DATE=2/3/2000
TYPE=ON THE LINE
TITLE=ON THE LINE: HOW DANGEROUS IS IRAQ?
NUMBER=1-00819
EDITOR=OFFICE OF POLICY - 619-0037
CONTENT=
THEME: UP, HOLD UNDER AND FADE
Anncr: On the Line - a discussion of United
States policy and contemporary issues. This week,
"How Dangerous Is Iraq?" Here is your host, Robert
Reilly.
Host: Hello and welcome to On the Line. The
United Nations Security Council recently approved
a new plan for dealing with Iraq. The plan calls
for the regime of Saddam Hussein to cooperate with
new weapons inspections, with the promise of an
eventual end to sanctions. Since December 1998,
Iraq has not allowed U-N weapons inspectors into
the country. Now, observers are worried that Iraq
has used the past year to reconstitute its
military capabilities. Iraq has responded to the
U-N Security Council plan by saying that it will
not accept the new U-N weapons inspectors.
Joining me today to discuss the danger from Iraq
are three experts. Roscoe Suddarth is president of
the Middle East Institute and a former U.S.
ambassador to Jordan. Patrick Clawson is director
of research at the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy. And Daniel Byman is a Middle East
policy analyst at the Rand Corporation.
Host: Mr. Suddarth, in trying to assess the
danger that Saddam Hussein presents, we have to
know something about his ultimate objectives.
Back at the time of the Gulf War, when the United
States and its allies liberated Kuwait, there were
statements that, were he not stopped and had he
the additional financial resources the Kuwaiti oil
fields would have given him, Saddam was on his way
to some kind of new Babylonian Empire. Nine years
later what can we say about Saddam Hussein's
objectives and the means he has of achieving them?
Suddarth: Well I don't think his objectives have
changed. I think he still wants to dominate the
Gulf. He wants to be the primary Arab power. And
they have the resources to do it -- the second
largest oil reserves. They've got ample water.
They've got a well-educated population. So his
ambitions have not been trimmed. Otherwise he
would have given up these arms that we've now
tried for nine years to get from him.
Host: But he wants to dominate the Gulf region to
what end?
Suddarth: Well, to be dominant. And what are the
ends of people who seek power? It's to have
power. It's to have hegemony. It's to be able to
call the shots. It's to be respected, to be
feared probably more in his case. He lacks the
means, the military means, but he is dearly trying
to reconstitute them. He still has -- Daniel
Byman is much more expert on this than I am -- the
most powerful army of any other Arab country in
the region, except for Israel. He's trying to
reconstitute, obviously, his weapons of mass
destruction. Those are potent instruments.
They're not as potent as the United States
military force in the area. So one hopes that he
would be deterred by it, but one can never be sure
with a tyrant like Saddam Hussein.
Host: Patrick Clawson, do you agree with that?
Clawson: Yes, absolutely. There are no
indications whatsoever that Saddam has backed off
in the least. After all, this is a man who has
forgone well over a hundred billion dollars in oil
income in order to keep up with these clandestine
programs of weapons of mass destruction, which
don't seem to get him a whole lot.
Host: Why does he want them then?
Clawson: This is a man for whom power is so
important that he is prepared to sacrifice the
well-being of the Iraqi people in order to have
these weapons of great prestige, if not great
power.
Host: How might he use these weapons if he had
them?
Clawson: He would certainly use them to intimidate
others, to bend them to his will. It's
conceivable that he would actually use them for
war-fighting purposes, but I think that his first
purpose would be to try to force others to
accommodate him. So for instance, in 1990, he
used his potent military as a threatening tool,
trying to extract tens of billions of dollars from
the Arab oil producing countries. So if he had
weapons of mass destruction, I think he would try
to extract tens of billions of dollars again from
them.
Host: Daniel Byman?
Byman: These weapons are also a prestige symbol
for Saddam, both in the region and at home.
Host: But so are hundreds of billions of dollars.
Byman: I don't think he was thinking in 1990 or
1991 that if he continued resisting the inspectors
and defying the U-N, that nine years later
sanctions would have continued. What he was
thinking was: if I get through the next three
months, if I get through the next six months, then
this will all end. And this is common with
dictators, where their survival is often so in
jeopardy at home, that a long-term strategy is
often not how they work.
Host: Well, how dangerous do you think he is
today?
Byman: Well today, fortunately, not very
dangerous. But part of that is because sanctions
remain, not exactly strong, but in place, in terms
of weapons of mass destruction, to varying
degrees. If he were freed from the sanctions, he
could rebuild his programs fairly quickly within
several years and again pose a fairly substantial
menace to the region.
Host: What about the thirteen months he has had
so far to rebuild without the interference of
inspectors?
Byman: There are two things that have held Saddam
back from rebuilding his weapons. One has been
inspections, and as time has gone on inspections
have become less and less effective. Starting
really in late 1997, we saw a decline in the
effectiveness of the inspectors, until as you
mentioned, in December 1998, they stopped
altogether. However, also stopping Saddam from
rebuilding his weapons are sanctions. That is,
countries -- Russia, China, France, other
potential suppliers of sophisticated technology --
have not been selling or have only been selling
small quantities of precursors of items that could
be used for these types of weapons.
Host: The new U-N Security Council plan for
inspections, is this a sound plan that will keep
the pressure up on Iraq? Or is it a move in the
direction that Saddam Hussein has so wanted to
see, that is, a lessening in the pressure, an
inspection regime that is not as strict as the U-N
Special Commission under Richard Butler was?
Suddarth: Well, that's a good question. The way
he's acting now, if even Mr. Blix is not
acceptable.
Host: Hans Blix.
Suddarth: And Rolf Ekeus. Everybody was surprised
and appalled at the French veto of Ekeus, who was
extolled as the model head of UNSCOM [United
Nations Special Commission]. So it's very
doubtful that Saddam will accept UNSCOM. In which
case, I would hope that the United States and
others could point out that here he is depriving
the Iraqi people of a loosening of the sanctions.
Fortunately, the money will still be in the hands
of escrow accounts. He will not get his hands on
it. And weapons of mass destruction, there will
not be military things that can be shipped in. So
I would hope that it could be pointed out that,
once again, he's depriving the Iraqi people of a
lessening of sanctions.
Host: But that doesn't seem to bother him.
Suddarth: It doesn't seem to bother him. But who
knows? We all hope that some spark is going to set
off some kind of mutiny that could overthrow him.
But it's not a happy situation. It took a year
for the Security Council to get this thing
together. They finally managed to pass it. This
could be tactical on Saddam's part, but I think we
need more publicity about the fact that he is
turning down something that could help the Iraqi
people.
Host: Do you find, Patrick Clawson, the fact that
France, China and Russia vetoed the appointment of
Rolf Ekeus a break-down in the coalition behind
the sanctions, and for them to have said [that] we
shouldn't appoint someone as the head of this new
commission who is unacceptable to Iraq, a rather
extraordinary statement?
Clawson: Absolutely, especially because Ekeus,
during the years that he ran UNSCOM, was very
careful to keep fully informed the French and the
Russians and the Chinese, and to seek their
advice. And Ekeus was very proud that the U-N
resolutions backing his activities, backing
UNSCOM's activities, were almost always unanimous
or close to unanimous, that he had strong support
from the French and the Russians and the Chinese,
who, after all, have an interest in seeing that
these issues are decided at the U-N, and not
decided by the United States, outside of the U-N
framework. So the fact that these three permanent
members of the Security Council were prepared to
say that Iraq has a de facto veto really seriously
undermines the ability of the United Nations to
ever implement arms control without the active
cooperation of the member country. And let's be
honest, Saddam is the kind of leader who's never
going to cooperate with an arms control.
Host: Daniel Byman, when Hans Blix was head of
the I-A-E-A, the International Atomic Energy
Agency in Vienna, they were unable to detect the
secret nuclear weapons program that Saddam Hussein
had underway until it was discovered after
Operation Desert Storm in 1991. Even if
inspections are resumed under his leadership, do
you have any confidence that they will make a
difference?
Byman: The problem is not so much Mr. Blix, who,
while he was head of the I-A-E-A, their mandate
was so limited that there really was no chance for
him to uncover secret weapons. That's almost more
a weakness inherent to the I-A-E-A than anything
related to its leadership. The deeper problem is
that Saddam in the past, with superb inspection
heads, has simply denied access, that whenever the
inspectors get near a facility that he doesn't
want them to see, he stops them with force often,
restricting their access. The question then
becomes, what will the major powers do about it?
And if the answer is nothing, no inspections team,
no matter who heads it, is going to make any
difference.
Clawson: May I point out that Mr. Blix was also
head of I-A-E-A when that agency indeed discovered
a great deal of information about the clandestine
nuclear program of North Korea, back in 1994-1995.
So, that agency, and Mr. Blix himself, learned a
great deal from the experiences with Iraq, and
they adopted much more robust procedures. For
instance, they made use of intelligence provided
by governments. And that's been key to the success
of these kinds of inspections programs -- to be
able to get intelligence. It's been a very
politically sensitive issue, and Mr. Blix has
really taken a tough stance, saying that, while
it's an international organization, they have to
be prepared to receive secret information from
governments that provides them tips of where to
look.
Host: Okay, let's say the Iraqi position remains
the same, Mr. Suddarth, and they continue to say,
no more inspections, we're not going to let anyone
into this country. How do the U-N and the United
States respond?
Suddarth: Well, again it's a difficult question.
There was an obviously leaked report, a trial
balloon in the New York Times yesterday,
indicating concern in the intelligence community
that he is indeed building these things up. I
think the Administration will be compelled to do
something militarily. It's also doubtful that
they will get Security Council backing on this.
We may have something again like Desert Fox.
Host: The four days of bombing back in December
of 1998?
Suddarth: Saddam is a cunning person. I think
he's going to try to complicate our electoral
scene. I think he will try to make trouble, and I
would imagine the Administration would think it's
best for us to get this thing done early before we
get into the fall or the summer, with an intense
thing that would politicize the debate on Iraq.
So I think Saddam is going to cause us trouble. I
think we have to be ready to react, and I think we
have to react strongly.
Host: Do you agree with that, Patrick Clawson?
Clawson: Yes. In other words, we should not be as
concerned as we have been at some times in the
past about holding together the U-N coalition with
the Russians, the French and the Chinese because,
frankly, that's not working. And we have to be
prepared to take action on our own. The paradox
is that if we take the action on our own, we may
well find that it's easier to gain some
cooperation from the Russians, the French and the
Chinese for addressing the question: what are we
going to do next? We have to go to those
countries and say it's in your interest, just as
it's in our interest to see that the United
Nations is an effective body at solving
international problems, and not just talking about
them.
Host: But what are the interests of France, China
and Russia in respect to Iraq that they would not
support a harder line against Iraq's obduracy?
Clawson: Well, they have been concerned that the
United States is really interested in seeing the
overthrow of Saddam's government.
Host: And we have said that, have we not?
Clawson: Which is indeed our goal. And they have
said that they're not sure that we would, in fact,
ever be prepared to see the sanctions lifted
unless Saddam were overthrown. And that's not a
policy that they support. And for that reason
they have been suspicious for some time about what
U.S. intentions were with these arms control
resolutions. And one of the reasons that I think
the United States went along with this new
resolution was to say: look, we're prepared to
walk that extra mile, to make that extra effort,
to make an arms control regime work, and to see
if, in fact, we can get arms control back on track
with Saddam. If Saddam shows that we can't, that
is certainly going to reinforce the attitude of
the United States that we have got to get rid of
this guy.
Host: Do you read the politics of the situation
this way, Mr. Byman?
Byman: To a degree. I'm actually a touch more
cynical about the motives of some of the major
powers. I think that the Russians and the Chinese
and the French have very strong commercial
motivations. I think that Saddam Hussein has
probably cut sweetheart deals with them for their
support. Also all of them are very sensitive to
the idea of the United States throwing its weight
around. And I think that Patrick has touched on a
very fundamental irony, which is, they think we're
throwing our weight around now, but if they
abandon the U-N process, then they'll really see
something -- which is the United States acting
much more unilaterally, not consulting them on
major decisions regarding Iraq.
Host: You know at the time of Desert Storm, the
Administration of President Bush said: we're
sticking with the agreement with our Arab and
other allies that this is an operation only to
liberate Kuwait, not to remove Saddam Hussein.
That wasn't part of the bargain. And that, had we
done that, we would still be in that region.
Well, it turns out now that because he wasn't
removed, we still are in the region. There are
no-fly zones in both northern and southern Iraq.
There is the sanctions regime. There is the very
frequent bombing going on when Iraqi radar fixes
on allied aircraft or fires a missile at them.
How is the United States going to extricate itself
from this situation successfully?
Suddarth: Bob, I not sure I buy the premise of
your comment there. There's a difference of
degree. Yes, we are militarily involved, but it's
a light involvement. I happen to agree with those
who were against going to Baghdad. I think we
would have taken thousands of casualties. We
would have killed tens of thousands of Iraqis. We
may or may not have gotten Saddam, and we would
still be there in military force and governing the
country. So I think this is the lesser of two
evils. I happen to think that containment is
worth trying. It's a policy that we kept up
[against the Soviet Union] for fifty years.
Host: Is Saddam in a box?
Suddarth: He's definitely in a box, and if he's
getting out of it, we need to rap his knuckles.
But we also have to be cognizant of the suffering
of the Iraqi people. We've done well in the
Kurdish areas, which administer themselves.
They're prospering now, relatively speaking, but
it is tragic. And so I think we're all conflicted.
I'd love to see arms control on a hundred percent
and sanctions off a hundred percent, but that
doesn't seem to be doable.
Host: Parting comment?
Clawson: Iraqis are not hurting as much as the
Iraqi government claims they are. In fact, income
in Iraq last year per person was higher than
income in Syria. Even with all the constraints on
Iraq, it's still a country with such natural
resources that it's been able to [remain] at a
middle income level. And the suffering of the
Iraqi people is certainly real compared to the
income that they used to have, but still Iraqis
are doing much better than people in most of
Africa and most of South Asia.
Host: And Saddam has succeeded in smuggling an
enormous amount of oil out of the country, hasn't
he, Daniel Byman?
Byman: Absolutely. In fact, this has been a
source of revenue for the regime that has enabled
it to stay strong at home. It gives Saddam the
money to buy off key supporters and at times to
purchase selective weapons in a clandestine
manner.
Host: And this he does in complicity with his old
enemy, Iran.
Byman: Yes, along with his old enemy, the Kurds,
along with almost every one of Iraq's neighbors.
Everyone seems to be willing to look the other way
in exchange for a small percentage of the deal.
Host: I'm afraid that's all the time we have
this week. I'd like to thank our guests - Roscoe
Suddarth from the Middle East Institute; Patrick
Clawson from the Washington Institute for Near
East Policy; and Daniel Byman from the Rand
Corporation - for joining me to discuss the danger
from Iraq. This is Robert Reilly for On the Line.
Anncr: You've been listening to "On the Line" - a
discussion of United States policies and
contemporary issues. This is --------.
03-Feb-2000 16:13 PM EDT (03-Feb-2000 2113 UTC)
NNNN
Source: Voice of America
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