Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, JUNE 11, 1999
I. MARTIN INDYK STATEMENT, HOUSE INT'L RELATIONS COMMITTEE, JUN 8
The hearing, scheduled yesterday, of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on "US
policy toward Iraq and Mobilizing the Opposition," in which Asst Sec
State for NEA, Martin Indyk, was to testify, was canceled at the last
minute.
But Indyk testified Jun 8 to the House Int'l Relations Committee on
the Middle East generally, including Iraq. His statement was
essentially the same as his Apr 22 statement to the Council on Foreign
Relations [see "Iraq News," May 4].
On Jun 8, Indyk said, "Our policy rests on three pillars. First, as
long as he is around, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce
the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people.
Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi
people of his refusal to comply with UNSC resolutions. Finally, we will
work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's neighbors,
to change the regime in Iraq and help its new government rejoin the
community of nations."
On Apr 22, Indyk said, "Our policy rests on three pillars. First, we
will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce the threat he poses both
to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people. Second, we will seek to
alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi people of containment.
Finally, we will work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as
Iraq's neighbors, to help a stable, peaceful Iraq rejoin the community
of nations when the departure of Saddam Hussein makes this possible."
On Jun 8, Indyk said, "Our policy of containment plus regime change
is designed to protect the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an
aggressive and hostile regime. Sanctions prevent Saddam Hussein from
reconstituting his military or WMD capabilities."
On Apr 22, Indyk said, "Our containment policy is designed to protect
the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile
regime. Sanctions prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his
military or WMD capabilities."
How do sanctions prevent Saddam from reconstituting his WMD
capabilities, as "Iraq News," May 4 asked? Notably, Indyk said nothing
about restoring UNSCOM or even a modified UNSCOM to Iraq. "Iraq News"
believes that that is no longer a US goal. Rather, as Indyk explained,
"We maintain a robust force in the region, which we have made clear we
are prepared to use should Saddam cross our well-established red lines.
Those red lines include: should he try to rebuild his weapons of mass
destruction; should he strike out at his neighbors; should he challenge
allied aircraft in the no-fly zones; or should he move against the
people living in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern Iraq."
In other words, if Saddam tries to reconstitute his proscribed
weapons; and if the US learns about it; and if the US can persuade those
countries whose cooperation it would need, like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait;
then the US would bomb Iraq. That doesn't seem to leave a role for
UNSCOM.
Indyk's Jun 8 statement did include new lines not in his Apr 22
statement, above all reference to UNSCR 688 and the suggestion that the
US was concerned about the fate of Iraq's Shiite Arab population as well
as the Kurds.
Indyk said, Jun 8, "Let me be particularly clear on this point: the
United States is concerned for the protection of all Iraqis against the
repression of the Baghdad regime. Hence, we believe that the world
community should tolerate no backsliding from Baghdad's obligations
under any of the UNSC resolutions intended to protect the people of Iraq
and its neighbors from the depredations of the current Baghdad regime.
In particular, UNSC resolution 688 twice cited the consequences of
Baghdad's repression of the Iraqi civilian population as a threat to
international peace and security. It therefore demanded not only that
Baghdad 'immediately end this repression.' Baghdad is in flagrant
violation of this UNSC resolution, as it is of so many others."
The question of providing some protection for the residents of
southern Iraq beyond enforcing the no-fly zones, arose during the recent
Iraqi opposition visit to Washington. The opposition suggested that the
US/UK rules of engagement should be expanded beyond permitting attacks
on Iraqi air defense sites to include allowing US pilots to strike
concentrations of Iraqi forces involved in suppressing the population, a
particular concern if stepped-up opposition activity were to lead the
regime to take harsher measures against the population. And since that
was just done in Kosovo, one wonders why that cannot be done in Iraq.
Indyk also said, Jun 8, "If it is to be successful, change must come
from within, from the Iraqis themselves. . . . The support of Iraqi
exiles, including the politically active opposition, along with
neighboring states, however is indispensable: the captive Iraqis need a
voice." In other words, US policy is still to keep the opposition a
talk shop.
As Indyk said, both Jun 8 and Apr 22, "Many have called on the
President to use this authority [the Iraq Liberation Act] to arm the
Iraqi opposition and support military action against Saddam Hussein. We
believe such action is premature."
But the administration has no answer to the threat posed by Saddam
without UNSCOM. And perhaps, the most shocking aspect of this all has
been the silence in Israel. The Forward, May 28, questioned Benjamin
Netanyahu's foreign policy advisor, Uzi Arad. "Mr. Arad defended
Israel's low profile on Iraqi issues during the tenure of Mr. Netanyahu.
'Saying things publicly would have been counterproductive,' Mr. Arad
said. 'It doesn't mean it wasn't viewed with the utmost seriousness.'
Mr. Arad backed off from fully supporting the Iraq Liberation Act. 'This
is American policy. We have an interest in seeing the threat removed.'"
But it is unclear why the Netanyahu Gov't thought that speaking
publicly about the Iraq threat would have been counterproductive. And
how, given that the Clinton administration was not handling the Iraq
threat properly, did the Netanyahu Gov't think the problem would be
addressed? That is particularly so, as over an entire year--from Nov
97, when Baghdad's assault on UNSCOM began, until Dec 98, when it
culminated in UNSCOM's departure from Iraq--the Israeli Gov't said
virtually nothing publicly about the danger.
I. MARTIN INDYK STATEMENT, HOUSE INT'L RELATIONS COMMITTEE
Written Statement of Martin S. Indyk
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
Department of State
House International Relations Committee
June 8, 1999
[Section on Iraq]
Eight years after the Gulf War and Saddam's persistent defiance of the
international community, we are under no illusions that Iraq under
Saddam Hussein will comply with UNSC resolutions on disarmament, human
rights, accounting for POW's and the return of stolen property.
In view of this reality, our policy rests on three pillars. First, as
long as he is around, we will contain Saddam Hussein in order to reduce
the threat he poses both to Iraq's neighbors and to the Iraqi people.
Second, we will seek to alleviate the humanitarian cost to the Iraqi
people of his refusal to comply with UNSC resolutions. Finally, we will
work with forces inside and outside Iraq, as well as Iraq's neighbors,
to change the regime in Iraq and help its new government rejoin the
community of nations.
Our policy of containment plus regime change is designed to protect
the citizens of Iraq and its neighbors from an aggressive and hostile
regime. Sanctions prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his
military or WMD capabilities. Operations Northern and Southern Watch
prevent Saddam from using his air force against the civilian populations
north of the 36th parallel and south of the 33rd. We maintain a robust
force in the region, which we have made clear we are prepared to use
should Saddam cross our well-established redlines. Those redlines
include: should he try to rebuild his weapons of mass destruction;
should he strike out at his neighbors; should he challenge allied
aircraft in the no-fly zones; or should he move against the people
living in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Northern Iraq.
Let me be particularly clear on this point: the United States is
concerned for the protection of all Iraqis against the repression of the
Baghdad regime. Hence, we believe that the world community should
tolerate no backsliding from Baghdad's obligations under any of the UNSC
resolutions intended to protect the people of Iraq and its neighbors
from the depredations of the current Baghdad regime. In particular, UNSC
resolution 688 twice cited the consequences of Baghdad's repression of
the Iraqi civilian population as a threat to international peace and
security. It therefore demanded not only that Baghdad "immediately end
this repression." Baghdad is in flagrant violation of this UNSC
resolution, as it is of so many others.
We are committed to maintaining UNSC sanctions against the Iraqi
regime, while lifting the burden of sanctions off the backs of the Iraqi
people through the expansion and streamlining of the oil-for-food
program.
This humanitarian relief program is the second pillar of our policy.
Sanctions were never directed against the humanitarian needs of the
Iraqi people. In fact, food and medicine are specifically exempt from
sanctions. Iraq has always been free to buy and import these goods, but
Saddam Hussein has long chosen not to do so in order to manipulate
public opinion by deliberately causing the suffering of his own
citizens. Our response has been to first establish, and then expand the
oil-for-food program, which provides a mechanism for the international
community to control the use of revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil for
the purchase of humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people. Despite
interference by the regime, the oil-for-food program has ensured that
the people of Iraq receive the food and medicine, which their own
government denies them. There is a fundamental principle at work here.
As long as the current Baghdad regime is in defiance of the UNSC
resolutions, we will never allow him to regain control of Iraq's oil
revenues. They will continue to be escrowed by the UN and their uses
controlled by the UN sanctions committee.
Although effective, containment has its costs. As we have seen
repeatedly since 1991, even a contained Iraq under its current
leadership remains a threat both to the stability of the region and to
the welfare of the Iraqi people. Both are paying too high a price for
Saddam's continued rule. In our judgment, both urgently deserve better.
It is past time for Saddam to go.
For these reasons, President Clinton announced in November that the
United States would work with the Iraqi people toward a government in
Iraq which is prepared to live in peace with its neighbors and respect
the rights of its people. We are fully committed to supporting the Iraqi
people in bringing this about. In pursuit of this objective, the United
States will adhere to two important principles: one, we will uphold the
territorial integrity of Iraq; and two, we will not seek to impose from
the outside a particular government or leaders on the people of Iraq. We
do support a change of government that will be responsive to the
aspirations of the Iraqi people -- one that takes meaningful steps
toward a democratic future for the country and can represent fairly the
concerns of all of Iraq's communities. And we will work with a new Iraqi
government, as it pledges to fulfill its international obligations, to
lift the sanctions, to deal with the large debt burden, and to
reintegrate Iraq into the international community.
If it is to be successful, change must come from within, from the
Iraqis themselves. In particular, the security forces and the people
must stand on the same side. The support of Iraqi exiles, including the
politically active opposition, along with neighboring states, however,
is indispensable: the captive Iraqis need a voice. And, in particular,
the internal Iraqi resistance needs a voice, through the Iraqi
Opposition living in freedom, to make clear to all Iraqis and to the
world its aims. The Iraqi National Congress has described these
resistance aims to us as: first, to bring the security forces to the
side of the people in changing the regime; and second, after the current
regime passes, to stand with all Iraqis in promoting reconciliation and
reconstruction. Our approach is to work in an intensive and coordinated
way with these Iraqis and other countries that support these aspirations
of the Iraqi people.
Free Iraqis -- those in exile and those who live in relative freedom
in northern Iraq - bear a special responsibility to develop a coherent
vision for a brighter future. They must take the lead in developing
and promoting an alternative vision based on the restoration of civil
society, the rebuilding of the economy, and the promotion of a new role
for Iraq as a force for peace and reconciliation in the region.
They can also play an effective role in delegitimizing Saddam, in
helping to build the case for his prosecution as a war criminal, and in
getting the truth into and out of Iraq. And, as Iraqis committed to
a future vision of Iraq that appeals to Iraqis inside and to Iraq's
neighbors, they can best build the case for the support of regional
states to channel more material assistance to the Iraqi people and their
resistance elements.
Congress has provided the Administration with a number of important
tools to support Iraqis who are working toward a better future for Iraq.
These include earmarks of $8 million in existing Economic
Support Funds. We are using these funds to strengthen opposition
political unity, to support the Iraq war crimes initiative, to support
humanitarian programs and the development of civil society, and for
activities inside Iraq.
We also have established and recently stepped up broadcasting hours
for Radio Free Iraq, which operates independently and broadcasts daily
in Arabic uncensored news and information to the Iraqi people.
We have named a Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq, Francis
Ricciardone, who is managing the overall effort. Mr. Ricciardone has
already had considerable success in helping disparate opposition groups
work together and elect a new interim leadership that right now is
preparing the way for an Iraqi opposition conference that will have as
broad participation as possible. He also is consulting intensively with
regional states on how best to promote our shared interests in the
reintegration of Iraq to the world community under a government that
will act responsibly both internally and externally.
We have also made progress working with the two major Kurdish
factions in the North, the PUK and the KDP, to help them reconcile their
differences and better provide for all the people of northern Iraq.
The two major Kurdish leaders, and other groups from Northern Iraq,
have played a very positive role in reunifying and reviving the Iraqi
National Congress. This portends well for the contribution the Kurds,
Turcomans, Assyrians, and Arabs of the North must also make in
reunifying and rebuilding Iraq when a new leadership in Baghdad makes
this possible.
Finally, there is the Iraq Liberation Act, which provides
discretionary authority to the President to direct up to $97 million in
Defense Department drawdown and training for designated Iraqi opposition
groups. We have now begun drawing down this account for the provision of
non-lethal supplies to the opposition.
Many have called on the President to use this authority to arm the
Iraqi opposition and support military action against Saddam Hussein.
We believe such action is premature. There are a host of issues that
must be resolved before such equipment and training could be provided
with confidence that it would advance our objectives of promoting a
change of regime and not just lead to more Iraqis being killed
unnecessarily. One requirement is a credible, broad-based, Iraqi
political umbrella movement, based on consensus, that can
authoritatively articulate a future vision for those Iraqis who now lack
a voice in their own fate. Hence, the first kinds of support which we
will provide to the Iraqi Opposition under the drawdown will be to meet
their most urgent requirements: equipment for the infrastructure vital
to the effectiveness of an international political advocacy movement;
broadcasting equipment; and training in "civil affairs." Further kinds
of material assistance to the Iraqi opposition can be provided when they
can best be absorbed and exploited.
To channel substantial assistance to those resisting Saddam's
oppression inside Iraq, we will need the cooperation of Iraq's
neighbors. Although they all share and support the Iraqi people's
longing for a change of regime in Baghdad, they have strong views about
how we can help the Iraqi people reach this goal. We must take those
views into account, and gain their cooperation in promoting the recovery
of Iraq as a good neighbor and contributor to regional stability.
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