Strategic importance of the region
to the United Kingdom
7. The MoD have told us that
The Strategic Defence Review set out the UK's interest
in the Gulf region as follows
The Secretary of State recently reiterated the importance
of the region
The MoD has set out the UK's formal relations with
the Gulf Co-operation Council countries as follows
8. The UK's commitment and that of many other countries,
most notably the United States, to uphold the security of the
region was demonstrated in the Gulf War. This determination to
preserve stability and guarantee the West's oil supplies remains
a key issue. Iraq has remained the main threat to regional stability
since the Gulf War and the operations to enforce the no-fly zones
are part of a policy aimed at containing Iraq. The Secretary of
State has affirmed that
The Gulf War
9. Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 in an attack
involving 100,000 personnel. UN Security Council Resolution 660
was passed that day demanding 'that Iraq withdraw immediately
and unconditionally all its forces to the positions in which they
were located on 1 August 1990'.[15]
Iraq's failure to comply with the Resolution led to a further
Resolution, 661, on 6 August 1990, which called for the restoration
of the 'sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Kuwait' and imposed wide-ranging economic sanctions against Iraq.[16]
The US and the UK, in Operation Desert Shield, began deployments
of troops to the region soon afterwards, with the initial aim
of deterring further Iraqi aggression against Saudi Arabia which
was threatened by large numbers of Iraqi forces on its border.[17]
10. Over the following months, the UN failed to persuade
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. On 29 November 1990, the Security
Council passed Resolution 678 which authorised Member States
unless Iraq adhered to previous Resolutions demanding
its withdrawal from Kuwait on or before 15 January 1991.[18]
In defiance of this, Iraq continued to build its forces in Kuwait
so that, by the 15 January deadline, it was estimated that it
had 600,000 personnel, 4,500 tanks and 3,250 artillery pieces
in the region.[19]
11. The failure of Iraq to meet the UN deadline led
to military operations by multinational forces, involving about
1 million personnel from 30 countries.[20]
The US contribution to the operation was 450,000 personnel; the
UK had the second largest contingent of about 45,000 personnel.[21]
The coalition war against Iraq, Operation Desert Storm,[22]
began on 16 January 1991 with a massive air attack against strategic
targets in Iraq and Kuwait and continued for five weeks. This
was followed by a ground campaign beginning on 24 February which
drove Iraqi forces from Kuwait by 28 February, when hostilities
were suspended. An official ceasefire followed on 11 April. About
250 allied personnel were killed during the campaign, 47 of whom
were British.
The United Nations and weapons
inspection
12. In the aftermath of the Gulf War and in an attempt
to prevent Iraq re-emerging from the war as a potent threat, the
United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 687 which required,
amongst other things
The Resolution also set out the process for setting
up a weapons inspection organisation, the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), to 'carry out immediate on-site inspection
of Iraq's biological, chemical and missile capabilities' and required
'the yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission
for destruction, removal or rendering harmless ... of all items
specified'. [24] UNSCOM
was to work with the assistance of the International Atomic Energy
Authority (IAEA).
13. Iraq accepted the Resolution on 6 April 1991
and UNSCOM began its first chemical weapons and missile inspections
in June that year.[25]
The relationship between UNSCOM and the government of Iraq from
then on was characterised by periodical flare-ups arising from
Iraq's lack of co-operation with the inspection process. Iraq
frequently threatened to end co-operation with UNSCOM altogether,
and some of these threats were followed through. For example,
in January 1993, Iraq refused to allow UNSCOM aircraft to fly
into Iraq and began incursions into the demilitarised zone on
the border with Kuwait. Following warnings from the Security Council,
France, the UK and the US conducted air raids on sites in southern
Iraq and Iraq backed down.[26]
Further UN Resolutions requiring Iraq to co-operate with weapons
inspection were passed when Iraq's behaviour was particularly
intransigent.[27]
14. There was a major escalation of tension in February
1998 when UNSCOM inspectors were once again refused access to
sites believed to be linked to the manufacture or storage of weapons
of mass destruction (WMD).[28]
This refusal related in particular to eight so-called 'presidential
sites' which Iraq declared out of bounds to the inspectors. The
US and the UK threatened Iraq with military action unless full
co-operation with the UNSCOM inspectors was restored. They built
up their military strength in the region and made it clear that
force would be used if necessary.[29]
This crisis was averted by the direct intervention of the UN Secretary
General which resulted in Iraq signing a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) in which it confirmed its acceptance of all relevant Security
Council resolutions.[30]
The UN Security Council endorsed the MOU in Resolution 1154 of
March 1998 and warned that any violation of the agreement would
have the 'severest consequences for Iraq',[31]
although it was not clear whether this gave authority for military
action in the event of non-compliance.
15. Iraq's relations with UNSCOM deteriorated again
in June and July 1998 when Iraq's declaration on its biological
weapons programme was disputed by UNSCOM, particularly on the
development of VX nerve agent.[32]
In August, Iraq announced it was suspending all co-operation with
UNSCOM and the IAEA.[33]
In September, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1194,
condemning Iraq's lack of co-operation and suspending the six-monthly
reviews of sanctions until co-operation was restored.[34]
A comprehensive review of sanctions was offered to Iraq as an
incentive but was rejected as it excluded the key issue of the
oil embargo. In October, the UN Secretary General again held direct
talks with Iraqi officials but failed to make progress and at
the end of the month the Iraqi government declared an end to all
co-operation with UNSCOM. In November, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 1205 which condemned Iraq's action as 'a flagrant
violation' of previous resolutions and demanded that 'Iraq provide
immediate, complete and unconditional co-operation' with UNSCOM
and the IAEA.[35]
All UNSCOM personnel were withdrawn from Iraq on 11 November 1998.
16. On 12 November the US and the UK warned Iraq
that it would face a substantial military strike if it did not
return to full compliance with UN Resolutions. On 14 November
the US and the UK authorised the launch of an initial wave of
strike aircraft. At the same time the UN Secretary General's special
representative attempted to provide Iraq with a face-saving formula.
Two hours before the first air strikes were due to take place,
Iraq indicated that it was willing to comply with UN demands although
allied forces remained ready to act while the exact terms of Iraq's
compliance were clarified. The UK and the US then suspended military
action on the basis that Iraq had agreed to 'unconditional resumption
of co-operation'. The Prime Minister said then 'If there is a
next time, I shall have no hesitation in ordering the use of force'.[36]
UNSCOM inspectors returned to Iraq on 17 November.
17. Renewed Iraqi co-operation was short-lived and
on 15 December 1998 the Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, Richard
Butler, wrote to the UN Secretary General to update him on Iraqi
compliance since November. He reported some progress but concluded
that during that period 'Iraq initiated new forms of restrictions
upon the Commission's work' and that 'Iraq's conduct ensured that
no progress was able to be made in either the fields of disarmament
or accounting for its prohibited weapons programmes'.[37]
Iraq had therefore failed to honour the promise of full co-operation
made in November, when military action was suspended.
Operation Desert Fox
18. Military action against Iraq was initiated by
US and UK forces on 16 December 1998 in Operation Desert Fox on
the basis of Iraq's non-compliance with UNSCOM and the growing
concern that Iraq was continuing to develop its chemical and biological
weapons capability. The objective of the operation was
The operation ended on 19 December. UK forces participated
in 32 sorties (15 per cent of the total missions)[39]
involving Tornado GR1 fighter-bombers from RAF 12 Squadron based
at Ali Al Salem in Kuwait. Targets were chosen on the basis of
avoiding damage to civilians and civilian sites as far as possible
and 'economic targets', such as power supplies and transport networks,
were not attacked.[40]
The then Secretary of State announced in January 1999 that 87
per cent of targets in Iraq were either damaged or destroyed[41]
and that, as a result, Iraq's WMD programmes had been disrupted
'for several months at least'; its ballistic missile programme
had been set back by one or two years; and its L-29 unmanned aerial
vehicle programme had been seriously damaged or destroyed.[42]
19. Operation Desert Fox had no effect on Iraq's
intransigence on weapons inspection and there have been no UN
weapons inspectors in Iraq since the withdrawal of UNSCOM personnel
in November 1998. We discuss below the arrangements for a new
inspectorate as set out in UNSCR 1284 (see paras 73 to 79). During
the years of its operation, UNSCOM was able to make some progress
in the disclosure and destruction of weapons. It destroyed more
than 38,000 chemical weapons munitions, 690 tonnes of chemical
weapons agents, 3,000 tonnes of precursor chemicals, 48 Scud missiles
and a biological weapons factory.[43]
Sanctions
20. Sanctions were first imposed on Iraq in August
1990, following the invasion of Kuwait, under UN Security Resolution
661. This Resolution prohibited the sale or supply to Iraq (or
Kuwait at that time) of all goods except 'supplies intended strictly
for medical purposes, and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs'.[44]
After the Gulf War had ended, Resolution 687 of April 1991 specified
that the prohibitions did not apply to foodstuffs or 'to materials
and supplies for essential civilian needs'.[45]
Further Security Council Resolutions later that year introduced
the so-called 'oil-for-food programme' which permitted Iraq to
sell $1.6 billion worth of oil every six months for the import
of humanitarian supplies.[46]
Iraq did not agree to the terms of the oil-for-food programme
until five years later and has not fully co-operated with its
implementation since that time.[47]
21. During the time sanctions have been in place,
the health and well-being of the Iraqi people have deteriorated.
Iraq's failure to co-operate fully with the oil-for-food programme
has been cited as a key factor in the high incidence of malnutrition
amongst Iraqi people, especially children, and the lack of adequate
medical care.[48]
The UN Special Rapporteur observed
He also commented that 'the Government of Iraq has
used some resources to enrich itself'[50]
and the UK Government estimate that illegal exports of Iraqi oil
were worth $250 million in 1999 and $170 million to date this
year.[51] The Executive
Director of the Office of the Iraq Programme expressed concern
in May 1999 that, of the $570 million worth of medical supplies
which had reached Iraq, only 48 per cent had been distributed.[52]
22. A contrast is frequently drawn between the three
northern governorates of Iraq, where the UN administers the oil-for-food
programme on behalf of the Government of Iraq, and the 15 governorates
in the southern and central regions, home to 85 per cent of the
country's population, where the government of Iraq distributes
food and medical supplies directly. In the latter, the under-five
and infant mortality rates more than doubled from the 1984-89
assessment period to the 1994-99 assessment period. In the northern
region both rates rose between 1984 and 1994 but have fallen since
the UN took over responsibility for the programme.[53]
23. Our colleagues on the International Development
Committee have recently examined the effect of sanctions on Iraq
as part of a wider inquiry into the future of sanctions.[54]
The view of that Committee is that 'the responsibility for the
plight of the Iraqi people must ultimately lie with the Iraqi
leadership' but that 'This does not ... entirely excuse the international
community from a part in the suffering of Iraqis': Saddam Hussein's
willingness to oppress his people and his contempt for humanitarian
law were well-known before sanctions were imposed and the Committee
concluded that 'A sanctions regime which relies on the good faith
of Saddam Hussein is fundamentally flawed'.[55]
24. Some of those closest to the situation believe
the UN sanctions are the direct cause of the suffering of the
Iraqi people. Mr Hans von Sponeck, the UN humanitarian co-ordinator
for Iraq, resigned in March this year and alleged that UN sanctions
were causing huge suffering in Iraq without achieving their goal
of reforming the regime.[56]
The UN Secretary General acknowledged in March this year that
the 'humanitarian situation in Iraq posed a serious moral dilemma
for the United Nations' and that the UN was 'in danger of losing
the argument, or the propaganda warif that had not already
been lostabout who was responsible for the situation in
Iraq'.[57]
UN Security Council Resolution 1284 of December 1999, which is
discussed further below (see paras 73 to 79) was intended, amongst
other things, to address some of the weaknesses in the present
sanctions regime.
United Nations Iraq/Kuwait Observer
Mission (UNIKOM)
25. Under Security Council Resolution 687 of April
1991 a demilitarised zone on the Iraq/Kuwait border was established
extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait.[58]
Under a further Resolution a few days later, a Chief Military
Observer was appointed and arrangements put in place for an observer
mission to be established, which would monitor the zone, deter
violations of the border and observe hostile acts by either country.[59]
In 1993, UNIKOM's role was enhanced to allow the redress of violations
of the zone and to monitor Iraqi installations,[60]
including ship movements in and out of Umm Qasr, Iraq's main port,
which is used for oil-for-food programme shipments.
26. We were able to visit the demilitarised zone
and were briefed by the Force Commander and members of the British
contingent in UNIKOM. The UK contribution to UNIKOM is currently
11 officers drawn from all three Services on six-month postings.
32 countries contribute personnel and the operation is unique
for the UN in that it involves representatives from all five permanent
members of the Security Council.[61]
Violations of the zone do occur but serious incidents have been
few and the mission is regarded by the United Nations as a success.[62]
11 Strategic
Defence Review, MoD, July 1998, Cm 3999, paras 40 and 54 Back
12 Speech
by the Secretary of State for Defence to the Royal United Services
Institute's conference on Gulf Security 2000, 17 May 2000 Back
13 Letter
to the Second Clerk of the Committee from the Parliamentary Clerk,
MoD, 25 July 2000, not printed. The Gulf Co-operation Council
countries are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates. Back
14 Speech
by the Secretary of State to the RUSI conference, op cit Back
15 UN
Security Council Resolution 660 (1990), 2 August 1990, para 2 Back
16 UN
Security Council Resolution 661 (1990), 6 August 1990 Back
17 See
Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 28 June 1991,
Despatch by Air Chief Marshal Sir Patrick Hine, GCB, ADC, FRAeS,
CBIM, RAF, Joint Commander of Operation Granby, published with
the Minutes of Evidence to the Tenth Report from the Defence Committee,
Session 1990-91, HC 287, Preliminary Lessons of Operation Granby Back
18 UN
Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), 29 November 1990, para
2 Back
19 See
Second Supplement to the London Gazette, 28 June 1991,
op cit Back
20 Parliamentary
Office of Science and Technology, Gulf War Illnesses-Dealing
with the Uncertainties, December 1997 Back
21 Tenth
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1990-91, HC 287, Preliminary
Lessons of Operation Granby, para 15. The total number of
UK personnel who served in the Gulf during the entire campaign
was about 54,000 and the US figure was nearly 700,000: see Seventh
Report from the Defence Committee, Session 1999-2000, HC 125,
Gulf Veterans' Illnesses, para 3 Back
22 The
UK's contribution was known as 'Operation Granby'. Back
23 UN
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, para 8 Back
25 UNSCOM:
Chronology of main events,
UN website at www.un.org/Depts/unscom Back
27 UNSCR
699 of June 1991; UNSCR 715 of October 1991; UNSCR 1051 of March
1996; UNSCR 1060 of June 1996; UNSCR 1115 of June 1997; UNSCR
1134 of October 1997; UNSCR 1137 of November 1997 Back
28 See
HC Deb., 24 February 1998, cc 173-176; See also UNSCOM: Chronology
of main events, op cit and House of Commons Library
Research Paper 99/13, Iraq: 'Desert Fox' and Policy Developments,
10 February 1999 Back
29 See
HC Deb., 24 February 1998, c 173 Back
30 See
HC Deb., 24 February 1998, c 174 and 3 March 1998, c 511w Back
31 UNSCR
1154 (1998), March 1998, para 3 Back
32 HC
Deb., 16 July 1998, c 249w and 20 July 1998, c 766-767 Back
33 HC
Deb., 16 November 1998, c 608 and UNSCOM: Main chronology of
events, op cit Back
34 UNSCR
1194 (1998), September 1998 Back
35 UNSCR
1205 (1998), 5 November 1998 Back
36 HC
Deb., 16 November 1998, c 610 Back
37 Letter
from the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, 15 December 1998, S/1998/1172; see also
HC Deb., 17 December 1998, c 1099 Back
38 Statement
by the Prime Minister to the House, HC Deb., 17 December 1998,
c 1097 Back
39 MoD
aide memoire sent to all Members of Parliament, December
1998, See Ev pp 28-29 Back
40
Operation Desert Fox: Battle Damage Assessment, edited
transcript of press briefing by Air Marshal John Day, 22 December
1998, available on FCO website at www.fco.gov.uk/news Back
41 HC
Deb., 25 January 1999, c 1 Back
42 MoD
aide memoire, op cit, December 1998, Ev p 28-29;
see also transcript of press briefing by Air Marshal John Day,
op cit Back
43 HC
Deb., 16 November 1998, c 607; see also UNSCOM's Main Achievements,
March 1998, on UN website at
www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Achievements/achievements.html Back
44 UNSCR
661 (1990), 6 August 1990, para 3(c) Back
45 UNSCR
687 (1991) 3 April 1991, para 20 Back
46 UNSCR
706 (1991) of 15 August 1991 and UNSCR 712 (1991) of 19 September
1991 Back
47 Situation
of Human Rights in Iraq,
reports by the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human
Rights, February 1999, E/CN.4/1999/37, paras 29-43 and October
1999, A/54/466, paras 30-37 Back
48 Reports
by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights
in Iraq, , op cit, February 1999 paras 41-42 and October
1999, para 31 Back
49 October
1999 Report, op cit, para 31 Back
50 October
1999 Report, op cit, para 33 Back
51 HC
Deb, 22 May 2000, c 839 Back
52 October
1999 Report, op cit, para 36 Back
54 Second
Report from the International Development Committee, Session 1999-2000,
The Future of Sanctions, HC 67 Back
56 Jane's
Defence Weekly, 3 May 2000,
p 21 Back
57 UNSCR
Press Release SC/6833, 24 March 2000 Back
58 UN
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991), 3 April 1991, para 5 Back
59 UN
Security Council Resolution 689 (1991), 9 April 1991; Ev p 27 Back
60 UN
Security Council Resolution 806 (1993) of 5 February 1993 Back
62 See,
for example, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (24 September 1999-30 March 2000)
S/2000/269, 30 March 2000, paras 2 and 17 Back
UK defence policy in the
Gulf (endorsed by the Defence Council in May 1999) aims to encourage
regional stability in the Gulf region as identified by the SDR
[Strategic Defence Review] to be of core strategic importance
to the UK. As part of this, we attach a high priority to demonstrating
a long-term commitment to the security of the Gulf Co-operation
Council (GCC) states, and encouraging self-sufficiency and internal
stability in the region.[10]
We have particularly important
national interests and close friendships in the Gulf. Oil supplies
from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy. Confrontation
in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and, since the
region borders on NATO, in some circumstances crises could involve
the Alliance directly ... Outside Europe, the greatest risks to
our national economic and political interestsand probably
to international stabilitywill remain in the Gulf.[11]
Stability and security in
the Gulf region is vital for economic prosperity there, in the
UK and throughout the world.[12]
Whilst we have agreements
and Treaties of Friendship of various descriptions with all GCC
countries, the only formal treaty obligation we have which explicitly
commits us to the defence of a country is with the United Arab
Emirates, in the form of a Defence Co-operation Accord signed
in 1996 ... All of the GCC countries have an expectation that
we would assist them in times of crisis, as we did in 1990, and
as the continuing deployment of British troops in the region has
shown we are prepared to do. Many of the GCC countries do not
feel the need for an agreement because we have continually assured
them of our commitment to the stability of the region, and a formal
treaty could be construed as a limitation on the UK's preparedness
to assist by setting out defined limits on when and where the
UK would help out. Nevertheless, the UK should remain open to
requests for such treaties from GCC states.[13]
We will continue to work
with the states of the region to assist them in developing their
defensive capabilities. And we will continue to be prepared, when
necessary, to commit our own forces in the face of aggression.[14]
to use all necessary means
to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent
relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security
in the area
... that Iraq shall unconditionally
accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless, under international
supervision, of: (a) All chemical and biological weapons and all
stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components ...
all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres
... Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General ... a declaration
of the locations, amounts and types of all items specified ..
and agree to urgent, on-site inspection ...[23]
... to degrade the ability
of Saddam Hussein to build and use weapons of mass destruction
[WMD], including command and control and delivery, and to diminish
the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbours by weakening
his military capability.[38]
... had the Government of
Iraq not waited five years to decide to accept the 'oil-for-food'
agreement proposed as early as 1991 ... millions of innocent people
would have avoided serious and prolonged suffering.[49]
10 Ev p 31 Back
Prepared 2 August 2000
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