air-defense systems, for fear of losing them to our patrolling airplanes.
I don't anticipate that there will be a show of force tomorrow, but in Iraq anything's possible.
Q: And just to follow up on Jamie's statistical questions, any idea how many tons of ordnance we've expended since either the beginning or the end of the Gulf War?
Bacon: I can't answer that question. We've probably -- the question would be, have we used more or less than he's fired at us? He fires quite a lot of AAA and missiles at us.
Q: Of course, some people would argue that Saddam Hussein is still very much in power 10 years later; that he may in fact even be more wealthy today because he is skimming money off of smuggled oil. His population is not as prosperous, certainly, but he is. And the whole U.N. apparatus that the United States has helped to spearhead, to set up, is eroding, undeniably, and you're losing traction on that. So how is it that we have really won when he is still there, still in power, still an irritant, and perhaps richer than he was the day he launched the war?
Bacon: Well, I think in several ways. First, I would question what joy one can derive from being a strong man in a weak country, as Saddam Hussein is. But beyond that, I think we are containing him every day from the depredations that made him a pariah in the Middle East in 1990 when he invaded Kuwait 10 years ago tomorrow. And he is no longer a threat to his neighbors and is not seen as a threat to his neighbors. That's largely because of the containment that we have carried out. He has not been able to rebuild his military, in part because of our containment, but also in large part because of the United Nations embargo on Iraq, which has prevented him from buying the military equipment he would like to buy.
Yes, he has skimmed off a lot of money. He's built new palaces for his own benefit, but apparently not for the benefit of the people of Iraq. He delayed for a long while participating in the oil-for-food program, which has actually been one of the hopeful and helpful measures that the U.N. has brought to Iraq, allowing it to import more food in return for the oil it sells.
So he may personally feel that his standard of living is fine. I don't know how he would feel that. He's, in a sense, a captive in his own country; he can't leave. He seems to move around regularly in order to avoid assassination or other attacks from forces that wish him ill. He, as I say, is an emperor in a weak country, a weak, dispirited country.
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