Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1999
I. SAUDIS CONCERNED IRAQ REBUILDING WEAPONS, WASH TIMES, JUN 8
II. DESERT FOX FAILURE IF IRAQ REBUILDS WEAPONS, HAARETZ, DEC 21 98
III. JERSUALEM POST EDITORS, FINISH THE JOB, DEC 21, 98
IV. HAARETZ EDITORS, THE THREAT REMAINS, DEC 21, 98
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs, will hold a hearing on "US policy toward Iraq
and mobilizing the opposition," according to its press release,
yesterday. Sen. Sam Brownback will preside. Asst Sec State for NEA,
Martin Indyk, will testify. The hearing will be Jun 10, 10:00 AM, in
SD-562.
"America's Most Wanted," Saturday evening, is scheduled to include a
segment on the May 26 murder of the Iraqi-American family in McLean, Va.
Iraqi challenges to the no-fly zones continue almost daily, along
with limited US/UK bombing in response. Otherwise, Baghdad is quiet,
even as it has been nearly six months-just a week shy-since UNSCOM/the
IAEA left Iraq. The consensus of informed, expert opinion is that,
among other things, Iraq is using the time to acquire fissile material
for a nuclear bomb, or at least is trying very hard to obtain it.
The Wash Times, yesterday, reported, "The Saudi Arabian crown prince
days after Operation Desert Fox ended, warned President Clinton in a
private letter that the December bombing had made Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein stronger internationally and divided the old Persian Gulf war
coalition. . . . In his Jan. 4 letter, the crown prince wrote that the
strikes 'may have achieved the objectives in curtailing Saddam Hussein's
ability to threaten his neighbors . . . However, it did not totally
eliminate such [a] threat. It created a situation of sympathy with the
Iraqi regime that Saddam Hussein can use to achieve his objectives, and
it has also fissured the international position which could lead Saddam
to achieve additional challenges, threats, and coercion of the Arab and
Muslim world towards the West in general and the United States in
particular . . . To rectify this situation, we must adopt a strategy
that can prevent Saddam Hussein from taking advantage of his position
whereby he will rebuild his military arsenal in the absence of the
international inspection teams or continue to threaten the security and
safety of his neighbors.'"
The Wash Times also reported that Operation Desert Fox "received
less-than-positive reviews from some military officers, who said only
limited damage was done and that the United States lost any chance of
ever getting back UN weapons inspectors into Iraq."
It is worth recalling that the Israeli response at roughly the same
time was similar. Haaretz, Dec 21, reported, "Even if Iraqi military
facilities sustained severe damage in the four days of bombing by
American and British forces, there is still no sign that Iraq's weapons
of mass destruction were hit. The sanctions imposed on Baghdad will
undoubtedly continue, but it is unlikely that the UN inspections will be
renewed at a serious level. In short, the end result is that Saddam
Hussein will go on manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, perhaps
even more intensively than before. . . . In that case, Operation Desert
Fox will go down as a failure."
Also included are two items run previously in "Iraq News"--a Jerusalem
Post editorial, Dec 21, and Haaretz editorial, Dec 20, to the same
effect.
I. SAUDIS CONCERNED IRAQ IS REBUILDING WEAPONS
The Washington Times
June 8, 1999
Saudi Letter Rejects Wisdom of Desert Fox Attack on Iraq
Writer to Clinton is Next in Succession to Throne
by Rowan Scarborough
The Saudi Arabian crown prince days after Operation Desert Fox ended,
warned President Clinton in a private letter that the December bombing
had made Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein stronger internationally and
divided the old Persian Gulf war coalition.
The letter, according to a translated copy obtained last week by The
Washington Times, was sent by Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz,
Saudi Arabia's No. 2 ruler and designated successor to King Fahd.
Saudi Arabia did not publicly endorse the six [sic] days of air raids
against Iraq, nor did it allow US aircraft to launch strikes from its
soil.
The bombing was heavily criticized by Republicans in Washington
suspicious that Mr. Clinton timed the attack to divert attention from
the House's impeachment debate. The White House denied the charge.
The crown prince's letter shows that Saudi Arabia, too, had
misgivings about the attack.
In his Jan. 4 letter, the crown prince wrote that the strikes "may
have achieved the objectives in curtailing Saddam Hussein's ability to
threaten his neighbors . . . "
"However," the letter continued, "it did not totally eliminate such
[a] threat. It created a situation of sympathy with the Iraqi regime
that Saddam Hussein can use to achieve his objectives, and it has also
fissured the international position which could lead Saddam to achieve
additional challenges, threats, and coercion of the Arab and Muslim
world towards the West in general and the United States in particular.
An administration official who confirmed the letter's contents, said
the White House disagrees with the Saudi leader's assessment.
"It's his view," said the official, who asked not to be identified.
"We don't necessarily share that view. Saddam remains isolated in the
region and internationally."
The letter reveals differences between Saudi Arabia and the Clinton
administration over whether Desert Fox achieved its goals. The kingdom
is the United States' chief ally among the moderate Persian Gulf states.
It buys billions of dollars in US-made warplanes and other weapons, and
is host to 5,000 US troops who enforce the no-fly zone over southern
Iraq.
Crown Prince Abdullah said another round of bombing would be
"suspicious and doubtful" in the eyes of some members of the UN Security
Council, whose support is essential if the United States is to maintain
eight years of economic sanctions on Iraq.
The Saudi ruler urged Mr. Clinton to immediately convene a meeting in
Washington on Iraq among the leaders of the United States, Russia,
France, China, and Britain--the permanent members of the UN Security
Council splintered on the Iraq question.
The White House, however, rejected the proposal.
"While it is inappropriate for us to discuss a personal letter from
the crown prince, we take the views of the Saudi allies very seriously.
Their advice carries tremendous weight in our decision-making on Iraq as
well as all issues related to the Gulf region . . . we do believe it is
important to try to restore the unity of the Security Council regarding
Iraq. We are involved in conversations with out partners on the
Security Council. We're actively discussing the various issues to try
to forge a new consensus on Iraq."
Council members Russia, China and France have voiced objections to
continuing economic sanctions.
"It is of the utmost necessity that we gain back a common position
by the permanent members of the Security Council regarding Iraq," the
crown prince wrote. "We should focus at this stage on Russia, France,
and China."
A translation of the letter was provided to the Washington Times
last week by a US official troubled over NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia.
Desert Fox was praised by Defense Secretary William S. Cohen as
highly successful in its goals of degrading Saddam's armed forces and
setting back his ability to produce weapons of mass destruction.
But the bombing received less-than-positive reviews from some
military officers, who said only limited damage was done and that the
United States lost any chance of ever getting UN weapons inspectors back
into Iraq.
The crown prince wrote, "To rectify this situation, we must adopt a
strategy that can prevent Saddam Hussein from taking advantage of his
position whereby he will rebuild his military arsenal in the absence of
the international inspection teams or continue to threaten the security
and safety of his neighbors."
The Saudis did not support a US invasion in 1991 to bring down
Saddam. But in subsequent years Riyadh has grown increasingly restive
with a US policy that seeks only to contain the dictator.
Mr. Clinton ordered the December strikes after Baghdad repeatedly
blocked the inspectors from visiting suspected weapons storage and
production sites.
II. DESERT FOX FAILURE IF IRAQ REBUILDS PROSCRIBED WEAPONS
Ha'aretz: Desert Fox 'Failure' if Saddam Pursues Buildup
Tel Aviv Ha'aretz (Internet version) in English 21 Dec 98
[Analysis by Ze'ev Schiff: "Misguided Missiles?"]
[FBIS Transcribed Text] Even if Iraqi military facilities sustained
severe damage in the four days of bombing by American and British
forces, there is still no sign that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
were hit. The sanctions imposed on Baghdad will undoubtedly continue,
but it is unlikely that the UN inspections will be renewed at a serious
level. In short, the end result is that Saddam Husayn will go on
manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, perhaps even more intensively
than before.
A key question is what effect the results of the operation will have
on Iran. Will those responsible for manufacturing deadly weapons in that
country decide that they have to accelerate their projects even more
because Saddam Husayn will obtain such weapons? Intelligence sources say
the Iranian program has been proceeding at full tilt for some time,
regardless of what Iraq is doing.
It is clear that Iraq sustained damage, but the scale is not yet
known. Only US and British intelligence know why the various targets
were chosen. However, even if they knew where the illicit weapons were
being hidden, they have no way of knowing whether the weapons were
buried under the rubble of the buildings razed to the ground by the
Tomahawk cruise missiles.
It is not clear if the operation was meant to last four days or
whether the decision to stop was taken in midstream. Nor is it clear
whether the Americans and the British will be willing to resume the
bombing if they find targets where weapons are manufactured or stored.
Perhaps they will act only if Iraq actually attacks one of its
neighbors. If Saddam Husayn concludes that the danger has passed
he will find this a spur to continue the production of his deadly
weapons. In that case, Operation Desert Fox will go down as a failure.
III. JERSUALEM POST EDITORS, FINISH THE JOB
The Jerusalem Post
Dec 21, 1998
Editorial
"Finish the Job"
In announcing the end of Operation Desert Fox on Saturday, President
Bill Clinton stated that its objectives were clear: to degrade Saddam
Husayn's deadly weapons programs and his command and control structure.
Saddam's rearmament program was no doubt set back somewhat, but he
has also gained something important: He has most likely freed himself of
those pesky UN inspectors (UNSCOM), who had been unwilling to ignore or
lie about his weapons buildup.
In its seven years of operations, UNSCOM never did receive the
unfettered access necessary to fully disclose all of Saddam's nefarious
activities, but its presence inconvenienced Saddam's ambitions to arm
himself and threaten the region. We do not know to what degree bombs
have accomplished what inspections could not, but we do know that Saddam
will now be able to arm himself unfettered by UN inspectors, perhaps
indefinitely.
Both UNSCOM and the latest allied bombing campaign were important
components in the effort to rein in Saddam. But the United States and
Britain should be under no illusions that the job is done.
Not only is the job not done, but with the UNSCOM era over, the
challenge posed by Saddam should be expected to increase. The allied
action, therefore, will in retrospect only have served to advance its
objectives if coupled with a new method to keep the world safe from
Saddam.
Though the US and Britain are certainly right to maintain an upgraded
presence in the region, periodic air strikes are not a feasible solution
to the problem. Saddam may be crazy, but he is not stupid: years of
aerial bombings, starting with Israel's prescient 1981 attack against
Iraq's nuclear reactor, have taught him to place his most important
assets underground, or hidden in civilian areas.
Cruise missiles and stealth bombers are cutting-edge technologically,
but a crude form of arms control. Belatedly, Clinton has admitted that
"Over the long-term, the best way to end the threat that Saddam poses to
his own people and the region is for Iraq to have a different
government." The problem lies in the term "long-term," which hints at
the lack of conviction with which the US approaches support for the
Iraqi opposition.
In a speech to Stanford University on December 8th, National Security
Adviser Sandy Berger illustrated the US ambivalence toward the Iraqi
opposition in what were supposed to have been supportive remarks.
"What we can and will do," Berger explained, "is to strengthen the
Iraqi opposition and support the Iraqi people, to work with them step by
step, in a practical and effective way, to delegitimize Saddam, and then
when the time is right, to help them achieve a new leadership in Iraq."
For the Iraqi people, the idea that there is a need to first
"delegitimize Saddam" before attempting to remove him reveals either
staggering ignorance, insensitivity, or both. A leader who has used
poison gas upon his own people, who has driven a tenth of the population
into exile, and is responsible for his nation suffering for years under
stiff economic sanctions, renders any sort of PR campaign painfully
superfluous.
The allied attack in itself did not topple Saddam, nor was it
expected to.
But by showing that the US was once again willing to use force, and
by wounding Saddam's command and control infrastructure, it created a
momentum that must not be lost. Now is the time for the US to throw
first its full moral, then material weight behind the Iraqi opposition,
not as a long-term, theoretical option, but as a centerpiece of allied
policy.
As opposition movements go, the Iraqi opposition -- organized into
the Iraqi National Congress --is more tested, has more democratic roots,
and faces a weaker enemy than perhaps any such rebellion that has
enjoyed American support. The same moral and legal grounds that permit,
indeed require, the West to take military action, impel wholehearted
support for the Iraqi people's efforts to free themselves.
If the 70-hour military campaign is not to have been in vain, the
Clinton Administration must follow up with a campaign of unmistakable
support for the Iraqi opposition. This means inviting opposition
leaders to meet with Clinton, as has Jordan's King Husayn. It means
telling the leaders of the region -- some of whom are just waiting for a
positive signal - that the US wants them to help. And it means helping
the opposition with training and equipment, not just fax machines and
radio broadcasts. Saddam will not wait for the "long-term" to rebuild
his strength and deadly arsenal; the United States should show at least
as great an urgency and conviction in supporting his opponents.
IV. HAARETZ EDITORS, THE THREAT REMAINS
Haaretz Editorial
Sunday, December 20, 1998
The threat remains
After three days of massive bombing, it is still too early to judge
the efficiency of the strikes against Saddam Hussein. The United States,
which led the effort, and Britain, which joined in, hoped to achieve
three declared goals: to lessen Iraq's ability to produce weapons of
mass destruction; to reduce Iraq's military threat to its neighbors; and
to force Saddam to allow free access to UN inspectors. In addition, the
U.S. hopes to remove Saddam's regime and lay the groundwork for the
ascendance of an alternative government.
The declared goals of the operation are worthy of international
support since weapons of mass destruction, wherever they are found,
constitute a real danger to civilian populations. A regime seeking to
develop these weapons, and more so one that has proved its readiness to
use them, cannot hide behind claims of self-defense. The international
community has built appropriate tools for the supervision, limitation
and destruction of these kinds of weapons. But these tools can only be
effective with the cooperation of the targeted country. Iraq, which has
signed multilateral treaties for limiting the spread non-conventional
weapons, has shown that it has no intention of honoring them, and at the
same time that it feigns cooperation with UN inspectors, it finds
infinite ways to deceive them.
But the justice of the goals are no proof of the efficacy of the
means employed to achieve them. Limited destruction of military targets
in Iraq may be important from a tactical perspective, but it already
raises serious doubts about the renewal of inspections. The Iraqi threat
is still in place. The international repercussions already felt as a
result of the operation are no less dangerous than the danger presented
by Iraq itself. The profound disagreement between Russia and the United
States places the ratification of the START-2 treaty for dismantling
nuclear weapons in danger, for example. Broad public oppositionin the
Arab world to the attacks compromises American relations with that part
of the world. And the sparring taking place between some European
nations and the United States over the Iraqi question endangers a vital
alliance among them that was designed to address all kinds of other
global problems.
Israel removed itself from the current round of conflict by
announcing that it is not involved in the dispute. This position, which
largely prevents it from openly supporting the attack on Iraq, still
does not remove it from the sphere of danger. As if to prove this,
Patriot missile batteries, whose usefulness is hotly debated, were
placed in sensitive areas of the country, and the Home Front Command
heightened its preparedness. Israel must contend with the need to
withstand an Iraqi missile attack, and there is no dispute in the Middle
East toward which Israel can remain indifferent, but that is not to say
it must become actively involved.
The current decision, like past ones not to participate in operations
against Iraq, is a wise one. Israeli involvement is liable, in the best
case, to burden the U.S. and Britain's freedom of action. In the worst
scenario, it could widen the confrontation between the U.S. and the Arab
world. Israel needs therefore to take a deep breath, contribute as much
as it can (by way of diplomacy) to the success of the operation, and not
give the Arab world a pretext for lumping the United States together
with it under the headline, "enemy of the Arabs."
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