DoD News Briefing
Tuesday, August 10, 1999
Presenter: Mr. Kenneth H. Bacon, ASD PA
.............
Q: Can you give us an update on the airstrike situation? Can you give us any kind of numbers on how many airstrikes have occurred since Desert Fox, and how many times U.S. aircraft have been challenged either by no-fly violations or radar illuminations? Do you have any of those numbers?
Mr. Bacon: As you know, the numbers come out of two theaters. First of all, there were attacks in the no-fly zones, both the North and the South, today, by allied planes in response to provocations from Iraq. And you can get releases both out of the European Command on that, and the CENTCOM release just came out several minutes ago. You may not have seen that yet.
The responses in Operation Southern Watch have been running at the rate of about half a dozen a month since January, and that is responses to Iraqi provocations. These are times when allied planes have struck back in response to being fired upon, generally by anti-aircraft guns, sometimes by other -- by missiles -- but generally by anti-aircraft guns.
And in Operation Northern Watch the rate is running slightly higher. It's closer to an average of eight or nine times a month that allied planes have responded to provocation.
As you know, Desert Fox was in December. So starting in January these figures are about six a month in Southern Watch and about nine a month in Northern Watch.
Q: Those are responses in which individual airstrikes are lumped into that one response? That's not eight or nine individual airstrikes. That's just one response per provocation?
Mr. Bacon: Those are times when allied planes have struck back against Iraqi air defense systems.
Q: After six months can you say what the U.S. is accomplishing by continuing these airstrikes which are, half a dozen monthly or nine times a month?
Mr. Bacon: Sure. First of all, these are part of the containment policy, to contain Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi military from attacking his own people in the South, in particular, but also in the North. And also from mobilizing to launch an attack against his neighbors. These attacks, along with the sanctions -- not the attacks, but the patrols over the no-fly zones -- along with the sanctions are a crucial part of the containment policy.
Second, these patrols and the attacks, when necessary in response to provocation, are a message to Saddam Hussein that we take the no-fly zones seriously, and that we plan to patrol them as an integral part of our containment policy.
Third, the attacks are degrading his air defense system slowly and systematically. But they are not by leaps and bounds but by small steps having an impact on his ability to, one, to attack our planes, but also to maintain a strong air defense system.
His communications have been degraded somewhat, his ability to communicate among the elements of his air defense systems. Because he has basically adopted, or the Iraqi air force's air defense system has adopted, a fairly low-risk approach. They have a high chance of failure approach. That is to say, they're not turning on their radars at all or for any length of time. A lot of what they're firing is being fired without radar guidance and therefore has a small chance of success.
In order to avoid strikes against his missile installations and radar installations, the Iraqi forces are moving their radars and missile installations quite frequently, which is wearing on his forces, wearing on his equipment, and generally makes them somewhat less effective because of the wear and tear they're subject to all the time.
So I think when you add this up, the primary contribution that the patrols make is they support the containment policy by responding aggressively and quickly to challenges to the patrols. We are degrading his air defense system and also making it very clear that we take containment seriously.
Q: Does it have any impact at all on his ability to create weapons of mass destruction?
Mr. Bacon: The short answer to that is no, except that it does drain resources that he might otherwise devote to weapons of mass destruction.
Saddam Hussein has not shown much of an inclination to devote resources to the welfare of his people instead of to weapons, and he does seem to be devoting resources to weapons. But remember, he is under economic sanctions, which makes it difficult to import -- or we hope impossible to import -- new parts that he may need to properly maintain his air defense system.
Q: If the Iraqi National Congress holds regular meetings in the northern part of Iraq, what protection, if any, can they expect from the United States and what should Saddam Hussein expect should he try to disrupt such a meeting or attack it?
Mr. Bacon: To the extent that our patrols in the Northern no-fly zone prevent Saddam Hussein from moving military forces or equipment in the area, anybody meeting in Northern Iraq would benefit from that. Other than that, there's no specific protection.
Q: Movement of ground forces is not a violation, obviously, of the no-fly zone.
Mr. Bacon: Not in the North, no. In the South there is a no-drive zone as well as a no-fly zone.
........Thank you.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug1999/t08101999_t0810asd.html
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