28 September 1999Text: Former UNSCOM Chief Butler's Senate Testimony on Iraq Sept. 28
(Calls on UNSC to insist that Iraq comply with resolutions and law) (1750) Richard Butler, former chief of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), called upon the permanent members of the UN Security Council to "stand together in insisting to Iraq that it return to compliance with the law." "It is a point of fundamental significance that the refusal by Iraq to comply with the disarmament law has been the main source of the continuation of sanctions. The key to sanctions relief has always been disarmament. The Saddam Hussein regime has refused to pick up that key and turn it," Butler said September 28 in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The key connection between disarmament and sanctions, said Butler, is namely that "when the Security Council is satisfied that Iraq has been disarmed it would then abolish the oil embargo." Butler noted that it has been 13 months since Iraq ordered UNSCOM inspectors out of the country and that on-the-ground inspections and monitoring have not taken place. He said the United Nations is debating two proposals that would suspend economic sanctions against Iraq and allow some kind of inspections or monitoring. A Russian plan would "give Iraq a total lifting of sanctions and Iraq would accept monitoring." This plan, said Butler, has been supported at different times by China and France. The other proposal is a British-Netherlands plan which would suspend sanctions for six months and then the United Nations would decide if renewable periods of six months would be authorized, provided Iraq complied with disarmament provisions and allowed for ongoing monitoring. Butler said that while the U.S. has indicated that it would go along with this draft, recent reports have suggested that it is unlikely that the Council will be able to reach consensus on it and statements from Baghdad indicate that the Government of Iraq would not be prepared to cooperate with such a resolution. Following is the text of Butler's prepared statement: (begin text) Washington -- 28 September 1999 PREPARED STATEMENT FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, UNITED STATES SENATE RICHARD BUTLER, DIPLOMAT IN RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK Eight years ago, following the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait, the Security Council of the United Nations passed resolutions relating to the disarmament of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and sanctions. Those resolutions were amongst the most detailed resolutions ever adopted by the Security Council, but their key elements are able to be summarized simply. First, Iraq was to be disarmed of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and the means of manufacturing them and was prohibited from holding, acquiring or manufacturing missiles which could fly further than 150 kilometers. Secondly, only after the Security Council agreed that Iraq had taken all of the disarmament actions required of it would the oil embargo and related financial strictures be removed. The Security Council created the Special Commission, UNSCOM, to carry out this work of disarmament, with Iraq. Iraq was required to cooperate fully with the Commission and to give it immediate and complete access to all relevant sites, materials and persons. The basic system for disarmament which was established had three parts -- Iraq would declare in full its prohibited materials, the Commission would verify those declarations, and the illegal weapons materials thus revealed would be "destroyed, removed or rendered harmless," under international supervision. The key disarmament resolution was Security Council resolution 687. Another resolution was subsequently adopted under which UNSCOM would monitor all relevant activities in Iraq as a means of seeking to ensure that illegal weapons were not reconstituted, following the disarmament phase. The main resolution dealing with monitoring was Security Council resolution 715. It is essential to mention that the Security Council had in mind that the disarmament of Iraq would take place very quickly. This was reflected in the fact that the declarations sought from Iraq were required within fifteen days. It was broadly anticipated that, thereafter, the work of destroying, removing or rendering harmless all relevant materials might be completed in a period of between nine and twelve months. What has been the practical experience? Iraq's actions may be summed up as having three main characteristics. In the first instance, its declarations were never complete. From the beginning, Iraq embarked upon a policy of making false declarations. Secondly, Iraq divided its illegal weapons holdings into two parts -- the portion it would reveal and the portion it decided to conceal. Thirdly, to mask its real weapons of mass destruction capability, Iraq also embarked on a program of unilateral destruction of a portion of its weapons. Finally, it refused to comply with the resolutions of the Security Council, in very many ways, so that the Commission was never able to exercise the rights spelled out for it in the resolutions of the Security Council. In practical terms, this has meant that the job of disarming Iraq, which should have taken about a year, is still not complete. A little over a year ago, during consultations in Baghdad, Tariq Aziz demanded of me that I declare Iraq disarmed. This was consistent with the position Iraq had stated, during preceding months, including in writing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and to the Security Council. I refused to do so on the ground that I was not able to. We had given Iraq a list of the remaining materials, the evidence, that it needed to provide in order for UNSCOM to complete the disarmament job. Iraq had failed to provide that evidence. Following my refusal to agree to Aziz's demand, Iraq shut down all work by UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iraq. As a result of these actions, there has been no disarmament or monitoring work in Iraq for a year, and throughout that period the Security Council has been unable to reach any agreement on how its resolutions may be enforced and/or the work of disarmament and monitoring resumed. Earlier this year, in the context of the Security Council's consideration of what it might do, I directed that UNSCOM provide to the Council a basic document setting out the then current state of affairs with respect to the disarmament of Iraq's proscribed weapons and on ongoing monitoring and verification in Iraq. That document, published as S1999/94, remains the basic statement of position. The initial response of some members of the Security Council was to seek to suppress this document but, in the event, it was published. The Council subsequently undertook its own examination of the position in special panels of enquiry, and in April 1999 the panel on disarmament and monitoring issued a report which came to broadly similar conclusions as those set forth in UNSCOM's document. Since that time there has been a continuing negotiation in the Security Council about a draft resolution which would address both the disarmament and monitoring issues and the sanctions issues. One draft resolution, provided by Russia, would essentially accept the Iraqi claim that it was disarmed and remove sanctions in return for which Iraq would be obliged to accept an ongoing monitoring system. Another draft resolution, tabled initially by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, would establish a successor organization to UNSCOM, charge it with bringing specified disarmament tasks to conclusion, and establish an ongoing monitoring system. It would suspend sanctions for renewable periods of six months, provided Iraq continued to behave in compliance with the terms of the resolution. In recent months, negotiations have tended to focus increasingly upon the British-Dutch draft, and the United States administration has indicated, broadly, that it could go along with that draft., However, recent reports have suggested that it is unlikely that the Council will be able to reach consensus on this draft and, moreover, statements from Baghdad have indicated that the Government of Iraq would not be prepared to cooperate with such a resolution. This state of affairs has two main implications -- one in the area of arms control and the other in the area of the authority of the Security Council. With respect to arms control, Iraq's challenge to the non-proliferation regimes is the most serious and direct ever faced by those regimes. It is a matter of serious concern that, if Iraq is able to successfully ignore its own obligations under the various weapons of mass destruction non-proliferation regimes, then the fundamental credibility of those regimes could be harmed around the world. Secondly, all of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on Iraq and its disarmament have the force of international law. If Iraq succeeds in rejecting those resolutions, it will by that action have deeply harmed the authority of the law-giver -- the Security Council. The consequences of that event are incalculable and potentially broad. In an article I wrote on repairing the Security Council, which is now available in the September/October 1999 edition of the journal, Foreign Affairs, I proposed that there should be a consultation amongst permanent members of the Council on their veto power. Specifically, I proposed that the use of the veto to protect a clear transgressor of an arms control undertaking should be considered inadmissible. Iraq is in such a position of noncompliance today, yet certain permanent members of the Security Council appear unprepared to insist upon compliance with the resolutions and law which they themselves adopted: I do not believe that Iraq would be able to continue to defy the Security Council for very long if the five permanent members were, in fact, to stand together in insisting to Iraq that it return to compliance with the law. Finally, there is the issue of sanctions. As the former Executive Chairman of UNSCOM, sanctions were never within my responsibility. They were, designed and applied by the Security Council to back up and provide an incentive for Iraq to comply with the resolutions of the Council. The key connection between disarmament and sanctions was the one I have mentioned earlier, namely that when the Security Council is satisfied that Iraq has been disarmed it would then abolish the oil embargo. In this context, it is a point of fundamental significance that the refusal by Iraq to comply with the disarmament law has been the main source of the continuation of sanctions. The key to sanctions relief has always been disarmament. The Saddam Hussein regime has refused to pick up that key and turn it. (end text)
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