SECURITY COUNCIL
ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY ALAIN DEJAMMET
AMBASSADOR, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF FRANCE TO THE U.N.
(New-York, 17 December 1999)
Mr. President,
1. This vote follows a year-and-a-half-long crisis with Iraq that started in the summer of 1998 with Iraq's refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM and then the abrupt departure of UNSCOM and the IAEA, without consulting the Council, and the events that followed.
The draft resolution takes note of the difficulties of implementing Resolution 687; the demands laid down in the area of disarmament could not be met 100%, the prospect of lifting the sanctions soon was no longer credible and UNSCOM no longer offered all the required guarantees.
This situation led to the conclusion that France reached in January 1999: priority has to be given to the return to security and stability. The Council has to look to the future in order to prevent Iraq from arming and consequently must ensure the long-term presence of professional inspectors on the ground in order to guarantee the security of the states in the region. In the immediate future, it is also necessary to see that the sanctions are directed only against arms and prohibited materials, and are lifted against the Iraqi population whose humanitarian situation, as we all realize now, is worsening day by day.
The Council heard this message, and it was agreed at the start of 1999 that relations between Iraq and the United Nations should be established on a new basis. The establishment of a panel of experts, a welcome initiative by Canada, made a pragmatic and impartial approach possible. I would like to pay tribute to the role played by the chairman of the panel of experts, Ambassador Celso Amorim, whose recommendations made a substantial contribution to the present resolution. For our part, we would have liked to see these recommendations adopted and implemented in full by the Secretary-General in April 1999.
2. The present text is a combination of successive drafts of various origins. It was heavily amended as a result of further work carried out in September by several delegations.
The Council is unanimous in asking Iraq to cooperate on the issues of missing Kuwaitis and Kuwaiti property. France, a member of the tripartite commission, intends in this respect to fulfill its responsibilities so that this question can at last be settled, thereby leading to the establishment of new relations between Iraq and Kuwait.
The draft resolution also makes significant improvements to Resolution 986. The elimination of the ceiling on oil exports is a good example. We thank the United Kingdom for having incorporated in these past few weeks a number of French suggestions, most of them based on the conclusions of the Amorim panel: notifying the Secretariat of contracts involving food, health, agriculture and education, having independent experts approve contracts on spare parts for the oil industry, increasing the quota for spare parts for the oil sector, suspending Resolution 986 once the sanctions themselves are suspended. We have two regrets, however: the refusal to break the isolation of the Iraqi people and to that end to permit civilian air traffic to resume. The absence of any real exemption from the sanctions for religious activities such as the Hajj and Omrah pilgrimages, for everything is still subject to control by the Sanctions Committee, itself dependent as everyone knows on the veto of any one country.
The new commission will be very different from UNSCOM--and that is desirable. The new commission will obey the principles of professionalism, collegial structure and universality. These principles should guarantee its independence vis-à-vis all the member states and ensure that, like the IAEA and ICAO, it is respected by all, including Iraq. The commission will have the same powers as its predecessor and the same duties, in particular respect for the Memorandum of Agreement of February 1998. But its conduct, methods, organization and composition have been radically altered.
The use of force to enable the inspectors to return is neither desirable nor practicable. The experience of December 1998 made this clear. The text therefore had to include a realistic incentive mechanism for the Iraqi authorities; this lies in the suspension and then the removal of sanctions. These sanctions, of dubious effectiveness, hurt the Iraqi people above all. It is the Iraqi population which pays the price every day. The Council, which has a choice of means to impose its policy, cannot completely absolve itself of responsibility in the face of what is being described as a veritable humanitarian catastrophe. So at last this led the Security Council members to accept the simple, realistic notion that if cooperation with Iraq is to be resumed in a manner that everyone wishes to be satisfactory, the sanctions should be suspended. This provides relief to the Iraqi population and an incentive for the Iraqi authorities to continue their cooperation.
The mechanism for suspension is linked, as France had proposed, to solid guarantees. The suspension can only be extended by a new, positive decision by the Council. Arms naturally continue to be prohibited, and dual-use equipment will continue to be monitored beforehand. If Iraq does not cooperate, the sanctions will be automatically reimposed.
3. The draft resolution, however, does include an unknown element and an ambiguity in particular that deserve to be clarified:
- The details of the financial mechanism have not yet been spelled out. So Iraq is being asked to accept the return of inspectors without knowing what the post-suspension mechanism will be. Consequently, we shall insist in subsequent work that the monitoring includes reasonable proposals that France formulated in writing at the end of July. Resolution 986 must be suspended, and different modalities worked out which reconcile free trade and civilian activities with maintaining prohibitions on arms and dual-use equipment.
- But it is above all the criteria for suspending and later lifting the sanctions which give rise to difficulties in interpretation. The analyses of the Council members differ. Paragraph 7 means in our view that when the program of work has been successfully concluded, the sanctions will not simply be suspended but actually lifted altogether. Suspension, a partial, interim measure corresponding to the spirit of article 21 of Resolution 687, must start once progress is made in implementing the program, and not when the working program has been completed. Such progress, according to paragraph 34, has to be the criterion for cooperation, and cooperation, according to paragraph 33, is the criterion for suspension. A different interpretation of the text would make the suspension of the sanctions highly uncertain. It goes without saying that one cannot have suspension, a partial, interim measure, dependent on the conditions required for lifting the sanctions. That brings into question the very intent of the Council's proposal.
4. It seemed to us that this text should have been clarified in regard to the criterion for suspension and should have better reflected the views of all the Security Council's members. We welcome the efforts made to that end these past few weeks, especially by the United Kingdom. We did our part in this common endeavor, proposing many formulae in the hope of achieving a consensus. Why this insistence on a consensus? Because unanimity will be indispensable for effectively implementing this resolution. The Council will in effect have to approve without a veto the appointment of a new chairman, approve without a veto the organization of the commission and approve without a veto the list of key tasks. And if interpretations of the text differ, how will the chairman of the commission be able to carry out his mandate and how will the Security Council be able to decide when the sanctions should be lifted?
A final, justifiable effort to achieve agreement was therefore reasonable. A few modifications were enough: clarifying the meaning of paragraph 7 and stipulating that progress is the criterion for cooperation. In spite of this final, justifiable effort, a consensus was not reached. So the draft resolution remains flawed. It falls short of our hopes in January. That is why France will abstain. However, this text is the only way open to us at this time, given the views expressed by the majority of the Council's members. That is why, in spite of our abstention, we shall plead for wisdom to prevail in the interpretation of paragraphs 33 and 34 so that a reasonable financial mechanism is adopted, so that everyone acts realistically and with good faith in order that the resolution may produce what is best in itself.
5. Now we must start to think about the future, post resolution. The Council is going to decide. We will have to convince Iraq to respect this decision and summon goodwill all round. We will have to reflect how the member states, individually or collectively, and also the U.N. Secretary-General, can play a role in this matter. France will spare no effort. The resumption of dialogue between the United Nations and Iraq, which we earnestly desire, will also make it possible, we hope, to dispel the uncertainties of the resolution. We will be vigilant in the interpretation and application of this text.
If, as we hope, there emerges in the Council a resolve to work towards consensus to apply the guidelines set out in this resolution in a clear and realistic manner, France will participate without reservation or restriction in the undertaking.
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