REPORT ON IRAQI DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Report Required Under Section 585 (с) of the
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act 1999, as enacted in P.L. 105-277Section 585 (c) of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1999, as enacted in P.L. 105-277, requires the President to submit a report to the Congress concerning three issues related to Iraq's development of weapons of mass destruction:
- an assessment of Iraq's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs and its efforts to move toward procurement of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction;
- an assessment of the United States view of the International Atomic Energy Agency's action team reports and other IAEA efforts to monitor the extent and nature of Iraq's nuclear program; and
- the United States Government's opinion on the value of maintaining the ongoing inspection regime rather than replacing it with a passive monitoring system
The following addresses each of these issues:
1. Iraq's nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction programs and its efforts to move toward procurement of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their Delivery Systems Policy and Redlines:
Some eight years after the Gulf War and Saddam Hussein' s defiance of the international community, we are under no illusions that Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, will comply with UNSC resolutions on disarmament, human rights, accounting for POWs, and the return of stolen property.
Our policy of containment plus regime change is designed to secure the interests of the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile regime, while UN sanctions help prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his military or WMD capabilities. We maintain robust forces in the region, which we have made clear we are prepared to use, should Saddam cross our well-established redlines: should he rebuild his WMD, should he strike out at his neighbors, should he challenge allied aircraft in the no-fly-zones, or should he move against the people living in the Kurdish controlled areas of Northern Iraq.
Reconstitution of WMD and missiles - Iraqi Activities:
U.S. National Technical Means can provide information on Iraqi facilities associated with WMD, but there are limits to what insights can be gained. This underscores the need for an effective UN inspector presence in-country. UN inspectors on the ground identified and destroyed many items that U.S. intelligence assets could not detect or identify. Getting UN inspectors on the ground in Iraq under conditions that permit them to do the job given to them by the Security Council would give greater-confidence to us on deterring, detecting and reversing Iraqi reconstitution. Without Iraqi cooperation, however, we will use the means at our disposal to detect and deal with reconstitution.
Reconstitution of WMD and Missiles - United States Government Response:
The United States Government is continuing to refine its knowledge of Iraqi weapons programs. We continue to update the list of dual-use items that Iraq should not be allowed to acquire without monitoring, and we continue to assist the UNSCOM/IAEA joint unit in refining its export/import mechanism. The United States Government continues to provide analytic support to UNSCOM and IAEA to help those agencies monitor the Iraqi target. Upon request we have provided classified briefings to UNSCOM and the IAEA on certain WMD-related sites affected by Desert Fox.
The American intelligence community will continue to focus its capabilities on Iraqi activities, and will continue to monitor all information received regarding possible efforts by Iraq to reconstitute WMD. Saddam Hussein has shown no hesitation in developing WMD in the past, and it is only prudent to assume that he is still intent on such development.
We are concerned by activity at Iraqi sites known to be capable of producing WMD and long-range ballistic missiles, as well as by Iraq's long-established practice of covert procurement activity that could include dual-use items with WMD applications. In the absence of UN inspectors on the ground to carry out the existing Security Council mandate, our concerns about the potential meaning of these activities will persist.
a. Nuclear Weapons:
The United States Government continues to work with the IAEA and United Nations member nations to prevent Iraq, from acquiring any items which could support development of its nuclear weapons program.
As of December 1999, Iraq did not have the physical capability to produce fissile material in sufficient quantities to produce nuclear weapons. At the sane time, we cannot rule out continued Iraqi nuclear weapons research. Research, as opposed to production of fissile material, would be difficult to detect even under strict monitoring. Unresolved issues include incomplete Iraqi documentation about its enrichment, weapons design, procurement» and foreign assistance; and information on its concealment mechanism, the abandonment of the nuclear program, and an alleged offer of foreign assistance. In addition, Iraq has not, as required, passed penal legislation prohibiting activities contrary to UNSCR 687 (production, possession or procurement of WMD).
b. Chemical Weapons:
As of December 1998, UNSCOM reporting provides an accurate assessment concerning Iraq's chemical programs as we understand them. We agree with the lists of priority CW issues shown in reports to the Security Council by both UMSCOM and the Amorim Disarmament Panel. On discrepancies in the material balance of chemical munitions, Iraq continues its refusal to account for a falsely-reported expenditure of some 6,000 chemical munitions, for the disappearance of 550 artillery shells filled with mustard agent: - and for an inaccurate accounting of R-400 aerial CW bombs. Concerning VX, UNSCOM has stated that the amount of VX Iraq produced has yet to be verified and that Iraq has yet to admit to its weaponization of VX into missiles. Concerning the material balance of chemical weapons production equipment, the Commission stated that the disposition of eighteen shipping containers remains to be verified, it is known that two containers held nearly 200 pieces of glass-lined production equipment.
c. Biological Weapons:
The UNSCQM and Anorim reports note that in the biological weapons area, priority issues begin with Iraq's failure at a fundamental level to provide an accurate declaration of its BW program; Iraq has submitted several declarations all found to be incomplete. Iraq has not accounted for materials and items that may have been used or acquired for such a program. The result of these failures is that the scope of priority issues for disarmament covers all aspects of Iraq's BW program. Iraq retains the industrial capability and knowledge base to develop BW agents quickly.
d. Long-Range Missiles;
Priority issues include proscribed missile warheads such as special CBW-capable warheads (including those filled with VX) and conventional warheads. Also outstanding are single-use liquid missile propellant and indigenous missile production, including seven complete missiles and their major components.
A fuller identification of the priority issues for resolving questions concerning the chemical, biological and missile programs in Iraq, in paragraphs 21-41 of the detailed report prepared by UNSCOM in January 1999 may be found attached as the appendix to this report.
2. The IAEA action team reports and other IAEA efforts to monitor the extent and nature of Iraq's nuclear program.
We concur with the IAEA's assessment that Iraq does not рossess the capability to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. We also note that Iraq has not provided the IAEA with documentary evidence of a political decision to discontinue the nuclear weapons program, Iraq is obligated by UNSCOM's and the IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (omv) plans (approved by UNSCR 715) to enact penal legislation prohibiting activities contrary to UNSCR 687 (e.g., possession of WMD). Although Iraq has acknowledged this obligation, to date Iraq has not yet implemented this requirement in domestic law.
The IAEA believes that Iraq continues to withhold information about centrifuge enrichment, foreign procurement, weapons design, and the role of Iraq's security and intelligence services in obtaining external assistance and coordinating postwar concealment. Iraq continues to deny the existence of additional documentation on the technical achievements of its nuclear program, particularly its weapons design and centrifuge enrichment programs.
We encourage the IAEA action team to pursue the unanswered questions posed by the gaps in Iraq's nuclear declarations. Answers to these questions will help enable the IAEA to verify Iraq's declarations, will add a higher degree of confidence to the IAEA's findings, and will allow greater confidence in the execution of the IAEA's OMV plan.
The IAEA. is also working with UNSCOM to tighten import/export monitoring related to Iraq. The United States is actively supporting this effort. For example, in October we supplied a nuclear advisor to UNSCOM who works with the IAEA in this area.
The IAEA is also investing other means to increase the chances of detecting Iraqi efforts to reconstitute its program, including the use of mobile sensors vehicles and increased use of aerial surveillance platforms.
- The value of maintaining the ongoing inspection regime rather than replacing it with a passive monitoring system.
Iraq has failed to complete its disarmament obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. The United States Government insists that Iraq must comply with these disarmament obligations, and that existing resolutions are the proper legal basis upon which to verify if and when Iraq complies. As noted above, Iraqi evasions have made it impossible for UNSCOM to establish an accurate baseline of information, especially in the chemical, biological; and missile areas. In the absence of a credible baseline, it is not feasible to transition from an inspection regime to a monitoring regime. Were Iraq to comply faithfully with its obligations, an active monitoring regime could be conceived.
Neither UNSCOM's nor the IAEA's long-term monitoring programs are "passive." The long-term monitoring plans adopted under UNSC 715 delineate unscom and IAEA rights, as well as Iraq's obligations. Our position has been consistent and clear since 1991; there must be expert UN weapons inspectors on the ground, with full Iraqi cooperation as required under Security Council resolutions for us to have confidence that there is credible arms control in Iraq.
The IAEA's Director General, Mohammed ElBaradei, has made clear that in order to be effective, the IAEA's OMV plan must be comprehensive and intrusive. Under the OMV plans, UNSCOM and IAEA inspectors continue to have the right to immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access at any time to all sites, including documentation which, in their judgment, is necessary to fulfill their respective mandates. Inspectors will still be able to ask questions of facility personnel, gather environmental samples/ take pictures and set up monitoring cameras. Both unscom and the IAEA are authorized to report any violations to the Security Council.
Maintaining an intrusive long-term monitoring regime will be critical to detecting an Iraqi effort to reconstitute its WMD programs, Continued, intensive vigilance of Iraqi efforts to acquire materials useful to WMD development will also be key, as will continued U.S. support to UNSCOM and the IAEA.
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