16 May 2000
Text: Gen. McCaffrey Responds to New Yorker Article about Desert Storm
(Says story recycles unfounded allegations about 24th Infantry Division) (830) Following is the text of a statement by General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.), Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), released May 15, concerning an article, "Overwhelming Force," by Seymour Hersh which appears in the May 22, 2000, New Yorker magazine: (begin text) STATEMENT OF ONDCP DIRECTOR BARRY McCAFFREY CONCERNING THE NEW YORKER ARTICLE, "OVERWHELMING FORCE" (Washington, D.C.) -- Today, General Barry R. McCaffrey (ret.), Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, released this statement concerning an article, "Overwhelming Force," by Mr. Seymour Hersh, which appears in the May 22, 2000, edition of The New Yorker: This article maligns the 26,000 men and women of the 24th Infantry Division who in 100 hours advanced 413 kilometers, through elements of 7 heavily armed Iraqi divisions, in a maneuver that has been described as "the greatest cavalry charge in history." Our overwhelming force kept American casualties to a minimum. Our soldiers' discipline and compassion also minimized enemy casualties. These men and women deserve our praise; instead, Hersh impugns them. Five months ago, Seymour Hersh began an inquiry apparently seeking to attack the Administration's proposed counter-drug assistance package for Colombia. However, the Gulf War allegations that he recycles were long ago investigated and fully cleared -- a fact he is compelled to acknowledge in the article. The incidences Hersh recycles were the subject almost ten years ago of no less than four complete investigations, including two which were separate, independently -- led and exhaustive -- one by the Army Inspector General and the other by the Army's Criminal Investigation Division. These events have also been the subject of a Congressional hearing, hundreds of news media accounts, and several scholarly books. In every instance, all of these investigations and analyses have determined that these allegations were completely unfounded. Hersh and The New Yorker devote 32 pages to these Gulf War allegations. However, the record of the official investigations alone, which are now almost a decade old, total over 2,100 pages -- based on over 200-plus interviews ranging from privates to generals, analysis of battlefield audio and video tapes, and countless hours of underlying investigatory work. Hersh has found nothing new -- he started from the same anonymous letter. His sources are almost without exception the exact same people the official investigators spoke to under penalty of perjury. And, he has looked at the same events. The CID report specifically "substantiated that the [post-cease fire Rumaylah] engagement was clearly provoked by the Iraqis and the response of the 24th ID was [in accordance with] cease-fire guidance provided by ARCENT and the XVIII Airborne Corps." This report also concluded that "[a]fter extensive interviews with personnel from brigade and battalion commanders to privates, there was no evidence to indicate that members of the [24th Infantry] killed or mistreated [Iraqi prisoners of war]." Over the past five months, I and the Office of National Drug Control Policy have cooperated with The New Yorker. We have responded in writing to Hersh's questions. I personally provided The New Yorker with 32 pages of detailed answers to their questions -- including sources, maps and notes. We have repeatedly offered to provide information and speak on the record about the Colombia counter-drug plan or other aspects of our National Drug Control Strategy. We have encouraged others to cooperate with Hersh on the record. In order to set the facts straight, we have brought individuals with actual knowledge to the attention of The New Yorker. Hersh's article is nothing more than a revisionist history of the war. He, in effect, faults our troops for defeating the Iraqi threat with so little loss of American lives. He faults the 24th Infantry's leadership for using superior force. However, that force not only saved American lives, but it shortened what could have otherwise been a protracted struggle inflicting far more casualties on both sides. Hersh has the safe luxury of armchair quarterbacking the every move of the 24th Infantry during the Gulf War-ten years after the fact. We did not have that luxury. We were out there fighting the fourth largest army in the world, which was armed with biological and chemical weapons, and which had already invaded Kuwait and oppressed the Kuwaiti people. Hersh says that the Iraqi forces at Rumaylah were in "retreat." However, he wasn't the one watching a force spanning five miles, made up of hundreds of Iraqi tanks, trucks, and armored personnel carriers face him. The Iraqis fired on U.S. forces. The Army investigations unequivocally concluded that the use of force in response was justified. I am proud that the 26,000 soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division acted with such courage, professionalism, and compassion throughout the Desert Storm Campaign. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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