Asterisks in the Written Evidence denote
that part or all of a question or answer thereto, or a passage
of Evidence has not been reported, at the request of the Ministry
of Defence and with the agreement of the Committee.
(i) Set out
the command structure for the operations in the northern and southern
no-fly-zones, giving details of the role of CBF Bolton and CBF
Warden. How are their respective roles co-ordinated? And how are
the UK command structures co-ordinated with the US structures?
* * *
(ii) Is the targeting approval process
the same for the northern no-fly-zone as for the southern-no-fly
zone? During Oral Evidence DAO said "SofS delegates authority
for CBFB for certain collateral damage limitations". Is there
a similar delegation for CBF Warden?
No, the approval process is not the same for
the NNFZ as the UK does not conduct offensive ops, thus the requirement
for targets is non-existent. For the same reason, there is not
a similar delegation for CBF(W) as for CBF(B).
(iii) The Committee is seeking additional
information on continued repression against the Kurds and Shia.
Reports from UN Special Rapporteur and Amnesty
International attached[3].
(iv) The Committee is seeking information
on the different legal justifications for air and ground operations.
The continuing purpose of the no-fly-zones over
Iraq is:
- — to impede Saddam Hussein's regime
from engaging in repressive operations from the air against the
Kurds in the north and the Shias in the south and to monitor compliance
with UNSCR 688, thereby preventing a return to the grave humanitarian
situation which required the establishment of the zones in 1991
and 1992.
The NFZ in the North was established in April
1991 in order to save Kurdish lives that were threatened on a
massive scale. This was against the background of repeated repression
during the 1980s culminating in the Anfal campaign of 1988 and
the attack with chemical weapons on the Kurdish town of Halabjah
which resulted in thousands of civilian casualties. Since 1991
the NFZ operations have been effective in inhibiting major campaigns
against the Kurds, though there nevertheless has been evidence
of continued attempts including:
- — forcible deportation of Kurdish,
Turkomen and Assyria families estimated by Amnesty at 15,000;
- — shelling of Kurdish areas, though
fortunately range does not allow extensive damage.
In the South there was a pattern of repression
of the Shia Arabs. An uprising in 1991 was suppressed by use of
helicopter gunships and aircraft. Reports suggest that over 100
to 150 thousand Arab marsh dwellers were displaced, many are still
in Iran. The NFZ was set in 1992 to secure Iraq compliance with
UN SCR 688 which calls on Iraq to halt the oppression of its own
people. The NFZ has largely prevented further major atrocities
but the signs of repressive intent still persist. The UN Special
Rapporteur reported 1,000 arrests in Basrah alone last June. In
July a settlement near Rumaitha was the scene of clashes between
Shias and Iraqi security forces: they returned to bulldoze several
hundred houses and later in September destroyed the rest of the
settlement. The UN Special Rapporteur has consistently reported
such incidents.
Thus the justification for the no-fly-zones
remains that of overwhelming humanitarian necessity in that, without
our deployment, a severe humanitarian crisis would in all probability
recur.
No ground operations are taking place. The legal
justification for any such operations, if contemplated, would
have to be considered in the light of all circumstances prevailing
at that time.
(v) The Committee is seeking clarification
of the effect of host nation sensitivities on the conduct of operations.
The Committee were told that Saudi Arabia only permits defensive
air patrols and that Turkey only permits aircraft to fly a maximum
of three days a week for three hours a day; that Turkey limits
the number of aircraft participating in missions and the type
of munitions carried; and that it does not permit pre-planned
attacks on Iraqi installations but responses must be immediate.
In what ways do these restrictions limit the effectiveness of
operations?
* * *
We cannot comment on the restrictions on the
use of certain types of weapons as this is a matter for the US-UK
aircraft only conduct reconnaissance operations.
* * *
(vi) The Committee is seeking evidence
on the serviceability of all aircraft types involved in no-fly-zone
operations.
* * *
(vii) The Committee is seeking detailed
information on the Tornado F3 Upgrade programme.
* * *
(viii) What was the operational role
of the HMS Illustrious Carrier Task Group? Are the Harriers and
Helicopters able to operate effectively in the region given the
climate? To what extent is command and control of the UK air and
maritime force in the region "joint"? With whom does
joint Command in-theatre lie when the task group is in the region?
UK defence policy in the Gulf (endorsed by the
Defence Council in May 1999) aims to encourage regional stability
in the Gulf region as identified by the SDR to be of core strategic
importance to the UK. As part of this, we attach a high priority
to demonstrating a tangible long-term commitment to the security
of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states, and encouraging
self-sufficiency and internal stability in the region. In line
with this policy, the RN periodically deploys naval forces, including
Carrier Task Groups, to the Gulf to maintain theatre currency
and to demonstrate a capability and willingness to deploy significant
forces into the region to those who might threaten regional stability
and also to reassure our allies.
The routine deployment of the HMS Illustrious
Task Group to the Gulf encompassed a wide range of operational
tasking including participation in the humanitarian patrols of
the no-fly-zones under Operation Southern Watch and Maritime Interdiction
Operations (MIOPS) to help enforce the trade embargo against Iraq.
The deployment also provided important training opportunities
for the RN through a series of joint and combined exercises with
key allies in the region, including US forces and GCC states,
which has done much to further our operational capability and
interoperability with allies in the region. A series of goodwill
visits in the region were also undertaken in the furtherance of
Defence Diplomacy objectives and support of wider British interests.
Main exercises included: Exercise Neon Falcon,
a regular trilateral UK/US/Bahrain exercise held off Bahrain which
involved HMS Illustrious and her air group, the nuclear submarine
HMS Triumph and the destroyer HMS Gloucester, and GULFEX 00-1,
a tri-annual exercise co-ordinated by the US with rotational planning
lead. On this particular occasion to the lead fell to the UK.
A Mine Countermeasure (MCM) Group and a survey
vessel also integrated with the Task Group deployment to conduct
MCM route survey work and to promote the maintenance of UK maritime
intent and capability in the Gulf region.
Are the Harriers and Helicopters able to
operate effectively in the region given the climate?
* * *
In 1999, Lord Robertson commissioned the first
part of a study to investigate the feasibility of equipping the
Sea Harrier with the Rolls Royce Pegasus 11-61, that provides
approximately 3,000 lbs of additional thrust in similar conditions
to that of the current Pegasus engine, which would overcome this
limitation. The study is due to report shortly, after which a
judgement will be made on technical feasibility, cost and operational
benefits of this enhancement.
* * *
One of the main objectives of the Joint Harrier
Force, as part of the SDR's Joint Force 2000 initiative, is to
provide an enhanced offensive air capability from the Aircraft
Carriers, which could operate with little or no recourse to Host
Nation Support. Ultimately a combined FA2/GR7 engine upgrade would
facilitate this and provide a balanced, year round, joint carrier
borne offensive air package.
Helicopters
* * *
To what extent is command and control of
the UK air and maritime force in the region "joint"?
* * *
With whom does joint Command in theatre lie
when the Task Group is in the region?
* * *
(ix) What is the timescale for improvements
to the accommodation at Ali Al Salem? Is the work on schedule?
Are there any plans to improve the R&R arrangements for personnel
based at Ali Al Salem?
* * *
(x) The Committee is seeking information
on the total numbers, types and locations of US aircraft and personnel
deployed on operations in the northern and southern no-fly-zones.
* * *
3 Not reproduced. Back
Prepared 2 August 2000
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