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23 June 1999

TEXT: STATE DEPARTMENT'S JONES ON IRAQ POLICY AT SENATE HEARING

(Arming Iraqi opposition "premature"; US supporting UK-Dutch
resolution) (2710)
Washington -- Beth Jones, principal deputy assistant secretary of
state for Near Eastern Affairs, reiterated the Administration's Iraq
policy before the Senate Foreign Relations Near East and South Asia
subcommittee June 23.
"As long as the current Baghdad regime is in defiance of the UNSC
(United Nations Security Council) resolutions, we will never allow it
to regain control of Iraq's oil revenues," Jones stated, referring to
the ongoing debate in the Security Council over whether or not to ease
sanctions on Iraq.
"Though there are some aspects of the draft which we will seek to
improve in the course of Council discussions, we support the
British/Dutch draft because it meets our bottom line criteria: real
arms control; expansion of the oil-for-food program on the basis of
humanitarian need; insistence on a standard of full Iraqi compliance
for action on sanctions; and denial of oil revenues to the regime.
This is a tough, credible package that deserves Council support."
Turning to the Iraqi opposition, whose interim leadership visited
Washington late last month, Jones said: "If it is to be successful,
change must come from within, from the Iraqis themselves. In
particular, the security forces and the people must stand on the same
side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including the politically active
opposition, along with neighboring states, however, is indispensable:
the captive Iraqis need a voice."
Jones also said that the call to arm the Iraqi opposition now is
"premature. There are a host of issues that must be resolved before we
can have confidence that providing arms to the Iraqi opposition would
advance our objectives of promoting a change of regime and not just
lead to more Iraqis being killed unnecessarily. One requirement is a
credible, broad-based, Iraqi political umbrella movement that can
authoritatively articulate a future vision for those Iraqis who now
lack a voice in their own fate."
Before Jones spoke, Subcommittee Chairman Sam Brownback, a Republican
from Kansas, expressed some impatience with the effort to remove
Saddam Hussein from power.
"We need to get moving," he said. "I don't want Saddam to outlast
another American president."
At the same time, Brownback expressed satisfaction with the members of
the Iraqi opposition. They had visited lawmakers during their stay in
Washington.
"I was encouraged to see them unified with a single message," he said.
Following is the text of DAS Jones' remarks:
(begin text)
Written Statement of A. Elizabeth Jones
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
Department of State 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia Affairs
June 23, 1999
I am pleased to appear before you this morning to discuss US policy
towards Iraq.
Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, remains dangerous, unreconstructed and
defiant. We have come to the conclusion, after more than eight years
of effort at seeking Saddam's compliance with UN Security Council
resolutions, that his regime will never be able to be rehabilitated or
reintegrated into the community of nations. This conclusion is based
on what Saddam's record makes manifest -- that he will never
relinquish what remains of his WMD (weapons of mass destruction)
arsenal, and that he will never cease being a threat to the region,
U.S. interests, and his own people. It is based on Saddam's policies,
not on any predetermined policy of our own. Thus, in November of last
year, President Clinton announced a new policy with regard to Iraq:
henceforth, we would contain Saddam Hussein while we sought a new
regime to govern in Baghdad. The President committed the United States
to support those Iraqis -- inside and outside Iraq -- who seek a new
government and a better future for all the people of Iraq.
Eight years after the Gulf War and Saddam's persistent defiance of the
international community, we are under no illusions that Iraq under
Saddam Hussein will comply with UNSC (United Nations Security Council)
resolutions on disarmament, human rights, accounting for POW's and the
return of stolen property.
In view of this reality, our policy rests on three pillars. First, as
long as he is around, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to
reduce the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi
people. Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the
Iraqi people of his refusal to comply with UNSC resolutions. Finally,
we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's
neighbors, to change the regime in Iraq and help its new government
rejoin the community of nations.
Our policy of containment plus regime change is designed to help
protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and
hostile regime. Sanctions diminish the ability of Saddam Hussein to
reconstitute his military and WMD capabilities. Operations Northern
and Southern Watch deter Saddam from using his air force against the
civilian populations north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd.
We maintain a robust force in the region, which we have made clear we
are prepared to use should Saddam cross our well-established redlines.
Those redlines include: should he try to rebuild or deploy his weapons
of mass destruction; should he strike out at his neighbors; should he
challenge allied aircraft in the no-fly zones; or should he move
against the people living in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern
Iraq.
Let me be particularly clear on this point: the United States is
concerned for the protection of all Iraqis against the repression of
the Baghdad regime. Besides those new living in relative safety in
parts of northern Iraq, the world should not forget that Iraqi Shiites
in the south, tribal Sunni Arabs in the west and center, the Turkomans
and Assyrians, and even Tikritis themselves continue to suffer
Baghdad's daily repression. Hence, we believe that the world community
should tolerate no backsliding from Baghdad's obligations under any of
the UNSC resolutions intended to protect the people of Iraq and its
neighbors from the depredations of the current Baghdad regime. In
particular, UNSC resolution 688 twice cited the consequences of
Baghdad's repression of the Iraqi civilian population as a threat to
international peace and security. It therefore demanded not only that
Baghdad "immediately end this repression," but it also insisted that
Baghdad give "immediate access by international humanitarian
organizations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of
Iraq." Baghdad is in flagrant violation of this UNSC resolution, as it
is of so many others.
We are committed to maintaining UNSC controls on the Iraqi regime,
while lifting the burden of sanctions off the backs of the Iraqi
people through the expansion and streamlining of the oil-for-food
program.
This humanitarian relief program is the second pillar of our policy.
Sanctions were never directed against the humanitarian needs of the
Iraqi people. In fact, food and medicine are specifically exempt from
sanctions. Iraq has always been free to buy and import these goods,
but Saddam Hussein has long chosen not to do so in order to manipulate
public opinion by deliberately causing the suffering of his own
citizens. Our response has been first to establish, and then to
expand, the oil-for-food program, which provides a mechanism for the
United Nations to control the use of revenues from the sale of Iraqi
oil for the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people.
Despite interference by the regime, the oil-for-food program has
ensured that the people of Iraq receive the food and medicine, which
their own government denies them.
There is a fundamental principle at work here. As long as the current
Baghdad regime is in defiance of the UNSC resolutions, we will never
allow it to regain control of Iraq's oil revenues. They will continue
to be escrowed by the UN and their uses controlled by the UN sanctions
committee. This same approach underpins the British/Dutch draft
Security Council resolution currently under consideration in New York.
The draft would allow for the suspension of sanctions on Iraqi exports
in return for full compliance by Baghdad with a roadmap of key
disarmament tasks. Imports would continue to be controlled and
effective financial controls would remain in place. These provisions
are coupled with an effective, intrusive arms control regime that
preserves UNSCOM's mandate and prerogatives. Though there are some
aspects of the draft which we will seek to improve in the course of
Council discussions, we support the British/Dutch draft because it
meets our bottom line criteria: real arms control; expansion of the
oil-for-food program on the basis of humanitarian need; insistence on
a standard of full Iraqi compliance for action on sanctions; and
denial of oil revenues to the regime. This is a tough, credible
package that deserves Council support.
Although effective, the containment element of our policy has its
costs. As we have seen repeatedly since 1991, even a contained Iraq
under its current leadership remains a threat both to the stability of
the region and to the welfare of the Iraqi people. Both are paying too
high a price for Saddam's continued rule. In our judgment, both
urgently deserve better. It is past time for Saddam to go.
For these reasons, President Clinton announced in November that the
United States would work with the Iraqi people toward a government in
Iraq which is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors and respect
the rights of its people. We are fully committed to supporting the
Iraqi people in bringing this about. In pursuit of this objective, the
United States will adhere to two important principles: one, we will
uphold the territorial integrity of Iraq; and two, we will not seek to
impose from the outside a particular government or leaders on the
people of Iraq. We do support a change of government that will be
responsive to the aspirations of the Iraqi people -- one that takes
meaningful steps toward a democratic future for the country and can
represent fairly the concerns of all of Iraq's communities. And we
will work with a new Iraqi government, as it pledges to fulfill its
international obligations, to lift the sanctions, to deal with the
large debt burden, and to reintegrate Iraq into the international
community.
If it is to be successful, change must come from within, from the
Iraqis themselves. In particular, the security forces and the people
must stand on the same side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including
the politically active opposition, along with neighboring states,
however, is indispensable: the captive Iraqis need a voice. And, in
particular, the internal Iraqi resistance needs a voice, through the
Iraqi Opposition living in freedom, to make clear to all Iraqis and to
the world its aims. The Iraqi National Congress has described these
resistance aims to us as: first, to bring the security forces to the
side of the people in changing the regime; and second, after the
current regime passes, to stand with all Iraqis in promoting
reconciliation and reconstruction. Our approach is to work in an
intensive and coordinated way with these Iraqis and other countries
that support these aspirations of the Iraqi people.
Free Iraqis -- those in exile and those who live in relative freedom
in northern
Iraq -- bear a special responsibility to develop a coherent vision for
a brighter future. They must take the lead in developing and promoting
an alternative vision based on the restoration of civil society, the
rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of a new role for Iraq as
a force for peace and reconciliation in the region. They can also play
an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam, in helping to build the
case for his prosecution as a war criminal, and in getting the truth
into and out of Iraq. And, as Iraqis committed to a future vision of
Iraq that appeals to Iraqis inside and to Iraq's neighbors, they can
best build the case for the support of regional states to channel more
material assistance to the Iraqi people and their resistance elements.
Congress has provided the Administration with a number of important
tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a better future for
Iraq. These include earmarks of $8 million in existing Economic
Support Funds. We are using these funds to strengthen Opposition
political unity, to support the Iraq war crimes initiative, to support
humanitarian programs and the development of civil society, and for
activities inside Iraq.
We also have established and recently stepped up broadcasting hours
for Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and broadcasts daily
in Arabic uncensored news and information to the Iraqi people.
We have named a Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Francis
Ricciardone, who is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone has
already had considerable success in helping disparate opposition
groups work together and elect a new interim leadership that right now
is preparing the way for an Iraqi opposition conference aimed at
achieving a broader participation and more effective program of
activity. Last month, Secretary Albright met with an Iraqi delegation,
including the INC interim leadership and prominent independents, to
underscore the Administration's support for their efforts. We know
they were warmly received on the Hill as well.
Since then Mr. Ricciardone has worked further with the INC on their
plans for the opposition conference and has also consulted intensively
with regional states on how best to promote our shared interests in
the reintegration of Iraq to the world community under a government
that will act responsibly both internally and externally.
We have also made progress working with the two major Kurdish factions
in the North, the PUK and the KDP, to help them reconcile their
differences and better provide for all the people of northern Iraq.
Just last week, leading members of both groups came to Washington for
talks aimed at strengthening the reconciliation process. The two major
Kurdish leaders, the Turkomans, and other groups from Northern Iraq,
have played a very positive role in reunifying and reviving the Iraqi
National Congress. This portends well for the contribution the Kurds,
Turkomans, Assyrians, and Arabs of the North must also make in
reunifying and rebuilding Iraq when a new leadership in Baghdad makes
this possible.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides
discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97 million
in Defense Department drawdown and training for designated Iraqi
opposition groups. We are in the process of drawing down this account
for the provision of equipment and training to the opposition.
Many have called on the President to use this authority to arm the
Iraqi opposition and support armed insurrection against Saddam
Hussein. We believe such action is premature. There are a host of
issues that must be resolved before we can have confidence that
providing arms to the Iraqi opposition would advance our objectives of
promoting a change of regime and not just lead to more re Iraqis being
killed unnecessarily. One requirement is a credible, broad-based,
Iraqi political umbrella movement that can authoritatively articulate
a future vision for those Iraqis who now lack a voice in their own
fate. Such a movement is indispensable to reassure those few Iraqis
now supporting Saddam Hussein that there is no future for them or Iraq
under his regime while there is a bright future afterwards, even for
them. Hence, the first kinds of support which we aim to provide to the
Iraqi Opposition under the drawdown will be to meet their most urgent
requirements: equipment for the infrastructure vital to the
effectiveness of an international political advocacy movement;
broadcasting equipment; and training in "civil affairs," including
disaster relief operations. Further kinds of material assistance to
the Iraqi opposition can be provided when they can best be absorbed
and exploited.
To channel substantial assistance to those resisting Saddam's
oppression inside Iraq, we will need the cooperation of Iraq's
neighbors. Although they all share and support the Iraqi people's
longing for a change of regime in Baghdad, they have strong views
about how we can help the Iraqi people reach this goal. We must take
those views into account, and gain their cooperation in promoting the
recovery of Iraq as a good neighbor and contributor to regional
stability.