Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)
SPEECH BY FRANCE'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
(New York, 24 march 2000)
I should like to begin by thanking the Secretary-General for his outstanding introduction to our debate today. I wish also to pay tribute to the very effective and dedicated efforts of all those who are working in difficult conditions in Iraq to implement the humanitarian programme.
In examining the Secretary-General's report today, the Security Council is considering once again the very serious humanitarian crisis in Iraq. I think it would be useful to review the main characteristics of this crisis in order to show the extent to which the Iraqi people have been profoundly affected by the deterioration in their living conditions.
Under the direction of Ambassador Amorim, the humanitarian panel reported that Iraq had experienced "a shift from relative affluence to massive poverty". It also confirmed that the disturbing figures given by United Nations agencies on the nutrition, health and social situation of the country are reliable and exact.
According to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the mortality rate for children under five rose from 56 per 1,000 in the period 1984-1989 to the current 131 per 1,000. The infant mortality rate is among the highest in the world. One dramatic statistic in a recent British parliamentary report deserves mention: if the progress in health observed during the 1980s had been maintained through the following decade, 500,000 children would have survived.
The situation is scarcely better in the educational sector. According to UNICEF, the school attendance rate fell by 20% between 1991 and 1999. The UNICEF representative who spoke to the Committee on Monday pointed out that education had lost value in Iraq today as the country's young people see their parents forced to accept jobs at a lower level than their studies had prepared them for. This "embargo generation" is a lost generation.
In the area of social services, the situation has also deteriorated. Only 41% of the population has regular access to clean water, the quality of which has also deteriorated, according to the World Health Organization. Power cuts are frequent and growing longer. Iraq's health-care system has suffered greatly from the shortages of clean water and electricity. At this point, it is in a decrepit state, according to the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Lastly, the almost daily bombardments have had negative humanitarian effects on the civilian population. According to our information, these military actions killed 144 civilians and injured 446; 42% of the victims in the air raids have been civilians.
An entire society is today living without structure and being destroyed. This will have long-term consequences for Iraq and for regional balance as a whole. Admittedly, the Iraqi Government bears a heavy share of the initial blame for this disastrous situation. But the Security Council can no longer disregard its own responsibility in the matter, which is indisputable and increasingly condemned by international public opinion.
Of course, in order to assist the Iraqi people, on the Security Council adopted resolution 986 (1995), the so-called oil-for-food programme, and significantly improved it with resolution 1153 (1998). As the report emphasizes, despite the difficulties encountered and its shortcomings, the programme has provided real assistance to Iraqis, especially in the areas of food and health. But we must keep in mind the conclusions of the humanitarian panel's report, which in paragraph 58 states: "the panel reiterates its understanding that the humanitarian situation in Iraq will continue to be a dire one in the absence of a sustained revival of the Iraqi economy, which in turn cannot be achieved solely through remedial humanitarian efforts." Resolution 986 (1995), even though improved by resolution 1153 (1998), is only a partial and temporary response. Only the suspension of civilian sanctions, which can be envisioned in the context of implementing resolution 1284 (1999), then lifting them completely once the conditions have been fulfilled, will allow the country's economy to start growing again. Meanwhile, the members of the Security Council have a responsibility to improve the Iraq programme.
That is why we have closely examined the recommendations in the Secretary-General's report addressed, on the one hand, to Iraq and, on the other, to the Sanctions Committee and the Security Council. These recommendations, which are intended to improve the effectiveness of the humanitarian programme, are welcome. With regard to the proposals addressed to Iraq, we hope that programme officials in New York and on the ground will examine with the Iraqi authorities ways and means to implement them quickly.
With regard to the recommendations addressed to the Committee, we hope they will all be applied resolutely and speedily. Many of these recommendations (on the oil supervisors, the procedures for reimbursement and the illegal contractual clauses) are aimed at correcting long-standing difficulties on which no progress has been made for months. This paralysis of the Sanctions Committee is unacceptable. The French delegation, which has made numerous compromise proposals, is prepared to resume discussions without delay to break the present impasse in the Committee.
Several of the Secretary-General's recommendations concern the issue of holds, which have very serious effects. The report details their very negative impact on implementing the humanitarian programme. It is certainly legitimate to make sure that before goods are sent they are not liable to be used for prohibited ends. But the Council should recognize that the number of holds has become, as the Secretary-General has rightly said, so high that it is unacceptable: $1.75 billion worth of contracts, an unprecedented level, are currently on hold. I would like to point out in particular the high rate in certain sectors essential to improving the humanitarian situation, such as electricity, water and agriculture. In these sectors, the rate of holds exceeds 50% and has even reached 100% in phase V of the telecommunications sector. With such high rates, the humanitarian programme can no longer function in these sectors.
The programme to purchase spare parts for the oil industry is also characterized by an excessively high rate of holds. The Secretary-General invites the Council to give its attention to this today, recommending that it approve an additional amount of $300 million for each of the final two phases.
Even last year we believed that the Security Council should assume its responsibilities in this area. We have not changed our opinion. The last report of the independent group of experts mandated by the Secretary-General presents, like previous reports, an eloquent picture of the Iraqi oil industry. The situation in all sectors of the industry continues to deteriorate, endangering the lives of workers, causing serious harm to the environment and damaging oil wells. Unless more spare parts are sent to Iraq quickly, the oil industry's capacity to maintain the current level of production will be compromised. Insofar as Iraq's entire revenue comes from the sale of oil, this warning should not leave the Council indifferent: if oil prices were to fall tomorrow, Iraq's ability to finance the humanitarian programme would be seriously diminished.
Consequently, we hope that the Secretary-General's recommendation will at last be heard by the Council. But this alone will not suffice. This measure will have a positive effect only if the spare parts are delivered quickly. The practice of excessive holds in this sector must therefore end. Spare parts with a total value of only $250 million have actually been delivered, whereas the Council has made available the equivalent of $1.2 billion in four phases. The decisions taken by the Council are therefore being largely ignored.
It is precisely to correct these malfunctions that France insisted that resolution 1284 (1999) contain an ambitious humanitarian section. It made a significant contribution to the drafting of that part of the resolution, which contains many technical improvements. Their implementation at this time does not, however, live up to our expectations.
We regret in particular the fact that in the four months since the resolution was adopted, few measures have actually gone into force. The mechanism for notifying the Secretariat of contracts for food, medicines, agriculture and education will at last be implemented because holds were lifted yesterday. The application of paragraph 18 on the approval of the contracts for oil spare parts by independent experts is pending. Yet the implementation of these two provisions would lead to a significant drop in the number of holds.
The arrangements requested from the Secretariat, in application of paragraph 24 of the resolution, to implement a local cash component have still not been communicated to the Council. This measure could, however, improve the programme. All the humanitarian agencies agree on this point. We hope that these arrangements are presented to the Council as quickly as possible. Ms Bellamy appealed to the Council several months ago to implement a local cash component. Could she give us her ideas on this issue today so as to help the Council consider how her recommendation could be quickly implemented?
We hope that the Security Council will be better informed of the situation on the ground, in particular by hearing from representatives of United Nations agencies and from the Humanitarian Coordinator on a more regular basis. We are convinced that if the Council were better informed, it would want to correct the shortcomings of the current humanitarian programme. But we need more in-depth consideration of this matter. In this connection, I echo the Secretary-General's very pertinent comments this morning.
In 1999 the panel observed that, irrespective of the improvements that might be brought about, the magnitude of the humanitarian needs was such that those needs could not be met within the context of this programme. That statement is more pertinent than ever. It should prompt the Security Council to work in good faith and in a spirit of consensus for the implementation of the positive guidelines of resolution 1284 (1999) in order to encourage Iraq
to cooperate, and thus to enable the sanctions to be suspended and then lifted. But beyond that, this situation should make the Council question, in the future, the effectiveness and consequences of broad, indiscriminate sanctions that hurt civilian populations exclusively and whose human cost clearly exceeds any political benefits that the Council could expect of them./.
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