Bipartisan Congressional Leadership writes Clinton on Iraq
Iraq News,11 August 1999
By
Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the
considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and
its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is
time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
Congress of the United States
Washington DC 20515
August 11, 1999
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
Dear Mr. President:
As the principal proponents of last year's Iraq Liberation Act, we
are writing to express our dismay over the continued drift in U.S.
policy toward Iraq.
We were greatly encouraged by your decision last October to sign the
Iraq Liberation Act which established as an objective of U.S. foreign
policy the removal of the Saddam Hussein regime, and we welcomed your
pledge last November 15th to work with Congress to implement the Act.
We were also p1eased with the execution of Operation Desert Fox 1ast
December, and the continued commitment of your Administration following
the conclusion of that Operation to fully enforce the no-fly zones over
northern and southern Iraq.
Since the beginning of this year, however, we have noted signs of a
reduced priority in U.S. policy toward Iraq. The last six months have
been notable more for what has not happened rather than for what has
been achieved. In particular, we are dismayed by the following:
*International Inspections no longer constrain Saddam's Weapons of Mass
destruction (WMD) programs. Up to and during Operation Desert Fox,
Administration officials expended considerable energy explaining to the
international community, Congress, and the American people why it was
necessary to use force to compel Saddam to submit to comprehensive
international inspections. Without inspections, we were told, Saddam
could begin to reconstitute his WMD capabi1ity within a matter of weeks.
Operation Desert Fox was necessary to compel him to stop obstructing
inspections. Since Operation Desert Fox, however, there have been no
inspections at all. Now, rather than emphasize the danger that Iraq's
WMD programs may be reconstituted, Administration officials apparently
claim that they have "no evidence" that Saddam is reconstituting his
capabilities. In fact, there is considerable evidence that Iraq
continues to seek to develop and acquire weapons of mass destruction.
The whole point of Operation Desert Fox was that we could not afford to
wait until Saddam reconstituted his WMD capabilities. If international
security could be assured by waiting until we find evidence that Saddam
has developed weapons of mass destruction and responding to the threat
at that time, there wou1d have been no need for Operation Desert Fox.
The President
August 11, 1999
Page Two
*The Administration is not giving the Iraqi opposition the political
support it needs to seriously challenge Saddam. While Administration
spokesmen sometimes have expressed support for the Iraq Liberation Act,
all too often they distanced themselves from, if not ridiculed, the
policy you endorsed last November 15th. In this regard, the views of
General Zinni, Commander-in-Chief of the Centra1 Command, are
well-known. More recently, a senior State Department officia1 was
quoted in the Washington Post saying of the opposition "these are the
day-after guys. These are not the guys who are going to put a bullet in
the head of Saddam Hussein." In fact, the members of the democratic
opposition need to be supported as the "today" guys--unless it is the
intention of the Clinton Administration to send U.S. ground troops in to
achieve the U.S. policy objective of removing the Saddam Hussein regime
from power. Instead of permitting senior officials to denigrate the
opposition, the Administration should be seeking to enhance the
opposition's political legitimacy by receiving its officials at the
highest level and supporting its efforts to convene meetings inside
Iraq, in the United States and elsewhere.
* The Administration is not giving the Iraqi opposition the material
support it needs to seriously challenge Saddam. To achieve the
objective of removing Saddam, the opposition will require not only more
political support from the United States than it has received so far,
but also more material support. To date, of the $8 million appropriated
in last year's omnibus appropriations act to assist the opposition, less
than $500,00 has been used to support activities carried out by the
opposition. Most of the rest of this money is being spent on such
things as academic conferences, community outreach projects, and
conflict management programs that will do little or nothing to expedite
the demise of Saddam's regime. Notwithstanding these expenditures, we
understand that as much US $1 million of this aid may be returned to the
Treasury at the end of the fiscal year. Further, the opposition has
received no assistance whatsoever from the $97 million in military
assistance made available under the Iraq Liberation Act. The
Administration has begun to plan an initial drawdown under the Iraq
Liberation Act, but has signaled Saddam that he has nothing to fear by
emphasizing that the drawdown will be "non-lethal" in nature.
Reportedly it will in include photocopiers, computers, and fax machines,
as well as training in such areas as accounting and flood management.
In providing authority for military drawdown, it was our intention to
train and equip a force dedicated to bringing democracy to Iraq.
*The Administration is not willing to deliver assistance to the
opposition inside Iraq. In addition to withholding from the opposition
the most useful forms of assistance, the Administration has ruled out
delivering assistance to the opposition inside Iraq. Delivering such
assistance inside Iraq might violate U.N. sanctions, we are told. U.N.
sanctions cannot present a legal problem under U.S. law, inasmuch as the
Iraq Liberation Act authorizes the provision of assistance under the act
notwithstanding any other
The President
August 11, 1999
Page Three
provision of law." To find a legal problem under international law, it
is necessary to overlook the fact that the purpose of U.N. sanctions is
to weaken Saddam. It is further necessary to ignore the U.N. Security
Council resolutions, including 688 and 949, that authorize action to
protect the Kurdish and other minorities in Iraq and provide the
foundation under international law for our continued enforcement of
no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. If it does not violate
U.N. sanctions for coalition aircraft to bomb targets inside Iraq, it
should not violate sanctions to deliver munitions and other assistance
to the opposition for use against targets inside Iraq. And certainly
the delivery of non-lethal forms of assistance inside Iraq, especially
humanitarian assistance, should not violate U.N. sanctions.
*The Administration is not willing to give appropriate security
assurances to anti-Saddam Iraqis, including the Kurds and Shi'a. The
Kurdish and Shi'a population of Iraq has paid a horrible price for
resisting Saddam's rule. To provide a measure of protection to these
groups, the northern and southern no-fly zones were established in l991
and 1992. More recently, Secretary Albright extended U.S. security
assurances to the Kurds last September in order to facilitate the
reconciliation agreement between Kurdish groups. On July 7th of this
year, the Executive Council of the Iraqi National Congress asked the
Administration for additional security assurances in order to make
possible an Iraqi National Assembly meeting in northern Iraq. The
opposition did not ask for a commitment of U.S. ground forces or other
specific guarantees. Nevertheless, in a letter dated July 29th, Acting
Secretary of State Strobe Talbott rejected this request. We be1ieve
this decision should be reconsidered. The United States already is
committed to providing security for the Kurds and Shi'a of Iraq. To
specifically deny a request from the opposition for assurances that
would, in their words, "show that the United States is committed to a
change of government in Iraq" sends a dangerous signal. This sign of
irresolution can only tempt Saddam to once again move against the Kurds
and Shi'a.
We are dismayed by these developments. We do not believe, however,
that it is too late to reverse the drift in U.S. policy and regain the
momentum that our nation had last year. We respectfully propose an
action plan consisting of the following four key elements:
1. Set a deadline for the reinstitution of meaningful international
inspections of Saddam's WMD programs in the near future, while ensuring
that Saddam is not rewarded for complying with his international
obligations. Make clear that serious consequences will ensue if the
deadline is not met. This could mean, among other things, further
military action against WMD-related facilities and other targets central
to Saddam's hold on power, or expansion of the existing no-fly zones
into no-drive zones.
The President
August 11, 1999
Page Four
2. Provide enhanced security assurances to anti-Saddam Iraqis along the
lines proposed in the letter of July 7, 1999, from the Executive Council
of the Iraqi National Congress. Not only is this the right thing to do,
but it will reverse the dangerous signal that was sent by the
Administration's initial response to the July 7th letter from the
opposition.
3. Support the effort of the Iraqi National Congress to hold a National
Assembly meeting in the near future at the location of their choice,
including northern Iraq or Washington D.C. Urge other countries to send
observers as a sign of support, and facilitate their attendance.
4. Immediately begin a program of meaningful assistance to the
designated opposition groups. This must include both material
assistance and training under the Iraq Liberation Act. The opposition
has an immediate need for such items as communications equipment,
uniforms, boots, and bivouac gear. In addition, the necessary equipment
should be provided for direct broadcasting into Baghdad of FM radio and
television signals from opposition-controlled sites in northern Iraq.
Training may best be provided outside Iraq, but there is no reason not
to deliver material assistance inside Iraq. Over time, we must be
prepared to deliver both lethal military training and lethal material
assistance.
With these steps, we believe that our nation can begin to recover the
ground that has been lost since last year. We stand prepared to offer
whatever legislative support you require in order to achieve our shared
objective of promoting the emergence of a peaceful, democratic
government in Iraq.
Sincerely,
TRENT LOTT JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN
[signed] [signed]
JESSE HELMS J. ROBERT KERREY
[signed] [signed]
RICHARD C. SHELBY SAM BROWNBACK
[signed] [signed]
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN HOWARD L. BERMAN
[signed] [signed]
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