Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IV. STATEMENT OF REND FRANCKE Statement of Rend Rahim Francke Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs June 23, 1999 Mr. Chairman, Thank you for the opportunity to speak about the situation in Iraq. I speak in my personal capacity, and not in my capacity as director of the Iraq Foundation. 1-The situation in Iraq today is closer to a boiling point that ever since March 1991 2-Classic modes of change, such as a sudden military coup, are unlikely to succeed 3-The United States can seize the opportunity and help a process of change that can lead democratization in Iraq I Mr. Chairman, Earlier this month, the official Iraqi media offered a startling insight into the situation in Iraq. The media announced that Saddam Hussein had met with senior Ba'th Party and security officials in the southern province of Basra to urge them to restore the regime's control of the city. In statements that were made public, Saddam called on his henchmen to" spare no effort in thwarting the plans of our enemies." He exhorted them to "confront the influence of hostile information", which Saddam described as "greater than the influence of bombs". He also stressed the importance of "psychological preparation before entering the next confrontation." Rarely before has Saddam admitted the threat posed by the internal opposition, or displayed his fear, or suggested that his regime's control was shaky. It was an unprecedented public admission of weakness from a man who knows he is sinking. Since the twin blows of the Iraq Liberation Act and Desert Fox, Saddam's behavior has been more desperate and his internal repression even more brutal. Simultaneously, since January this year, Iraq has seen a surge of resistance activity throughout the country, involving increasing numbers of people across the social-political spectrum. Opposition to Saddam's regime has been going on since the failure of the uprising in March 1991. However, in January this year, and in response to a particularly virulent campaign of terror in the fall, the nature of opposition activity changed. Resistance activity is no longer sporadic, confined to pockets in the southern marshes or carried out by cross-border commandos, as it has been for several years. On the contrary, today it is continuous and sustained, and striking in its frequency, tenacity and boldness. Moreover, it has spread geographically and across the social spectrum. This is an entirely new development, and needs to be noted and evaluated. In February this year, Saddam made the mistake of assassinating a prominent Shi' a cleric. Cities in southern Iraq, as well as neighborhoods in Baghdad, erupted into massive protests and armed confrontations with Saddam's paramilitary. Since then, resistance fighters have fought government troops daily, dissidents have attacked government buildings, and there have been widespread incidents of civil defiance. The dissent is not confined to the south or to the Shi'a population. In March, a group of active and retired army officers from some of the largest Sunni tribes in Iraq were plotting a revolt centered in the northern city of Kirkuk. The plot was foiled and the officers were executed. In May, a clandestine military group calling itself "the Secret Organization of Iraqi Army officers--General Command" took responsibility for attacks in Baghdad against buildings belonging to the secret services. On June 14, a car bomb exploded in a Baghdad neighborhood--not itself an unusual event. What was unusual was the fact that the bomb exploded in a solidly middle class neighborhood with a diverse population of Sunnis, Shi'a, Christians and foreigners. There are reports that the bomb exploded near a Republican Guard command post. The situation in Iraq is more volatile now that it has been since March 1991. The Iraqi people are resisting Saddam's rule everyday throughout the country, without external help and at enormous cost to their lives and the lives of their families. Thousands of men and women have died fighting or have been executed. The regime has razed villages, deported communities, and confiscated property. II Does this widespread and sustained dissent mean that a military coup or a popular uprising is about to overturn the regime? I don't believe so. The odds are overwhelming against a military coup. Since 1991, there have been at least six verified military plots, and rumors of many more. In every case, the plot was uncovered in its embryonic stage through a ubiquitous system of intelligence and security organs, or through sheer fear. Hundreds of officers are known to have been executed as a result- officers from the army, the Republican Guard, the air force, and even the Special Republican Guard closest to the presidency. It is virtually impossible to engineer a covert plan that can mature, gather momentum and proceed to a successful coup without being uncovered by Saddam and killed in its early stages. In any case, the Iraqi military is no longer a cohesive institutions with an acknowledged hierarchy, but is riddled with factionalism. Indeed, it is doubtful that any military faction can seize and hold on to power for more than a few months before being challenged by a rival faction. The obstacles facing a popular uprising were demonstrated in March 1991. The civilian resistance in the south and center of the country is geographically and operationally disconnected. Communications within the region are difficult and the leadership is dispersed. The resistance lacks a unified command and an overarching political framework. As a result, its activities are tactical rather than strategic. While this type of resistance can debilitate the regime and sap its resources, it lacks the concentrated and directed force to deal a final blow. Thus Saddam's regime survives in Iraq not because of its inherent strength but because of the organizational weakness of the opposition. There are three elements to the opposition: 1. An internal civilian resistance that engages in open confrontation with the regime at great cost, but lacks organization 2. Dissident military groups that repeatedly attempt covert coups, but fail and get executed 3. An "external opposition", which is outside the regime's control in Kurdistan or in a foreign country, that has had an uneven progress but represents a wide cross-section of Iraqi society and has organizational potential At present these elements are not integrated, and yet they are interdependent and complementary, and their integration is essential to a successful effort against Saddam's regime. We need to devise a strategy to knit these three strands together in a syncretic combination. A successful challenge to Saddam Hussein requires, first, an opposition movement with organizational capability and a unified strategy; second, inclusion of military and civilian forces inside Iraq as part of this strategy; third, an overt program that can capitalize on the regime's vulnerabilities and act as a magnet for Iraqis. Mounting such a challenge demands greater energy and boldness than an overnight military coup, but I believe it is the only viable strategy for effecting change in Iraq. A unified Iraqi opposition that operates inside Iraq but outside Saddam's control is an indispensable component of an integrated strategic solution because it can serve as the political and organizational framework for confronting the regime of Saddam Hussein. To be effective, such an opposition needs a credible presence inside Iraq, whether in Iraqi Kurdistan or other region of the country. For example, between 1992 and 1995 [sic], the Iraqi National Congress, based in Iraqi Kurdistan, was able to establish contacts with dissidents in government controlled areas and had the potential to provide such a political framework for the forces confronting the regime. That experience, while imperfect and not fully developed, can serve as a useful model. Clearly, the closer the organizational base is to the forces on the ground, the more effective it will be. III The ingredients for change are gathered in Iraq but they need to be assembled It is in the interest of the United States to help in that process by strengthening and supporting the Iraqi opposition inside and outside Iraq. The Iraqi situation was essentially frozen from 1996 to 1998, but there have been several welcome advances in the past twelve months. The Iraq Liberation Act has had a strong impact on the Iraqi situation, signaling to Iraqis an explicit American backing for an end to Saddam's dictatorship and open support for the Iraqi democracy movement. The Iraqi opposition, stagnant since Saddam's invasion of Iraqi Kurdistan in August 1996, has revived and is beginning to coalesce for future action. There is still some way to go in re-structuring and expanding the opposition umbrella, but I believe this process can be successful. Finally, the Kurdish parties are being encouraged by the US Administration to restore normal relations and conditions to the northern region under their control and participate as fiill-fledged partners in the Iraqi opposition. But the momentum established by these steps has to be maintained and developed with more political, diplomatic and logistical support from the US. If the momentum slackens, there will be renewed disappointment and a return to stagnation, precisely at a time when the internal situation in Iraq is critical and requires resolute movement. Moreover, these steps have only targeted the "external opposition". Support is also needed by those daily fighting the regime inside Iraq, and some linkage has to be established between work outside and work within Iraq. Judging from the evidence, the United States has so far neglected the forces inside Iraqi territory. I recognize that supporting the resistance within Iraq is more complicated and entails more risks than supporting the external opposition, but ultimately it is this domestic resistance, both civilian and military, which carries the responsibility for confronting the regime and also bears the consequences its repression and terror. Iraqis involved with the resistance often ask these questions: -Will the United States support the resistance groups inside Iraq? -Will the US protect territory liberated from Saddam's control in the south and center of the country? -Why is the United States silent on providing protection for Iraqis in the south and the center, who are being killed by the regime's paramilitary troops and executed in its jails? These questions are germane to the issue of how we want to confront Saddam Hussein. I believe the United States should address these questions squarely because the answers will be inseparable from the way we envisage the process of change in Iraq. Finally, I would like to stress that for thirty years the Iraqi people have suffered under Saddam's brutality, compounded for the past nine years by the deprivations of stringent international sanctions. They feel that their dual suffering has received only lip-service from the world, which has abandoned them and let them down. Helping Iraqis is not only in the geo-political interest of the United States, but also a moral imperative.
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