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WEDNESDAY 19 APRIL 2000

RT HON GEOFFREY HOON, MP, AIR COMMODORE GLEN TORPY AND MR SIMON WEBB

  1. Welcome, Secretary of State, and your colleagues. Welcome to this evidence session on the no fly zones over Iraq. If I might make some introductory remarks, and then you might wish to, Secretary of State, our evidence session today will examine the UK contribution to operations to patrol the no fly zones over Iraq. The no fly zones have been in existence since the early 1990s. They cover substantial areas of northern and southern Iraq with the stated aim of protecting minority peoples in those regions. Patrolling the zones is undertaken by a coalition force, now principally involving the US and the UK, but with support from the host Gulf states. Iraqi violations of the zones are a regular occurrence and coalition aircraft frequently come under attack from Iraqi artillery. Although this is a low key operation in terms of the media coverage it receives, it involves about 1,000 UK personnel and the cost of operations in the Gulf region as a whole for the last financial year is estimated at £30 million. Today's evidence session follows on from the visit made by the Committee to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait. It was an extremely worthwhile and interesting visit. We were able to meet the British forces, mainly RAF personnel, deployed in all three countries and were fully briefed by them on the particular challenges of the mission. We should never forget that our Forces personnel are risking their lives in the Gulf and we would like to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the professionalism and commitment they demonstrate. We were able during our visit to discuss the wider regional security issues with ministers and chiefs of staff of the three Gulf states we visited and we are grateful to the host countries for the welcome extended to us. We are also grateful to the MoD officials and the Foreign Office posts who helped to organise the visit in a way which enabled us to cover so much ground in the six days available to us and for the very helpful written material they provided in advance. In principle, we would be interested to know why you invited the Defence Minister to watch Derby County, Secretary of State, when you had an opportunity to take them to far more illustrious teams—not, I might say, Walsall, which is quite close. Is this part of the punishment inflicted? Our intention during this evidence session is to explore the purpose and execution of the operation in more detail and to discuss with you some of the concerns which were raised with us during our visit. Perhaps, Secretary of State, you would begin by introducing your team?

  (Mr Hoon) Well, Mr Chairman, before I do I was about to thank you for your generous invitation to be with you and share your hospitality this afternoon, but after your unfortunate remarks about Derby County I am not entirely sure that I am feeling quite so generous. As you know, no greater invitation could be bestowed on a fellow human being than to watch Derby County. Since Mr Gapes is here, and he was probably happy with the result on Saturday afternoon, I had probably better not dwell on it further.

  Chairman: I did tell him to bring a player with him.

  2. I have got Paulo Wanchope waiting outside!
  (Mr Hoon) More seriously, can I thank you for your kind words about the armed forces deployed there and, indeed, about the help that you were given by MoD officials. I was in Saudi Arabia last week and, as you mentioned, I met the Kuwait Defence Minister on Saturday, and everyone spoke warmly of your visit and they were very pleased to see you there. I am delighted that you were able to take advantage of the opportunities that were available. I am joined today by Simon Webb, the Director General of Operational Policy, and Air Commodore Glen Torpy who is the Director of Air Operations. I can, I think, dispense with the need for an opening statement, and I would be delighted to try and answer any questions that you have.

  3. Thank you so much. In terms of clarifying the issues, could you explain to us, Secretary of State, what activities are covered by the umbrella title of Operation Bolton?
  (Mr Hoon) What we are seeking to do with the no fly zones is to support United Nations Security Council Resolution 688 which demanded an end to Saddam Hussein's repression of the Kurds in the north and the Shi'a in the south for clear humanitarian reasons. So the purpose of our operations is to ensure that we afford protection to those on the ground by monitoring the way in which the Iraqis comply with UNSCR 688. Such action is entirely justified within international law in response to a situation of overwhelming humanitarian necessity.

  4. Geographically, what is the scope of Bolton?
  (Mr Hoon) We operate within two no fly zones that have been established since, respectively, April 1991 for the north and August 1992 for the south. They ensure that Iraqi aircraft are unable to fly north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd. Essentially, we patrol those zones together with our allies as a means of containing the regime in Iraq.

  5. We are a little confused about whether it includes the northern no fly zone within the generic term.
  (Mr Webb) Technically speaking, we give the northern no fly zone operation, a different sub-name—Warden—but in policy terms we look at them as a piece and we monitor them day-by-day as a piece. Technically speaking, it is Bolton in the south and Warden in the north.

  6. If anything needs to be clarified further, perhaps you could inform us, Mr Webb, because when we looked at the briefing papers we received and from speaking to people there we were not exactly certain as to the scope, but you are saying, in essence, it covers the northern as well as the southern. Secretary of State, you mentioned the humanitarian missions of the no fly zones. Would you like to add, perhaps, anything that is gained by our activities other than the humanitarian mission? What other useful purpose does it serve?
  (Mr Hoon) There is no doubt—and I am sure the Committee found this during its visits in the region—that our presence does give a degree of confidence and security to Iraq's immediate neighbours in the region. Undoubtedly, they are still concerned about the threat that Saddam Hussein's regime poses to them. So our presence there is reassuring to them, particularly, of course, as, historically, it follows on from the fact that we stood by Kuwait following the invasion of Kuwait. That, again, is a very strong indication of the determination of the allies to stand by our friends in that region.

  7. Is there any empirical evidence that we are actually achieving our objectives in protecting the minority groups in the north and the south?
  (Mr Hoon) The empirical evidence is, of course, concerned with what happened immediately before the establishment of the no fly zones: the fact that Saddam Hussein used his ability to dominate the air to cause appalling attacks to be perpetrated on people on the ground. That was a justification for us agreeing the no fly zones in the first place. I cannot categorically give you empirical evidence as to what has occurred since then, save to say that we have been very successful in patrolling those no fly zones in ensuring that he is not able to use his ability to dominate the air to cause further problems. What we can say, of course, is that on the ground there have been difficulties. The no fly zones, in our view, have certainly prevented Saddam Hussein from carrying out the kinds of overwhelming attacks that he perpetrated before 1992 and 1991 respectively.

  8. If there is such evidence available but you cannot recall it, produced by the Foreign Office or minority rights groups, perhaps you could alert us to it. If we do have a major commitment and the purpose is ostensibly humanitarian, it would be quite helpful to have what intelligence is available. That what we are doing is benefiting the people in the region.
  (Mr Hoon) You are essentially asking me to prove a negative. We have been successful in ensuring that Saddam Hussein is not able to fly over the no fly zones. That is one piece of empirical evidence. He has not been able to use the sky to attack people on the ground in the zones. He did so before the zones were established. He has not been able to do so since. There can not be any evidence other than the fact that he has from time to time, on the ground, perpetrated atrocities on the ground underneath the no fly zones. All I can say to you is that we judge that but for the no fly zones, he would be able to do what he did before 1992 and 1991 on the ground. I do not think there can be any more empirical evidence than the judgment I make and I hope you share, that we are doing an extremely good job there in making sure that he cannot carry out the kinds of attacks before the no fly zones were established.

  9. As far as I am concerned, I totally endorse what we are doing and how we are doing it, but on a committee sometimes we have to argue the case that people outside would like us to argue, and I have heard and read.
  (Mr Hoon) I do not know whether the Air Commodore would like to add any more or, for that matter, Simon.
  (Air Commodore Torpy) I have nothing else to add.
  (Mr Webb) I think one can pick out some incidents that did occur before. The ones which strike me were the use of chemical weapons in the late 1980s at Halabjah during campaigns against the Kurdish population, which caused overall tens of thousands of casualties, something of that order. The operation which stimulated the no fly zone in the south was against the Shi'a Arabs in the Delta there, which led to the displacement of (figures which come to me) of 100,000 to 150,000 people, who were displaced by those operations, which included aircraft and helicopter gun ships. Some of these people are still in Iran to this day. Those are overwhelming humanitarian incidents which prompted this reaction. What we can say is that since then, yes, there has been trouble. They have been shelling across border into the Kurdish areas, but you do not get very far shelling. There have been deportations of minorities. Perhaps Kurds, Turkomans and Assyrians might even get up to 10,000 or 15,000 over the years. In the south you have seen operations against villages and so on, which we could describe in more detail. It is a difference of scale, that is the point. Before, you had these overwhelming tragedies. Now you have signs of repression going on—and I fear it is repeated signs—but it is not on anything like the same scale. I think that is the achievement: to stop the very large scale of oppression that we saw before.

  10. How would you rebut those people who argue that the concept that we are operating under, and the way the no fly zones are being enforced, is actually doing more harm to the Iraqi people than assisting?
  (Mr Hoon) All I would say is that it simply is not true. We have made it consistently clear that we have no quarrel with the Iraqi people. We are there, and our pilots and aircrew are risking their lives in order to protect people on the ground. Equally, we have made it quite clear that we will respond in self-defence if aircraft are attacked. They come under fire and they respond in kind, but we are very careful to ensure that in selecting targets we do so in a proportionate manner and, indeed, in a manner that avoids, if at all possible, the prospect of civilian casualties. The suggestions that are made from time to time, that there are widespread civilian casualties, I am afraid generally emanate from Baghdad and are inherently unreliable.

  11. Lastly, in terms of the legal basis for the operation, do you believe that UNSCR 688 provides that sufficient legal basis for our operations and the American operations?
  (Mr Hoon) I put it very carefully earlier that the justification is essentially based on the overwhelming humanitarian necessity of protecting people on the ground, combined with the need to monitor the effect of 688; so it is the two taken in combination that provides the legal justification.

  12. You are perfectly happy with that?
  (Mr Hoon) Yes.

  13. On the justification about protection for people on the ground, when the story goes out from today's evidence, a lot of British people and other people will be surprised to hear that whilst we can hold the line in the air, there are atrocities and people are still being killed by what Saddam is doing on the ground. I would have thought that most people would have thought that the no fly zone was there to protect people both from air attack and from continued atrocity on the ground. Why is it not possible for you to give that humanitarian protection? Why is it not possible that two air forces, operating in both ends of a country, cannot prevent that criminal act against innocent people happening on the ground?
  (Mr Hoon) Because then we would be engaged in ground operations on what is clearly the sovereign territory of Iraq. The legal justification in those circumstances would clearly have to change. What we are doing is monitoring compliance with a United Nations Security Council Resolution. There would have to be a different United Nations Security Council Resolution in order to justify in law what you are describing.

  14. Is not your airspace sovereign space as well? Do we not treat airspace over the United Kingdom as part of the sovereign state and defendable?
  (Mr Hoon) Yes, it is, but our legal advice would be that it would require a different legal basis in order to justify what would be ground operations.

  Chairman: This is perhaps worthy of a note, Secretary of State, from your legal adviser. It would be quite helpful.

  15. Chairman, before we move on. Following up on what Mr Hancock has just said, in December 1998 we did launch attacks on ground installations from the air. Did that require a different legal basis?
  (Mr Hoon) No, it did not, but again it was designed to deal with the threats to existing UN Security Council Resolutions, particularly in the light of weapons of mass destruction. Those attacks were concerned with enforcing the Security Council concerns about the efforts that Iraq were making to develop weapons of mass destruction. In those circumstances, again—and it is consistent with the answer I just gave—our response was justified in international law on the basis of the Resolution. There would need to be a different legal basis in order to justify today attacks on the ground.

  Chairman: Perhaps that following question from Dr Lewis might be incorporated in your note to us, please, Secretary of State[1].

  16. But how can it be right to attack a threat which has not actually materialised?—and I would not condemn that. I think it was a perfectly legitimate thing to do—but you cannot attack the real thing when people are being killed on the ground by rocket shying and what have you, when you have the capability of taking those rocket carrying vehicles out and to knock out gun replacements?
  (Mr Hoon) Because specifically in relation to Desert Fox, what we were seeking to do was to prevent Saddam Hussein from developing weapons of mass destruction, having had information that that was what he was doing. Security Council Resolutions justify making intervention for that reason. We are able to attack assets on the ground like radar, anti-aircraft installations, potential missile installations, in order to prevent attacks on our aircraft in self-defence. Okay, they are on the ground. But there are certainly circumstances—and we relied on this as a matter of international law in Kosovo—where once again we would be able to take action on the ground in response to a situation of overwhelming humanitarian necessity. That is a question of scale. I accept that it is extremely difficult to make judgments as to what is the appropriate scale precisely to justify intervention. All I am saying, for the moment, is that we do not judge that there is sufficient repression today, for us to make the judgment that it would be appropriate for us to intervene, using ground forces, to deal with the kinds of incidents that we are aware of in the two zones. I accept that is a judgment that you might not share.

  17. This is a big operation, is it not, patrolling the no fly zones? I was impressed by the scale of it. The number of aircraft required. Perhaps the Air Commodore could tell us how many aircraft and what types are involved in a typical patrol, including the surveillance, refuelling and so on. Am I right in thinking that the work of the patrolling is really to back up photographic work by aircraft?
  (Air Commodore Torpy) Correct. The actual patrolling of the no fly zones is conducted in packages of aircraft. The primary role is to provide tactical reconnaissance, which is only one constituent part of building up the overall intelligence picture, which is provided by unmanned vehicles, by AWACS and satellites as well. A typical package is about 50 aeroplanes but it does vary, depending on the number of targets which are actually going to be looked at by the reconnaissance aircraft. It involves support aircraft, which are tanker aircraft, AWAC aircraft for co-ordination, the actual packages which go into the no fly zones, include fighter sweep aircraft, suppression of enemy defence aircraft, which is both American jamming aircraft and aircraft which can fly anti-radiation missiles, should aircraft be threatened by a surface-to-air missile threat. Then we have clearly aircraft which do the reconnaissance, and also the offence operations, should they be required in self-defence.

  18. So the whole of this large operation is really to enable photographic reconnaissance to take place, which means that if that is the prime purpose, what evidence do we have from that photographic reconnaissance of continued operation by Saddam Hussein against the local population?
  (Mr Webb) We pick up, as I was illustrating earlier, these sporadic incidents. If I can come back to Mr Hancock's point. We have managed successfully to prevent the major atrocities that have been seen in the past. What is very difficult to deal with, of course, is something that happens on a day-to-day scale, a small incident. We all know from the Balkans that if there is a small group of people which are being rounded up, something like that, unless you were going to occupy the whole country there is a limit to what you can do. However, we do manage to keep the lid on it. That, I think, is the important point here. What the aerial reconnaissance shows is that for the most part we are succeeding in keeping the lid on the major atrocities, but we do say—and you asked me so I told you—we do see sporadic incidents, which do show that repression is still a risk; and that is important when one is looking for the basis for the operation. But just because you cannot do everything, is not a good reason for not doing most of it.

  19. We have had briefings on photographic reconnaissance.
  (Mr Hoon) One practical thing that we can learn from the air is that from time to time there have been houses that have been bulldozed and villages that have been flattened. Whether that indicates attacks on the people themselves, the photography does not necessarily reveal, but certainly we can see from the air, from time to time, that he continues—particularly in the south—to use his ability to dominate the ground; to perpetrate these kinds of attacks on civilian populations.