22 May 2000
Byliner: Director of National Drug Control Policy McCaffrey Rebuttal
(Op-ed from May 22 The Wall Street Journal) (1290) (This op-ed by Barry R. McCaffrey first appeared in The Wall Street Journal May 22 and is in the public domain, no copyright restrictions.) The New Yorker's Revisionist History (By Barry R. McCaffrey (Mr. McCaffrey, a retired general, commanded the 24th Infantry Division during the Gulf War. He is currently director of the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.) During the Gulf War the 26,000 men and women under my command in the 24th Infantry Division advanced 413 kilometers in just 100 hours. They made their way through elements of seven heavily armed Iraqi divisions, in a maneuver that has been called "the greatest cavalry charge in history." This assault played a critical role in freeing Kuwait from the oppression of Saddam Hussein's armies. These soldiers deserve our praise; instead, Seymour Hersh impugns them. The May 22 edition of the New Yorker devotes nearly all of its issue to Mr. Hersh's account of the division's actions; it is an article that is both unfair and untrue. The fighting in Iraq was indeed one-sided; our commanders made sure of this to save American lives. As Napoleon said: "God is on the side of the biggest guns and the biggest battalions." During the war the 24th Infantry Division captured or destroyed 363 enemy tanks and armored personnel carriers, 314 pieces of artillery, 207 antiaircraft guns, 1,278 trucks, 22 multiple rocket launchers, 1,300 ammunition bunkers and 25 warplanes. We suffered eight dead and 36 wounded, still too many by my count. Our soldiers' discipline and compassion minimized enemy casualties. My division alone took care of the health and medical needs of more than 5,000 enemy prisoners and thousands of displaced people. We provided more than 120,000 meals, 2,500 gallons of drinking water and 1,000 blankets to civilians during combat. Five months ago, Mr. Hersh began an inquiry seeking to attack the Clinton administration's proposed counterdrug assistance package for Colombia. Mr. Hersh apparently believed that in assailing me in my current position as director of U.S. drug policy, he could undermine our efforts to stem the flow of illegal drugs to America. In the process of this inquiry, he turned his attention to 10-year-old allegations of Gulf War misconduct by the 24th Infantry Division. Mr. Hersh's conduct in developing his story has been a far cry from the objectivity we expect from responsible journalists. Several people Mr. Hersh contacted now claim he misled his sources, fabricated statements from people he never spoke with and made clear his bias and intention "to bury" McCaffrey. These claims are documented in letters and phone calls to me. Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war, called the article "an attempt at character assassination of a soldier named Barry McCaffrey who served his nation proudly and did everything he could to protect the GIs entrusted to his care." White House Press Secretary Joe Lockhart described the article as "an example of a journalist, and I use that term loosely, trying to revive a career with personal attacks on public officials." The Gulf War allegations that Mr. Hersh recycles were long ago investigated and fully cleared -- a fact he acknowledges in the article. There were four investigations, including two that were independently led and exhaustive -- one by the Army Department's Inspector General and the other by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division (CID). The events were also reviewed by a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, hundreds of news media accounts and several historical books. In every instance, the allegations were determined to be completely unfounded. Mr. Hersh and the New Yorker gave 32 pages to these old allegations. In contrast, the records from the official investigations alone total more than 2,100 pages. That full account is based on 200-plus interviews ranging from privates to generals, analysis of battlefield audio and video tapes, and countless hours of investigatory work. The Army CID report specifically "substantiated that the (post-cease-fire Rumaylah) engagement was clearly provoked by the Iraqis and the response of the 24th ID was (in accordance with) cease-fire guidance provided by ARCENT and the XVIII Airborne Corps." This report also concluded that "after extensive interviews with personnel from brigade and battalion commanders to privates, there was no evidence to indicate that members of the (24th Infantry) killed or mistreated (Iraqi prisoners of war)." After reviewing Mr. Hersh's article, the Army concluded: "No new issues appear to have been raised ... there is no need to reopen the investigation." The facts fully support the conclusion that this is old news, or, more accurately, no news. Mr. Hersh's sources are, almost without exception, the same people the official investigators interviewed. His story is dependent on accounts from people who heard rumors of events and were concerned, but who themselves never witnessed anything. In one instance, his sources were nine kilometers away, listening by radio to the events he describes. One of the generals Mr. Hersh quotes was in Saudi Arabia at the time of these events, which occurred in Iraq. These well-meaning soldiers never saw a single act of wrongdoing because none occurred. Most important, the direct evidence undercuts Mr. Hersh's assertions. For example, Mr. Hersh claims that the Iraqi tanks destroyed at Rumaylah were on transport trucks with their turrets locked down. But the gun camera video footage taken from Apache helicopters during the battle clearly shows combat-ready Iraqi tanks prepared to fight. Some of Mr. Hersh's sources have already written to New Yorker Editor David Remnick to say that their statements in the article were misrepresented. Retired Lt. Gen. Steven Arnold informed the magazine: "I know that my brief comments in the article were not depicted in an entirely accurate manner and were taken out of context.... When the Iraqi forces fired on elements of the 24th Infantry Division, they were clearly committing a hostile act. I regret having granted an interview with Mr. Hersh. The tone and thrust of the article places me in a position of not trusting or respecting General Barry McCaffrey, and nothing could be further from the truth." In the end, Mr. Hersh's article is nothing more than revisionist history. He attacks the 24th Infantry Division's leadership for using overwhelming force. Yet that superior force not only saved American lives but shortened what could have been a protracted struggle inflicting far more casualties on both sides. As Gen. Powell said about Mr. Hersh's article: "It is ironic that for nine years we were criticized for not destroying more Iraqi units, now we are being criticized for attacking Iraqi units that attacked us." Mr. Hersh has the safe luxury of judging battlefield decisions 10 years after the fact. We didn't have that luxury. We were fighting the fourth-largest army in the world, which was armed with biological and chemical weapons and which had already invaded Kuwait and brutalized its people. Mr. Hersh says the Iraqi forces at Rumaylah were "in retreat." But he wasn't there, facing an Iraqi force spanning five miles and made up of hundreds of tanks, trucks and armored personnel carriers. He wasn't with Lt. Col. Chuck Ware and Capt. Richard Averna when Sagger missiles and enemy rounds were fired at their troops. Army investigations concluded that the Iraqis started the Rumaylah battle when they opened fire on U.S. forces. In self-defense -- we finished it. America can be proud that the brave men and women of the 24th Infantry Division acted with such courage, professionalism and compassion during the Gulf War. These soldiers lived up to the division's simple motto: "Victory."
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