Northern no-fly zone
35. Time constraints prevented us on this occasion
visiting the UK personnel based at Incirlik in Turkey, on operations
in the northern no-fly zones, although our predecessor Committee
visited those deployed there on Operation Provide Comfort in 1995
and we hope to be able to visit the region ourselves in the future.
We have received information about the UK contribution to Operation
Northern Watch (Operation Warden) from the MoD.[87]
The UK contribution to operations in the northern zone does not
include offensive action against Iraqi targets.[88]
Four RAF Jaguar GR3 tactical reconnaissance aircraft are based
at Incirlik, supported by two VC-10 tankers providing air-to-air
refuelling.[89]
The detachment comprises about 200 personnel, under Commander
British Forces Warden.
Southern no-fly zone
36. The UK contribution to patrolling the southern
no-fly zone, Operation Bolton, is part of a coalition operation,
Operation Southern Watch. The operational headquarters for Southern
Watch are based at Eskan in Saudi Arabia. It is very much a US-controlled
operation, under the US Commander, Joint Task Force-South West
Asia (CJTF-SWA). The British commander, Commander British Forces
Bolton (CBFB), an RAF Group Captain, is also located at Eskan,
with supporting staff, and is responsible for all UK operations
in the southern no-fly zone.[90]
37. There are no operational units based at Eskan.
Coalition missions are flown from Prince Sultan Air Base at Al
Kharj, about 2 hours' drive south of Riyadh. This is a huge airbase,
the size of the Isle of Wight. The RAF has six Tornado F Mk 3
aircraft located there, crewed at the time of our visit by about
200 personnel from 43 Squadron. The squadron is supported by Royal
Engineers and Logistic Corps personnel, making a total detachment
strength of about 280 under the command of a Wing-Commander.[91]
The role of the Tornado F3s is to provide air defence from possible
Iraqi air attack to coalition patrols flying from the Ali Al Salem
base in Kuwait on tactical reconnaissance and offensive strike
missions.[92]
38. Air-to-air refuelling for the Tornado F3s is
provided by a VC-10 tanker based at Muharraq airfield in Bahrain,
crewed since 1997 by 101 Squadron from RAF Brize Norton.[93]
The current detachment is about 36 personnel and the crew is rotated
every 5 weeks. The tanker can support US Navy aircraft but not
US Air Force aircraft which use a different refuelling system.
39. The reconnaissance and ground attack elements
of the UK contribution to operations are provided by 8 Tornado
GR Mk 1 aircraft based at Ali Al Salem airbase in Kuwait. At the
time of our visit, the aircraft were crewed by II (AC) Squadron
from RAF Marham. The Tornado GR1s are equipped with Paveway laser
guided bombs, thermal imaging and laser designator (TIALD) pods
and reconnaissance pods.[94]
Ali Al Salem is the Kuwaiti Air Force base and is located only
30 miles from the Iraqi border. II Squadron are supported by a
half squadron of RAF Regiment personnel, with Royal Engineers
on the base working on infrastructure improvements. The total
detachment of about 430 personnel is under the command of a Group
Captain.
Maritime operations
40. The Royal Navy's Armilla patrol has been in operation
in the Gulf region since the Iran-Iraq war began in 1980. Its
purpose then was to ensure the safety of British merchant ships
in the region. Its role has since developed to 'provide reassurance
to friendly Gulf states and act as a tangible demonstration of
UK engagement in the region' and to contribute to the international
effort to enforce sanctions against Iraq.[95]
The Armilla patrol currently consists of the continual presence
in the Gulf Region of a frigate or destroyer supported by a Royal
Fleet Auxiliary vessel.[96]
41. The Armilla patrol is augmented by Carrier Task
Groups and other naval forces deployed to the region from time
to time. Earlier this year HMS Illustrious led a Carrier Task
Group to the Gulf which comprised a nuclear submarine, nine warships
and 2,000 personnel.[97]
Its activities included participation in no-fly zone patrols and
maritime interdiction operations as well as training exercises
for Royal Navy personnel and joint exercises with the US Navy
and those of Gulf states.[98]
The Task Group included a four-ship mine countermeasures group
(MCM) which undertook routine MCM survey work in the region. We
were able to visit HMS Inverness, one of the mine countermeasure
vessels integrated with the Carrier Task Group, during our visit
to Bahrain.
Command structure and targeting
process
42. The commanders of the British operations in the
Iraqi no-fly zones, Commander British Forces Bolton in the southern
region and Commander British Forces Warden in the northern region,
report directly to the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) in London.
CJO, under the authority of the Secretary of State, passes to
the commanders 'highly detailed levels of delegated authority
for target clearance'. The commander can apply for authority to
attack targets beyond this delegated authority; this has been
applied for and granted on 5 occasions since April 1991.[99]
43. The Secretary of State told us
Although mistakes are made on rare occasions,[101]
the MoD takes the view that reports from Iraq about civilian casualties
have to be treated with extreme scepticism. Accusations often
come from Baghdad of damage caused by coalition bombs on days
when no missions have been flown.[102]
'Painstaking battle damage assessment' is carried out after the
dropping of any bomb, which gives the MoD confidence that 'in
the vast majority of cases, released ordnance by coalition aircraft
lands on, or very close to, its intended target'.[103]
Appropriateness and serviceability
of equipment
TORNADO F3 AIRCRAFT
44. During our visit to RAF personnel based at Prince
Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia, we were told about some of the
performance problems demonstrated by their Tornado F3 aircraft
in undertaking no-fly zone missions. The high temperatures in
the Gulf have a significant effect on the performance of the aircraft,
preventing them from being able to fly high enough to reach an
ideal altitude, in contrast to the US Air Force's F-15s, which
regularly fly at 40,000 feet. The Secretary of State told us that
all fast jets experience performance problems in hot climates
unless they are specifically adapted to operate in that environment
and that all F3s deployed on Operation Bolton had been provided
with additional cooling equipment to counter this.[104]
The F3 was originally intended for air defence of the UK, operating
primarily over the North Sea.
45. There were also serviceability problems with
the F3. The usual pattern in practice was for four aircraft to
take off on a mission; the two performing best on the day would
continue on the mission; one would remain in the vicinity of the
tanker aircraft in case it was needed; and the one performing
least well would return to base. The dangerous nature of the missions
means that minor problems with equipment cannot be tolerated in
the way they might be on training exercises. The Director of Air
Operations told us that all aircraft on operational detachments
were given priority in receiving spares and that
In response to a parliamentary question about the
serviceability of Tornado aircraft, the MoD said that 'operational
serviceability of front-line aircraft fluctuates each day according
to the maintenance that is required' and as an illustration provided
a 'snapshot' of aircraft available on a particular day. On 26
January this year, 79 of the 86 front-line F3s were classified
as serviceable. This includes those which require 'first line
servicing', undertaken by the deployed squadron itself, where
faults can be rectified in a few hours.[106]
46. Ministers have accepted the limitations of the
Tornado F3 for some time
The MoD is undertaking a £140 million upgrade
programme for the Tornado F3, announced in late 1997 and known
as the Capability Sustainment Programme (CSP) which is intended
to provide the RAF with an aircraft which meets its current requirements
until Eurofighter becomes available. (We discussed the Eurofighter
programme in our recent report on MoD major procurement projects.[108])
The Director of Air Operations told us that the CSP will give
the F3 the capability to fire advance short range and medium range
air to air missiles (ASRAAM and AMRAAM) and will improve the navigation
equipment and radar performance.[109]
It also includes fitting the Tornados with a Successor Identification
Friend or Foe (SIFF) system to allow pilots to identify aircraft
flying near them more effectively by electronic means rather than
relying on identification by eye.[110]
Unmodified aircraft will be kept in service until 2007 and the
CSP F3s until 2010.[111]
The Director of Air Operations told us that Eurofighter would
be an 'ideal aeroplane' to carry out the missions currently undertaken
in the no-fly zones by the Tornado F3, that it would be similar
to the US Air Force F-15 and that it would not suffer from temperature
problems.[112]
47. We understand the frustrations of our air-crew
in undertaking difficult missions with aircraft which are not
ideal for the task, particularly when they are operating alongside
their US colleagues who have demonstrably superior equipment.
The Secretary of State pointed out the difference in the budgets
available to him and to his US counterpart.[113]
Although we have made clear on a number of occasions our view
that the UK defence budget should be increased, we accept that
the realities of living within any level of budget mean that expensive
equipment cannot always be replaced as quickly as would be ideal.
However, we expect the MoD to provide all RAF air-crew undertaking
dangerous missions in the no-fly zones with upgraded F3 aircraft
as soon as possible and to ensure that the highest levels of serviceability
are maintained on all aircraft participating in the mission.
VC10 TANKER
48. We were told during our visit that some F3 missions
had to be cancelled because of the non-availability of the VC10
tanker based at Bahrain. There were two VC10s in operation until
January this year. The Secretary of State told us that reducing
the tankers to only one aircraft had not had an adverse effect
on operations
The decision to withdraw one of the aircraft had
balanced the needs of the mission with other factors
We do not challenge the benefits of the decision
to withdraw one of the VC10 tankers from the region, but we conclude
that the MoD's view that this has had no effect
on operations is an overstatement.
Capabilities of personnel
49. Many of the RAF personnel whom we met in the
Gulf were on their second or third rotation and some pilots expressed
to us their concern that they risked suffering 'skill fade'. This
arises when they train for and are then deployed on operations
in which the same type of mission is undertaken every day, as
in the Gulf. They are not then able to train over a range of activities
as they would normally do and therefore risk losing some of their
proficiency in all but the one type of mission being undertaken.
The Director of Air Operations accepted that this was a problem
in any deployment of this kind, and that
The Secretary of State told us
To address possible skill fade problems
To balance this, there are benefits to pilot training
from the no-fly zone operations. The Director of Air Operations
told us
Other possible restrictions on
operational effectiveness
50. We asked the Secretary of State about possible
limitations on operational effectiveness arising from host countries'
sensitivities about the way in which their facilities and support
were used. He told us
Saudi Arabia did not permit offensive aircraft to
be deployed from its territory during Operation Desert Fox and
that policy has continued since then.[121]
Turkey is reported to impose restrictions in relation to northern
no-fly zone missions operating from Incirlik: US and UK aircraft
can fly for only 3 days a week, for a maximum of 3 hours a day;
no more than 48 aircraft can take part in any operation; and the
types of munitions carried are limited.[122]
The MoD was confident that this sort of restriction was not having
an adverse effect on operations. The view of the Director General
of Operational Policy was that
51. It is part of the Iraqi tactics to use their
aircraft to try to lure US and UK aircraft into surface to air
missile (SAM) traps. The Iraqi government has offered a substantial
cash reward for members of their armed forces who succeed in bringing
down a US or UK aircraft or for the capture of a pilot. During
our visit to the Gulf, RAF personnel told us that it was made
very clear to them that, in undertaking missions, the key priority
was for air-crew to return safely: no target was worth risking
their lives for. It is regarded as near miraculous by those in
theatre that, given the number of missions flown over a sustained
period of time, there have so far been no casualties. Some RAF
personnel thought it was inevitable that sooner or later casualties
would be sustained, either because of mechanical failure to an
aircraft or a successful Iraqi attack. The Secretary of State
emphasised that it was a tribute to the skill of our RAF personnel
that none had so far been lost and that the danger of flying missions
should not be underestimated.[124]
52. The conduct of operations also has to take into
account the reality, or the perception by governments and chiefs
of staff, that public opinion is 'risk averse'; that the public
expect none of their Service personnel to be killed or captured
and that they would no longer support participation in an operation
if casualties occurred. This risk aversion is assessed to be particularly
strong in the United States and, as the US is the dominant partner
in the no-fly zones coalition, this philosophy inevitably has
an effect on the way the missions are conducted and the rules
of engagement adopted.
53. We conclude that these considerations do place
constraints on the manner in which coalition air operations are
conducted but do not prevent our forces from making an effective
and valuable contribution to the goals of the mission.
54. We are also concerned that the capacity rapidly
to reinforce air presence in the region, either in terms of maritime
forces or land and HQ elements, is at best limited. Much of the
evidence about this is, for good reasons, sensitive.
Operational welfare
ACCOMMODATION AND FACILITIES
55. The accommodation for RAF personnel which we
saw on the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia is of a good
standard. Purpose-built units replaced tented accommodation in
March last year. Leisure facilities include a swimming pool and
UK personnel are able to use the extensive US social, recreational
and leisure facilities. The high-tech US medical facilities were
made available to the UK medical officer. In Bahrain, UK personnel
are accommodated off the base in rented villas and those we met
found their facilities satisfactory.
56. The accommodation for personnel at the Ali Al
Salem airbase in Kuwait, which is provided by the host government,
is of a poor standard and this is acknowledged by the MoD. The
Secretary of State told us
When we visited the base, personnel were accommodated
in 12 two-room blocks, with 20 personnel in each room and one
bathroom per block. There is inadequate air-conditioning and,
given the extreme heat in the region, the rooms are very uncomfortable
for much of the year. Plans to improve the accommodation have
been agreed: the number of people accommodated in each room will
be reduced from 20 to 10 and effective air-conditioning installed.
The Secretary of State told us
We understand that the planned completion date for
improvements is early autumn. We expect the MoD to be able
to tell us in response to this Report that the required improvements
to the accommodation at Ali Al Salem airbase have been completed.
TELEPHONES
57. As so often seems to be the case, we were told
during our visit to the Gulf of problems with welfare telephone
connections to the UK. The Project Welcome system, which provides
telephone links to the UK for Service personnel deployed abroad,
has been introduced for personnel on the Prince Sultan Air Base
(PSAB) in Saudi Arabia. The system was not fully commissioned
when we visited the Ali Al Salem base in Kuwait. We were told
by personnel based at both PSAB and Ali Al Salem that the telephone
system is not working well: connections are poor and as a result
as much as half of the 20 minutes free allocation per week is
wasted. Additional time can be bought on the Project Welcome system
and on the other welfare systems at a cost ranging between £1.47
and £1.63 per minute but personnel do not take up this option
because cheaper and more effective alternatives (such as buying
commercial telephone cards) are available. Commanding officers
at the Prince Sultan Air Base told us that they had raised the
connection problems many times with Permanent Joint Headquarters
(PJHQ) before they were able to convince those responsible that
a problem existed and should be investigated. In Bahrain, where
Project Welcome apparently does not use satellite links, personnel
reported no problems with telephone connections, although they
were equally reluctant to purchase additional time on the system.
58. The Minister for the Armed Forces has admitted
that there are problems
The Secretary of State also assured us that he was
aware of the problems and that they would be addressed.[128]
We have raised the issue of telephones on numerous occasions in
the past, most recently in our report this Session on the MoD's
Annual Reporting Cycle.[129]
The government said in reply to that report that it endorsed our
views on 'the importance that Service personnel deployed on expeditionary
operations attach to being able to contact their families regularly,
reliably and cheaply'. We are therefore disappointed to find that
there are problems in a region where UK personnel have been deployed
for nearly 10 years. The contrast with the facilities available
to US personnel at the same bases is stark. We hope that the
MoD, in response to this Report, will be able to tell us that
an efficient welfare telephone system is now in place for personnel
deployed in the Gulf and indeed elsewhere. The MoD also needs
to continue to respond to the rapidly increasing popularity of
e-mail as a way for personnel to keep in touch with their families,
by supplying an adequate number of suitable computers.
Force protection
59. The region is not a benign or safe environment
in which to operate. There are military threats, terrorist threats
and other risks inherent in the nature of the deployment. Although
this was not raised as an issue of particular concern during our
visit, we would welcome reassurance that these risks have been
adequately assessed and that the necessary thinking about preventative
measures has been done.
89 The
GR3s are currently crewed by No. 54(F) Squadron and the VC10s
by No. 10 Squadron: see RAF Operation Warden News at www.raf.mod.uk/news/ Back
95 Ev
p 21-22 Back
97 HC
Deb., 22 February 2000, c 1394 Back
99 HC
Deb., 6 June 2000, c171w; see also QQ 52-58. No offensive operations
are conducted by UK forces in the northern no-fly zone and there
is therefore no targeting policy there. Back
101 Since
December 1998, there have been two occurrences of ordnance released
from UK aircraft hitting unintended targets. See HC Deb., 6 June
2000, c 169w Back
102 Q
60; see also HC Deb., 6 June 2000, cc 169-170w Back
103 HC
Deb., 6 June 2000, c 168w Back
106 HC
Deb., 14 February 2000, c 370w Back
107 HC
Deb., 9 July 1997, c 867 Back
108 Tenth
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1999-2000, Major
Procurement Projects, HC 528, paras 11-26 Back
110 HC
Deb., 14 June 2000, cc 645-6 w; see also QQ 102-106 Back
111 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 8 March 2000 Back
122 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 12 April
2000, pp 23-24. The MoD has said that it cannot comment on restrictions
on certain types of weapons as UK aircraft in the northern no-fly
zone only conduct renaissance operations; see Ev p 31 Back
124 QQ
123-127 Back
127 HC
Deb., 13 April 2000, c 523 Back
129 Second
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1999-2000, Ministry
of Defence Annual Reporting Cycle, HC 158, paras 100-103 Back
... we are very careful to
ensure that in selecting targets we do so in a proportionate manner
and, indeed, in a manner that avoids, if at all possible, the
prospect of civilian casualties.[100]
... serviceability of aircraft
in all of our operational attachments is more than adequate to
meet the task that we have been set by the commander in the field.[105]
We all recognise that the
RAF's F3 Tornado has a limited further life. It is not ... an
agile aircraft. It was designed to deal with the Cold War threat
of Soviet long-range bomber attack on the United Kingdom. The
missile upgrade currently being implemented will, of course, make
it a much more effective system, but that can be no more than
a relatively short-term solution.[107]
... we have lost only four
of the planned sorties either due to crew sickness or aircraft
unserviceability. That represents a success rate of 93% and we
judge that to be acceptable.[114]
The withdrawal of the VC10
airframe was to allow us to both minimise the impact on the crews
but equally to allow additional training and exercising opportunities.
There have been real benefits in withdrawing one airframe in terms
of ensuring the retention of the appropriate skill levels but
also simply in terms of ensuring the people affected have more
opportunities to be at home and not to be deployed.[115]
... the sort of skills that
they are clearly not able to practise in the Gulf are things like
low flying; some of the weapon deliveries as well we cannot practise
in the Gulf region.[116]
I must emphasise to you that
this is not a new phenomenon ... We have had to deal with this
kind of management problem over a very long period of time, and
we are very much aware of the implications of skill fade if people
are not given the rounder training that they require.[117]
... we tend to cycle the
crews through after about six weeks, and they come back to the
United Kingdom to ensure that the skills that they have do not
perish.[118]
... operating in the Gulf
gives them very good experience of operating in very large packages
with the US, and they do not get that opportunity on a day-to-day
basis very often in the UK.[119]
Clearly in general terms
we would indicate to the host nation what it was that we were
doing based in their territory. There is full disclosure as to
what our intentions are ... It does not go as far as giving precise
details. We have a general permission to operate from a host nation
territory subject to an indication to those countries as to what
it is that we are doing there.[120]
Obviously there are sensitivities
about their customs and domestic issues of that kind but in terms
of operations I cannot think of any inhibitions that are preventing
us undertaking operations as we want to do so.[123]
They are not conditions in
which we would want people to have to live for very long.[125]
... we are very grateful
to the Kuwaiti Government for both the speed with which they have
responded and indeed the efforts that they are making to improve
the living accommodation. So the matter is in hand, but clearly
we want to get it sorted out quickly.[126]
... in the Gulf region ...
we know that there have been some technical problems with the
introduction of Project Welcome telephones. The speech quality
of the original system was not good, and it was difficult for
untrained personnel to use ... We have taken temporary measures
to resolve the problems. For the longer term, we shall shortly
be changing the communications system used in the Gulf region.
We are determined to make Project Welcome work for our personnel.[127]
87 Ev pp 27 and 30 Back
Prepared 2 August 2000
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