OPERATION DESERT FOX: EFFECT OF COALITION ATTACKS
Overall Objective
To reduce substantially Saddam's ability to threaten
his neighbours and international security, in particular by degrading
his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capability, including control
and delivery systems, and his wider military capability.
Specific Objectives
To degrade Saddam's WMD capabilities including
his concealment organisation.
To reduce Saddam's ability to command and control
his regime, especially those elements associated with WMD.
To reduce Saddam's conventional capability and
his ability to threaten his neighbours.
To ensure force protection of coalition aircraft
by disrupting the integrated air defence system and strategic
and mobile surface to air missile sites.
Military Attacks
Over 400 cruise missiles (more than in 1991
Gulf Conflict), and 218 tactical bomber sorties (32 by UK—15
per cent of the total).
100 sites attacked:
- — sites and units involved in Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes (30 targets);
- — command and control facilities and
communications network through which the Iraqi regime controls
its military and internal security forces (20 targets);
- — the Republican Guard, which is key
to the threat which Saddam is able to pose to his neighbours and
to his grip on power (nine targets);
- — Iraqi air defence system (34 targets);
- — airfields, including those associated
with the remotely piloted WMD delivery system and with helicopter
forces used for internal repression (six targets);
- — pumping station involved in illegal
oil exports (one target);
- — 87 per cent of targets were either
damaged or destroyed—made possible by the extensive use
of precision-guided weapons.
Outcome
As a result of the campaign:
- — We have significantly damaged Saddam's
ability to produce and repair ballistic missiles by severe damage
and destruction to critical elements, including unique facilities
and research equipment, such as Saddam's only missile engine test
stand, the only wind tunnel suitable for missile tests and the
largest metal press in Iraq. Provided that sanctions remain in
place, it will take one to two years to rebuild this capability.
A key element of the threat Saddam could pose to his neighbours—including
his ability to deliver biological or chemical weapons—has
thus been seriously weakened.
- — The Iraqi Ministry of Industry and
Military Industrialisation Headquarters in Baghdad was successfully
picked out by precision guided weapons and damaged. This building
was heavily involved in WMD programmes, particularly their organisation
and administration. This work is assessed to have been disrupted
for several months at least.
- — We have badly damaged the L-29 unmanned
aerial vehicle programme ("The Drones of Death") developed
for the delivery of biological and chemical weapons.
- — We have set back his biological and
chemical weapons capability, including through attacks against
production and research and development facilities. We have also
successfully disrupted infrastructure and destroyed key buildings
occupied by the Special Republican Guard and Special Security
Organisation units who concealed and controlled the chemical and
biological programmes. The Directorate of General Security in
particular lost some of its most important buildings, which we
believe contained key equipment and documents.
- — Air Defence sites were hit at Al
Basrah, An Nasariya, Al Habbaniya, Ash Shuaybah and Al Khut amongst
others. As a result there was no successful engagement of allied
aircraft during Operation Desert Fox. Moreover, major damage inflicted
upon Saddam's missile repair facilities has reduced his capability
to maintain and upgrade air-defence missile systems.
- — We have struck hard against corps
and divisional headquarters of the Republican Guard, a key prop
of Saddam's regime which spearheaded the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.
The headquarters attacked are the locations where operations are
planned and are focus of communications. Installations were hit
in Baghdad, Abu Gharib, Al Khut, As Shuaybah and Tikrit amongst
others. Rebuilding of this infrastructure may take up to a year.
These strikes ensured that Saddam could not attack Kuwait while
Desert Fox was in progress. This privileged force will now be
in no doubt that we know their locations and that they continue
to be vulnerable to the precision capability of the US and UK.
We did not attack the poorly-paid conscript Regular Army.
- — We have severely disrupted Saddam's
senior level command and control network, including elements associated
with visible symbols of the Iraqi regime such as the Ba'ath Party
Headquarters, Abu Rajash Presidential Palace, the Baghdad Presidential
Bunker and Residence, and the Tikrit Presidential Complex. Such
targets are particularly important because they are critical points
for gathering information and disseminating Saddam's orders. They
are therefore crucial to Saddam's ability to control the regime.
Saddam is afraid of a coup by his officers and makes all decisions
himself. He relies on an effective command and control system
to pass on instructions and we assess that he will now be finding
it far harder to control his military and internal security forces.
- — Through our attacks on Iraqi Airfields
we destroyed a number of assault helicopters used to repress the
civilian population, particularly the Kurdish and Shi'a minorities.
- — As a consequence of our attacks on
his military capability, and particularly on those forces closely
associated with his WMD concealment programme, those close to
Saddam will realise that we have the ability and the will to target
the regime, as distinct from the Iraqi people.
- — The risk of civilian casualties was
a major consideration during the very careful target selection
process for Operation Desert Fox and only precision guided weapons
were used where there was any risk of collateral damage. For these
reasons, we are confident that civilian casualties were minimal.
We are confident that Operation Desert Fox has been the most accurate
bombing campaign in which we have ever been involved. Saddam has
obviously claimed that we were responsible for widespread collateral
damage. However, he has failed to show any evidence of this and
UN humanitarian workers and the media have been prevented from
viewing all but a carefully selected few of the sites hit. Taken
with Saddam's history of lying, exaggerating and fabricating evidence,
this indicates strongly that genuine collateral damage was minimal.
The Future
- — We remain vigilant for any signs
that Saddam is rebuilding his capabilities or threatening his
neighbours. Saddam remains at risk if he attempts to do so. Our
forces will remain in the region and will be bolstered by the
arrival of HMS Invincible escorted by HMS Newcastle and RFA Fort
Austin in the next few weeks. We are consulting further with the
UN Security Council and European partners on measures to contain
the threat of Saddam in the future.
Prepared 2 August 2000
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