Iraq News by Laurie Mylroie
The central focus of Iraq News is the tension between the considerable, proscribed WMD capabilities that Iraq is holding on to and its increasing stridency that it has complied with UNSCR 687 and it is time to lift sanctions. If you wish to receive Iraq News by email, a service which includes full-text of news reports not archived here, send your request to Laurie Mylroie .
IRAQ NEWS, FRIDAY, JUNE 4, 1999
I. AMB. BUTLER LETTER TO UNSC ON UNSCOM LAB, JUN 1
II. REP. BEN GILMAN, ON PROPOSED DRAWDOWN UNDER THE ILA, MAY 25
III. SEN. BOB KERREY, ON MEETING WITH IRAQI OPPOSITION, MAY 27
Reuters, Jun 1, reported that Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, in an
interview with Al-Sharq al-Awsat, "defended Iran's right to arm itself
for self-protection and said progress in relations between his country
and the Islamic republic was for the benefit of the Gulf region." "Iraq
News" can only reiterate that the Saudi leadership would not speak like
that, save for a great concern about Iraq.
An Iraqi-American family--Fuad Taima, his wife Dorothy, and their
son, Laith--were killed last week in their McLean, Va home, as the Wash
Post, May 31 reported. Taima had long-standing business deals with
Baghdad. On Wed, May 26, around 9:00 PM, while Leith was out with a
friend, his mother paged him, asking him to come home, because a family
friend whom she hadn't seen in many years had come by and "she felt
uncomfortable with him there." Later that night, neighbors heard what
might have been gunshots, but which they dismissed "as a car backfiring
or firecrackers." Two days later, the family was found dead. "One
government source knowledgeable about similar cases said the slayings
fit the modus operandi for what Iraqi operatives do to people whose
business dealings with Saddam Hussein turn sour." However, the Fairfax
Commonwealth's Attorney, Robert Horan, maintained "It's a wide-open case
at this juncture" and any talk of a connection to Baghdad "would be
sheer and utter guesswork." Horan prosecuted Mir Aimal Kansi for the
Jan 25 93 shootings outside the CIA and couldn't find anything bigger in
that one either.
The Russian ambassador to the UNSC, Sergei Lavrov, made an enormous
fuss over an UNSCOM request that a team be allowed to return to Baghdad
to shut down its chemical laboratory there, as the NYT, Jun 2, reported.
Lavrov maintained that UNSCOM had left dangerous substances in the lab,
risking the lives of other UN personnel, along with half the residents
of Baghdad.
As Amb. Butler's Jun 1 letter to the UNSC explained, UNSCOM had a
small quantity of Iraqi mustard gas in its lab, as well as minute
amounts of other chemical agents used to calibrate equipment, all stored
in accord with international regulations. Noting the NYT's Jun 2 front
page story on the environmental disaster left behind from Russia's BW
program, one person remarked that that was an awful lot more frightening
than anything in UNSCOM's refrigerator.
UNSCOM's future, and the future of any effective international arms
monitoring regime in Iraq, looks dim. Butler will leave at the end of
this month, but there is no sign that the UNSC/UNSG have begun moving to
appoint a successor. Besides, what individual of talent and integrity
would want that job now? Moreover, UNSCOM is losing staff and
institutional knowledge as contracts expire, people go home, and are not
replaced.
And US officials no longer talk publicly about reestablishing a UN
weapons monitoring presence in Baghdad, giving the impression that it is
no longer a US goal in Iraq. That, although administration officials
from President Clinton on down, repeatedly affirmed the importance of
UNSCOM's work.
On Nov 12, 97, Clinton said, "I want every single American to
understand what is at stake here--these inspectors, since 1991, have
discovered and destroyed more weapons of mass destruction potential than
were destroyed in Iraq in the entire Gulf War. . . They must get back
to work."
In his 1998 State of the Union address, Clinton said, "Saddam
Hussein has spent the better part of this decade, and much of his
nation's wealth, not on providing for the Iraqi people, but on
developing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons--and the missiles to
deliver them. The United Nations weapons inspectors have done a
remarkable job, finding and destroying more of Iraq's arsenal than was
destroyed during the Gulf war itself. . . . I speak for everyone in
this chamber, Republicans and Democrats, when I say to Saddam Hussein:
You cannot defy the will of the world. You have used weapons of mass
destruction before. We are determined to deny you the capacity to use
them again."
And on Dec 16, 1998, on launching Operation Desert Fox, Clinton said,
"If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far
greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his
neighbors. He will make war on his own people. And mark my words, he
will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them and he
will use them."
So how does the administration intend to deal with the threat? It is
not by implementing the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA). Last week [May
24-28], an Iraqi opposition delegation, dominated by the Iraqi National
Congress (INC), visited Washington. The visit confirmed established
positions: the administration does not want to carry out the ILA, even
as Congress keeps pushing it to do so.
The Iraqi delegation met with Sec State Madeleine Albright and NSC
Adviser Sandy Berger. Berger told them that it was the administration's
intent to get rid of Saddam before the end of Clinton's presidency, but
he did not say how it intended to achieve that.
Indeed, the Wash Post, May 25, reported that the US would not
provide military aid to the Iraqi opposition. The State Dept even told
the opposition that it would violate sanctions for the US to provide
them arms. Rather, the opposition were, in the words of one
administration official, "The day-after guys. These are not the guys
who are going to put a bullet in the head of Saddam Hussein."
Thus, it would seem, that to the extent the administration has a
policy to deal with the Saddam threat, it is still to look to a coup in
Baghdad. In its view, the opposition should focus on what a senior
administration official in a May 24 background briefing, characterized
as "setting the post-Saddam agenda." What does that mean? As the US
official tried to explain, "Holding themselves out as the voice of the
Iraqi people in explaining what the Iraqi people want afterwards. And
more than just saying what the Iraqi people want, they've taken it upon
themselves now to plan it, to lay out in some detail the recovery of
Iraq. That would be the theme of several of the discussions around town
at the think tanks over this coming week."
And as part of the administration's efforts to help ensure that the
Iraqi opposition would be seen as no more than a talk shop, the
administration insisted on adding two non-INC figures to the delegation.
That was the opposite of what the Bush administration did. When the INC
began in 1992, the Bush administration said that if the opposition
wanted US support it had to be united. The result was the INC. Any
opposition elements that wanted US support had to be part of the INC, so
they joined together. But the Clinton administration went and found
people outside the INC and gave them a separate status.
One of those added to the delegation by the State Dept, and favored
in particular by Asst Sec State for Near East Affairs, Martin Indyk, was
Adnan Pachachi, Iraq's UN ambassador (1959-65; 1967-69) and Foreign
Minister (1965-67). Pachahi wrote a memoir, "Iraq's Voice at the United
Nations 1959-1969: A Personal Record," (London: Quartet Books, 1991).
As Pachachi explained in the first sentence of the first chapter of
his memoir, "Ever since I can remember, the question of Palestine has
occupied an important place in my life. My father, a dedicated Arab
patriot instilled in me a strong nationalist sentiment and a firm belief
in the destiny of the Arab nation. . . . My first memory relating to
Palestine dates from 1930. We were spending the summer in Lebanon, and
my father went to Jerusalem to testify before a British commission of
Inquiry. . . . When I asked where he was going, he explained that the
British were helping the Jews to take over Palestine and drive out its
people. The basic injustice was so glaring and obvious that, after
sixty years, I am still unable to accept it. [p. 19]
"At the beginning of December, 1966, I accompanied President Abdul
Rahman Aref on an official visit to Kuwait. I was known in Kuwait, from
my stout defense of Iraq's claim in the Security Council in 1961 and my
successful efforts to prevent the admission of Kuwait to UN membership
from 1961 to 1963. [p. 88]
"The Arab position has been greatly weakened as a result of the
conclusion by Egypt of a separate peace with Israel. [p. 167]
"During its long war with Iran, Iraq was able to build, at tremendous
cost to its people, a strong military capability which was probably the
most credible military deterrent ever to Israel's crushing military
superiority. Israel and its supporters in the West launched a vicious
campaign against Iraq, branding it as the greatest threat to the peace
and security of the Middle East, while ignoring the fact that Israel
introduced nuclear weapons, remains to this day the only nuclear power
in the region and possesses the largest arsenal of weapons of mass
destruction. It was clear from the outset that Israel and her allies
would not rest until Iraq's new military power was eliminated or
considerably weakened. Suddenly they were presented with an unexpected
and welcome opportunity to achieve their goal: Iraq occupied and annexed
Kuwait. The reaction should have been predictable. There was no
possible excuse for such a gross miscalculation. The United States and
its allies eagerly and immediately set in motion the campaign to
obliterate once and for all Iraq's military capabilities." [p. 171]
On Mar 6, 1999, the London paper, al-Zaman, published an article,
based on an interview with Pachachi, entitled, "Pachachi: Iraq
Liberation Act will lead to a Civil War and the (US) Administration is
not Enthusiastic."
Following the opposition visit to Washington, al Zaman, Jun 1,
wrote, "Pachachi said that the Americans showed understanding for the
request of the Iraqi delegation to lift sanctions." That caused a stir
among Iraqi exiles, wondering why such a request was made. Of course,
it was not. Al Zaman also reported, "Pachachi was closer to the views
of the administration, whereas the INC was closer to Congress. Pachachi
refused to participate in the request of the INC for a military
exclusion zone in southern Iraq and refused the scenarios for making a
base for the Iraqi opposition in Kurdistan . . . . Pachachi said that he
rejects US financial support and is looking to Iraqi and Arab support
for an opposition fund. . . "
During the visit of the Iraqi opposition, the chairman of the House
International Relations Committee, Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R, NY),
publicly expressed his displeasure with what the administration was
doing. In a May 25 statement on the administration's proposed drawdown
under the ILA, Rep. Gilman said, "Clearly the Administration is
structuring the drawdown in order to placate Congress without offending
Saddam Hussein. Dick Morris may have left the White House, but his
policy of triangulation is still with us. Congress did not pass the
Iraq Liberation Act to channel US assistance to 'day-after guys.' It is
insulting to the Kurdish and Shiite resistance fighters affiliated with
the Iraqi National Congress who are today fighting and dying for freedom
in Iraq, to suggest that they are nothing but 'day-after guys.' . . .
Congress is interested in assisting those people in Iraq who will get us
to the day after Saddam Hussein. . . . Clearly the Administration still
has no such plan, and does not appear to be serious about developing
such a plan."
The Iraqi delegation met with Rep. Gilman. It also met with
Senators: Trent Lott (Majority Leader, R, MS); Tom Daschle (Minority
Leader, D, SD); Jesse Helms (R, NC); Bob Kerrey (D, NE); Sam Brownback
(R, KS); and Joseph Lieberman (D, CT).
Following the meeting, Sen Kerrey issued a statement saying, "We are
moving away from the failed policy of containing Saddam, to the more
constructive policy of helping the INC in their efforts to implement
democracy in Iraq. . . . It is in our vital national interest to see a
peaceful, united Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors. It is in
our moral interest to replace Saddam's brutal dictatorship with a
humane, democratic government."
During the meeting, the senators expressed their clear
dissatisfaction with what the administration was doing. One senator
asked the delegation whether they were ready to receive arms and
training. Gen. Hassan al-Naqib, of the INC presidential council, said
yes. The senator replied that it was good to hear that, because when
they ask the administration how it intends to overthrow Saddam, the
administration replies that it is waiting for a Sunni general. But as
the senator noted, he never comes. Other senators expressed their
determination to get for the Iraqi opposition U.S. support and materiel
that will help them more effectively work to overthrow Saddam.
I. AMB. BUTLER LETTER TO UNSC ON UNSCOM LAB
United States Special Commission
The Executive Chairman
1 June 1999
His Excellency
Mr. Babouccarr-Blaise Ismaila Jagne
President of the Security Council
United Nations
Excellency,
During today's informal consultations of the Security Council, it was
agreed that UNSCOM should provide, in writing, information on the status
of: the chemical laboratory and the biological room; and, the equipment
and components located at the Special Commission's premises in Baghdad.
The present letter provides such information and supplements the
information I provided today to the Council, orally.
The chemical laboratory at the Commission's offices in Baghdad (the
BMVC) was established in 1994 with the purpose of conducting on-site
analysis of samples from Iraq's known chemical weapons related
facilities and munitions and materials as well as other sites
potentially related to chemical weapons. To be able to accomplish these
tasks, the laboratory was equipped with special features, including:
two-door systems; extra air-conditioning; fume hoods with special
filters; and, laboratory refrigerators and freezers for the temporary
storage of standards of CW agents used for calibration of analytical
equipment, as well as chemical samples collected in Iraq for further
analysis.
For the safe transportation of the chemical standards to Iraq, the
Commission used special containers certified by the International Air
Transport Association (IATA). For those standards, the Commission used
diluted chemical agents provided by a supporting government, in
concentrations which can only be used for calibration of equipment, but
not as toxic agents. The total quantity of standards present at any
given time at the laboratory did not exceed 50 milligrams. They do not
represent a threat, even in case of an accident.
The laboratory also provided safety check capabilities and NBC
defence protection for the Commission's personnel charged with
inspecting facilities in Iraq at which the discovery of CW or BW agents
was considered possible.
The Commission has also maintained a biological room at the BMVC. It
is designed for the packaging, temporary storage and preparation for
transportation of all kinds of biological samples, for their analysis
outside Iraq.
Upon its departure from Baghdad, in December 1998, the Commission
shut down the chemical laboratory and the biological room in order to
preserve safety and to maintain their capability to resume verification
activities as soon as possible.
The standards of chemical warfare agents were stored, sealed, in the
laboratory freezer.
Twelve samples of the chemical warfare agent Mustard, with a total
quantity of less than 1 kg, were stored in the laboratory refrigerator.
The samples had been taken from Iraq's 155 mm shells filled with Mustard
and recovered by the Commission and by Iraq in the period 1997-1998.
Each sample was sealed in a glass vial, of a capacity of about 50 ml
each and put inside metal containers with activated charcoal and silica
gel (absorbent substances). In the case of an accident, such as a seal
being broken, the activated substances would absorb the chemical warfare
agent and prevent its release. Analyses of these Mustard samples were
in progress at the time the Commission evacuated its personnel from
Iraq.
Prior to the evacuation, the Commission had planned to send a special
mission to Iraq, in December 1998, to dispose of the Mustard samples
together with 50 kilograms of Mustard, remaining in Iraq's custody, from
the recovered 155 mm shells.
The other conventional chemicals present in any working chemical
laboratory were also safely stored before the evacuation.
One biological sample, handed over by Iraq to the Commission a few
days prior to the evacuation, was also left at the BMVC, in the
biological room. It is a 5 ml sealed vial, placed inside a plastic
container. The sample was labelled as smallpox vaccine, but according
to Iraq, it contained BCG (Tuberculosis) vaccine. Past experience was
that vials of this nature, from the same site, had been pre-labelled, by
Iraq, "smallpox vaccine", and that this labelling had proven to have no
relationship to the content of any given vial.
At the time of the departure, the Commission had not been able to
determine the content of this vial. It should be recorded, however,
that similar past experiences had not revealed the presence of BW
agents. The vial was stored safely in the freezer at the biological
room.
Upon its departure from Iraq, the Commission secured the chemical
laboratory and the biological room, and their equipment and components,
in a safe condition, following standard procedures. Under those
conditions, the conventional laboratory chemicals, chemical standards
and chemical and biological samples have not represented a threat or
hazard to the safety of the other personnel working at the UN building,
nor to the Iraqi population. But such conditions cannot provide this
level of confidence indefinitely, that is in the absence of periodic
checks and certification.
The issue of safety at the UN premises in Baghdad has always been of
priority importance for the Commission. In this context, in March 1999,
the Commission handed to the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, Mr.
Hans von Sponeck, the keys and access codes for entry to its offices in
Baghdad, so that access could be obtained to prevent or control an
emergency situation, such as fire or explosion. This action was
communicated to the office of the Secretary-General.
In mid-April, a process of consultation was initiated by the office
of the Secretary-General on the question of the need for the UN
Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq to have access to the BMVC to retrieve
medical equipment from the Commission's office, so that it could be made
available for use by UNOCHI staff.
A week ago, I raised with the Executive Office of the
Secretary-General concerns held by UNSCOM with respect to the chemical
and biological areas of the BMVC. It was emphasized that there were no
immediate safety concerns, but that senior, competent, UNSCOM staff
believed that it was now appropriate to seek access to those areas in
order to shut them down. Three reasons motivated this recommendation:
that we had been absent from the BMVC for longer period of time than had
been originally expected; summer was approaching; this may lead to
fluctuation in the electricity supply to the BMVC.
It was agreed with the office of the Secretary-General that immediate
arrangements for access by the UNOCHI coordinator, accompanied by the
Acting Director of the BMVC, should be made, and that thereafter, a
second visit, specifically to the chemical and biological areas, should
take place for the purposes stated above. It was further agreed that
the Executive Office of the Secretary-General should initiate
arrangements for the first visit, and UNSCOM should commence assembling
the appropriate technical team required for the second visit.
In the circumstances now prevailing, and in accordance with this
report to the Security Council, the following course of action is
recommended:
a. The Commission should assemble an appropriate team of experts to
travel to Baghdad, in order to evaluate the chemical laboratory and the
biological room. The team would then proceed to destroy the:
conventional laboratory chemicals; chemical standards; and, biological
samples. The team would also remove the Mustard samples and switch off
all the equipment.
b. The Government of Iraq should be requested to cooperate with the team
with respect to the removal of the Mustard samples, as it would be safer
to destroy them outside the BMVC. These samples could be destroyed at
Iraq's former chemical weapons production facility - Muthanna - or
stored, properly sealed, in a secured area at the same facility, under
Iraqi custody, until further arrangements are made.
The Commission believes that, with the full support of the Security
Council, this mission could be successfully implemented in a short
period of time.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.
(Signed)
Richard Butler
II. REP. BEN GILMAN, ON PROPOSED DRAWDOWN UNDER THE ILA
Statement of Benjamin A. Gilman
On Proposed Drawdown under Iraq Liberation Act
May 25, 1999
I am pleased that the Administration is finally moving ahead with an
initial drawdown for the Iraqi opposition under the Iraq Liberation Act.
They should have done this months ago.
Clearly the Administration is structuring the drawdown in order to
placate Congress without offending Saddam Hussein. Dick Morris may have
left the White House, but his policy of triangulation is still with us.
Congress did not pass the Iraq Liberation Act to channel U.S.
assistance to "day-after guys". It is insulting to the Kurdish and
Shiite resistance fighters affiliated with the Iraqi National Congress,
who are today fighting and dying for freedom in Iraq, to suggest that
they are nothing but "day-after guys".
Congress is interested in assisting those people in Iraq who will get
us to the day after Saddam Hussein. It was because the Administration
had no plan to get us to that day that we passed the Iraq Liberation
Act. Clearly the Administration still has no such plan, and does not
appear to be serious about developing such a plan.
There is no excuse for the Administration's continuing failure to help
the Iraqi National Congress establish a broadcasting capability inside
Iraq.
There is no excuse for not providing them military training, and for
not giving them communications gear and other equipment to help them
carry on their struggle against Saddam Hussein.
III. SEN. BOB KERREY, ON MEETING WITH IRAQI OPPOSITION
Bob Kerrey
News Release
Contact: Mike Marinel1o, Jody Ryan (202) 224-6551
May 27,1999
KERREY MEETS WITH IRAQ OPPOSITION LEADERS TO DISCUSS END OF SADDAM'S
REGIME
WASHINGTON Senator Bob Kerrey today met with Iraq opposition leaders in
the U.S. Capitol, and urged the group to continue to prepare the people
of Iraq for the transition to democracy
"As we move closer to the complete demise of Saddam's regime, the
people of Iraq must prepare for the transition to democracy," Kerrey
said. "I am pleased with the progress the Iraqi National Congress is
making and am encouraged by the support the US Congress is giving the
people of Iraq.
Kerrey said the Iraq National Congress (INC) continues to show the
world that Iraq is capable of democracy, and of overcoming their ethnic
and religious differences to take a united stand against Saddam Hussein.
Kerrey added that the Iraq Liberation Act, which he sponsored and became
law last fall1 demonstrated America's strong commitment to the
replacement of the Iraqi dictator with a representative government.
The meeting took place in Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's (R-MS)
office and was attended by key Senators including Minority Leader Tom
Daschle (D-SD).
"We are moving away from the failed policy of containing Saddam, to
the more constructive policy of helping the INC in their efforts to
implement democracy in Iraq," Kerrey said. "It is in our vital national
interest to see a peaceful, united Iraq that does not threaten its
neighbors. It is in our moral interest to replace Saddam's brutal
dictatorship with a humane, democratic government."
In April, Kerrey addressed the first meeting of the Executive Council
of the Iraq National Congress in over four years. During his address he
urged the council to convene a full meeting of the Congress, as soon as
possib1e, and to work daily for Saddam Hussein's removal.
Kerrey was a key player in the passage of the Iraq Liberation Act.
He also has played a key role in Radio Free Iraq--which provides an
alternative news source for the people of Iraq other than the filtered
propaganda produced and broadcast in coordination with the government of
Saddam Hussein.
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