WEDNESDAY 19 APRIL 2000
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON,
MP, AIR COMMODORE
GLEN TORPY
AND MR
SIMON WEBB
120. Do you have a sufficient number of appropriately
trained aircrew to continue the operations indefinitely?
(Mr Hoon) Perhaps you could give an update on that.
(Air Commodore Torpy) We do. We keep the crewing ratio
in the operational theatres to the absolute minimum commensurate
with the task. As the Committee will undoubtedly be aware from
their visit, there is a degree of skill fade, so we tend to cycle
the crews through after about six weeks, and they come back to
the United Kingdom to ensure that the skills that they have do
not perish.
121. Some personnel are indeed in theatre for
the second or third time. What implications does this have for
morale and for their overall career structure? We were told, for
example, that there is skill fade and that this is a problem which
really concerns especially the pilots.
(Air Commodore Torpy) In terms of skill fade, I would
not relate it to their career progression. It clearly has an operational
impact, and the sort of skills that they are clearly not able
to practise in the Gulf are things like low flying; some of the
weapon deliveries as well we cannot practice in the Gulf region.
On the other hand, operating in the Gulf gives them very good
experience of operating in very large packages with the US, and
they do not get that opportunity on a day-to-day basis very often
in the UK.
122. That was one of the things that surprised
me. I thought the fact that they were in action would assist their
skills. Indeed, that was an impression that we were given, that
there was a strong expression of view that because it was repetitive
and they were doing it often, they were not getting the value
of the training when they were in the UK or other places.
(Mr Hoon) I think the real problem—and this
is not a new problem, as far as managing people is concerned—is
that obviously they are doing a particular kind of deployment
which involves particular kinds of skills, and what is very important
for us is that we maintain a range of skills. I must emphasise
to you that this is not a new phenomenon. We have had to deal
with this kind of management problem over a very long period of
time, and we are very much aware of the implications of skill
fade if people are not given the rounder training that they require.
Squadron commanders will look on an individual basis at the experience
of particular pilots and crew, to ensure that after the deployment
a priority will be given to ensuring that in their further period
of training they are trained to deal with the kinds of operations
that they have not been deployed to do in the Gulf. So it is clearly
a management problem, and we are aware of the potential for difficulty,
but equally we have systems in place to deal with it.
123. Can I take you back to the question of
the operation of the no fly zones. We had understood, or we were
told, that despite this very large number of operational flights
over Iraqi territory north and south, up to now there has not
been a loss of a single plane or a single pilot. That is a considerable
achievement, but it also raises the question that perhaps, given
the law of averages, at some point there might be. Clearly, the
Iraqis, with their air defence system, are determined to try to
get the propaganda victory of downing one of the aircraft. Does
this mean, particularly given the United States' obsession with
no casualties, that we are actually flying at a height which makes
the mission less effective than it would otherwise be? Is there
not a danger that, in effect, the requirement for having no casualties
is either an unrealistic expectation or, on the other hand, is
actually making the mission less effective?
(Mr Hoon) If you will forgive me, I think there are
a number of ideas mixed up in that.
124. Yes, there may be. I am trying to deal
quickly with a lot of points.
(Mr Hoon) I shall try to disentangle them as best
I can. In doing that, I do not want in any way to minimise the
risk to our crew, the danger that they operate in and, indeed,
having seen some of the film of what they do, what they face.
I think no one could underestimate the threat to them, and the
remarkable skill that they display in avoiding anti-aircraft and
aggressive actions from the ground in Iraq. When you talk about
our mission, our mission is to supervise the no fly zones. Our
mission is not—and I must emphasise this—to bomb assets
on the ground. From time to time we need to do that in response
to the threat to the aircraft, but I assure you that we do not
take unnecessary risks in ensuring that we are capable of responding
in self-defence. It is not as if we are there specifically—and
this is where I thought it needed some disentangling—to
bomb parts of Iraq.
125. No, I did not say that.
(Mr Hoon) No. I need to make my position clear.
126. Okay.
(Mr Hoon) Indeed, if our aircraft did not come under
fire we would not need to conduct any kind of bombing of targets
on the ground. The nature of the mission does mean that for most
of the time at any rate we do not need to take unnecessary risks
and I would not expect our air crew to do so. I would not ask
them to do so.
127. You are reasonably optimistic that at the
present level of operations it is quite likely that we will not
be facing casualties?
(Mr Hoon) That is why I do not want in any way to
under-estimate the risk. You made the point that things could
go wrong and I am not pretending that there could not be a problem
in this kind of very hostile environment that could result in
danger. I have sat and talked to a number of the pilots and they
have taken me through the kinds of threats that they face, and
they are considerable. I think it is a great tribute to their
skill that we have not lost any air crew. I do want to emphasise
how dangerous what they do is and how skilful they are, so far
at any rate, at avoiding casualties.
128. A number of questions we were going to
ask we shall have to write to you on. One is on the role of the
HMS Illustrious Carrier Task Group. We actually visited
the John Stennis, I noted named after a distinguished Defence
Committee Chairman, not that I am in any way—
(Mr Webb) What was the name?
129. John Stennis.
(Mr Hoon) Chairman, we have a very considerable programme
of construction of up to 30 warships. I am sure—
Chairman: I think the HMS Bruce George has a better ring about it than the HMS Geoffrey Hoon actually.
Mr Hood: I dare not mention the HMS
Hood.
130. That was sunk without trace, I am afraid.
We have some questions on command and control and on UK maritime
forces, and a bunch of questions that we would like to ask, but
we cannot, on telephones. Bloody telephones, wherever we go there
is one problem or another. Either they do not work or it is too
expensive. We clearly picked this up, as we did questions of R&R
arrangements for personnel based at Ali Al Salem.
(Mr Hoon) Chairman, could I just say about telephones
that I also picked that up, if that is the right word. I could
not have avoided it during the course of my visit. I want to make
it quite clear to the Committee that it is something we are addressing.
It is something that I regard as a matter of great importance
as far as people on deployment there are concerned. The points
were made to me very effectively and very skilfully and I will
certainly be doing something about it.
131. That is very good news. Thank you. Just
two final questions, Secretary of State. What is your view as
to the likely duration of the mission?
(Mr Hoon) I do not think we can have a specific timetable.
We will be there for as long as is necessary and is supported
by international law and the international community. Without
keeping going back to 1284, it does seem to me that Resolution
1284 does offer to Saddam Hussein a way out of his very considerable
difficulties and it is a very carefully considered view of the
international community, it forms part of international law, and
we are taking the necessary steps, as Simon Webb explained earlier,
to prepare an appropriate inspection regime which will be quite
different from the regime that operated previously in Iraq. We
see no reason why Saddam Hussein should not accept that as a means
both of protecting his own people and allowing them access to
very considerably enhanced oil revenues, for example, as well
as allowing Iraq the opportunity of being restored to the international
community. With the exception of the utterances from Baghdad I
am not aware of a single other country that would not like to
see Resolution 1284 implemented. It does seem to me to be a sensible,
practical basis on which we can take things forward. If we were
able to take things forward in relation to 1284 and Saddam Hussein,
or any subsequent leadership in Iraq, was in a position to accept
the decisions of the international community then I assume that
the threat to the people in Iraq would diminish and we would no
longer have to supervise the no-fly-zone in the way that we do
today. There is a process there and it is available to Saddam
Hussein, if he were to accept it, by which he could remain in
his present position in Iraq, if he chose to, but equally any
subsequent leadership would be in a position to restore Iraq to
the international community, which we would judge to be a wholly
beneficial thing and in time would lead to an end to our necessity
to patrol over no-fly-zones.
132. Thank you. Speaking personally, we have
not written a report or considered one, but if one read some of
the media and scepticism as to why we and the Americans were there,
I think those Members of the Committee who went would find that
what we are doing, what the United States are doing and what a
handful of other allies who are concerned are doing is absolutely
justified on any terms that you wish to justify. Certainly I would
like, through you, Secretary of State, to thank our personnel
who are there. It is not the finest of postings. It is challenging,
it is demanding, in conditions that are not always as congenial
as living in London. They are doing, as always, a very, very professional
job, and we take a pride in what they are doing.
(Mr Hoon) I would thank you for your comments, and
I shall make sure that those views are passed on both to the people
who are involved on the ground and also to the very large number
of people who are engaged either on rotation or in terms of the
planning and preparation for those missions, because it does involve
a large effort and a large number of people.
Chairman: Thank you very much.
Prepared 2 August 2000
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