U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

.................... MR. RUBIN:

Secondly, the Secretary will be meeting this afternoon with the Interim Leadership of the Iraqi National Congress. The purpose of this meeting is for us to learn their plans for the recovery of Iraq. We will discuss how we can support their work to realize the aspirations of the Iraqi people for a government that is responsive to their needs and that upholds Iraq's international obligations.

I also want to announce that we are planning to forward to the Hill in the next few weeks our plans for initiating a draw-down on non-lethal equipment and training under the Iraq Liberation Act. Under this plan, and in consultation with the Iraqis -- that is, the opposition Iraqis -- we would provide assistance under three broad categories which will help to build unity among the opposition, develop greater political infrastructure, and enable them to get their message out more effectively. These categories are: The establishment of an opposition headquarters and satellite offices; training; and public advocacy on behalf of the Iraqi people. This assistance will help the Iraqi opposition build further cohesion and representation of the broad spectrum of Iraqis who oppose Saddam Hussein. There will be a briefing later this afternoon after the meeting here in the Briefing Room with some senior State Department officials who can go into some more detail, but I can try to take some of your questions on this now.

QUESTION: Training in what?

MR. RUBIN: It's non-lethal assistance. Training and civil administration preparing for day-after scenarios for the recovery of an Iraq free of Saddam Hussein. We're not talking about lethal assistance at this time, so this is equipment from existing Department of Defense inventories that can be used to help them organize themselves and create a more unified front and to be in a better position to get their message out to the Iraqis, who we believe are supportive of their goals.

QUESTION: Could you - just - if you possibly can - one or two examples, as if we could hold this assistance in our hands, what would we be holding?

MR. RUBIN: Equipment that would be non --

QUESTION: Not a hand grenade but --

MR. RUBIN: A computer.

QUESTION: A computer.

QUESTION: Jamie, maybe I missed this. You said three broad categories and then you came up with - or one?

MR. RUBIN: Establishment of an opposition headquarters.

QUESTION: That's one?

MR. RUBIN: That's one.

QUESTION: Satellite offices is two?

MR. RUBIN: No, that's "and satellite offices." That would be one.

QUESTION: What's two?

MR. RUBIN: Training of the kind that -- in how to organize the opposition and that would be a second. And the third - that's three, after two - would be public advocacy on behalf of the Iraqi people - that would be in the communications field primarily. But there may be some obvious overlap.

QUESTION: This plan that you are going to present to Congress - does it have a money figure attached to it?

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're still working on this. There are a number of steps that have to be taken before the assistance is provided and we will need to consult with Congress and provide formal notice of the President's intention to exercise his draw-down authority. We'll also need to consult closely with the Iraqi opposition to determine their needs; their goals; what material and training will be provided to whom, when, and under what auspices. We do expect to begin providing assistance following the enlarged meeting of the opposition's general assembly which the INC Executive Council has announced as scheduled for July.

So I'm not able to put a dollar figure on it at this time. It's something we're going to have to work our way through.

QUESTION: Is just for the INC or is it possible that -

MR. RUBIN: No, it's all the groups - it's the broad array of people that are going to be here today.

QUESTION: But they - but those people are now part of the INC or at least they're affiliated -

MR. RUBIN: Umbrella -- they're part of the broad umbrella.

QUESTION: But are there any outside that umbrella that might also -

MR. RUBIN: I wouldn't want to rule anything out, but the focus of this effort is on these people who are coming here.

QUESTION: When is this going to the Hill?

MR. RUBIN: Well, today is the end of May, and it is also Monday, and I indicated to you that the idea would be to have this equipment and assistance and training in place after the July conference. So that gives us roughly two months to work through the needs with the Iraqi opposition groups; work through the consultation process with the Hill - so certainly in the coming weeks.

QUESTION: Where is the July conference?

MR. RUBIN: I think they haven't made a final decision on where it will be located.

QUESTION: Some big conference?

MR. RUBIN: Some big conference.

QUESTION: Jamie, will the money for this program come from funds already allocated for the FY2000 budget?

MR. RUBIN: Its draw-down authority, which means that it's equipment that exists that the Iraqi opposition is authorized - sorry - that the Administration has authorized to draw down existing equipment and provide to them. So it doesn't have the same kind of budgetary impact as an outlay.

QUESTION: This is part of the $95 million that was set aside -

MR. RUBIN: It's part of that law. I'm not sure it's - that's 97 and that's for direct - that's for lethal assistance. And to what extent this falls under that - maybe it's the kind of question we can get into in detail at about 4:00 p.m.

QUESTION: What do you feel about these people?

MR. RUBIN: Can I go to Jim, please?

QUESTION: We've been through this before with the INC. What gives you any hope that it's going to work this time?

MR. RUBIN: Well, I don't know what "this before" means. What we've never done before is try to work closely with them to have them develop the broadest possible base of support at a political level; to gain the support, the advice, the understanding, and analysis from all the groups of people in the world - Iraqis - who are opposed to Saddam Hussein's leadership -- both inside Iraq and outside Iraq. It is an undertaking we've never tried to pursue before. There have been activities inside Iraq and others that you're familiar with, but this kind of broad-based, political regime change - overt policy - is a new policy.

So, I wouldn't say that we've done it before. We're trying to give you concrete examples of what we are doing in an open way, and our briefers later this afternoon will be able to go into greater detail.

QUESTION: Do you think that these opposition - you're not announcing any lethal aid today?

MR. RUBIN: Correct.

QUESTION: You think that these various opposition groups are now not yet in the position to receive such aid from the US?

MR. RUBIN: Well, not at this stage. We are providing non-lethal assistance, as I've said. We've made it clear that we're not prepared to take action that is premature, or that puts people's lives needlessly at risk. There are a number of steps that have to be taken before we're in a position to provide lethal assistance. One priority, which is what we're trying to meet through this effort, is the strengthening of an Iraqi opposition movement that can lay out solid plans for the post-Saddam recovery in all sectors of national life. This meeting in Washington today is a critical step in that direction. So, we're trying to develop first a broad base of support, work that through step by step in a realistic and serious way, and not prematurely put people's lives at risk in assisting on the lethal side. But it obviously is something we haven't ruled out, and it is therefore a possibility.

QUESTION: You define these people in a negative way. They're all opposed to Saddam Hussein. But in a positive way, is there anything you can say about --

MR. RUBIN: Yes. If you take a look at the Iraq Liberation Act, there are certain criteria for those who need to receive support, and they include support -- those groups that support democracy, those groups that support the territorial integrity of Iraq, those groups that support human rights, and have a broad similarity to Western and American goals for a democratic, free and tolerant Iraq.

QUESTION: How do you get training out of the draw-down equipment?

MR. RUBIN: When the experts come here later this afternoon they can go into that kind of detail. But there's a draw-down for equipment. If the equipment is of the kind -- I gave an example to Barry - that would be authorized under the Iraq Liberation Act, that then could be provided.

QUESTION: You said you couldn't talk a specific dollar figure. Can you say it's millions of dollars? Hundreds of thousands?

MR. RUBIN: I'm not in a position to specify that. But it's a substantial amount of money for this kind of assistance.

QUESTION: You said the establishment of an opposition headquarters, here in Washington?

MR. RUBIN: Well, the satellite - the offices we would envisage -- and it's obviously something we would be consulting with the Iraqi opposition on -- but we would envisage offices - we would not be consulting with the Iraqi government. Let me re-phrase my half a phrase that drew a titter. We would envisage offices in London, New York, and hopefully in the region.

QUESTION: What hotel? (Laughter.)

QUESTION: These are - we're pushing - at least some of us are pushing these questions --because you're on the record and the briefing is not going to be on the record. So it's better to get --

MR. RUBIN: I think we've done about 15 questions by my count.

QUESTION: No, and I say I'm apologizing in a sense for extending what you hope would be just an introduction. We would take all of our questions --

MR. RUBIN: No, I was prepared for some questions.

QUESTION: Well, I'm still kind of quizzical about who these groups are - I'm wondering why they aren't - they've been fighting Saddam Hussein from some of the better hotels in London -- what is their - what are their credentials? Are they democrats? Are they - have they ever done anything to try to un-horse Saddam Hussein? Are they fundamentalists - against the seculars who run Iraq? There are a lot of reasons not to like Saddam Hussein.

MR. RUBIN: And all of them good ones.

QUESTION: Well, some of them, they don't like his secularism, for instance.

MR. RUBIN: Well, we're not against religion.

QUESTION: I know that, but you --

MR. RUBIN: Some might be. We're not.

QUESTION: I know, but the US funded freedom fighters in Afghanistan who were fundamentalists with a greater cause they saw of driving the Soviets out - and you planted the seeds for - not you or me, but the government at that time -- planted the seeds for a fundamentalist regime. Or at least it could be argued - stingers and all help -- so, I'm wondering who these folks are?

MR. RUBIN: I know there's always a desire to make analogies. We would reject any analogy between Afghanistan and Iraq, and reject it categorically in all its aspects, because Afghanistan is not Iraq.

QUESTION: Sure.

MR. RUBIN: And Saddam Hussein is a unique and horrific tyrant, who doesn't have a lot of analogies in the modern world.

Having said that, let me say there is a list of groups - I can give you their names - of the Interim Leadership who's going to be here. Please forgive me for bad pronunciation - from the PUK, it's Latif Rashid; from the KDP, it's Hoshyar Zebari -- and after the briefing I'll give it to you on paper, so we don't have to do spellings - from the INA, Mr. Allawi; Ahmed Chalabi will be there -- a Sunni independent group; independents - several outside without groupings. What they all have in common to us is a commitment to a worthy cause; to change the leadership in Iraq that has caused such damage to the world and such damage to the people of Iraq. What they also have - yes, the PUK is a Kurdish organization - and they all have in common -- is that worthy cause and that they have understood that our assistance is linked to their fulfillment of the kind of democratic approach that we are trying to seek in a new regime in Iraq.

Does that mean that this is going to be easy; does it mean that it's going to be an overnight project? No. We've been approaching this in a very deliberate, step-by-step way; letting all of you know of each step we've taken. We think it's a worthy cause; we think it's worth spending money and time on. But I don't think anyone should have exaggerated expectations of the results - the immediate results.

QUESTION: Are the Shiites also represented here?

MR. RUBIN: I believe there will be -- with respect to the certain groups - they've chosen not to participate, and when I give you the list you can go through that kind of detail.

QUESTION: So they represent the majority of the people in the south?

MR. RUBIN: We believe it has broad-based representation of a wide group including throughout Iraq.

QUESTION: Jamie, this policy has not always been the most popular policy among some of your allies - the French and others; Russians - not necessarily allies, but friends -and this might not be something you can address - but since the war against Belgrade, have you found new - any new opposition to this Iraq policy; any new criticisms of it? Are your allies even more uneasy - the ones who were - now towards the Iraq policy than they were before the Yugoslavia thing? And also, secondarily, can you bring us up to date on the effort to monitor his weapons of mass destruction through peaceful means rather than through bombing?

MR. RUBIN: With respect to the first aspect of you question, I've sat through many briefings where the Secretary has worked on the Iraq policy and I've not - not aware of any crossover on this issue. I think that the unity that NATO has shown on Kosovo - that includes governments which we may not agree with every aspect of our policy on Iraq - I don't see how that would interfere with the unity or the views of other governments on Iraq. With respect to the Russians, I think their views have been well-known on both Kosovo and Iraq for some time and the position hasn't been harder or easier; it's been precisely the same.

Governments, by and large, proceed on the basis of national interests, and each of the governments here has their own view of its national interests as to how to proceed with the objective of disarming Iraq and making someday Iraq join the community of nations. And each country is pursuing that as it pursues its national interests on Kosovo and I haven't seen any crossover in the briefings that I've been part of.

With respect to the second question, there continues to be discussion in New York about the regime for monitoring and disarming Iraq, pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions. There are several resolutions that are being discussed and considered. We are supportive of the effort by the Dutch and the British to try to bring together a consensus in favor of implementing the Security Council resolutions that require Iraq to be disarmed, and that process continues in New York. In the meantime, as your question eluded to, we retain the right to use force against Iraq if they were to reconstitute their weapons of mass destruction, even as we work to develop inspections and monitoring of weapons of mass destruction pursuant to Security Council resolutions.

Same subject - question 19.

QUESTION: The government of Turkey usually and frequently mentions that they don't like the toppling of the Saddam Hussein. And the Turkish Foreign Ministry's spokesman said that the special envoy's efforts in this area is the basis for establishing an independent Kurdish state. Do you have any kind of --

MR. RUBIN: That is not our policy. And anyone who suggests that doesn't read our policy, think about our policy, or understand our policy. That's not our policy. Broadly speaking, let me say that a lot of governments publicly disavow support for the regime change policy, even while privately being supportive. And that's for obvious reasons. That doesn't specifically intend to apply to Turkey, but it is a general comment that applies to many of the countries in the region.

QUESTION: Is that why you cited territorial integrity at the outset?

MR. RUBIN: That's always been our position.

QUESTION: But that's not why I --

MR. RUBIN: That's not why I cited anything, that's always been our position.

QUESTION: But that means what? That means you don't support a Kurdish state?

MR. RUBIN: Well, that's been a policy longer than even you've been at the State Department.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: I'm just wondering about Kurdish aspirations?

MR. RUBIN: Which our policy hasn't changed on either.

(Briefing concluded at 1:40 p.m.)

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