WEDNESDAY 19 APRIL 2000
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON,
MP, AIR COMMODORE
GLEN TORPY
AND MR
SIMON WEBB
40. I have one or two questions about the role
of air power in relation to preventing Iraq acquiring weapons
of mass destruction. In December 1998 we were told that the bombardment
was to inhibit this. However, earlier in the year, in February,
the Foreign Secretary told the House that because of the dangers
the one thing that we would be careful not to bomb would be stockpiles
of chemical or biological weapons. Can you explain to me whether
the bombing in December 1998 did anything to inhibit the Iraqi
potential for acquisition or use of chemical and biological weapons,
and if so, what?
(Mr Webb) The operation in December 1998 certainly
did substantially erode the Iraqi capability in this area, but
I think one will notice that it also managed to do so without
causing very substantial collateral damage problems at the same
time, so it was very well engineered. I think I would probably,
Chairman, rather not get into lots more detail beyond that point
in open session, because targeting matters can get rather sensitive.
The proof is that it did succeed in its objective.
(Mr Hoon) I apologise to members of the Committee,
Chairman, that I am not wholly familiar with the details of Desert
Fox, because I came prepared to deal with no fly zones, but I
shall certainly, in any way that assists the Committee, supply
appropriate information in due course.
41. I shall press this one more time, because
this is relevant to today's inquiry. Surely one of the purposes
of the continuing air patrols is to enable us to continue to restrict
or inhibit the acquisition of mass destruction weapons by Saddam
Hussein? If I am not correct in that, perhaps you will tell me,
but in any event I do not think it is adequate to use the shield
of security to avoid the very straightforward point that if you
are going to avoid hitting stockpiles of these weapons, and if
those stockpiles already exist, it is hard to see how hitting
anything can limit or restrict that capability to use those weapons
given that they already do exist.
(Mr Hoon) I am not confident, but I do not think that
any part of our justification legally for the no fly zones is
to do with inhibiting the programme of Saddam Hussein to develop
weapons of mass destruction. There is not that connection.
(Mr Webb) No. Obviously the no fly zones only apply
to certain parts of the country, so they could not be effective
in that respect in other parts of the country. That is one reason
why the UN has been striving so hard to get inspection on the
ground back in there.
42. So as far as we are concerned, then, whatever
it was that we magically did in December 1998 to damage that potential
to acquire weapons of mass destruction, we are no longer doing
now, and therefore presumably Saddam Hussein is now able to do
whatever it is we were purporting to stop him doing in respect
of chemical and biological weapons in December 1998?
(Mr Hoon) We certainly damaged his capabilities comprehensively
in Desert Fox. The question is, to what extent he has been able
to repair those facilities in the interim. As I said earlier,
we judge that sanctions have been successful in limiting the regime's
ability to develop the equipment and the weapons that we are concerned
about. Equally, as I conceded and have conceded on a number of
occasions, the reality is that without an effective inspection
system we cannot be wholly sure, and therefore that is why 1284
does create a new inspection system that we believe Saddam Hussein
should accept as a means of ultimately restoring Iraq to the international
community.
43. I want to ask some questions, if I may,
about the cost involved. If we go back to the height of the campaign
there, or just afterwards, we were spending £½ billion
a year and it has now gone down to around £30 million. That
is a big de-escalation. Do you consider that what you are getting
for that £30 million is good value for money, or were there
other alternatives that you considered to keep Saddam and his
regime under control?
(Mr Hoon) To the extent that it has been a remarkably
successful operation—or operations, depending on how you
choose to describe them—then I have no doubt that it has
provided extremely good value for the money that has been spent.
As I say, I am confident that in terms of inhibiting Saddam Hussein's
ability to threaten his own people, inhibiting his ability in
the region as well as restricting his ability to threaten internationally,
I think it has been a remarkably useful exercise and money very
well spent. There clearly are other ways in which you could conceivably
monitor the no fly zones, and certainly from time to time it is
necessary to look at those, but we have—
44. What are they?
(Mr Hoon) We have judged that they are not as successful
in being able to contain Saddam Hussein and, moreover, in terms
of giving us the confidence that he is not able to avoid the kinds
of detection that might otherwise be available to us.
45. What were the other alternatives that you
considered but ruled out?
(Mr Hoon) Clearly it is possible to monitor what is
going on on the ground from satellites, but they do not give us
the kind of close supervision that we believe is necessary.
46. I would like to go back to this point because
I went to the library and I re-read with interest not only the
press cuttings but some of the press releases that emanated from
the Ministry of Defence during the war about how successful we
were in killing off the majority of the key good assets of the
Iraqi military—aircraft, missiles, tanks, etcetera—and
a considerable amount of personnel. There were legions of pictures
of the tattered remains of the cream of the Iraqi military. I
was very interested in your reply earlier about what you perceived
to be the threat there, and the way in which you built up the
Iraqi military as being a fairly formidable force. If you consider
that in the ten years since the war, presumably they have not
been out in the world buying and re-equipping with any great deal
of success, otherwise you would know about it, how can you therefore
justify a statement in 1991-92 that "the cream of the Iraqi
military now lies in ruins on the deserts of Kuwait and Southern
Iraq", yet today you sit here and tell us they have this
formidable array of technology and military hardware which is
a powerful threat?
(Mr Hoon) I do not, with respect, think that I actually
said that. I emphasised the numbers. I emphasised the size of
the Iraqi forces. I also said that we judge that the technological
capability of Iraq has been degraded as a result of the sanctions.
That is what I actually said, so I was not presenting to you a
formidable picture.
47. We have to be careful, do we not, because
people outside will read your first answer? If I had not got you
then to clarify that first answer, the picture you painted of
300 combat Iraqi aircraft, 2,000 tanks and however many artillery
pieces was a pretty formidable array of military might. That,
I was led to believe, is the perceived threat we are actually
patrolling to stop becoming operational, is it not? How real is
that threat of outdated equipment, and who is the threat to? Is
it an internal threat to the Iraqi people, or is it a threat to
Iran? Is it a threat to Saudi Arabia, to Kuwait, knowing that
he has got pretty degraded military resources, or do you know
that he has actually been able to re-stock and re-equip?
(Mr Hoon) What you are asking me to do is to get inside
the mind of Saddam Hussein and determine what it is for which
he intends to use this army and the equipment that he has.
48. That is a pretty good question, because
that is what you are telling us you are doing.
(Mr Hoon) We are making judgements. I cannot precisely
tell you what it is that he intends to do with this army. Clearly
there is little doubt that he uses the army for internal oppression
and internal intimidation. I do not think there is any argument
about that.
49. No, I think that is clear.
(Mr Hoon) The concern must be—and you will have
heard this in the region as well—that the army that he has
is available and could be available for regional threats in certain
circumstances, if he were in a position to do that. Again, he
has past form, and therefore we must be suspicious about his current
intentions. It might assist to some extent to say that whilst
I have emphasised the forces, they are not as formidable as they
were before the Gulf war. Before the Gulf war Iraq could put some
72 divisions into the field, and we judge that he may currently
be capable of only providing 23 divisions, but that is still absolutely
formidable compared to the armed forces in the region from other
countries.
50. Despite the fact that the other armed forces
are equipped with technology and hardware which far outweighs
his? Warfare now is not just about numbers, is it, it is about
your ability to hit with the hardest hit or punch, is it not?
(Mr Hoon) I think that is a very, very fair point,
and I think that is something that clearly would have to be put
in the balance in terms of any assessment of Saddam Hussein's
intentions as far as his regional neighbours are concerned. Undoubtedly
a number of those countries have invested significant amounts
of money in some very smart defence equipment.
Mr Hancock: So when do we get to the stage of saying, "You've got enough going for you now as a region to protect yourself from this threat"?
Chairman: Like 2500. We can tell Mr Hancock
afterwards based on what we heard; far better telling him privately
than your saying it publicly.
51. I would like to take up targeting policy.
When we visited we were told that the list of targets in Iraq
has to be approved by US Centcom in Florida. What is your role
in the targeting approval process? Is there a danger of UK forces
being involved in offensive action against Iraq without your knowledge?
(Mr Hoon) Let us make it clear, when you talk about
"offensive action", our aircraft respond to threats
to them. If they were left peacefully to supervise and monitor
the no fly zones, we would not need to bomb or attack anyone.
So when you talk about "offensive operations", these
are operations that are conducted in self-defence to deal with
specific threats to those aircraft.
52. So you do not have a target list?
(Mr Hoon) If you will allow me to develop this, we
would identify targets threatening those aircraft, whether those
targets are, for example, radar that are capable of locking onto
the aircraft and guiding missiles or anti-aircraft systems onto
those aircraft, or whether they are themselves anti-aircraft batteries
or potentially missile batteries. So those are the targets that
we would identify, and certainly we would want to respond quickly
but proportionately to any threat that we perceived to those aircraft.
It is necessary to bear in mind that many of those, if not most
of those, targets are highly mobile, and the fact that we identify
a target does not usually mean that that identification remains
valid for very long.
53. So you are saying really that you do not
get involved in the targeting, you leave it to those on the ground
to go after the mobile targets?
(Mr Hoon) No.
54. Do you set a criterion?
(Mr Hoon) My responsibility is to establish overall
that the rules of engagement under which our forces operate are
consistent with international law and provide proper protection
for the people for whom I am responsible.
55. It is a bit vague.
(Mr Webb) No, it is not.
56. How does your criterion differ from that
of the United States, for example?
(Mr Webb) I think the point to understand is that
there are very specific directives issued about the specific types
of targets that are authorised by Ministers to be engaged. From
having identified those types, yes, the local commanders then
decide whether what it is they see on the ground is of that type
which is within the authorised limits.
(Air Commodore Torpy) The only other thing I would
add is that the Secretary of State having defined the categories
of targets that we are permitted to attack, on the legal basis
that we are conducting the operation, delegates authority to the
Commander of British Forces Op Bolton for certain collateral damage
limitations. If he is tasked, or believes that a target needs
to be attacked, in consultation with the US Commander, but that
falls outside his delegation, then clearly he has to refer to
the MoD to get that authority.
57. That is an interesting reply, and I understand
your point about delegation. Then it was mentioned, though, that
the Secretary of State gives a list of specific targets in Iraq.
(Mr Webb) Types.
(Mr Hoon) Yes, types.
58. Can they be made available to the Committee?
Are they different? The other point is, are they different in
quality or nature to those which the United States are using?
(Mr Hoon) No, they are not. I do not want to make
any mystery out of any differences. There are circumstances in
which we take decisions in relation to collateral damage that
might involve slightly different judgements, but we are very concerned
about the potential for harming civilians. That is not to say
that the Americans are not equally concerned, but there are times
when we make slightly different judgements, as you might expect,
about whether particular targets are or are not at risk of causing
collateral damage. Essentially, though, we have an entirely common
approach to identifying potential targets and responding appropriately
and proportionately in order to protect the aircraft that are
flying missions. I think the important point to emphasise is that
these targets are very highly mobile, and we do not have a lot
of time in which to make very complex judgements about precisely
what is and is not something that we should attack, which is why
it is absolutely right that specific decisions, subject to my
overall responsibility for the rules of engagement and consistently
with international law, should be taken on the ground.
59. All right, I will not pursue that further.
You lead me on to my next point about them being highly mobile
targets. There would be a likelihood, I would have thought, that
in those circumstances mistakes might be made. Indeed, you rubbished
earlier, as virtually saying it was propaganda from the other
side, their saying that you had perhaps bombed farmers or villagers
or whatever. We know from experience that in Kosovo mistakes were
made, and yet the position you are taking in saying that this
is just propaganda from the other side is really a denial that
any mistakes have been made from our side—or it could be
read that way. Have any mistakes been made from our side?
(Mr Hoon) I know that on occasions we have hit targets
that we thought were different from the ones that we were intending
to attack. The point I made earlier was that it would not be wise
to rely upon the assessment of damage and the number of civilian
casualties that emanate from Baghdad.
Prepared 2 August 2000
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