Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, FRIDAY, JUNE 25, 1999
I. STATEMENT OF BETH JONES, JUN 23
II. STATEMENT OF AHMAD CHALABI, JUN 23
III. STATEMENT OF PATRICK CLAWSON, JUN 23
IV. STATEMENT OF REND FRANCKE, JUN 23
On Wed, Jun 23, Beth Jones, Principal Deputy Ass't to the Ass't Sec
State for NEA, testified before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations, in a hearing on "US
Policy Toward Iraq: Mobilizing the Opposition." Ahmad Chalabi, of the
INC's provisional leadership council and its representative to
Washington, also testified, along with Patrick Clawson of TWI and Rend
Francke of the Iraq Foundation.
Subcommittee chairman Sen. Sam Brownback [R, KS] presided. Sen Paul
Wellstone [D, MN] also attended. Both senators were critical of
administration policy.
In response to a question from Sen. Brownback, Jones clarified the
limited nature of the US commitment to protecting Kurdish-held Northern
Iraq or to helping insure that the Iraqi opposition will be able to
operate there.
Brownback asked how firm the US commitment to protect Northern Iraq
was. Would the administration propose declaring it a no-drive zone, so
that if Saddam Hussein moved troops against the North, we would stop
them?
Jones replied that an Iraqi attack on the North was indeed a
"red-line." But she then said, "We will respond at a time and place of
our own choosing. We would like to leave that vague." In other words,
Saddam could attack in the North and the US might retaliate in the
South, as it did in Sept, 96.
Brownback replied that the US vagueness "would make me hesitate" if I
were a member of the opposition. "I would encourage the government to
be clearer. We weren't so vague in Kosovo." Brownback also suggested
that hesitancy on the administration's part would encourage hesitancy on
the part of the Iraqi opposition.
Brownback began the session by praising the recent visit to Washington
of the INC interim leadership. He described their meeting in the senate
as "excellent" and explained that the senators and the INC leadership
had held a "frank discussion about what the US needs to do." He also
said that the opposition "needs to see tangible support on the ground,"
even as he welcomed the administration's announcement that it would
begin the drawdown, called for in the ILA. He also criticized the
administration's characterization of the Iraqi opposition as the "day
after people," as an "unnecessary insult." And he asked, "The day after
what," asserting that we cannot rely on a "magical bullet" to eliminate
Saddam.
Brownback also said, "I'm interested in knowing what concrete steps
the administration will be taking to help the opposition," not just
holding conferences and providing fax machines. He suggested there was
a need for lethal aid, as well as non-lethal aid. He concluded his
opening remarks, addressing Jones, "The last time you were here you
talked about the need for being patient. We've been patient long
enough."
Jones' testimony was essentially the same as the talk that Asst Sec
State for NEA Martin Indyk gave to the Council on Foreign Relations Apr
22 [see "Iraq News," May 4] and Indyk's testimony Jun 8 to the House
Int'l Relations Committee [see "Iraq News," Jun 10].
On Jun 23, Jones said, "Our policy rests on three pillars. First, we
will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both
to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to
alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of containment.
Finally, we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as
Iraq's neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community
of nations."
On Jun 8, Indyk said, "Our policy rests on three pillars. First, as
long as he is around, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce
the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people.
Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi
people of his refusal to comply with UNSC resolutions. Finally, we will
work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's neighbors,
to change the regime in Iraq and help its new government rejoin the
community of nations."
On Apr 22, Indyk said, "Our policy rests on three pillars. First, we
will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both
to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to
alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of containment.
Finally, we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as
Iraq's neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community
of nations when the departure of Saddam Hussein makes this possible."
On Jun 23, Jones said, "Our policy of containment plus regime change
is designed to help protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from
an aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions DIMINISH the ability of
Saddam Hussein to reconstitute his military and WMD capabilities."
That marked a slight shift from Indyk, who said, Jun 8 and Apr 22,
"Our policy of containment plus regime change is designed to help
protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and
hostile regime. Sanctions PREVENT Saddam Hussein from reconstituting
his military or WMD capabilities."
On Jun 23, Jones said, "We maintain a robust force in the region,
which we have made clear we are prepared to use should Saddam cross our
well-established redlines. Those redlines include: should he try to
rebuild or deploy his weapons of mass destruction; should he strike out
at his neighbors; should he challenge allied aircraft in the no-fly
zones; or should he move against the people living in the Kurdish-
controlled areas of Northern Iraq."
On Jun 8 Indyk said, "We maintain a robust force in the region, which
we have made clear we are prepared to use should Saddam cross our
well-established redlines. Those redlines include: should he try to
rebuild his weapons of mass destruction; should he strike out at his
neighbors; should he challenge allied aircraft in the no-fly zones; or
should he move against the people living in the Kurdish-controlled areas
of Northern Iraq."
That sounds like it is a US commitment to prevent Baghdad from
attacking the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern Iraq. Yet as Jones
explained, it is really only a commitment to respond with force,
somewhere in Iraq, if Baghdad again made such a move.
Jones' statement added a paragraph to Indyk's text, clarifying the US
position in light of the UK/Dutch draft UNSC resolution. Jones said,
"As long as the current Baghdad regime is in defiance of the UNSC
resolutions, we will never allow it to regain control of Iraq's oil
revenues. They will continue to be escrowed by the UN and their uses
controlled by the UN sanctions committee. This same approach underpins
the British/Dutch draft Security Council resolution currently under
consideration in New York. The draft would allow for the suspension of
sanctions on Iraqi exports in return for full compliance by Baghdad with
a roadmap of key disarmament tasks. Imports would continue to be
controlled and effective financial controls would remain in place.
These provisions are coupled with an effective, intrusive arms control
regime that preserves UNSCOM's mandate and prerogatives."
That is at odds with what NSC adviser on the Middle East Bruce
Reidell said Jun 18, "After two years of repeated crises and broken
Iraqi promises, it is clear the inspectors cannot do their job the way
it needs to be done. Inspectors without access, without required
documents, without a cooperating partner, can only do so much. A
Potemkin inspection process is worse than no inspection process. . . .
We will not be a party to a phony arms control regime." [see "Iraq
News," Jun 22. With apologies, the correct URL for Reidell's speech is
http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/topic/intrel&f=99061803.npo&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml And the
correct URL for Clinton's Jun 17 press conference is
http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/topic/intrel&f=99061704.tpo&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml ]
Jones also said, repeating Indyk's language, "If it is to be
successful, change must come from within, from the Iraqis themselves.
In particular, the security forces and the people must stand on the same
side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically active
opposition, along [sic] the neighboring states, however, is
indispensable; the captive Iraqis need a voice. . . . Finally, there is
the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides discretionary authority to the
President to direct up to $97 million in Defense Department drawdown and
training for designated Iraqi opposition groups. We are in the process
of drawing down this account for the provision of equipment [Here,
Indyk, Jun 8, said "provision of non-lethal equipment]. Many have
called on the President to use this authority to arm the Iraqi
opposition and support armed insurrection against Saddam Hussein. We
believe such action is premature." In other words, keep the opposition
a talk shop.
Brownback responded to Jones' testimony by noting with "displeasure"
that the drawdown seemed to be intended for things like fax machines and
asked, "When will the military equipment start?"
Jones responded that the plan was to identify things that would
develop "the political outreach" of the opposition and give the Iraqi
people a "voice."
Brownback asked if the administration opposed the supply of military
equipment.
Jones responded by saying no, but we don't see an effective use for
military equipment. There are plenty of weapons in Iraq now, she said.
Brownback asked, if you see a rational use for military equipment,
would the administration support supplying it to the Iraqi opposition?
After a long pause, Jones replied, yes, but the problem was fear of
reprisals, i.e. if opposition activity stepped up against the regime,
Saddam's repression of the population would become more ruthless.
Brownback concluded his questioning on this subject by saying "I
don't understand your hesitancy" in providing arms. "There are
virtually daily press reports of unrest in Iraq. One would derive from
that that we should press forward with all means. . . . I hope you will
consider military support. This is going to have to be a first order."
The questioning then shifted to the site of the INC's forthcoming
Nat'l Assembly meeting. Brownback noted that the INC wanted to hold the
meeting in Northern Iraq and asked if the administration was prepared to
assist in that.
Jones replied that it might be wiser to have the first meeting
elsewhere, because of "security considerations" --i.e. the US is not
willing to provide a guarantee against an Iraqi attack on the North.
Brownback noted that Saddam had already outlasted one US president and
asked, "Will Saddam outlast Clinton?"
Jones replied, "I don't know."
Brownback responded, "Is the administration serious?"
Jones replied, "Yes, Frank Ricciardone (Special Coordinator for
Transition in Iraq) is hastening the end of Saddam Hussein."
Brownback concluded, "There seems to be a great hesitancy in the face
of a lot of factors that would seem to suggest faster action" is needed.
He cited 1) reports of unrest in Iraq and 2) the INC pulling together
and being prepared for a meeting in Northern Iraq. Brownback said one
would think that this is the time for more aggressiveness. But it
looked like the US was not going to act with the same aggressiveness as
we did in Kosovo in Iraq.
Sen. Wellstone's questions focused on the humanitarian situation in
Iraq. He said, "I've pressed for considering the effect of sanction on
Iraqis. Saddam Hussein doesn't care, about his people. But we should.
It is almost in our self-interest," suggesting that the US might be
running the risk of turning the Iraqi population against it.
Wellstone also said that it was "critically important" to get weapons
inspectors back into Iraq. He also said, "I think it is also very
important to have international human rights monitors" in Iraq.
Jones replied that the US was addressing the human rights issue by
funding INDICT. She also said that money had been appropriated for a
conference on Halabja. She said there were "a variety of things in
train and we would be happy to brief" you.
Wellstone replied that it was one thing to talk about past abuses,
but he wanted to prevent present and future abuses.
The second panel began with the testimony of Ahmad Chalabi. Chalabi
noted, "Last summer it was proven that Saddam had ballistic missile
warheads loaded with deadly VX nerve gas, an active biological weapons
program, and the potential for nuclear weapons in less than a year . . .
Since Operation Desert Fox, over six months ago, a virtual state of war
has existed between the United States and her allies . . . On the fifth
of this month, Iraqi Foreign Minister Sahaf formally protested to the
United Nations on behalf of Saddam, that the Iraq Liberation Act was
illegal and that relations with the Iraqi National Congress constituted
'aggression against a sovereign state.'"
Chalabi called on the US to "protect the Iraqi people from Saddam's
massive repression . . . through a large-scale program of direct
humanitarian assistance that bypasses the regime." And "broaden the
rules of engagement for US aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones over much
of Iraq to make all of Saddam's military forces targets." And "help the
Iraqi National Congress to develop an alternative to the regime and
assist us, including all the brave Iraqis fighting Saddam inside the
country." And "support the establishment of UN human rights monitors in
Iraq."
Brownback thanked Chalabi for his testimony and praised his "courage,
commitment and hard work." He said, "I am impressed with the details of
the plan you are presenting . . . and I look forward to working with
you."
Patrick Clawson then testified. Clawson said, "By publicly
identifying regime change as a policy objective, the United States has
already put its prestige on the line. From now on, the world will use a
simple test to judge the success or failure of US policy towards Iraq,
namely is Saddam still in power? . . . The policy of promoting regime
change is not one that should be done half-way: it should either be
quietly buried or put at the center of all US actions towards Iraq. And
the simple fact is that success depends on the vigor with which the
policy is pursued. . . The US government should therefore devote
vigorous effort to regime change, rather than presenting regime change
as a long-term aim-with the implication that in the short run, little
will be done to promote it. . . Support for the opposition is the
clearest expression of America's commitment to regime change . . . The
more the United States supports the opposition, the more regional
governments will be confident that Saddam will in fact go and that
therefore they can assist the opposition without facing eventual Iraqi
retaliation."
Clawson also testified, "Some see support for the opposition as the
only element necessary to achieve success in Iraq. This approach is
unrealistic. The opposition is unlikely anytime soon to create a
military force capable of defeating Saddam Husayn, even if supported
with American airpower." That seems a nod to an earlier position
articulated in "Iraq Strategy Review: Options for US Policy," (TWI,
1998).
Rend Francke then testified. Francke said, "The situation in Iraq is
more volatile now that it has been since March 1991. The Iraqi people
are resisting Saddam's rule everyday throughout the country without
external help and at enormous cost to their lives and the lives of their
families. . . Does this widespread and sustained dissent mean that a
military coup or a popular uprising is about to overturn the regime? I
don't believe so. The odds are overwhelmingly against a military coup.
Since 1991, there have been at least six verified military plots, and
rumors of many more. In every case, the plot was uncovered in its
embryonic stage through a ubiquitous system of intelligence and security
organs . . . A unified Iraqi opposition that operates inside Iraq but
outside Saddam's control is an indispensable component of an integrated
strategic solution because it can serve as the political and
organizational framework for confronting the regime of Saddam Hussein.
To be effective, such an opposition needs a credible presence inside
Iraq. . . . The United States has so far neglected the forces inside
Iraqi territory."
Brownback asked what was the most important thing the US could do to
help the Iraqi opposition. Francke replied to help the Iraqi opposition
establish a presence inside Iraq.
Brownback asked about holding the INC Nat'l Assembly meeting in
Northern Iraq and Francke endorsed the notion. Brownback said, "This
strikes me as a good idea." It would be a "bold statement."
Brownback asked Chalabi's view and he concurred. Chalabi noted that
he had been in northern Iraq until Saddam's assault on Irbil and "in
Northern Iraq we were in fact coordinating events in real time. We had
contacts with military and tribal groups opposing Saddam. This is what
has to be done."
I. STATEMENT OF BETH JONES
http://www.usia.gov/cgi-bin/washfile/display.pl?p=/products/washfile/topic/intrel&f=99062301.npo&t=/products/washfile/newsitem.shtml
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