WEDNESDAY 19 APRIL 2000
RT HON
GEOFFREY HOON,
MP, AIR COMMODORE
GLEN TORPY
AND MR
SIMON WEBB
20. Secretary of State, you mentioned UN Resolution
688 as a legal justification. I have that in front of me, that
1991 Resolution. Whilst it is condemnatory of the Iraqi regime,
it does not mention military operations or give any authority
for it whatsoever. It just says that it appeals to all Member
States and all humanitarian organisations to contribute to these
humanitarian relief efforts. Is it not the case that the Russians
have said that these are not backed by specific UN resolutions;
and France have actually withdrawn from the operations because
they say there is no humanitarian content? Just on the issue of
the land, which you said is the issue of sovereign territory,
how much land do the zones cover? I understand in the south it
is a third of Iraq alone. So is there not a bit of an inconsistency
about who is protected and who is not from humanitarian problems?
Is it not really an occupation with an arbitrary line drawn?
(Mr Hoon) Let me deal with the legal justification.
I did not say that it was simply saying UN Resolution 688. What
I said was that it was the Resolution, in conjunction with our
judgment: that it was necessary, in order to protect people on
the ground, in what we see to be circumstances of humanitarian
necessity.
21. Where is the legal justification?
(Mr Hoon) The legal justification is the combination
of the two, which is what I said earlier. There is a clear justification
in international law for the international community to respond
to protect people where they are threatened by an overwhelming
humanitarian catastrophe. That is precisely the same legal justification
which was used in relation to Kosovo. It is that, in combination
with the indication in 688, that we should take steps to prevent
the attacks on people, on minority peoples in Iraq. Inevitably,
those people are not precisely located in particular parts of
the country. Indeed, there are Kurds south of the line and I am
sure there are Shi'as north of it. I accept you are right to this
extent that it is arbitrary, but those lines were selected as
providing protection to as large a number of people as we reasonably
could.
22. 10,000 people have been kicked out of the
country, which Saddam has done since the war stopped, and that
is more than were pushed out of Kosovo before we started bombing
Kosovo. Does that not reflect that the legal justification for
taking action against what is happening on the ground is far greater
for doing something in Iraq than, it could be argued, it was in
Kosovo? If you are talking about sheer numbers of people who have
been pushed about, the reality is that Iraq were kicking out more
people over a longer period of time than the Serbs were doing
in Kosovo. Your friend on the right is nodding in agreement.
(Mr Hoon) I do not think he is!
(Mr Webb) I think the situation is very different
because we are talking about the accumulating figures over a period
of many years. What was happening in Kosovo was—
23.—over a few months, I understand.
(Mr Webb) Yes, months, and building up very quickly.
So it is different in time and scale.
Chairman: All will be explained in your
memorandum. Question number 2. Mike Gapes, please, who has been
very patient.
24. Nobody who has met the Kurds who have been
tortured, or who has met people from the south of Iraq, can doubt
the brutality of the regime. My first question. The no fly zones
operate within a certain range: the 36th parallel in the north
and the 33rd parallel in the south. Clearly there can be all kinds
of atrocities and terrible things going on within the area of
the central belt of Iraq, which none of us can see, but just from
my confirmation that we have no surveillance or information about
what is going on there, how certain can we be that Saddam is not
carrying out his threat to rebuild his capabilities?
(Mr Hoon) We cannot be certain, and that is why in
the course of the negotiations leading to the passing of Security
Council Resolution 1284 we emphasised the importance of fulfilling
the regimes previous responsibilities in relation to inspection
and, also, allowing us the opportunity of ensuring that he has
not rebuilt his capabilities to develop weapons of mass destruction.
I have to say that given his absolute determination to exclude
us then we must reach certain suspicious conclusions but we cannot
absolutely guarantee what is taking place in that central belt.
Really, to return to the point I made earlier, the zones are established
to protect minorities who clearly have been under threat. In answer
to the Chairman's earlier questions, they were established in
response to particular specific events. Those events have not
been able to occur on the same scale simply because of the no
fly zones, in our judgment. I accept that is capable of other
interpretation.
25. What evidence do we have and what information
do we have about the way in which Iraq has been trying to rebuild
its armed forces since 1991?
(Mr Hoon) I can in time give you some information
about that because there is no doubt that Iraq remains an extremely
powerful country militarily, although we judge that their technological
capabilities have deteriorated as a result of UN sanctions which
we judge to have been successful in that respect. Nevertheless,
Iraq still maintains very significant armed forces. We believe
that Iraq has active armed forces in the order of 429,000 people,
it has reserves of 650,000, some 2,200 tanks, 1,800 artillery
pieces and probably 300 combat aircraft. That is a formidable
arsenal and a formidable capacity for offensive action. If you
compare it with Kuwait's total of around 49,000 active armed forces
and reserves, even Saudi Arabia at 162,000 is far short of what
Iraq has. Now, again, it is a matter of judgment, you might judge
that Iraq has got those forces for purely defensive purposes,
I do not reach that conclusion. I cannot see that a country that
claims such difficulty for its people and claims poverty internationally
should be maintaining such a large armed force but for reasons
of threatening its neighbours and that is what we judge Iraq is
doing.
26. You said that sanctions have been successful,
you are talking there specifically about the sanctions against
military material and militarily usable, capable equipment. As
I understand it, the vast majority of things where people apply
for licences are approved but, nevertheless, there are some areas
which are not. Could you give us some more information about how
sanctions work? How effective they are? What capabilities Saddam
is trying to get which he is not getting as a result of sanctions?
(Mr Hoon) We are able to use the sanctions to ensure
that Saddam is not capable of building up his military capability,
particularly as far as technology is concerned but, also, clearly
we look very carefully at chemicals, at any kind of equipment
which might be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. The
sanctions are targeted and are very specific. They are designed
to inhibit Iraq's ability to rearm itself.
27. There are no sanctions against food? There
are no sanctions against medicine?
(Mr Hoon) There are no sanctions against food. There
are no sanctions against medicine. There are no sanctions against
educational materials. There are a range of things which, from
time to time, we are accused of preventing from being exported
to Iraq but, generally speaking, they are simply not true.
28. Can I take you back to the point about Kuwait.
You mentioned Kuwait's armed forces, those of us who were there,
looking at the terrain, could see that Kuwait would be pretty
indefensible in terms of a mass land invasion from the north.
What do you assess the intentions of Iraq are towards Kuwait?
Have they changed their attitude since the defeat in 1991?
(Mr Hoon) In formal terms, no, because
they still maintain a territorial claim on Kuwait. Certainly in
the past they have called upon the people of Kuwait to rise up
and overthrow their present government. Certainly they have no
particular respect for governments in the region. It is a matter
why many of those governments feel so alienated from the regime
in Iraq. Really our judgment must rest on the fact that they maintain
this territorial claim to Kuwait and nothing in the recent history
seems to have altered that.
29. If there were no British and American forces
in the region and there was no no fly zone in the South, do you
think Iraqis would be far more aggressive in their attitudes to
the Kuwaitis?
(Mr Hoon) There must certainly be a risk of that.
The military capability that I described, the disparity between
the level of their armed forces and those of their immediate neighbours
and, frankly, recent history must make—and I have heard
this from a number of different countries in the region—them
concerned about Iraq's intentions.
30. In a sense I get the impression that we
have got Saddam in a box and he is not able to get out of it but
we are in a kind of stand-off situation. He is not in a position
where militarily he is prepared to launch an attack but, nevertheless,
his capabilities are still there and we are not doing anything
to remove those capabilities.
(Mr Hoon) I think that is not an unreasonable description
except that I would not necessarily draw the same conclusion.
We spent many, many months agreeing a new Security Council Resolution
which we believe offers the Iraqi regime a way out and a very
sensible way out both as far as the Iraqi people are concerned
and equally as far as the region is concerned but, ultimately,
as far as the rest of the world is concerned in the sense that
the inspection regime would allow us to be sure he is not developing
weapons of mass destruction that could threaten countries well
beyond his immediate region. Whilst, as I say, I share your description,
I do not accept that we are content to remain where we are now.
The fact that we put such a lot of effort into securing that new
Resolution does indicate that we want to see movement, we want
to help the Iraqi people. We do not want Iraq impoverished or
broken up, we would like to see Iraq restored to the international
community but that does depend, crucially, on the present regime
accepting Security Council Resolution 1284.
31. I accept that. Can I ask you then about
the Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear programmes. What is
your assessment of the capability in that area and is there a
possible danger for any of our forces? We saw our forces very
close up to the Iraqi border, our ground forces, the UN military
observers and we saw, also, our people in Bahrain and in Saudi.
Is there a threat to any of those forces as a result of these
Iraqi capabilities?
(Mr Hoon) Clearly, as I said earlier, since the expulsion
of UNSCOM in December 1998 we have a much less complete picture
than we had previously as to what precisely the regime is up to.
We judge that certainly there are still undeclared stocks of chemical
weapons, agents weapons and precursors. We know as well that Iraq
has the capability to start the production of significant stocks
of mustard gas and the production of nerve agents probably quite
quickly if they choose to do so. They have admitted in the past
the production of weaponisation of anthrax spores. Again, we make
assessments about their ability to produce these in significant
quantities and we judge that they could do so, if they chose,
quite quickly, in a matter of weeks. Obviously without an effective
inspection system we are making judgements about their capability
rather than having specific evidence, and clearly, as I said earlier,
without an effective inspection regime we must be suspicious,
in the light of what they have done in the past, as to what they
might intend to do in the future.
32. Is that, in a sense, why the Iraqis are
rejecting the new Security Council Resolution 1284? I have just
been reading the book by Bhatia and McGrory on the development
of their nuclear programme over many years and the lengths to
which they went to keep secrecy and to build that up. Is there
a fear that in fact the reason they do not want the inspectors
in is that the inspectors started last time to get close and therefore
even with a new Resolution, which is a considerable move from
where they were before, nevertheless they dare not allow inspectors
in again, because the inspectors might reveal what they are up
to?
(Mr Hoon) That is certainly one judgement that could
be made. I think, without being evasive, that if I am of a particularly
suspicious frame of mind myself, that is certainly where I place
the first emphasis in terms of the various reasons they might
have as to why they do not accept 1284. However, it does seem
to me that 1284 is a very sensible, pragmatic view by the international
community of a way out for Saddam Hussein. Clearly, inspection
is a key aspect of that exit strategy, and it may well be that
the reason Saddam Hussein is reluctant to allow it is the precise
reason that you describe.
33. Can I finally ask you about the no fly zones.
The operation of them has changed over a period of time. Has the
number of flights been stepped up since Desert Fox?
(Mr Hoon) The short answer is no. I was slightly puzzled
when you said that they had changed.
34. There was an expansion of the zone from
the 32nd to the 33rd parallel.
(Mr Hoon) The basic justification remains the same,
but there has been some fluctuation in the number of missions
and the number of responses. Essentially, though, since Desert
Fox there has been an overall decline in the operations both in
the southern and the northern no fly zones. With the permission
of the Chairman, I think we can probably give you some statistical
information to assist you. This is information which is already
in the public domain. I do not know if we have copies for everybody.
Chairman: Send us the document. Thank
you very much[2].
35. Thank you. Finally, related to that, the
French were participating but now are no longer participating.
Can you explain why the French are no longer involved in the no
fly zones, what role they currently have and why, if they are
not participating, they have still got forces deployed in the
region?
(Mr Hoon) All of those questions are strictly a matter
for the French Government.
36. You must have a view on it?
(Mr Hoon) I have a view on it, but I am not sure that
your questions invite my view; they invite me to explain why the
French are not there.
37. I shall put it another way around. Would
you like to explain what the role of the no fly zones is now without
the French, compared with what it was before, and whether the
French withdrawal has had any effect on the effectiveness and
the number of missions?
(Mr Hoon) The French maintain aircraft, as you will
have seen, in Saudi Arabia.
38. We saw stationary ones, yes.
(Mr Hoon) They still train and they still exercise.
We would certainly welcome their return to participating in the
monitoring of the no fly zones. For the moment they choose not
to participate.
39. Does that mean that they had no role within
this operation Desert Fox or the subsequent operation since then?
(Mr Hoon) The French aircraft withdrew from the northern
no fly zone in December 1996, and in the south in 1998. They must
make their own judgement as to why it is that they chose to do
that. We would certainly welcome them back if they wished to rejoin
us. The fact that their aircraft are there and are available must
mean that that would be relatively straightforward.
Chairman: It might be quite confusing,
as most of the Iraqi aircraft are French anyway. I would not like
to see any friendly fire on our French allies, Secretary of State,
so keep them where they are. Dr Lewis.
2 pp. 18-19. Back
Prepared 2 August 2000
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