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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

QUESTION: I was wondering about the US position on Iraq and on sanctions. The President made a little statement but - and of course you know things have been going on at the UN.

MR. FOLEY: Right.

QUESTION: What's the thinking here - that you couldn't hold the fort against the rest of the world, or has your attitude about Iraq changed and you find him not as bad as he used to be?

MR. FOLEY: No, not at all, Barry. I think I will give you a detailed answer in terms of what's happening at the UN, especially in regard to the text that the Netherlands and the UK have circulated. But the fundamental answer that I wish to give is that we haven't changed neither our policy nor our attitude towards the Iraqi regime in any way whatsoever. In other words, it's based on a fundamental lack of trust in the intentions and in the performance of the Iraqi regime. So what we would like to see happen is that the inspection regime be in a position to go back and do its job of disarming Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction programs. And so any step that we might consider approving would be based completely on Iraqi performance in this regard; in other words, the success of actual disarmament would be the predicate to any adjustment in sanctions. So it's not putting the cart before the horse in any way; and on that fundamental point, our policy remains unchanged.

To give you, though, a detailed update as to where we are, in mid-April the Netherlands and the United Kingdom jointly circulated ideas for a resolution incorporating key suggestions of the three Iraq assessment panels. This week, Council members are discussing the latest updated proposals for a possible resolution. Those discussions are ongoing.

The Dutch-UK proposals are drawing increasing Council support as the right overall approach on Iraq. Generally speaking, we are pleased with the proposal and can support most of it, although we have some problems with parts of it. We have not made a decision to cosponsor any draft, but we're working to insure that any resolution reflects US priorities.

What are those priorities? First, Iraq must comply with its obligations under all existing resolutions. Second, we want to see the arms inspection teams back on the ground in Iraq implementing a robust, effective arms control regime. Third, the United States will not accept any suspension or lifting of sanctions in the absence of Iraqi full compliance. That's the fundamental point I was making at the beginning. Finally, given the Iraq regime's extraordinary record of defying international norms and threatening regional peace and security, the United States will not accept any outcome which would give Saddam Hussein control of Iraq's oil revenues as long as he is in defiance of Security Council resolutions. So those are the fundamental points that guide our thinking as we look at the UK-Netherlands draft.

As you know, there are other resolutions being circulated. The Russian-Chinese and the French drafts, in our view, share two flaws that make them unacceptable to us. Both would have the effect of diminishing the effectiveness of the UN disarmament effort in Iraq and would reward Iraq prior, prior, to Iraq's having completed existing UN Security Council demands for disarmament.

QUESTION: There are things in parts of the resolution that you don't agree with. How do you explain - or can you try to explain - the division between the United States and its best friend, Britain, on this subject? The two of you have stood together against, sometimes, the French and certainly against the Chinese and the Russians. And now the British have parted company part of the way, no?

MR. FOLEY: I think what is true is that the British - and we support this - are trying to find a way forward out of the current impasse in which we don't currently have inspectors on the ground doing their job of seeking to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. That's an important objective which is not happening right now. The question is how do we move forward? Do we move forward towards a robust, effective inspections regime, rewarding Iraq prior to its having satisfied the requirements of Security Council resolutions - i.e., disclosing all information about its weapons of mass destruction programs, allowing for the destruction of its weapons of mass destruction? Do we accept some sort of mechanism to move forward, rewarding Iraq prior to its meeting those terms? No, in the view of the United States. And that is not what the UK-Netherlands resolution is about.

We may have continuing work, in our view, to do around the edges. But on the fundamental point, as I understand it, the UK-Netherlands text calls for partial suspension of sanctions following Iraqi compliance with disarmament requirements; not merely Iraq's agreeing that a disarmament regime will go forward or will be present in the country. No, it's predicated on Iraq actually meeting the outstanding obligations that exist. In that fundamental respect, we're supportive of such a mechanism; in other words, a disarmament team of inspectors going back in there, doing their job and then, on the basis of actual performance, considering the possibility of sanctions suspension.

But there's another fundamental point, again, as I understand it, in the UK-Netherlands text which means that in terms of revenues, that Iraq's purchases will still be escrowed and, therefore, under the control of the United Nations. In other words, we're not going to be in a position of trusting that Iraq will not be purchasing weapons material or other unacceptable items that would escape the scrutiny of the international community. That's another fundamental point of agreement between the United States and the sponsors of this resolution, another point that separates us from some others on the Security Council.

So I really don't see any change in the United States' position.

QUESTION: I was just going to ask a follow-up on Iraq, generally. If the State Department feels like the Iraqis should take, as an object lesson, the extremely successful air campaign that was waged in Serbia, and see that air campaign as possibly more acceptable now to the Middle East allies of the United States? Basically what I'm asking is should Iraq be more compliant, based on that air campaign in Serbia?

MR. FOLEY: That's an interesting question -- kind of a philosophical question. And, of course, it's hard to read into the mind of a dictator like Saddam Hussein, who often seems to act against his own country's interests, if not his own personal interest, at critical points. Certainly the contrary would have been true, had NATO and the United States failed to respond to Saddam Hussein's campaign of ethnic cleansing, or had we failed to succeed in our response to his campaign of ethnic cleansing. I think it's indisputable that that would have sent a very unhelpful message to would-be ethnic cleansers and dictators like Saddam Hussein who threaten their neighbors and are developing programs of weapons of mass destruction. That would have been a very unhelpful message. So I don't think Saddam Hussein can take any comfort whatsoever in the robust and successful response of the United States and NATO in the Balkans in the last few months.

But I would hesitate to draw specific conclusions as to what Saddam Hussein may or may not do in the future. That's why we remain utterly vigilant in terms of our military deployments. You've seen, obviously, ever since Operation Desert Fox, continued Iraqi attempts to challenge the no-fly zone, and equally consistent responses, effective, robust military responses on our part.

QUESTION: Yesterday in an interview, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Mr. Ecevit --

MR. FOLEY: I will have to come back to you.

QUESTION: You mentioned - I didn't quite get the two points that the US objected to in the UK-Netherlands draft. There was the - you said --

MR. FOLEY: I didn't spell them out; and I don't have that. As I understand it, they're not fundamental points. I mean, the fundamental points are, in response to Barry's question, we want to -

QUESTION: You want it escrowed -

MR. FOLEY: The escrow is one. So control over Iraq's purchases. Secondly, effective arms inspections. In other words, not merely arms inspections, but the ability of the arms inspectors to certify that Iraq has actually complied with its obligations.

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(The briefing concluded at 2:15 P.M.)

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