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INTERVIEW WITH GEN. NAJIB SALHI

Iraq News, NOVEMBER 9, 1999

The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .

I. INTERVIEW WITH GEN. NAJIB SALHI, IRAQ NEWS, NOV 4
   On Nov 3, UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke addressed the Nat'l Press 
Club.  The UNSC is said to be close to reaching agreement on a new 
resolution regarding Iraq, but Holbrooke questioned whether Saddam would 
accept it.  As AP, Nov 3, reported, "'Most experts think if there is 
one, Saddam would turn it down.  My view is that if he accepted it he 
would try to cheat,' Holbrooke said."
   The NYT, Nov 4, reported that Iraq's Foreign Minister, in Geneva, 
said Iraq "would reject any UN move to suspend economic sanctions in 
return for Iraq's cooperation with a new weapons-monitoring program."
   And AP, Nov 6, reported "Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz on Saturday 
pledged that his government will resist any new UN demands to cooperate 
with foreign weapons inspectors, while punishing economic sanctions 
remain in effect. . . . 'There is no change in the (UN) proposals which 
are being made and we stand firm against such maneuvers,' Aziz said."
   The Iraqi Gov't consists of very serious people and when they talk 
like that, they usually mean it.  So if a UNSC resolution is passed, one 
can be confident Iraq will reject it.  Then what will the US do?  Bomb 
Iraq?  To achieve what goal?  
   AP/NandoTimes, Nov 8, reported that Sen. John McCain, told an 
Arab-American conference in Dearborn, MI, that "he supported arming 
Iraqi opposition groups.  Saddam, he said, 'must be removed from 
power.'"
  With the recent INC meeting, "Iraq News" had the opportunity to meet 
and interview Gen. Najib Salhi.  In Mar 95, Salhi commanded a mechanized 
brigade opposite the INC lines.  He defected later that year.
  The events of Mar 95 are detailed in David Wurmer's, "Tyranny's Ally: 
America's Failure to defeat Saddam Hussein," (AEI Press, 1999), pps. 
14-15.  They are of particular relevance to considering the feasibility 
of the ILA.  How strong is the Iraqi military and how willing is it to 
fight for Saddam?
   The INC has long maintained that the Mar 95 offensive was successful 
and it was basically the Clinton administration's misplaced nervousness 
that obliged it to break it off.  That account has been supported by 
Warren Marik, then a CIA officer working with the INC in the North.  And 
it was presented on a ABC News/Peter Jennings' special report, first 
broadcast on Jun 26 97 and rebroadcast Feb 7 98.
   Gen. Salhi gave his account of those events to "Iraq News."  It is 
the first account from the other side of the lines and it was stunningly 
similar.  Salhi said that the INC "operation had a strong effect on the 
Iraqi army units. . . .  Many battalions came across  . . .  and the 
headquarters of the 38th division fell to the INC . . .  
   "The military situation was very bad.  We were given orders to detach 
the wheels of the guns, so the guns could not be towed by the INC, 
because the gunmen abandoned their guns. . . .
  "I was surprised and saddened when the INC broke off its offensive.  I 
had already coordinated with several commanders, waiting for the 
situation to deteriorate further.  We wanted to make a military revolt 
in place and declare for the INC in our area . . .
   "When I saw that the INC military operations had stopped, I decided 
to come across with a view to energizing the military operations of the 
INC . . . Had they continued and had there been coordinated operations 
in the South, Saddam would have collapsed in 15 days.  But when Saddam 
knew that the operations were confined to the North, he was able to take 
the Republican Guard reserves and deploy them in the North.
   "The kind of bombing that the US is doing in Iraq now will not lead 
to political change.  It has become routine."
I. IRAQ NEWS INTERVIEW WITH GEN. NAJIB SALHI
November 4, 1999
Interview with Gen. Najib al Salhi
In March 1995, Salhi was commander of the 27th mechanized brigade, 1st 
mechanized division.  He defected to the INC in November 1995. 
   In March, 1995 I was across the line from the INC.  Their operations 
had a strong effect on the Iraqi army units.  The military units were 
ready to cooperate with the INC.  They were hoping that the INC 
operations would continue, so they could join the INC.  Many battalions 
came across-the 848/847/130th brigade of the 38th division. Also 
battalions from the 2nd division went over to the INC.  And the 
headquarters of the 38th division fell to the INC. 
   The soldiers were waiting for something to happen.  The operations 
gave them a chance.  Some went to the INC and some went home.  The 
military situation was very bad.   We were given orders to detach the 
wheels of the guns, so the guns could not be towed by the INC, because 
the gunmen abandoned their guns.  Still, the INC towed a number of them.
   I was very surprised and saddened when the INC broke off its 
offensive.  I had already coordinated with several commanders, waiting 
for the situation to deteriorate further.  We wanted to make a military 
revolt in place and declare for the INC in our area.  There was no need 
to defect.  We could have taken control of our area.  But we gave up 
hope of carrying out this project when the INC operations didn't resume.
   When I saw that the INC military operations had stopped, I decided to 
come across with a view to energizing the military operations of the 
INC, to help them revive what they had done in March and continue what I 
considered to be a successful phase of their operations.
   As regards events like those that occurred in March 1995, had they 
continued and had there been coordinated operations in the South, Saddam 
would have collapsed in 15 days.  But when Saddam knew that the 
operations were confined to the North, he was able to take the 
Republican Guard reserves and deploy them in the North. 
   The kind of bombing that the U.S. is doing in Iraq now will not lead 
to political change.  It has become routine.